EASTMAN v. SMITH

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NATHAN B. EASTMAN, ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-577

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE JOY FLOWERS CONTI

)

)

)

v. )

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BRANDON SMITH, Blackhawk School )

District Technology Instructor, in his )

individual capacity. )

)

)

Defendant.

OPINION

Pending before the court is a motion to dismiss the amended complaint (ECF No. 20),

filed by defendant Brandon Smith (“Smith” or “defendant”), with brief in support. Plaintiff

Nathan Eastman (“Eastman” or “plaintiff”) filed a brief in opposition and the motion is ripe for

decision.

Factual and Procedural Background

At a hearing on July 23, 2019, the court granted Smith’s motion to dismiss the original

complaint filed in this case, but granted Eastman leave to file an amended complaint. Eastman

did so, and Smith renewed his motion to dismiss.

The facts are taken from the amended complaint (ECF No. 19). This case arose out of an

incident on April 30, 2015. At the time, Eastman was a minor high school student. Smith was

the Industrial Technology teacher at Blackhawk High School. Eastman was building a wooden

canoe in the industrial materials classroom at Smith’s direction. Smith instructed Eastman to use

a 2-inch forstner bit on a Clausing drill press. The spring retraction on the drill press was

broken. Eastman had not used this drill press to drill wood before this incident. Smith did not

provide instructions for securing the clamp to the table or blocking the clamp from moving.

Smith was working on a mower with his back turned.

Newly alleged in the amended complaint, Smith knew that the drill press would not

retract automatically and had specifically advised the students to be aware that they would

manually have to raise the drill. Amended Complaint ¶ 9. A second drill press that would retract

automatically was available in the classroom. Amended Complaint ¶ 10. “Nonetheless, Smith

instructed Eastman to use the broken Clausen drill press that he knew would not retract

automatically.” Amended Complaint ¶ 11. Smith was aware that the use of the forstner bit to

remove the sliver of wood between the holes in the canoe was not an intended use of the bit, but

instructed Eastman to use it anyway. Amended Complaint ¶ 22.

As Eastman attempted to use the drill press, the wood began shaking and pulled his hand

into the drill bit. When he let go, the drill bit did not retract because of the broken spring

mechanism. Eastman suffered severe injuries to his hand and wrist. Plaintiff asserts one claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on a “state-created danger” theory.

Standard of Review

A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.” But detailed pleading is not

generally required. The Rules demand “only ‘a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the

defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it

rests.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). “To

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

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pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.; see also

Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n. 27 (3d Cir. 2010).

Although the plausibility standard “does not impose a probability

requirement,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, it does require a pleading to show

“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678. A complaint that pleads facts “merely consistent with a

defendant's liability ... stops short of the line between possibility and

plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). The plausibility determination is “a context-specific task

that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense.” Id. at 679.

Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court

reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps. First, it must

“tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675. Second, it should identify allegations that, “because

they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of

truth.” Id. at 679; see also Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212,

224 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Mere restatements of the elements of a claim are not

entitled to the assumption of truth.” (citation and editorial marks omitted)).

Finally, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give

rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2016). At the final step, the court

is to assume all well-pled allegations to be true, construe those allegations in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of plaintiff, and ask

whether they “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” to support the

legal claim being asserted. Id. at *7.

Legal Analysis

Defendant argues that the amended complaint continues to allege mere negligence, rather

than conduct that “shocks the conscience”; that a teacher is immune from liability under 42 Pa.

Cons. Stat. §§ 8541, 8545; and that plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages. Plaintiff contends

he stated a valid claim and that defendant is not entitled to immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Plaintiff stipulates to striking his request for punitive damages.

A. Immunity

Defendant is not entitled to immunity. The Pennsylvania immunity statute is effective

against a state tort claim, but has no force when applied to federal claims under the Civil Rights

Acts. The supremacy clause of the Constitution prevents a state from immunizing entities or

individuals alleged to have violated federal law. Wade v. City of Pittsburgh, 765 F.2d 405, 407

(3d Cir. 1985).1

B. Prima Facie Case

In Bright v. Westmoreland County, 443 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2006), the court set forth the

essential elements of a meritorious “state-created danger” claim:

(1) “the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct;”

(2) a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience;

(3) a relationship between the state and the plaintiff existed such that “the plaintiff was a

foreseeable victim of the defendant's acts,” or a “member of a discrete class of persons subjected

to the potential harm brought about by the state's actions,” as opposed to a member of the public

in general; and

(4) a state actor affirmatively used his or her authority in a way that created a danger to the

citizen or that rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at all.

Id. at 281–82. The court explained:

It is important to stress, for present purposes, that under the fourth element of a

state-created danger claim, “[l]iability under the state-created danger theory is

predicated upon the states' affirmative acts which work to the plaintiffs'

1 Smith conclusorily raised a qualified immunity defense based on D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks

Area Vocational Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1368 (3d Cir. 1992), but did not develop this

argument. (ECF No. 21 at 14).

