Ordiway v. Pennsylvania Board of Parole

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TYLER J. ORDIWAY, :

Petitioner : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-0741

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

PA BOARD OF PAROLE,

Respondent

MEMORANDUM

Petitioner, Tyler J. Ordiway, an inmate confined in the Rockview State

Correctional Institution, Bellefonte, Pennsylvania, filed the instant petition for

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 23 U.S.C. §2254. (Doc. 1). Ordiway

challenges an April 8, 2024 decision by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation

and Parole, denying him parole. Petitioner claims the decision violated the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The filing fee has

been paid. Id. The petition has been given preliminary consideration and, for

the reasons set forth below, will be dismissed without prejudice. See Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 4.'

: Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases,

habeas corpus petitions must be promptly screened anc «are subject to

summary dismissal “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition ancl any attached

exhibits that the petition is not entitled to relief in the district sourt.” See Rule

4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District

l. Background

The Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole most recently

reviewed Petitioner for parole on April 8, 2024, and by Notice of Board

Decision of the same date denied Petitioner parole, based on the following:

As recorded on April 8, 2024, the Board of Probation and Parole

rendered the following decision in your case:

Following an interview with you and a review of your file and having

considered all matters required pursuant to the Prisons and Parole

Code, the Parole Board, in the exercise of its discretion, has

determined at this time that: You are denied parole/reparole. The

reasons for the Board’s decision include the following:

You need to participate in and complete additional institutional

programs.

Your risk and needs assessment indicating your level of risk to the

community.

Your failure to demonstrate motivation for success.

Your minimization/denial of the nature and circumstances of the

offense(s) committed.

Your refusal to accept responsibility for the offense(s) committed.

Your lack of remorse for the offense(s) committed.

The nature of your crime.

You are to serve your unexpired maximum sentence, 1C)/27/2025.

You may file an application for parole/reparole in accordance with 61

PA.C.S. §6139.

(Doc. 1-1, Notice of Board Decision).

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On May 2, 2024, Petitioner filed the instant petitioner for writ of habeas

corpus in which he claims he was denied due process of law as guaranteed

by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Doc. 1 at

2). Specifically, Petitioner states that “the parole board had not spent enough

time reviewing the petition,” in that “they had never came to his cell or

classroom or groups to see I’m a better person who could have a successful

rehabilitation” and “they based their decision solely on a report composed

and designed to express the negative things petitions has cone in the past.

Id, He claims that “the decision made by parole could only .e described as

arbitrary, egregious or conscious shocking.” Id.

ll. Standard of Review

A challenge to the denial of parole is cognizable uncler 28 U.S.C.

§2254. See Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 486 (3d Cir. 200 1) (jurisdiction

to entertain state prisoner's habeas petition challenging deria| of parole lies

under §2254). However, a federal district court may not avant parole or

determine parole eligibility. Billiteriv. U.S. Ba of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944

(2d Cir. 1976). “The only remedy which the court can give is to order the

Board to correct the abuses or wrongful conduct within a fixea period of time,

after which, in the case of non-compliance, the court can grant the writ of

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habeas corpus and order the prisoner discharged from custody.” Id.: see aiso

Bridge v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 981 F.2d 97 (3d Cir. 1992).

lll. Discussion

Petitioner advances the argument that the Parole Board’s denial

amounted to a violation of his right to due process. (Doc 1).

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const.

amend. XIV §1. It is well settled that “there is no constitutional or inherent

right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration

of a valid sentence,” nor has the Commonweaith of Pennsylvania created

such a right. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Pena! & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S.

1, 7 (1979); see also Burkett v. Love, 89 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1996)

(recognizing the general principle that the Pennsylvajia parole: statute does

not create a liberty interest in the right to be paroled); Coady v. Vaughn, 770

A.2d 287, 289 (Pa. 2001) (“It is undisputed that [an irmate] does not have a

clear legal right to the grant of parole, nor does the board have a

corresponding duty to grant the same.”).

