Cooper v. County of York

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL COOPER, : Civil No. 21-CV-01440

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

COUNTY OF YORK O/A YORK :

COUNTY PRISON, :

:

Defendant. : Judge Sylvia H. Rambo

M E M O R A N D U M

Before the court is a motion for summary judgment by Defendant County of

York o/a York County Prison (“York”). (Doc. 25.) For the reasons set forth below,

the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Michael Cooper is a 58-year-old male who was employed by York as a

correctional officer for over twenty-one years until his termination in March 2021.

(Doc. 23 ¶¶ 12-13.) Cooper suffers from certain disabilities related to his knees and

legs, which limit him from performing some daily life activities, such as walking,

standing for long periods of time, bending, and squatting. (Id. ¶ 16.)

Around May 29, 2020, Cooper experienced flare-ups of his health conditions,

which made it difficult for him to perform some of his job duties, including

completing his fifteen-minute rounds. (Id. ¶ 18.) As a result, Cooper requested and

was placed on light duty status, working primarily at a security point check post that

did not require inmate interaction, prolonged standing, or climbing stairs. (Id. ¶¶ 20-

21; Doc. 26-1 p. 22.)

Cooper testified that throughout his time working at the security checkpoint,

certain members of York management, including his supervisor, Deputy Warden

Adam Ogle, made numerous age and disability-related remarks to him. (Doc. 26-1

pp. 43, 48; Doc. 23 ¶ 14; Doc. 26-14 p. 7.) According to Cooper, Ogle’s comments

included repeatedly asking about Cooper’s light duty status, as frequently as several

times per day, as well as asking Cooper questions such as, “how much longer do you

have to work before retirement, you aren’t getting any younger,” and “when are you

going to retire?” (Doc. 23 ¶¶ 21, 30; 26-1 pp. 38-39, 48.) Cooper also testified that

throughout the same period, York’s human resources representative, Emily

Strickhouser, asked him on several occasions, “when are you going to retire?” (Doc.

23 ¶ 30; Doc. 26-1 p. 48.)

In June 2020, Cooper applied for and was granted intermittent leave under the

Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), which he took at varying points

throughout his remaining time with York. (Doc. 26-1 p. 23, 39.)

In early March 2021, Cooper participated in a pre-disciplinary conference

(“PDC”) with Ogle and Strickhauser, who asked Cooper when he could come off

light-duty status. (Doc. 23 ¶ 22; Doc. 26-1 p. 56.) Cooper responded that only his

doctor could answer that question, and that he had a follow-up appointment in a few

weeks. (Doc. 23 ¶ 22.) Cooper was also asked whether he could perform the essential

functions of the corrections officer position, to which he responded that it depended

on what the position was, but that he cannot work a post that requires him to walk

stairs. (Doc. 26 ¶ 36; Doc. 26-1 p. 31; Doc. 26-25 p. 2.) On March 12, 2021, York

terminated Cooper’s employment. (Doc. 26-25 p. 2.)

In August 2021, Cooper initiated this action against York by filing a

complaint, which he subsequently amended in September 2022. (Doc. 1; Doc. 23.)

Count I asserts claims for disability discrimination, retaliation, hostile work

environment, and failure to accommodate in violation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act, as Amended (“ADA”). Count II asserts a claim of retaliation under

the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). Count III asserts a claim for age

discrimination and hostile work environment in violation of the Age Discrimination

in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Count IV asserts disability discrimination under the

Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”). Count V asserts claims for age

discrimination and hostile work environment under the PHRA.

York has filed a motion requesting summary judgment on all counts. (Doc.

25.) The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides: “The court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.”

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). A factual dispute is

“material” if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive

law and is “genuine” only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable

factfinder to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a

court “must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” and

draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Fam. YMCA, 418

F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a

disputed issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. “Once the moving party

points to evidence demonstrating no issue of material fact exists, the non-moving

party has the duty to set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material

fact exists and that a reasonable factfinder could rule in its favor.” Azur v. Chase

Bank, USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010). The non-moving party

may not simply sit back and rest on the allegations in its complaint; instead, it must

“go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001).

