Brown v. Glover

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TODD ALAN BROWN, No. 4:22-CV-01154

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

WARDEN GLOVER, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MAY 31, 2024

Plaintiff Todd Alan Brown is currently incarcerated in SCI Huntingdon.

Before his transfer into the state prison system, he was briefly held in pretrial

detention at Huntingdon County Prison in Huntingdon, Pennsylvania. Brown filed

the instant pro se Section 19831 action concerning the medical care he received at

Huntingdon County Prison. Brown’s claims have been winnowed to a single claim

of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against one prison medical

provider. That Defendant now moves for summary judgment pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the following reasons, the Court will grant

Defendant’s Rule 56 motion.

1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves

as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

During all times relevant to the claims underlying this lawsuit, Brown was a

pretrial detainee at Huntingdon County Prison (HCP).3 In his complaint and

amended complaint, he alleged that from December 21, 2021, to February 3, 2022,

he received constitutionally deficient medical care by several prison officials and

medical providers at HCP.4

The Court screened both pleadings as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.5

Following screening of the amended complaint, the Court permitted Brown’s

Section 1983 medical indifference claims to proceed against nurse Susan Watkins

and a physician later identified as Dr. Mark Minor.6 After waiving service, both

Watkins and Dr. Minor moved for dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

2 Local Rule of Court 56.1 requires that a motion for summary judgment be supported “by a

separate, short, and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to

which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” LOCAL RULE OF COURT

56.1. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a separate statement of

material facts responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the moving party’s statement

and identifying genuine issues to be tried. Id. “Statements of material facts in support of, or

in opposition to, a motion [for summary judgment] shall include references to the parts of the

record that support the statements.” Id. Defendant Susan Watkins filed a properly supported

statement of material facts. See Doc. 49. Brown eventually responded to this statement. See

Doc. 58. Brown’s responses, however, are not supported by citations to the record and instead

contain nothing more than argument or allegations. This directly contravenes Local Rule 56.1.

See Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613 (3d Cir. 2018) (explaining that Local

Rule 56.1 “is essential to the Court’s resolution of a summary judgment motion due to its role

in organizing the evidence, identifying undisputed facts, and demonstrating precisely how each

side proposed to prove a disputed fact with admissible evidence.” (emphasis added) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted)). Defendant’s material facts, therefore, are deemed

admitted unless plainly contradicted by the record. See LOCAL RULE OF COURT 56.1.

3 Doc. 49 ¶¶ 1-2.

4 See Doc. 1 at 4-5; Doc. 11 at 1.

5 See generally Docs. 9, 10, 16, 17.

6 See Doc. 16 at 6-9.

Procedure 12(b)(6).7 The Court granted Dr. Minor’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion but

denied Watkins’ motion.8 As the Court observed, Watkins’ motion to dismiss

improperly relied on materials outside the pleadings that the Court could not

consider at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.9

Following discovery, Watkins moved for summary judgment pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.10 That motion is fully briefed. The Rule 56

record facts are as follows.

Brown was transferred from Geisinger Lewistown Hospital to HCP on

December 21, 2021.11 At the emergency department, Brown had been diagnosed

with a right auricular region hematoma, a facial contusion, and opioid

intoxication.12 The following day at HCP, he was seen separately by both Watkins

and Dr. Minor.13 Pursuant to the hospital discharge instructions, Watkins

scheduled Brown for a follow-up appointment with an ENT specialist, Dr.

