DeJesus v. Williams

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ALEJANDRO DEJESUS, : No. 4:21-cv-1639

Plaintiff :

: (Judge Munley)

v. .

JOHN STEINHART, et al., :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

|. Background

Plaintiff Alejandro DeJesus, a Pennsylvania state inmate, currently

confined in the Mahanoy State Correctional Institution, Frackville,

Pennsylvania (“SCl-Mahanoy”), filed the above captioned civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. (Doc. 1). The action proceeds via an amended

complaint. (Doc. 19). The named Defendants are John Steinhart,

Corrections Health Care Administrator (“CHCA”); Lori White, SCl-Mahanoy

Deputy Superintendent (“Deputy White”); Dr. Rogers; Dr. Baddick, and

Physician Assistants Jenna Williams and Russ Miller. ld. DeJesus alleges

that Defendants “acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious

medical needs by knowingly administering ineffective treatment over the

course of one year, and by deliberate delay of needed treatment, beginning

January 21, 2020.” Id. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “acted

with deliberate indifference by failing to protect [Plaintiff] from infectious

disease and future harm stemming from COVID-19, in violation of the Eighth

Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment.” Id. For relief,

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id.

By Memorandum and Order dated March 10, 2023, the Court granted

a motion to dismiss filed on behalf of Corrections Defendants John Steinhart

and Lori White, terminating them from the above captioned action and

directing the remaining Medical Defendants to file a responsive pleading on,

or before, March 31, 2023. (Doc. 26).

On September 18, 2023, remaining Medical Defendants filed a motion

to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim, (Doc. 43), along

with a brief in support. (Doc. 44). By Orders dated October 13, 2023, (Doc.

45) and April 5, 2024, the Court directed Plaintiff to file a brief in opposition

to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Court’s most recent Order granted

Plaintiff until April 25, 2024, to file a brief in opposition and warned that

Plaintiff's failure to file a brief in opposition would result in Defendants’ motion

being granted as unopposed. Id. To date, however, Plaintiff has failed to file

a brief in opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, nor requested an

enlargement of time within which to do so. Thus, for the for the reasons set

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forth below, the Court will grant remaining Defendants’ motion to dismiss as

unopposed.

Il. Standard of Review

In rendering a decision on a motion to dismiss, a court should not

inquire “whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is

entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416

U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 1996). The

court must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw

all reasonable inferences from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). In

addition to considering the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, the

court may consider “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference

and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor

Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).

However, “[t]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (stating “[t]hreadbare recitals of

the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,

do not suffice.”). “Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and

Iqbal, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps.

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First, it must ‘tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a

claim.’ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Second, it should identify

allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled

to the assumption of truth.’ Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. See also Burtch v.

Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir.2011) (“Mere restatements

of the elements of a claim are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”

(citation and editorial marks omitted)). Finally, ‘[w]hen there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’ Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d

780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (footnote omitted). Deciding whether a claim is

plausible is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

Because DeJesus proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed

and his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted).

lll. DeJesus’ Amended Complaint

DeJesus’ amended complaint raises various medical deliberate

indifference claims which began on January 21, 2020, and spanned the

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course of a year. (Doc. 19). Specifically, the pertinent allegations with respect

to the moving Defendants, Dr. Rodgers, Dr. Baddick, and Physician

Assistants Jenna Williams and Russ Miller, are as follows:

On January 21, 2020, DeJesus began complaining of headaches

and discharge from his nose. (Doc. 19 at 14). On January 21,

2020, PA Williams ordered blood work. (Id. at 15).

On January 22, 2020, he was taken to the medical department

on an emergency basis because of his headaches, discharge

and being disoriented. (Id. at 916). DeJesus was examined by

Dr. Rodgers, who told him he had nasal congestion and tension

headaches. (Id. at 917). The blood test ordered by PA Williams

showed an elevated white blood count. DeJesus contends that

this which could indicate an infection. (Id. at 918).