Summary judgment should be granted where a party “fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and

on which that party will bear the burden at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23. “Such

affirmative evidence—regardless of whether it is direct or circumstantial—must

amount to more than a scintilla, but may amount to less (in the evaluation of the

court) than a preponderance.” Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232 (quoting Williams v.

Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460–61 (3d Cir. 1989)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Disability Discrimination

York’s motion requests summary judgment on Cooper’s disability

discrimination claims. The ADA and PHRA prohibit employment discrimination

based on disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112; 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 955. To establish a prima

facie case of disability discrimination, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he “(1) has

a disability, (2) is a qualified individual, and (3) has suffered an adverse employment

action because of that disability.” Turner v. Hershey Chocolate USA, 440 F. 3d 604,

611 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see Fogleman v. Mercy

Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he PHRA is to be interpreted as

identical to federal anti-discrimination laws except where there is something

specifically different in its language requiring that it be treated differently.”). If the

plaintiff establishes a prima facie claim, the burden shifts to the employer to

articulate a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment

action. Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2007); McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). If the employer satisfies its burden, the

burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s explanation is a

pretext for discrimination. Anderson v. Wachovia Morg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 271

(3d Cir. 2010).

Here, York’s motion correctly argues it is entitled to summary judgment on

Cooper’s disability discrimination claim at the first step of the McDonnell Douglas

analysis because Cooper cannot show he was a “qualified individual” at the time of

his termination. There is no factual dispute that York corrections officers are

responsible for the care, custody, and control of inmates (Doc. 26 p. 4), and the job

description for the position makes clear that officers “must be physically able” to (1)

“stand for periods of two hours or longer,” (2) “climb stairs to conduct required

security rounds,” (3) “respond to emergencies by walking quickly,” and (4) “be

involved in physical altercations and apply appropriate restraints.” (Doc. 26-3 p. 2.)

Notwithstanding these requirements, shortly before his termination, Cooper

acknowledged to Ogle and Strickhauser that he was unable or unwilling to navigate

stairs or respond to certain emergencies, explaining to them that if “somebody is

counting on me to get to them quickly in an emergent situation, and my physical

limitation prevented that, I would be reluctant to take the responsibility for being

placed in that situation.” (Doc. 26 ¶ 37.) There is no suggestion in the record that

Cooper could climb stairs or quickly walk during emergencies with the assistance of

a reasonable accommodation. And as numerous federal courts analyzing similar

factual scenarios have persuasively held, given the sensitive nature and challenges

of working in a prison environment, a corrections officer unable to perform the

essential custody and control functions of the position is not a “qualified individual”

for purposes of the ADA. See e.g., Gera v. Cnty. of Schuylkill, 617 F. App’x 144,

146 (3d Cir. 2015) (upholding a district court’s findings that a corrections officer

was not properly classified as a qualified individual where the officer “conceded that

he could not engage in the custody or control of inmates due to his physical

disabilities” and “[n]o reasonable accommodation existed that would have enabled

[the officer] to perform this function.”); see also Mannan v. Colorado, 841 F. App'x

61, 68 (10th Cir. 2020) (holding that correction officer operating in prison control

room was not a qualified individual because they would be unable to execute the

“essential functions” of a corrections officer position including swiftly responding

to an emergency and applying physical restraint); Dargis v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 981,

988 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding county correctional officer who previously suffered a

stroke was not a qualified individual for ADA purposes because he could not

demonstrate that he could perform the essential functions of the position requiring

inmate contact); Cole v. Taber, 587 F. Supp. 2d 856, 865 (W.D. Tenn. 2008)

(granting summary judgment and finding that the plaintiff, a county corrections

officer, was not a qualified individual under the ADA given his inability to conduct

security checks, escort inmates, or respond to emergency situations). York is

therefore entitled to summary judgment on Cooper’s ADA and PHRA disability

discrimination claims.