“Since a discretionary decision of the Parole Board denying an inmate

early parole does not implicate any constitutionally [o1 state] protected liberty

interest, the scope of federal judicial review of these decisions is necessarily

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quite limited.” Diehl-Armstrong v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. 13-2302,

2014 WL 1871509, at *5 (M.D. Pa. May 7, 2014). The role of a federal court

is confined to reviewing the substance of the state parole decision to

determine whether the Parole Board exercised its authority in an arbitrary

and capricious, or constitutionally impermissible manner. Block v. Potter, 631

F.2d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 1980). Stated simply, the Court must evaluate whether

the Parole Board abused its discretion. In order to show a violation of

substantive due process, the petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) he was

arbitrarily denied parole on the basis of impermissible reasons such as race,

religion, or political beliefs, and/or (2) the Parole Board failed to apply

appropriate, rational criteria in reaching its determination. Id. at 236; Bonsall

v. Gillis, 372 F. Supp. 2d 805, 807 (M.D. Pa. 2005). “However, federal courts

are not authorized by the due process clause to second-guess parole boards

and the requirements of substantive due process are met if there is some

basis for the challenged decision.” Coady, 251 F.3d at 487. The “relevant

level of arbitrariness required to find a substantive due process violation

involves not merely action that is unreasonable, but, rather, something more

egregious, which we have termed at times ‘conscience shocking’ or

‘deliberately indifferent’.” Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 247 (3d Cir.

2002) (citation omitted).

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Here, Petitioner has not established that the April 8, 2023, denial of

parole amounted to an unreasonable exercise of the Parole Board's

discretion. No argument is made by Petitioner that the Parole Board based

its decisions to deny him parole on arbitrary or impermissible criteria in

violation of his substantive due process rights. Rather, it is apparent from the

arguments raised in Petitioner's petition that he merely disagrees with the

criteria the Parole Board relied upon to deny him parole. However, this

challenge to the Parole Board’s administrative decisions to deny Petitioner

parole release is unavailing. See 61 Pa. C.S. §6137 (granting the Parole

Board vast discretion to refuse or deny parole). The record clearly reflects

that the Parole Board based its parole determinations on factors that it is

statutorily required to consider in accordance with 61 Pa. C.S. §6135; see

McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 277 (1973) (holding that there is a

“legitimate desire of the state legislature to afford state prison officials an

adequate opportunity to evaluate both an inmate’s conduct and his

rehabilitative progress before he is eligible for parole”). Under 61 Pa. C.S.

§6135, the Parole Board must evaluate, among other factors: (1) the nature

and circumstances of the offense, (2) any recommendations made by the

trial judge and prosecuting attorney, (3) the general character and

background of the inmate, (4) the notes of testimony of the sentencing

hearing, if any, together with such additional information regarding the nature

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and circumstances of the offense committed for which sentence was

imposed, and (5) the conduct of the person while in prison and his physical,

mental and behavioral condition and history and his complete criminal

record.

Petitioner has not directed the Court to any factor relied upon by the

Parole Board that could be described as conscience shocking or

deliberatively indifferent. The fact that the Parole Board consistently relied

on a combination of factors to deny Petitioner parole, alone, does not rise to

the level of conscience shocking behavior that could give rise to a

substantive due process claim. Ralston v. Dep’t of Parole Prob., Civ. No.

12-1844, 2015 WL 1542480, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2015) (citing Gordon v.

Wenerowicz, Civ. No. 10-1257, 2011 WL 5509538, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 10,

2011)). Therefore, because Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of

demonstrating that the Parole Board abused its discretion, tthe Court will

deny the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant: to 28 U.S.C.

§2254.

IV. Certificate of Appeatability

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(1)(A), unless a trtuit xustice or judge

issues a certificate of appealability (‘COA’), an appeal may not: be taken from

a final order in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §2254. A COA rnay issue only

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if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2). “A petitioner satisfies this

standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the

district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could

conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to

proceed further.” Miller-El_ v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003). Because

reasonable jurists could not disagree with the resolution of this petition, there

is no basis for the issuance of a COA. Thus, the Court will decline to issue a

certificate of appealability, as Petitioner has failed to demonstrate “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§2253(c)(2); see also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

V. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing, the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 (Doc. 1) will be denied.

A separate Order will be issued.

United States District Judge

DATE: May 2024

24-0741-01

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