DeJesus was seen in the medical department on February 17,

2020, and March 3, 2020, by PA Miller for worsening of his

condition. DeJesus alleges that PA Miller ignored the laboratory

results. (Id. at ]9]J21-24).

DeJesus was seen on March 8, 2020, and again on March 9,

2020, when he saw PA Williams. (Id. at J 27).

On March 16, 2020, and March 18, 2020, he saw PA Miller. (Id.

at 7128-30). Also on March 18, 2020, he saw Dr. Rodgers. (Id.

at 731). DeJesus believes that PA Miller and Dr. Rodgers ignored

the laboratory results, showing an elevated white count which

could possibly be caused by an infection. (Id.). Dr. Rodgers

discussed that his headaches and discharge problems may be

stress related. DeJesus claims he was having difficulty talking

and was confused. (ld. at 931-32). On March 18, 2020, Dr.

Rodgers ordered a CT scan. (Id. at 731).

On March 19, 2020, DeJesus returned to the medical department

with continuing complaints of headaches and pain. (Id. at 732).

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On April 29, 2020, DeJesus was taken to an outside facility for

his CT scan. (Id. at 739).

On May 7, 2020, DeJesus was taken to the medical department

on an emergency basis because of his headaches and other

medical problems. (Id. at 9/40).

On May 8, 2020, PA Miller told him that the CT scan results were

normal. (Id. at 742). Nurse Bing told him that the CT scan results

were not what PA Miller was telling him. (Id. at {[43).

On May 22, 2020, he was placed in a psychiatric observation cell

for four days for observation. (Id. at 947).

DeJesus was seen on June 8, 10, 12, 15, 2020 for his medical

conditions. (Id. at ]]J50-54).

On June 18, 2020, he saw Dr. Baddick who told him that what

started as a simple infection in January 2020 was now much

more complicated, and he ordered DeJesus antibiotics. (Id. at

55).

On June 30, 2020, he was seen again. (Id. at 756).

On July 18, 2020, he saw Dr. Baddick, who told him that the

blood work showed a highly elevated IGE level. Dr. Baddick

diagnosed him with chronic sinusitis. (Id. at 1/61).

On October 7, 2020, DeJesus tested positive for H Pylori, a

stomach infection. (Id. at 62).

DeJesus alleges that the Medical Defendant's failed to diagnose

that he was allergic to Gluten. He believes that if the Medical

Defendants had worked up his signs of a sinus infection, they

would have been able to diagnoses that he was allergic to

Gluten. (Id. at 63).

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Dr. Baddick was treating DeJesus’ chronic sinusitis with nasal

sprays on a twice a day schedule as well as various medications

for allergies. (Id. at 770).

DeJesus’ second claim is an allegation of failing to protect him

from being exposed to COVID. (Id. at 764).

On November 13, 2020, DeJesus complained of symptoms and

was given a nasal swab test for COVID. (Id. at 4/76). DeJesus

was placed in a single cell in the Restricted Housing Unit as part

of a quarantine program. (Id. at 477). The test results from an

outside laboratory were inconclusive. (Id. at {]78).

On November 17, 2020, DeJesus was placed in a cell with a

COVID inmate. On November 19, 2020, he was told he needed

to be retested because the first test was inconclusive. (Id. at

1179-82). He believes he should not have been placed in a cell

with another inmate because the 6 feet apart rule could not be

maintained. Id. He believes because he was exposed to COVID,

he may suffer future harm. Id.

IV. Discussion

A. 1983 Action

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code offers private

citizens a cause of action for violations of federal law by state officials. See

42 U.S.C. §1983. The statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress ....

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Id., see also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002); Kneipp v.

Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199,1204 (3d Cir. 1996).

To state a claim under §1983, a plaintiff must allege “the violation of a

right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and must

show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under

color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,48 (1988). See also Barna v.

City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809,815 (3d Cir. 1994).

B. Eighth Amendment Medical Claim

In their unopposed motion to dismiss, Defendants contend that Plaintiff

has failed to allege facts in support of his allegation that they were

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. (Doc. 44).