Modzeski, on December 31, 2021, at 9:30 a.m.14 Dr. Minor, as part of his initial

assessment on December 22, determined, among other things, that (1) Brown did

not need to be seen within three days as recommended on the hospital discharge

7 See generally Docs. 21, 34.

8 See generally Docs. 36, 37.

9 See Doc. 36 at 7-8.

10 Doc. 47.

11 See Doc. 38 at 1; Doc. 38-3 at 3, 6; Doc. 50-1 at 2.

12 See Doc. 50-1 at 2.

13 See Doc. 38-2 at 1-2.

14 Id. at 1.

instructions, (2) Brown should keep the ENT appointment that was scheduled for

December 31, and (3) Brown should be placed on an antibiotic, which he

prescribed.15

The day before the December 31 ENT appointment, Dr. Modzeski’s office

canceled the appointment “due to the provider being out sick.”16 Dr. Modzeski’s

office rescheduled the appointment for January 17, 2022.17 That same day—

December 30—Watkins applied clean gauze to Brown’s right ear.18 Then, on

January 14, 2022, Dr. Modzeski’s office again canceled the January 17 ENT

appointment due to “upcoming inclement weather.”19 It was rescheduled for the

following day, January 18, 2022.20 Brown saw the ENT on January 18, 2022, as

scheduled.21

On January 17, 2022, the day before his follow-up appointment with the

ENT, Brown filed a grievance at HCP.22 In that grievance, he complained about

his head hurting, that he had suffered a concussion from his altercation with police,

and the fact that he had not seen the ENT for a follow-up appointment within

“three days” as ordered by a Geisinger Lewistown Hospital doctor.23 Brown’s

15 See id. at 2; Doc. 38-3 at 6; Doc. 49 ¶ 11.

16 Doc. 49 ¶ 3.

17 Id.

18 Id. ¶ 4.

19 Id. ¶ 5.

20 Id. ¶ 6.

21 Id. ¶ 7.

22 Doc. 49 ¶ 8; Doc. 38-3 at 5.

23 See Doc. 38-3 at 5.

grievance was reviewed and denied.24 Brown appealed, but his appeal was

likewise denied following a meeting with a three-person Grievance Committee.25

In July 2022, Brown filed the instant lawsuit.26

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate

and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.”27 Summary judgment is

appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”28 Material

facts are those “that could alter the outcome” of the litigation, and “disputes are

‘genuine’ if evidence exists from which a rational person could conclude that the

position of the person with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.”29

At the Rule 56 stage, the Court’s function is not to “weigh the evidence and

determine the truth of the matter” but rather “to determine whether there is a

genuine issue for trial.”30 The Court must view the facts and evidence presented

“in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” and must “draw all

reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.”31 This evidence, however, must be

24 Doc. 49 ¶ 9; Doc. 38-3 at 6.

25 See Doc. 49 ¶¶ 10-11; Doc. 38-3 at 3-4, 7.

26 See generally Doc. 1.

27 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

28 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

29 EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Clark v. Modern

Grp. Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993)).

30 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

31 Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014).

adequate—as a matter of law—to sustain a judgment in favor of the nonmoving

party on the claim or claims at issue.32 A “scintilla of evidence” supporting the

nonmovant’s position is insufficient; “there must be evidence on which the jury

could reasonably find for the [nonmovant].”33 Succinctly stated, summary

judgment is “put up or shut up time” for the nonmoving party.34

III. DISCUSSION

Brown’s only viable Section 1983 claim asserts that Watkins was

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. After careful consideration,

the Court finds that Brown has failed to adduce any evidence of deliberate

indifference by Watkins, so summary judgment must be granted in her favor.

A. Fourteenth Amendment Medical Indifference

As noted above, Brown was a pretrial detainee during his time at HCP.

Thus, his claims implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

rather than the Eighth Amendment’s cruel-and-unusual-punishments provision.

However, it does not appear that the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit has established or adhered to a different standard with respect to Fourteenth

Amendment pretrial detainee medical care claims versus those raised by

32 Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250-57; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 587-89 (1986).

33 Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477

U.S. at 252) (alteration in original).

34 Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 391 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Berkeley Inv. Grp.

v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006)).

incarcerated individuals under the Eighth Amendment.35 Accordingly, the Court

will apply existing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to Brown’s Fourteenth

Amendment medical indifference claims.

