Nelson v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KAMARIA NELSON, as Proposed : CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-CV-1030

Administrator of the Estate of Shaka :

Nelson, : (Judge Conner)

:

Plaintiff :

:

v. :

:

PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF :

CORRECTIONS, et al., :

:

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

This civil action arises out of the death of Shaka Nelson (“decedent”) during

his imprisonment with the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. Decedent’s

sister, Kamaria Nelson, alleges that the Department and several of its employees

are responsible for conditions that contributed to decedent’s mental deterioration

and eventual suicide while he was incarcerated at two State Correctional

Institutions (“SCI”), SCI Huntingdon and SCI Phoenix. She seeks monetary

damages as proposed administrator of decedent’s estate under the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution via 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

under Pennsylvania law. Defendants have moved to dismiss Nelson’s amended

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). For

the reasons that follow, we will grant defendants’ motion in its entirety.

I. Factual Background & Procedural History

According to the amended complaint, decedent suffered from schizophrenia

and bipolar disorder, and he was prescribed Seroquel, an antipsychotic, for the first

time at the age of 16. (See Doc. 14 ¶ 16). Decedent entered into the custody of the

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) in June 2019 following his

conviction on aggravated assault charges in March of that year. (See id. ¶ 15). Soon

after arriving at SCI Phoenix, decedent informed DOC officials that he had a history

of drug abuse and self-harm, including suicide attempts and hospitalizations. (See

id. ¶¶ 16-17). He was diagnosed with serious psychological disorders, including

“Bipolar I Disorder” and “Current or Most Recent Episode Manic with Psychotic

Features.” (See id. ¶ 20). Decedent advised DOC officials that he had been

incarcerated before, that he had been hospitalized in the past, and that he had

received treatment from DOC providers for his mental illness. (See id. ¶¶ 17-19).

His medical and mental health history was well-documented. (See id. ¶ 19). At SCI

Phoenix, decedent continued taking Seroquel. (See id. ¶¶ 22-23). While he was

being treated with Seroquel, decedent was compliant and did not face disciplinary

action from DOC officials. (See id. ¶ 23). His stability designation was a “D” on a

scale of “A” to “D,” meaning that he suffered from “the most severe psychological

disease” and thus was the most unstable. (See id. ¶¶ 21-22¶).

Around September 2019, decedent was transferred to SCI Huntingdon,

where his stability designation remained a “D.” (See id. ¶¶ 24-25). DOC officials at

SCI Huntingdon received records from decedent indicating that he was at high risk

of suicide. (See id. ¶ 26). A few weeks later, DOC officials discontinued treating

decedent with Seroquel. (See id. ¶ 27). Decedent’s anxiety increased and his

behavior became more erratic. (See id. ¶¶ 28-33). He filed a grievance report

regarding the discontinuance of his medication, and he also reported that he was

sexually assaulted by a cellmate. (See id. ¶¶ 28, 30). Rather than treat decedent

with medication, DOC officials placed him in restrictive housing—“the hole”—for 30

days at some point beginning in November 2019. (See id. ¶ 32). Nelson avers that

DOC healthcare providers submitted a false report that same month downgrading

decedent’s stability designation from a “D” to a “C” and stating that he had not

exhibited signs of “mania, anxiety, psychosis, or depression.” (See id. ¶¶ 35-36).

The November 2019 report also stated that decedent’s medical diagnoses had been

“completely resolved.” (See id. ¶ 37). In December 2019, decedent filed another

grievance report reiterating that he was suicidal and that he needed Seroquel. (See

id. ¶ 38). He was admitted for observation, did not receive medication, and was

released two days later with a note stating that he should have “no psychiatric

restrictions.” (Id.)

In 2020, decedent indicated that being housed with other inmates was

deleterious to his mental health and that a change to his housing conditions would

help alleviate some of his anxieties. (See id. ¶ 40). DOC officials denied his request

for a single-occupant cell. (See id.) For various incidents of misconduct and failure

to obey, decedent was sanctioned and, in June 2020, returned to the hole. (See id.

