Opinion

BURNSIDE v. SWINDELL

Court
District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Aug 9, 2019
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.2%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN OTIS BURNSIDE, )

Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 18-cv-191JOHNSTOWN

)

) District Judge Baxter

v. )

) Re: Motion to Dismiss or for Summary

) Judgment [ECF No. 9]

DR. KIM SWINDELL, et al, )

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

United States District Judge Susan Paradise Baxter

Relevant Procedural History

This civil action was filed in this Court on September 24, 2018. Plaintiff, an inmate

incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution at Loretto, brings this action against Dr. Kim

Swindell and Physician’s Assistant Stephanie Hoover, employees at the FCI-Loretto.

In his complaint, Plaintiff, acting pro se1, alleges that Defendants denied him medical

care following a serious fall in February 2018 thereby violating his Eighth Amendment rights

against cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff seeks to enforce his constitutional rights against

these federal employees by way of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau

of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Defendants, in response to the complaint, filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative

for summary judgment. ECF No. 9. As grounds for its motion, Defendants argue: 1) the action

1 Pro se pleadings, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (internal

citation omitted). Because Mr. Burnside is a pro se litigant, this Court will consider facts and

make inferences where it is appropriate.

should be dismissed because allegations of medical malpractice do not amount to a constitutional

violation; 2) Hoover is a PHS employee and is absolutely immune from suit; 3) malpractice

claims must be dismissed because Plaintiff did not file Certificates of Merit; and 4) alternatively,

individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Not all of Defendants’ arguments need

to be addressed herein. Plaintiff has voluntarily withdrawn his claims against Ms. Hoover [see

ECF No. 13] and Plaintiff has not raised any medical negligence claims in this action.

Plaintiff has filed a brief in opposition. ECF No. 13. This motion is fully briefed and is

ripe for disposition by this Court.

Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) must be viewed in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff and the complaint’s well-pleaded allegations must be accepted as true.

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007). A complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

Defendants request that this Court consider evidence outside of the pleadings in support

of their motion to dismiss. Where a court receives and considers matters outside the pleadings in

support of a motion to dismiss, the motion to dismiss should be converted into a motion for

summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . matters

outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated

as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”). See Dorsey v. Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections, 2016 WL 6124420, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2016). In such a situation, a district court must

provide sufficient notice of the conversion to the non-moving party and allow that non-moving

party, especially a pro se prisoner plaintiff, to submit materials to oppose summary judgment.

Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 340-341 (3d Cir. 2010). Here, this Court provided such a

notice to Plaintiff. ECF No. 11. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss shall be treated as a motion

for summary judgment.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment shall be granted if

the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Under Rule 56, the district court must enter summary judgment

against a party “who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears

the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying

those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue

of material fact.” Id. at 323, quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

The moving party has the initial burden of proving to the district court the absence of

evidence supporting the non-moving party’s claims. Id. at 330; see also Andreoli v. Gates, 482

F.3d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2007). After the moving party has satisfied this low burden, the nonmoving

party must provide facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial to avoid summary judgment.

Id. at 324.

Deliberate indifference

To state an Eighth Amendment violation in the medical context, a plaintiff must plausibly

allege “‘(i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate

deliberate indifference to that need.’” Anderson v. Bickell, 2018 WL 5778241, at *2 (3d Cir.

Nov.2, 2018) quoting Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 337 (3d Cir. 2016). Allegations of mere

negligence or disagreement with medical decisions are insufficient to establish deliberate

indifference. Id.; see Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). “That is because ‘prison

officials are afforded considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners.’”

Anderson, 2018 WL 5778241, at *2, quoting Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 227 (3d Cir.

2017). Generally, “[w]here a prisoner has received some amount of medical treatment, it is

difficult to establish deliberate indifference[.]” Id.

Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need involves the “unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Such indifference may be

evidenced by an intentional refusal to provide care, delayed provision of medical treatment for

non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment, or denial of reasonable requests for

treatment that result in suffering or risk of injury. Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir.

1993).

Although Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims are factually intertwined with his lengthy

and complex medical history, the present legal claim arises out of the failure of medical staff to

treat his injuries following his February 23, 2018 fall. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff alleges that he fell

down a flight of stairs snapping his neck against a step so hard that he was knocked unconscious

and defecated on himself. Plaintiff explains that prior to that fall, he suffered from a “severe

neurological problem (a C-5, C-6 nerve root lesion)” that had been left untreated. Injuries

received in the fall exacerbated Plaintiff’s pre-existing medical problems. Plaintiff complains

that he sought medical treatment immediately after the fall, but received none.

In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants submitted hundreds of

pages of Plaintiff’s medical records, many of them dating before the accident. Defendants argue

that Plaintiff has received “comprehensive and extensive medical care” during the entire period

of his incarceration at FCI Loretto. See ECF No. 10, page 9 (arguing that “his treatment included

access to Health Services staff, medical testing, medication, access to outside medical specialists,

surgery, and after-care.”).

Defendants’ reliance on the full medical records is misplaced and Plaintiff’s claim that he

received no medical attention following his fall is borne out by those medical records which

indicate that Plaintiff did not received any medical treatment related to the February 23rd fall.

ECF No. 10-6. Because such a denial of treatment can constitute deliberate indifference,

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment shall be denied.

Qualified immunity

In light of the Court’s analysis, above, the Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant

Swindell remains. In their Motion, Defendants argue that qualified immunity should preclude

liability because Plaintiff “failed to allege” that Defendants violated any of Plaintiff’s clearly

established rights. The Court having determined that an Eighth Amendment violation was pled in

the Complaint and was supported by the medical records, and Defendants making no further

arguments in favor of the application of qualified immunity, the Court finds that qualified

immunity does not apply at this juncture.

An appropriate Order follows.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN OTIS BURNSIDE, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 18-cv-191JOHNSTOWN

)

) Re: ECF No. 9, 22

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

Defendant. )

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 9th day of August, 2019;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Courts shall terminate Stephanie Hoover as

a Defendant to this action as Plaintiff has voluntarily withdrawn his claims against her. See ECF

No. 13.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to dismiss or for summary judgment filed by

Defendants [ECF No. 9] be denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for relief of judgment [ECF No. 22]

be dismissed as moot as Plaintiff has received the relief requested. See ECF No. 26.

/s/ Susan Paradise Baxter

SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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