In the context of prison medical care, the Eighth Amendment “requires

prison officials to provide basic medical treatment to those whom it has

incarcerated.”36 To establish an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim

regarding inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must show “(i) a serious medical

need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate

indifference to that need.”37 A serious medical need is “one that has been

diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay

person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”38

35 This remains so even following the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Kingsley

v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), which established a different standard for pretrial

detainee excessive force claims. See Thomas v. City of Harrisburg, 88 F.4th 275, 281 & n.23

(3d Cir. 2023) (applying Eighth Amendment standard to pretrial detainee’s medical care

claim); see also Moore v. Luffey, 757 F. App’x 335, 340 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2019) (nonprecedential)

(rejecting plaintiff’s argument to apply Kingsley’s holding to Fourteenth Amendment medical

care claim and instead analyzing under Eighth Amendment jurisprudence); see also Parker v.

Butler County, 832 F. App’x 777, 780 & n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) (nonprecedential) (applying Eighth

Amendment standard to pretrial detainee medical care claim while acknowledging Fourteenth

Amendment is source of right); Miller v. Steele-Smith, 713 F. App’x 74, 76 n.1, 78 (3d Cir.

2017) (nonprecedential) (same); Goode v. Giorla, 643 F. App’x 127, 129 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2016)

(nonprecedential) (same); Edwards v. Northampton County, 663 F. App’x 132, 136-37 (3d Cir.

2016) (nonprecedential) (citing Natale v. Camden Cnty Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d

Cir. 2003)).

36 Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).

37 Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).

38 Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987).

Deliberate indifference by prison officials may be evidenced by intentional

refusal to provide care known to be medically necessary, delayed provision of

medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment,

or denial of reasonable requests for treatment resulting in suffering or risk of

injury.39 Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is an exacting standard,

requiring a showing of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”40 Claims

sounding in mere medical negligence will not suffice.41

Brown’s primary medical indifference complaint is that he did not see the

ENT for a follow-up appointment soon enough. However, as the record plainly

reflects, Watkins immediately scheduled the ENT appointment as part of her initial

encounter with Brown on December 22, the day after he was transferred to HCP.

Obtaining a specialist appointment just nine days after an initial encounter is

medical care that even patients who are not incarcerated would likely envy.42

Moreover, any delay in treatment was caused by the specialist’s office canceling

and rescheduling Brown’s appointment due to legitimate reasons (including the

physician’s illness and inclement weather). In no way can the delay be attributed

to Watkins.

39 See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Lanzaro, 834 F.2d

at 346).

40 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted).

41 Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.

42 See Parker v. Mulderig, No. 92-CV-2645, 1993 WL 44275, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 1993)

(“The ability to obtain immediate medical care on demand is a luxury enjoyed by few outside

prison walls. Prisoners can expect no more.”).

Brown’s arguments to the contrary are wholly unpersuasive. He maintains

that Watkins should have contacted another specialist because “there are other

doctors in the area.”43 This type of bald assertion, which lacks any citation to the

record or legal authority, does not even implicate negligence, let alone a

constitutional violation. He additionally argues—without any evidence—that

Watkins “could have and should have had [him] temporarily transferred to another

facility[] in another area.”44 Again, Brown provides no support for his implausible

assertions that a nurse would have control over inmate transfers or that a facility

transfer would be appropriate for a mere follow-up ENT appointment.

Additionally, Brown contends that his hospital orders required him to see an

ENT three days after his discharge. However, the Rule 56 record shows that Dr.

Minor’s assessment was that a follow-up appointment nine days later was

sufficient. First, and most importantly, this medical determination did not involve

Watkins. Second, at most it would implicate a mere disagreement as to a medical

provider’s professional judgment or treatment plan, which does not rise to the level

of a constitutional violation.45

43 Doc. 50 at 2.

44 Id.

45 See Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346 (explaining that “mere disagreement as to the proper medical

treatment” does not “support a claim of an eighth amendment violation”); see also Pearson v.

Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 535 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Because ‘mere disagreement as to the

proper medical treatment’ does not ‘support a claim of an eighth amendment violation,’ when

medical care is provided, we presume that the treatment of a prisoner is proper absent evidence

that it violates professional standards of care.” (internal citation omitted)); Brown v. Borough

of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[I]t is well established that as long as a

Another facet of Brown’s medical indifference claim involves his left pinky

finger. He alleges that it was injured during an altercation with police at the time

of his arrest. On December 22, Dr. Minor ordered an X-ray for the finger because

it looked abnormal.46 It does not appear that this X-ray was completed until

January 24, 2022, two days after Brown saw Dr. Minor for a follow-up

appointment after the ENT consultation and Dr. Minor re-ordered the X-ray.47 The

following day—January 25, 2022—Brown was scheduled for an orthopedic

consult for January 27, 2022.48 Brown then had surgery on his finger on January

31, 2022.49

Once again, Brown has not proffered any evidence that Watkins was

deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. There is no evidence that Brown

continued to complain about his finger (or the X-ray) to Watkins and was denied

care,50 that Watkins intentionally failed to provide care known to be medically

necessary, or that Watkins delayed care for nonmedical reasons. The Court

specifically observes that Brown, in his prison grievance and its appeal, did not

physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will not violate a prisoner’s

constitutional rights.”).

46 See Doc. 38-2 at 2.

47 See id. at 4.

48 See id.

49 Doc. 49 ¶ 16.

50 Brown provides a witness statement from inmate Keith Larson indicating that Larson “heard

[Brown] tell the officers” that “[h]is finger was hurting or in pain.” Doc. 50-5 at 3. This

statement does not indicate when Brown made such complaints to corrections officers, nor

does it show that Watkins was informed of these complaints.

mention anything about his finger or the X-ray that Dr. Minor had ordered on

December 22.51 Thus, at most, the inadvertent failure by Watkins to obtain an X-

ray after it was first ordered by Dr. Minor implicates medical malpractice or

professional negligence, which is insufficient to establish a constitutional

infringement.52

Finally, Brown avers that at some point during his detainment at HCP, he

lost consciousness “on the main cell block” but was not immediately seen by

medical.53 He contends that several inmates saw him pass out and informed nearby

corrections officers, who in turn directed other officers to “call the nurse at

home.”54 The officers also took Brown’s vitals at the time of the incident and

found that his blood pressure was elevated.55 Brown avers that the nurse

(presumably Watkins) “never came to the jail” that night, instead arriving and

meeting with him the following morning.56 Brown does not allege that he

experienced any harm or injury from this syncope incident.

Once again, these circumstances do not evince deliberate indifference to

serious medical needs. Brown’s contention that he should have been provided

immediate on-call care, without showing that he had a “serious medical need” that

51 See generally Doc. 38-3.

52 Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.

53 Doc. 11 at 4; Doc. 50-6 at 3.

54 Doc. 50-6 at 3.

55 See id.

56 See id.

was an imminent threat to life or health and required urgent medical attention, is

insufficient to establish that Watkins violated his constitutional rights. Indeed,

Brown admits that prison officials promptly came to his cell, took his vitals, and

contacted the on-call nurse, who determined that treatment the following morning

would be sufficient. A brief delay in treatment for a medical issue that is not an

immediate threat to life or health (unlike, for instance, a stroke or heart attack)

simply does not amount to constitutionally deficient medical care.57

In sum, Brown has failed to proffer evidence that Watkins was deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical needs. At best, Brown has pointed to

circumstantial evidence that may implicate medical negligence. But that is a much

different standard than deliberate indifference, and Brown never asserted a state-

law medical malpractice claim against Watkins in his amended complaint.58 Thus,

summary judgment must be granted in Watkins’ favor on this claim.

57 See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236-37 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that inmate’s one-day delay

between signing up for sick call and being seen by a nurse, despite claiming he was in

“excruciating pain,” did not amount to deliberate indifference); Parker v. Mulderig, No. 92-

CV-2645, 1993 WL 44275, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 1993) (“[Plaintiff] avers he suffered pain

in the four or five hours between the time he first sought care from [a guard] and the time he

obtained medical attention [ ]. This delay, however, is constitutionally negligible. The ability

to obtain immediate medical care on demand is a luxury enjoyed by few outside prison walls.