To demonstrate a prima facie case of Eighth Amendment cruel and

unusual punishment based on the denial of medical care, a plaintiff must

establish that the defendant acted with “deliberate indifference to [his]

serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Durmer

v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993). There are two components to

this standard: Initially, a plaintiff must make an “objective” showing that the

deprivation was “sufficiently serious,” or that the result of the defendant's

denial was sufficiently serious. Additionally, the plaintiff must make a

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“subjective” showing that the defendant acted with “a sufficiently culpable

state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); see also

Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 499 (3d Cir. 2002).

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has found deliberate indifference

when a prison official knows of a prisoner's need for medical treatment but

intentionally refuses to provide it, delays necessary treatment for a non-

medical reason, or prevents a prisoner from receiving needed medical

treatment. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).

This approach “affords considerable latitude to prison medical

authorities in the diagnosis and treatment of the medical problems of inmate

patients. Courts will ‘disavow any attempt to second guess the propriety or

adequacy of a particular course of treatment ... which remains a question of

sound professional judgment.” Little v. Lycoming Cnty., 912 F.Supp. 809,

815 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (citing Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612

F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979)).

When an inmate is provided with medical care and the dispute Is over

the adequacy of that care, an Eighth Amendment claim does not exist.

Nottingham _v. Peoria, 709 F.Supp. 542, 547 (M.D. Pa. 1988). Mere

disagreement as to the proper medical treatment does not support an Eighth

Amendment claim. Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst’l Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d

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326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987). Only flagrantly egregious acts or omissions can

violate the standard. Medical negligence alone cannot result in an Eighth

Amendment violation, nor can any disagreements over the professional

judgment of a health care provider. White v. Napolean, 897 F.2d 103, 108-

10 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06 (medical malpractice

is insufficient basis upon which to establish an Eighth Amendment violation);

Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (‘It is well-settled that claims of negligence and

medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not

constitute ‘deliberate indifference.’ ”); Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346 (concluding

that mere allegations of malpractice do not raise issues of constitutional

import).

In the instant case, the allegations in Plaintiffs amended complaint

clearly demonstrate that Plaintiff received ongoing medical attention, along

with a variety of treatments,’ and that Plaintiff merely disagreed with the

treatment provided.

(Doc. 19 at 15 (administered Motrin and ordered a blood test); 917

(ordered a shot of Toradol); 921 (offered Excedrin); 923 (ordered blood

pressure checks); 24 (ordered a follow up visit with a Physician’s assistant);

27 (ordered x rays); 928 (conducted neurological checks); (prescribed

Voltaren); 931 (issued orders for a CAT scan and MRI)1; 938 (recommended

MRI); 39 (taken to outside hospital for CAT scan); 9/41 (ordered MRI and

(footnote continued on next page)

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However, a mere difference of opinion between the prison’s medical

staff and the inmate regarding the diagnosis or treatment which the inmate

receives does not support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment. Farmer

v. Carlson, 685 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (M.D. Pa. 1988). See McCracken v.

Jones, 562 F.2d 22, 24 (10th Cir. 1977); Smart v. Villar, 547 F.2d 112, 113

(10th Cir. 1976).

The facts in Plaintiff's amended complaint disclose that the Plaintiff

was being seen and treated by prison medical staff. His allegation that he

received no care does not conform to his own Amended Complaint. He

received repeated blood studies, a CT scan, examinations by multiple

providers, antibiotics, treatment for his stomach infection, nasal sprays,

treatment for nasal congestion and allergy medications. Thus, Defendants’

unopposed motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference claim will be granted.

prescribed antibiotic); 46 (prescribed antibiotics); 452 (given Zofran); 55

(prescribed steroidal antibiotics).

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V. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss filed

on behalf of Medical Defendants Courtney Rodgers, DO, Jenna Williams,

PA, Russ Miller, PA and Peter J. Baddick, Ill, DO.

An appropriate Order follows.

Date: C/N

UBGE JULIA K. MU

United States Dis Je

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