B. Age Discrimination

For substantially the same reasons, York is entitled to summary judgment on

Cooper’s age discrimination claims. The ADEA and PHRA prohibit employers from

discriminating against an employee because of age. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); 43

P.S. § 955(a). To prevail on a claim for age discrimination, the plaintiff must show

that his age “actually motivated” or “had a determinative influence on” the

employer’s adverse employment action. Fasold v. Just., 409 F.3d 178, 183–84 (3d

Cir. 2005) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141

(2000)); see Kautz v. Met-Pro Corp., 412 F.3d 463, 466 n. 1 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The

same legal standard applies to both the ADEA and the PHRA and therefore it is

proper to address them collectively.”). Where, as here, the plaintiff relies upon

indirect evidence of discrimination, age discrimination claims are analyzed pursuant

to the McDonnell Douglas framework. Fasold, 409 F.3d at 184; see also Evanoski

v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 571 F. App'x 92, 95 (3d Cir. 2014). To state a prima

facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate the following:

[F]irst, that the plaintiff is forty years of age or older; second, that the

defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff;

third, that the plaintiff was qualified for the position in question; and

fourth, that the plaintiff was ultimately replaced by another employee

who was sufficiently younger to support an inference of discriminatory

animus.

Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 689 (3d Cir. 2009).

Here, Cooper cannot establish a prima facie case of age discrimination,

because, as discussed above, he was not qualified for the position of a corrections

officer. The record is clear that Cooper was unwilling or unable to carry out the

essential functions of the position, and Cooper’s arguments that York could have

transformed his temporary light duty assignment into a full-time position are

unpersuasive. Moreover, even if he could show he was qualified for the position,

Cooper still fails to satisfy his burden because there is no evidence in the record that

he was ultimately replaced by a sufficiently younger employee. While Cooper

attempts to rely on a list of newly-hired individuals to satisfy this aspect of a prima

facie case (see Doc. 30 ¶ 120), the list merely sets forth the names and hiring dates

of individuals—not their birthdates. (See Doc. 28-20.) The deposition testimony on

which Cooper relies, including testimony by Ogle, likewise sheds no light on the age

of individuals who replaced Cooper at his light duty post. (See Doc. 26-14 p. 31.)

Because Cooper does not point to specific evidence in the record to support that he

was qualified for the position or that he was replaced by a sufficiently younger

individual, he fails to satisfy his prima facie burden, and York is entitled to summary

judgment on Cooper’s age discrimination claims.

C. ADA and PHRA Retaliation

York also moves for summary judgment on Cooper’s claims for retaliation

under the ADA and PHRA. (Doc. 23 pp. 9-10.) “To establish a prima facie retaliation

claim under the ADA, an employee must show ‘(1) protected employee activity; (2)

adverse action by the employer either after or contemporaneous with the employee’s

protected activity; and (3) a causal connection between the employee’s protected

activity and the employer's adverse action.” Soutner v. Penn State Health, 841 F.

App’x 409, 415 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494,

500 (3d Cir. 1997)). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts

to the employer to articulate a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its

decision. See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). If the employer satisfies its burden, the burden shifts back

to the plaintiff to show pretext “by identifying evidence ‘from which a factfinder

could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons;

or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a

motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s action.’” Duran v. Cnty. of

Clinton, 380 F. Supp. 3d 440, 454 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (quoting Shaner v. Synthes, 204

F.3d 494, 501 (3d Cir. 2000)).

Here, York does not dispute that Cooper presents a prima facie case of ADA

retaliation. The record supports that Cooper engaged in a protected activity and

asserted his rights under the ADA by seeking accommodations for his knee and leg

problems, and that Cooper ultimately experienced an adverse action in the form of

his termination. Moreover, the record contains some evidence of a causal connection

between Cooper’s request for accommodations and termination. Cooper testified

that immediately following his request for accommodation and continuing through

until his termination, he was consistently subjected to comments and unnecessary

inquiries related to his light-duty status and plans for retirement. (See Doc. 28 pp.