Prisoners can expect no more. While delay in access to medical care can amount to cruel and

unusual punishment, a few hours[’] wait for medical care for an illness or condition that does

not constitute an immediate threat to life or health is not evidence of a deliberate indifference

to serious medical needs.” (alterations in original) (quoting Felders v. Miller, 776 F. Supp.

424, 427 (N.D. Ind. 1991))).

58 Even if Brown had asserted a medical malpractice claim against Watkins, the Court would

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it because his constitutional claims are being

dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726

(1966) (explaining general rule that if all federal claims are dismissed before trial, courts

B. First Amendment Retaliation

In his amended complaint, Brown included allegations that possibly implied

a claim of retaliation.59 Those allegations, however, targeted a different defendant

(Warden Glover) who was previously dismissed from this litigation.60 Watkins

contends that any retaliation claim directed at her fails at the Rule 56 stage. The

Court finds that, if Brown intended to assert a First Amendment retaliation claim in

his amended complaint, he has failed to do so. Thus, any retaliation claim against

Warden Glover or Watkins must be dismissed.

Although a prisoner’s constitutional rights are necessarily circumscribed, an

inmate still retains First Amendment protections when they are “not inconsistent”

with prisoner status or with the “legitimate penological objectives of the

corrections system.”61 To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff

must plausibly plead that (1) “he was engaged in constitutionally protected

conduct,” (2) he suffered an “adverse action” by prison officials sufficient to deter

a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights, and

should likewise dismiss pendent state-law claims); Shaffer v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. Albert Gallatin

Area Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (explaining that, absent “extraordinary

circumstances,” supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims should be declined “where the

federal claims are no longer viable” (citation omitted)).

59 See Doc. 11 at 6-7.

60 See id.; see also Doc. 16 at 5-6.

61 Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d

775, 781 (3d Cir. 2010)).

(3) the plaintiff’s protected conduct was a “substantial or motivating factor” in the

prison officials’ decision to take the adverse action.62

Brown cannot state a claim for retaliation because he has not identified an

adverse action. Brown alleges that he was transferred from HCP to SCI Smithfield

(also located in Huntingdon, Pennsylvania, approximately two miles from HCP) in

retaliation for filing a grievance about his medical care. But a mere transfer to a

nearby prison, without more, would not deter a person of ordinary firmness from

exercising their First Amendment rights.63 Thus, Brown’s single allegation of

being moved to an adjacent prison within the same town does not establish an

adverse action for First Amendment retaliation, regardless of whom he targets in

this claim.

Consequently, to the extent Brown raises a retaliation claim in his amended

complaint, that claim must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Dismissal will be

62 Id. (quoting Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001)); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d

523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333).

63 See Collazo v. Rozum, 646 F. App’x 274, 276 (3d Cir. 2016) (nonprecedential) (explaining that

inmate had failed to allege “how the prison transfer was an adverse action”); cf. Rauser v.

Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that transfer to a distant prison where family

could not visit could implicate adverse action); Siggers-El v. Barlow, 412 F.3d 693, 702, 704

(6th Cir. 2005) (finding that prison transfer which caused loss of prison job and limited access

to plaintiff’s attorney could amount to an adverse action); Williams v. Wetzel, No. 1:17-CV-

79, 2020 WL 583983, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2020) (finding that prison transfer was adverse

action where it “punitively detach[ed] Plaintiff from his loved ones and/or visitation” and

affected his parole recommendation).

with prejudice, as Brown has repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies with his

pleadings even after “amendments previously allowed.”64

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant Watkins’ motion for summary

judgment as to Brown’s claim of Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference to

serious medical needs. To the extent that Brown asserts a First Amendment

retaliation claim, that claim will be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

64 See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Jones v. Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver &

Transp. Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019) (concluding that, where inmate plaintiff “has

already had two chances to tell his story,” providing “further leave to amend would be futile”).