¶¶ 39, 44). While decedent was in the hole, DOC healthcare providers reported that

his stability designation improved from “C” to “B.” (See id. ¶¶ 45-46). This

designation resulted in decedent being considered psychologically stable, and in his

discharge from any psychiatric or mental health treatment. (See id. ¶ 46).

In early September 2020, decedent again reported that he was the victim of

sexual assault and that he feared for his safety; defendants purportedly “took no

action to move or protect” him. (See id. ¶ 48). On September 25, 2020, decedent

hanged himself from the metal on his cell window using a “rope[-]like ligature.”

(See id. ¶ 49). DOC officers found decedent but were unable to cut him down from

the window for a “substantial amount of time” because they did not have a “J-

tool”—a tool designed to cut through rope or cloth in suicide attempts—despite

being required to always carry the tool. (See id. ¶¶ 50-51).

Nelson avers that the unit where decedent was housed at the time of his

death “had none of his mental health history, or suicide history” because he had

been discharged as a psychiatric patient and assigned a stability designation of “B.”

(See id. ¶ 52). She asserts that this omission resulted in decedent’s placement in a

unit that was not proofed against suicide. (See id. ¶ 54). Furthermore, based upon a

DOC report, she notes that it is “unusual” for an inmate with a designated mental

health stability code of “D” to improve to a “C,” let alone a “B.” (See id. ¶ 55).

Nelson also avers that defendants were aware of the risks associated with placing

individuals with mental health concerns in restrictive housing, as evidenced by a

2015 Department of Justice report and then-DOC Secretary John Wetzel’s public

comments regarding the same. (See id. ¶¶ 57-58). Considering the foregoing,

Nelson asserts that the various defendants created conditions that led to decedent’s

decline and ultimate death, including failure to train DOC staff and deliberate

withholding of mental health care. (See id. ¶¶ 60-71).

Nelson initiated this action by filing a complaint in the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. She named as defendants the DOC

and, in their individual capacities Wetzel, John Rivello (Superintendent of SCI

Huntingdon), Joel Kohler (Deputy Superintendent for Facilities Management of

SCI Huntingdon), and Jill Spyker (Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Services

of SCI Huntingdon). Nelson amended her complaint to add three unnamed

supervising correction officers, ten unnamed corrections officers, and ten unnamed

medical providers as defendants.

Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6); they also asserted that the Eastern District

was an improper venue for Nelson’s claims. The Honorable John M. Younge

granted the motion to transfer Nelson’s action to this court. We instructed the

parties that we would decide defendants’ motion on the briefs submitted to Judge

Younge. The motion is fully briefed and ripe for decision.

II. Legal Standards

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides that a court may dismiss a

claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). Such

jurisdictional challenges take one of two forms: (1) parties may levy a “factual”

attack, arguing that one or more of the pleading’s factual allegations are untrue,

removing the action from the court’s jurisdictional ken; or (2) they may assert a

“facial” challenge, which assumes the veracity of the complaint’s allegations but

nonetheless argues that a claim is not within the court’s jurisdiction. Lincoln

Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting CNA

v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2008)). In either instance, it is the

plaintiff’s burden to establish jurisdiction. See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan

Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). Courts may grant a Rule 12(b)(1) motion

based on the legal insufficiency of a claim only when it appears with certainty that

assertion of jurisdiction would be improper. See Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States,

220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).

A defendant may properly raise the jurisdictional defense of Eleventh

Amendment immunity in a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). See

Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 693 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100 (1984)); see also

Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 730 F.3d

291, 318 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Blanciak, 77 F.3d at 693 n.2). The court may consider

Eleventh Amendment issues sua sponte, but is not required to do so. Bowers

v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Ass’n, 346 F.3d 402, 417 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); see

also Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 394 (1998).

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the

dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6), the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under

any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”

Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker

v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)). In addition to

reviewing the facts contained in the complaint, the court may also consider

“exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, [and] undisputedly

authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.”

Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar.

Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide “the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To test the sufficiency of the complaint, the court conducts

a three-step inquiry. See Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 130-31

(3d Cir. 2010). In the first step, “the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’” Id. at 130 (alteration in original) (quoting

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Next, the factual and legal elements of a

claim must be separated; well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, while mere legal

conclusions may be disregarded. Id. at 131-32; see Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578

F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Once the court isolates the well-pleaded factual

allegations, it must determine whether they are sufficient to show a “plausible claim

for relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts “that allow[]

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

III. Discussion

Defendants raise numerous challenges to Nelson’s amended complaint,

including lack of subject matter jurisdiction, various claims of immunity, and failure

to plead facts sufficient to show a plausible claim for relief. As a matter of law, we

find that Nelson’s claims against the Department and her state law claims are

barred by immunity defenses. Next, we examine the remaining federal claims

under Section 1983 and find that the amended complaint fails to state a claim

against Wetzel, Rivello, Kohler, or Spyker upon which relief may be granted. We

will address defendants’ arguments seriatim.

A. Claims Against the Department

The Department asserts that it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity

against all of Nelson’s claims. (See Doc. 17 at 6-7). The Eleventh Amendment

provides that, “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to

extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the

United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign

State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Our court of appeals considers it “well-settled as a

matter of judicial construction that despite its limited and seemingly unambiguous

language, the Eleventh Amendment constitutionalizes a much more far-reaching

principle of state sovereign immunity.” Everett v. Schramm, 772 F.2d 1114, 1118 (3d

Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eleventh

Amendment as extending to suits brought against a state by its own citizens without

the state’s consent as well as to suits brought against a state agency or department.

See id. (citing Fla. Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Fla. Nursing Home

Assoc., 450 U.S. 147 (1981)); see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).

There are three basic exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity:

(1) Congress may specifically abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity by exercising

its enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) a state may waive its

sovereign immunity by consenting to suit; or (3) under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123

(1908), a state official may be sued in their official capacity for prospective

injunctive relief. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense

Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999); Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 168 (3d Cir.

2002). It is well-settled, however, that Congress did not intend to abrogate state

sovereign immunity by enacting Section 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66-71 (1989). Moreover, the Commonwealth has unequivocally

withheld its consent to such suits. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8521(b);

Lombardo v. Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 540 F.3d 190, 196 n.3 (3d Cir. 2008). Because

Nelson does not seek prospective injunctive relief, none of the exceptions to

Eleventh Amendment immunity apply. We accordingly agree with the Department

and will grant its motion to dismiss all claims for want of jurisdiction.

B. State Law Claims

Nelson’s amended complaint contains two state-law causes of action.

Specifically, Counts V and VI assert that she is eligible to recover damages under

Pennsylvania’s Wrongful Death and Survival Acts, respectively. (See Doc. 14 ¶¶ 85-

93 (citing 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8301, 8302; 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS.

STAT. ANN. § 3373)). Nelson is mistaken.

As a preliminary matter, neither the Wrongful Death Act nor the Survival Act

creates an independent cause of action; rather, claims under each statute derive

from the injury to the decedent. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8301,

8302; see also Pisano v. Extendicare Homes, Inc., 77 A.3d 651, 660 (Pa. Super. Ct.

2013) (quoting Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 184 A. 663, 664 (Pa. 1936)). This court

has explained that “where no underlying tort has been pled, there can be no

wrongful-death or survival action.” McCracken v. Fulton County, No. 3:19-CV-1063,

2020 WL 2767577, at *10 (M.D. Pa. May 28, 2020) (Conner, C.J.) (citing, inter alia,

Kaczorowski, 184 A. at 664). Nelson’s amended complaint does not allege that

decedent suffered a standalone tort. It does, however, assert that defendants acted

negligently, ostensibly allowing for recovery under these Pennsylvania laws. (See

Doc. 14 ¶ 88) (“Defendants . . . acted with . . . negligence”).

Even assuming, arguendo, that Nelson has sufficiently pled an underlying

tort, these claims fail because the DOC is a Commonwealth agency. Accordingly,

the DOC and its employees are entitled to sovereign immunity from state-law

claims, including allegations of liability arising from negligent acts. See McGrath

v. Johnson, 67 F. Supp. 2d 499, 511 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (state agencies and their

employees are entitled to protections afforded by sovereign immunity) (citing

Maute v. Frank, 657 A.2d 985, 986 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); Robles v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr.,

718 A.2d 882, 884 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998)), aff’d 35 F. App’x 357 (3d Cir. 2002)

(nonprecedential).1 2 Allegations of willful misconduct similarly do not negate the

1 The court acknowledges that nonprecedential decisions are not binding

upon federal district courts. Citations to nonprecedential decisions reflect that the

court has carefully considered and is persuaded by the panel’s ratio decidendi.