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supplied); Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1100–01 (3d Cir.1990) (finding

that DeShaney holds “that a state's failure to take affirmative action to protect a

victim from the actions of a third party will not, in the absence of a custodial

relationship ... support a civil rights claim”). It is misuse of state authority, rather

than a failure to use it, that can violate the Due Process Clause.

Id. at 282 (recognizing that the line between action and inaction is not always clear).

Defendant claims conclusorily that plaintiff did not meet any of the elements of the prima

facie case (ECF No. 21 at 10), but his legal argument addresses only the “shocks the conscience”

element. In Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008), the court of appeals

summarized the continuum of conduct required to “shock the conscience”:

“[t]he level of culpability required to shock the conscience increases as the time

state actors have to deliberate decreases.” Id. at 306. We then concluded that

although intent to cause harm must be found in a “hyperpressurized

environment,” where officials are afforded the luxury of a greater degree of

deliberation and have time to make “unhurried judgments,” deliberate

indifference is sufficient to support an allegation of culpability. Id. We further

noted “the possibility that deliberate indifference might exist without actual

knowledge of a risk of harm when the risk is so obvious that it should be known.”

Id. Finally, where the circumstances require a state actor to make something less

exigent than a “split-second” decision but more urgent than an “unhurried

judgment,” i.e., a state actor is required to act “in a matter of hours or minutes,” a

court must consider whether a defendant disregarded a “great risk of serious harm

rather than a substantial risk.” Id.

Therefore, under Sanford, three possible standards can be used to

determine whether state action shocked the conscience: (1) deliberate

indifference; (2) gross negligence or arbitrariness that indeed shocks the

conscience; or (3) intent to cause harm. 456 F.3d at 306.

Id. at 240–41. Because the amended complaint alleges that Smith had time to make an unhurried

judgment, a finding that he acted with deliberate indifference would support the claim. The

“shocks the conscience” standard is nevertheless difficult and encompasses “only the most

egregious official conduct.” United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d

392, 400 (3d Cir. 2003).

In Lichtenstein v. Lower Merion School District, No. CV 16-5366, 2017 WL 525889, at

*7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2017), the court denied a motion to dismiss a similar claim brought by a

special needs student who was injured while being transported to the high school pool. The

court explained that the complaint adequately pleaded deliberate indifference by alleging that

school personnel were aware of the chair’s poor condition and the harm that could result to the

student if it were to break. The court noted that defendants conceded that if they continued to

use the chair to transport the student after it had broken, their position would be weaker.

The allegations of the amended complaint in this case, construed in the light most

favorable to Eastman, are similar to the claim that survived dismissal in Lichtenstein and satisfy

every element of the Bright prima facie case. The amended complaint adequately alleges that:

(1) the harm ultimately caused to Eastman was foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) Smith’s

direction for Eastman to use a drill that Smith knew was broken (when an unbroken drill was

readily available) shocks the conscience; (3) an authoritative classroom relationship existed such

that Eastman was a foreseeable victim of Smith’s acts; and (4) Smith affirmatively used his

authority by directing Eastman to use the broken drill in a way that created a danger to Eastman

or rendered him more vulnerable to danger than had Smith not acted at all. Accord Cuvo v.

Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:18-CV-01210, 2019 WL 1424524, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29,

2019) (plaintiffs adequately pled the elements of a state-created danger claim where wrestling

coaches forced students to play tackle football without protective equipment while at wrestling

practice).

The court recognizes that whether Smith’s conduct “shocks the conscience” is ultimately

a question of law for the court to decide. Benn v. Universal Health Sys., Inc., 371 F.3d 165, 174

(3d Cir. 2004). It will be important, however, to resolve that question, and the viability of

plaintiff’s state-created-danger claim, based on a fully developed factual record. See

Lichtenstein, 316 F.Supp.3d at 855 (granting the school defendants’ motion for summary

judgment after denying a motion to dismiss). At this stage of the case, the court concludes that

Eastman’s amended complaint states a viable claim.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the motion to dismiss the amended complaint (ECF No.

20), will be DENIED.

An appropriate order follows.

/s/ Joy Flowers Conti

Joy Flowers Conti

Senior United States District Judge

FORI TNH TEH WE EUSNTIETREND DSTISATTREISC TD IOSFT RPEICNTN CSOYULVRTA NIA

NATHAN B. EASTMAN, ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-577

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE JOY FLOWERS CONTI

)

)

)

v. )

)

BRANDON SMITH, Blackhawk School )

District Technology Instructor, in his )

individual capacity. )

)

)

Defendant.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 11th day of October, 2019, in accordance with the accompanying

opinion, IT IS ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint (ECF No.

20), is DENIED.

/s/ Joy Flowers Conti

Joy Flowers Conti

Senior United States District Judge