White v. Pine Ridge Community Association

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WILLIAM ROBERT WHITE, JR.

Plaintiff | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-CV-614

V. (JUDGE MANNION)

PINE RIDGE COMMUNITY

ASSOCIATION, :

Defendant :

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff William Robert White, Jr., sues Defendant Pine Ridge

Community Association, his former employer, claiming age and disability

discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and intentional infliction

of emotional distress. Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint

under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 7).

□□ BACKGROUND

The following allegations are drawn from the Complaint. (Doc. 1).

Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a Community Manager. On November 18,

2019, a group of armed individuals attacked Defendant’s club building where

Plaintiff worked. Because of injuries sustained in the attack, Plaintiff filed for

state workers’ compensation. After he filed his workers’ compensation claim,

members of Defendant's Executive Board harassed him and made false

accusations. He was forced by the Board to review video of the attack in a

Board meeting, which triggered an emotional reaction. He thereafter

requested an accommodation for post-traumatic stress disorder, but his

request was rejected. The Board further made “social media posts against”

Plaintiff, sent him harassing emails related to his disability, and published

information about his PTSD diagnosis in the Community newsletter.

Plaintiffs second request for PTSD accommodations was also denied.

Members of Defendant's staff “continuously denied and/or impeded”

Plaintiffs requests to attend medical appointments. Although Plaintiff had

received bonuses and only positive evaluations, Defendant terminated him

effective June 30, 2020. He was 53 years old at the time.

Plaintiff brings the following claims: (Count |) age discrimination in

violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA); (II) retaliation;

(Ill) failure to provide reasonable accommodation in violation of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973; (IV) hostile work environment in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADEA; and

(V) intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Doc. 1 1[36--71). He requests

injunctive relief, compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees, and punitive

damages. (Doc. 1 at 17-18).

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ll. DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendant asserts that Counts | and IV must be dismissed because

Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing this

action and because these claims are now time-barred. (Doc. 8 at 8-11).

To file a civil action under Title VII or the ADEA, a plaintiff must first

bring a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 42

U.S.C. §2000e—-5(f)(1); 29 U.S.C. §626(d)(1). In a “deferral” state like

Pennsylvania, such a charge must be filed “within 300 days of the challenged

employment action.” Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 854 (3d

Cir. 2000) (citing 42 U.S.C. §2000e—-5(e)(1); 29 U.S.C. §626(d)(2); Colgan v.

Fisher Sci. Co., 935 F.2d 1407, 1413—15 (3d Cir. 1991) (en banc)).

The complainant must allow 180 days for EEOC investigation, after

which either the Commission will notify him by a “right-to-sue” letter that it

has not resolved his charge, or the complainant may request a right-to-sue

letter himself, and the Commission must timely issue it. Burgh v. Montrose

Borough Council, 251 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. §2000e—

5(f)(1)). Either way, the plaintiff must receive such a notice before bringing

suit. /d.; 29 U.S.C. 626(e).

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Here, Plaintiff did bring a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, in

which he alleged that Defendant discriminated against him on the basis of

disability, retaliated against him, and created a hostile work environment.

(Doc. 8-1). Defendant argues that this charge did not exhaust the claims

Plaintiff now brings in Counts | and IV. (Doc. 8 at 8). Plaintiff does not argue

that it did.

“The ‘relevant test’ for determining whether a later claim needs to be

exhausted despite the filling of a previous charge is a two-pronged inquiry

into whether ‘the acts alleged in the subsequent ... suit are fairly within the

scope of [1] the prior EEOC complaint, or [2] the investigation arising

therefrom.” Simko v. United States Steel Corp., 992 F.3d 198, 207 (3d Cir.

2021) (quoting Waiters v. Parsons, 729 F.3d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 1984)).

In Count I, Plaintiff claims that Defendant discriminated against him on

the basis of his age. (Doc. 1 ]36—37). But his EEOC charge made no mention

of age discrimination.’ Age discrimination is not fairly within the scope of a

charge alleging disability discrimination and retaliation. See Anfol v. Perry,

82 F.3d 1291, 1296 (3d Cir. 1996) (concluding that employee did not exhaust

' Indeed, the EEOC’s “Charge of Discrimination” form directs claimants

to check all appropriate boxes indicating the basis for discrimination. Plaintiff

in his charge checked “Retaliation” and “Disability,” but did not check “Age.”

(Doc. 8-1 at 2).

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gender discrimination claim by charging disability discrimination); Zezulewicz

v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty., 290 F. Supp. 2d 583, 591 (W.D. Pa. 2003)

(concluding that employee’s EEOC charge of retaliation did not exhaust age

or gender discrimination claims).

Whether Count IV was exhausted is less clear. There, Plaintiff alleges

a “hostile and abusive working environment in violation of Title VIl, Rehab

Act, and the ADEA.” (Doc. 1 961). And while his EEOC charge did not cite

Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act, or the ADEA, it did allege that Defendant

“created a hostile work environment.” (Doc. 8-1 at 7).

The court need not decide whether Count IV was exhausted by

Plaintiffs EEOC complaint, though, for even if it was, it cannot withstand

dismissal.

A claim under Title VII or the ADEA must be brought within 90 days of

receiving the right-to-sue letter. 42 U.S.C. §2000e—5(f)(1); McGovern v. City

of Phila., 554 F.3d 114, 115 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009); 29 U.S.C. §626(e); Ruehl v.

Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 383 n.11 (3d Cir. 2007). As Defendant notes,

(Doc. 8 at 8n.1), Plaintiff's right to sue letter was issued on January 12, 2022,

(Doc. 8-2), but he did not file this complaint until April 12, 2023, well outside

the 90-day window. So Count IV's Title VI and ADEA claims, even if they

were exhausted by his Plaintiff's EEOC charge, are time-barred.

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Plaintiff asserts (without citing authority) that because he sought relief

under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act “[h]e was not allowed to initiate

a court proceeding” until he had filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania

Human Relations Commission and it either rendered a decision or failed to

act within one year. (Doc. 11 at 10-11). This one-year waiting period governs

PHRA exhaustion, not Title VIl and ADEA exhaustion. 43 Pa. Stat. Ann.

§962(c)(1)-(2). That is, while Plaintiff could not have brought claims under

the PHRA until one year after filing his PHRC charge, he was not similarly

precluded from bringing claims under Title VII or the ADEA. See Burgh, 251

F.3d at 471-474 (explaining that because Title VII has its own statute of

limitations period, it does not borrow state statutes of limitations).

That leaves Count IV’s Rehabilitation Act hostile work environment

claim. Claims alleging violations of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act? are

not subject to an exhaustion requirement. See Jeremy H. by Hunter v. Mount

Lebanon, 95 F.3d 272, 281 (3d Cir. 1996). But as discussed below, the court

concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a Rehabilitation Act claim.

2 An aggrieved person may bring suit for violations of section 501 (42

U.S.C. §791) or section 504 (42 U.S.C. §794) of the Rehabilitation Act. See

29 U.S.C. §794a; Spence v. Straw, 54 F.3d 196, 199-200 (3d Cir. 1995). But

section 501 applies only to federal agencies. See §791; Spence, 54 F.3d at

199-200. Because Plaintiff does not sue a federal agency, his claims must

be brought pursuant to section 504.

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B. Rehabilitation Act claims

Plaintiff alleges violations of the Rehabilitation Act in Counts III and IV

of his complaint. (Doc. 1 9956, 61). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United

States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination

under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29

U.S.C. §794(a). Accordingly, a prima facie Rehabilitation Act claim requires

that the “program or activity in question receives federal financial

assistance.” Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Probation & Parole, 551

F.3d 193, 198 n.3 (3d Cir. 2008); see also 28 C.F.R. §42.540(f) (defining

“federal financial assistance’).

As Defendant points out, (Doc. 8 at 12-13), Plaintiff does not allege

that it receives federal financial assistance. Plaintiff in his brief suggests he

will testify “as to whether Defendant received any type of federal funds or

assistance” and “seek proof from Defendant” on that score. (Doc. 11 at 13).

That suggestion does him no good, because to survive dismissal against a

12(b)(6) motion “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Gelman v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal

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quotations omitted). Plaintiff can state no plausible Rehabilitation Act claim

without alleging that Defendant receives federal financial assistance.

“[I]In the event a complaint fails to state a claim, unless amendment

would be futile, the District Court must give a plaintiff the opportunity to

amend her complaint.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d

Cir. 2008). The court cannot conclude at this point that amendment would be

futile, so Plaintiff will be given leave to amend his complaint as to his

Rehabilitation Act claims. That does not mean Plaintiff may simply add a

general allegation of federal financial assistance in the hope that discovery

will bear it out. First, Plaintiffs counsel is reminded that “[b]y presenting to

the court a pleading ... an attorney ... certifies that to the best of [his]

knowledge, information and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under

the circumstances: (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if

specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a

reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

11(b). Second, a general, conclusory assertion that Defendant receives

federal financial assistance would be insufficient to survive dismissal. See,

e.g., Hunt v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 2019 WL 3776545, at *5 & n.8

(M.D. Pa. 2019) (allegations that the defendant “receives federal financial

assistance and as such is subject to Section 504” did not support a plausible

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inference that the defendant was a recipient of federal financial assistance’).

Instead, an amended complaint would need to include specific factual

allegations sufficient to raise a plausible inference that Defendant was a

recipient of federal financial assistance during the time of the alleged wrongs.

See Dana v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 2015 WL 5576880, at *4 (M.D. Pa. 2015).

C. Remaining State-Law Claims

The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's

state-law claims of retaliation and intentional infliction of emotional distress

in Counts Il and V. Where a plaintiff brings claims under both federal and

state law, as here, and all the claims over which the court has original

jurisdiction are dismissed, the court may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3).

Indeed, “[iJn the ordinary course, where the claims over which the district

court has original jurisdiction are dismissed before trial, the district court must

decline to decide the pendent state claims,” unless there is an “affirmative

justification for doing so” based on “considerations of judicial economy,

convenience, and fairness to the litigants.” N. Sound Capital LLC v. Merch &

Co., Inc., 938 F.3d 482, 494 n.11 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Hedges v. Musco,

204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000)).

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The parties here have not yet conducted discovery. (Doc. 17 94.1).

And, as Defendant points out, Plaintiff has brought an action against it in the

Pike County Court of Common Pleas alleging the same wrongful conduct

and claiming retaliation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Doc.

8-3). In these circumstances, the court finds no affirmative justification for

exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state-law claims.

Plaintiff's state-law claims will be dismissed without prejudice.

Ill. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss will be

granted. Count | will be dismissed with prejudice. Count IV will be dismissed

with prejudice as to Plaintiff's claims under Title VI] and the ADEA, but

without prejudice as to Plaintiff's Rehabilitation claim. Counts II, III, and V will

be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend as to

Counts Il, Ill, and V, and as to Count IV to the extent he claims a violation of

the Rehabilitation Act.

Mee —

Unite gates District Judge

DATE: January 22, 2024

23-614-01

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