2 See also Edwards v. Rivello, No. 1:23-CV-156, 2023 WL 8437052, at *3 (M.D.

Pa. Dec. 5, 2023) (Conner, J.) (subject to enumerated statutory exceptions, sovereign

immunity includes immunity from liability for negligence) (citing McGrath, 67 F.

Supp. 2d at 511). The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has explicitly retained its

sovereign immunity and not waived it, except in ten carefully defined and limited

circumstances: (1) vehicle liability; (2) medical-professional liability; (3) care,

custody or control of personal property; (4) Commonwealth real estate, highway

and sidewalks; (5) potholes and other dangerous conditions; (6) care, custody or

control of animals; (7) liquor store sales; (8) National Guard activities; (9) toxoids

and vaccines; and (10) sexual abuse. 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8522(b).

applicability of sovereign immunity when officials are acting within the scope of

their duties. See Bletz v. Corrie, No. 1:16-CV-717, 2019 WL 1354005, at *9 n.12 (M.D.

Pa. Mar. 26, 2019) (citing Brautigam v. Fraley, 684 F. Supp. 2d 589, 594 (M.D. Pa.

2010)); La Frankie v. Miklich, 618 A.2d 1145, 1149 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (en banc).3

Unlike Eleventh Amendment immunity, this protection “applies to Commonwealth

employees in both their official and individual capacities.” Larsen v. State Emps.’

Ret. Sys., 553 F. Supp. 2d 403, 420 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (citing Maute, 657 A.2d at 986).

The court therefore finds that Nelson’s arguments under Pennsylvania’s Wrongful

Death and Survival Acts are not claims upon which relief may be granted. See FED.

R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). We will dismiss Counts V and VI of the amended complaint.

C. Section 1983 Claims

Nelson brings her remaining claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983

creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional wrongs committed by

state officials. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute is not a source of substantive rights but

While Nelson alleges that decedent was a victim of sexual assault, (see Doc.

14 ¶¶ 30, 48), the “sexual abuse” exception exists only for “[c]onduct which

constitutes an offense enumerated under section 5551(7),” see 42 PA. STAT. AND

CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8522(b)(10). Section 5551(7), in turn, is limited to offenses in

which “the victim was under 18 years of age at the time of the offense.” See 42 PA.

STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5551(7); see also Jean v. City of Philadelphia, 604 F.

Supp. 3d 271, 276 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (“[I]n enacting the sexual abuse exception, the

Pennsylvania legislature made clear that its intended purpose is to ‘waive sovereign

immunity for public entities guilty of covering up childhood sexual abuse.’”)

(emphasis in Jean) (citation omitted). Nelson does not assert that decedent was

under 18 years of age at the time of the alleged offenses.

3 While Nelson alleges willful misconduct with respect to her claim under

Pennsylvania’s Wrongful Death Act, (see Doc. 14 ¶ 88), she does not allege that any

of the defendants acted outside the scope of their duties.

serves as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law.

See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d

1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). To state a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show a

deprivation of a “right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United

States . . . by a person acting under color of state law.” Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1204

(quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995)). Nelson

alleges that defendants violated decedent’s right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution while he was imprisoned at SCI Huntingdon, and she seeks monetary

damages pursuant to Section 1983. (See Doc. 14 ¶ 1). Defendants assert that Nelson

has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as to both Wetzel and

Rivello’s supervisory liability and her “failure to train” allegation in light of case law

interpreting those doctrines. (See Doc. 17 at 7-10). We agree.

1. Supervisory Liability

Wetzel and Rivello argue that Nelson fails to allege a plausible claim for

supervisory liability under Section 1983 because she does not assert either

defendant’s “personal involvement” in actions leading to decedent’s suicide. (See

id. at 7-9). Defendants further contend Nelson named them simply because of their

titles, and not due to their conduct, thereby violating Rule 8. (See Doc. 17 at 7-9

(citing Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 249 (3d Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (quoting

Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77));

see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring that a pleading contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). Upon review

of relevant precedent, we agree.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the

government from inflicting “cruel and unusual punishment” upon its citizens. U.S.

CONST. amend. VIII. Encompassed within that prohibition is the requirement that

prison officials provide “humane conditions of confinement” to incarcerated

individuals. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Prison officials may

not “deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes

v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272 (3d Cir.

2003). A successful conditions-of-confinement claim must satisfy a two-pronged test

with objective and subjective components: first, that the plaintiff experienced an

objectively “serious” deprivation of life’s basic needs or that they were exposed to a

“substantial risk of serious harm” to their health; and, second, that the defendants

knew of and were deliberately indifferent to that deprivation or risk. See Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834; Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 227-28 (3d Cir.

2015). Defendants focus on the second prong.

Relevant to the form of Nelson’s amended complaint, a civil rights action

against an individual government defendant requires a showing that the defendant

had “personal involvement” in the violation of a plaintiff’s rights, and it cannot be

predicated upon respondeat superior. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207; Evancho

v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005). Personal involvement includes directing

others to violate a plaintiff’s rights, or having actual knowledge of and acquiescing

in the alleged violations. See Evancho, 423 F.3d at 353; A.M. ex rel. J.M.K.

v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Detention Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing

Baker v. Monroe Township, 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995)). Supervisors can

be held liable if they “established and maintained a policy, practice or custom

which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” See Santiago v. Warminster

Township, 629 F.3d 121, 129 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting A.M., 372 F.3d at 586). But a

mere hypothesis that an individual defendant had personal knowledge of or

involvement in the deprivation of a plaintiff’s rights is insufficient to establish

personal involvement. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208; see also Payne v. Butts, No. 21-

2210, 2022 WL 16916347, at *1 (3d Cir. Nov. 14, 2022) (per curiam) (nonprecedential)

(“A mere hypothesis about a defendant’s knowledge will not suffice.”). Our court of

appeals has further instructed that the review and denial of a prisoner’s grievance

alone does not establish personal involvement in an underlying violation of the

prisoner’s constitutional rights. See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir.

2020); see also Robinson v. Delbalso, No. 22-2378, 2022 WL 17248100, at *2 (3d Cir.

Nov. 28, 2022) (per curiam) (nonprecedential).

Facially, the amended complaint does not articulate a plausible claim for

relief under a theory of personal involvement. Nelson’s allegations do not include

facts specific to Wetzel or Rivello, and those claims that are phrased without

particularity cannot survive defendants’ motion. (See, e.g., Doc. 14 ¶ 59

(“Defendants failed to provide medically necessary mental health treatment and

failed to take reasonable measures to prevent [decedent] from engaging in self-

harm or suicide.”)); Evancho, 423 F.3d at 354. Nelson does not assert that Wetzel or

Rivello directed others to violate decedent’s rights, and to the extent the amended

complaint alleges knowing acquiescence to misconduct, she fails to provide a

factual basis for that inference. (See Doc. 14 ¶ 80 (asserting that defendants

“acquiesced in policies and practices that withheld necessary treatment, which was

known to Defendants”)).4 Finally, we set aside any allegations premised upon

whatever role Wetzel or Rivello may have played in denying decedent’s formal

grievances. See Dooley 957 F.3d at 374.

What remains of Nelson’s amended complaint is similarly deficient. She

asserts that Wetzel and Rivello “maintain rules that an inmate[’]s psychological

history is not provided to the unit [where the inmate is housed] if the inmate is

deemed as currently mentally stable.” (See Doc. 14 ¶ 53). More broadly, she asserts

that various policies and practices existed “which were causing”—or risking—

serious harm to inmates with mental illness or vulnerability to suicide. (See, e.g., id.

¶ 66). But courts afford prison medical authorities “[d]eference . . . in the diagnoses

and treatment of patients,” and “disavow any attempt to second-guess the propriety

or adequacy of a particular course of treatment.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209,

227-28 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d

754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979)); see id. (“Allegations of mere negligent treatment or even

medical malpractice do not trigger the protections of the Eighth Amendment.”). To

4 Nelson asserts that “Defendants were well aware, based on a 2015 U.S.

Department of Justice investigation, that the use of restrictive housing as

punishment for inmates with mental illness was bad practice and led to increased

incidents of suicide.” (See Doc. 14 ¶ 57). Apart from involving only a narrow subset

of Nelson’s claims, this assertion is devoid of factual support and does not indicate

actual knowledge of specific conduct. Cf. Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374 (inmate sending

copies of grievances to DOC Secretary insufficient to establish actual knowledge).

the extent the amended complaint invites the court to examine the correctness of

decedent’s treatment or stability designation, we decline that invitation.

While Nelson clearly alleges that decedent informed DOC officials of his

history with mental illness and suicidality, (see Doc. 14 ¶¶ 26, 28), she also

acknowledges that he received some degree of professional attention, (see id. ¶ 20

(DOC officials diagnose decedent); ¶ 27 (medical providers discontinue Seroquel)).

Indeed, many of the allegations of deficient care stem from decedent’s stability

designation improving from a “D” to a “B.” (See id. ¶¶ 35, 46).5 Cognizant of the

difficulty associated with establishing deliberate indifference where a prisoner “has

received some amount of medical treatment,” and the “considerable latitude”

afforded to prison officials in diagnosis and treatment, see Palakovic, 854 F.3d at

227, we will grant defendants’ motion and dismiss Counts I, II, and III as they

pertain to Wetzel and Rivello.6

2. Failure to Train

Nelson contends that defendants “failed to train [DOC] staff at SCI

Huntingdon on how to manage prisoners with serious mental illness and those that

5 For instance, failing to house an inmate in a cell that has not been “proofed

or protected against suicide,” and maintaining rules in which an inmate’s history of

mental illness “is not provided to the unit if the inmate is deemed as currently

mentally stable,” (see Doc. 14 ¶¶ 53, 54), are not inherently problematic. The court

understands the argument that these actions resulted in a constitutional violation to

follow from Nelson’s belief that decedent should not have been deemed stable in

the first place.

6 The amended complaint asserts Counts I, II, and III against all defendants,

(see Doc. 14 ¶¶ 73, 75-78, 80-81), but defendants move to dismiss Nelson’s deliberate

indifference claims against Wetzel and Rivello only, (see Doc. 17 (proposed order)).

Accordingly, Counts I, II, and III are not dismissed as to Spyker and Kohler.

were vulnerable to suicide.” (See Doc. 14 ¶ 83). Count IV of the amended complaint

specifically alleges that DOC personnel were not carrying the “J-tool” upon finding

decedent. (See id. ¶¶ 50-51, 83). Defendants characterize Count IV as a failed

attempt at stating a Monell claim,7 which they argue is not viable against state as

opposed to municipal officials; they also contend that Nelson presents her claim in

conclusory terms. (See Doc. 17 at 9-10). We agree that Nelson’s claim fails as a

matter of law. Although municipal officials may be subject to Monell liability in the

“failure to train” context, the same is not true for state officials. See Will, 491 U.S.

at 71; see also O’Hara v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 171 F. Supp. 2d 490, 499 (W.D. Pa.

2001). Wetzel, Rivello, Kohler, and Spyker are employees of the Commonwealth,

therefore we will dismiss Count IV as to each of them.

D. Leave to Amend

Courts must generally grant leave to amend before dismissing a civil rights

action if curative amendment is conceivable. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.,

293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Because Nelson plausibly could cure the defects

relative to her claims of deliberate indifference and vulnerability to suicide by

presenting new factual allegations, we will dismiss Counts I, II, and III against

Wetzel and Rivello without prejudice. Conversely, Nelson’s “failure to train” theory

and state causes of action fail for the legal reasons identified above such that further

7 In Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658

(1978), the Supreme Court established that a municipality may be held liable under

Section 1983 if a plaintiff can prove that an action pursuant to an official municipal

policy caused their constitutional injury. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 694.

amendment would be futile, thus we will dismiss Counts IV, V, and VI with

prejudice.

IV. Conclusion

We will grant defendants’ motion to dismiss as explained hereinabove. An

appropriate order shall issue.

/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER

Christopher C. Conner

United States District Judge

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: January 26, 2024