22-23; Doc. 26-1 pp. 39, 56.) Cooper testified he was inundated with light-duty

remarks and inquiries as much as several times per day, sometimes within in an hour

of one another. (See Doc. 26-1 pp. 39, 42, 107.) While many of the comments may

not have been inherently discriminatory, they were made by individuals with

supervisory authority, including one supervisor who ordered Cooper to come off

light duty, and they unambiguously invoked Cooper’s disability, advanced age, and

separation from the County. Considering this evidence, Cooper is able to satisfy his

prima facie burden.

Just as Cooper is able to satisfy his initial burden, York satisfies its burden of

articulating a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for its decision to terminate

Cooper. York contends that Cooper was terminated due to his inability to execute

the essential functions of a correctional officer position and come off light-duty, and

for substantially the same reasons outlined above, the record supports Cooper was

unable or unwilling to do so. (See Doc. 26-25 p. 2.)

So too does Cooper satisfy his burden of presenting sufficient evidence from

which a factfinder could disbelieve York’s proffered reason or believe that

retaliation was more likely than not a motivating cause of York’s termination

decision. Cooper’s testimony that immediately upon requesting an accommodation,

he was repeatedly questioned about his light-duty status and plans for retirement,

would allow a reasonable jury to infer that York was displeased with the underlying

request itself. The timing of the purported questions and comments, viewed in a light

most favorable to Cooper, arguably undermines York’s explanation that Cooper’s

termination was spurred by his long-term inability to complete the essential duties

of his position. The remarks were made by ostensible decisionmakers—human

resources personnel and Cooper’s supervisor, the Deputy Warden—and occurred

with such purported frequency that they could reasonably be viewed as an attempt

by York to drive Cooper from his position. To be sure, there is ample evidence in

the record to support York’s version of the events that Cooper was terminated

because he overstayed the County’s regular period for light-duty and was unable or

unwilling to execute the essential functions of the position. But that evidence must

be weighed against the apparent scrutiny and pushback Cooper experienced from

the time he requested light duty until his termination. And considering the timing

and frequency of the Cooper’s treatment, as well as the subjects and speakers of the

comments made to him, a reasonable jury could find that retaliation played a role in

Cooper’s termination. Summary judgment is therefore not appropriate on Cooper’s

ADA and PHRA retaliation claims.

D. FMLA Retaliation

York also moves for summary judgment on Cooper’s FMLA retaliation claim.

Under the FMLA, an employer may not “‘discharge or in any other manner

discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful.’”

Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 301 (3d Cir. 2012)

(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)). “To prevail on a retaliation claim under the

FMLA, the plaintiff must prove that (1) [he] invoked [his] right to FMLA-qualifying

leave, (2) [he] suffered an adverse employment decision, and (3) the adverse action

was causally related to her invocation of rights.” Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 301-02.

Where, as here, the plaintiff’s claim is not predicated on direct evidence of

retaliation, the claim is analyzed using the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting

framework. Id. at 302.

Here, York’s motion correctly argues that Cooper cannot establish prima facie

claim because there is no evidence in the record of a causal connection between

Cooper’s invocation of FMLA rights and his eventual termination. No temporal

connection exists between the events because Cooper requested and was continually

approved for intermittent FMLA leave beginning at least nine months prior to his

termination. (See Doc. 26-1 p. 41.) Cooper does not point to any evidence suggesting

that York disapproved of him taking FMLA leave, and in stark contrast to the

treatment Cooper received regarding his light duty status, there is no indication that

Cooper was incessantly questioned or otherwise subjected to repeated comments

regarding his leave under the statute. Cooper’s testimony to the contrary relies on

subjective feelings and beliefs which are insufficient to establish causation. Cf.

Dinnerstein v. Burlington Cnty. Coll., 764 F. App’x 214, 217 (3d Cir. 2019). (See

Doc. 26-1 p. 41) (“I think management was of the opinion that, you know, that I had

had FMLA, maybe they felt I had it long enough. I don’t remember that being clearly

said at any point. And, again, it was mostly attitudinal rather than overt action being

taken on anyone’s part.”) Moreover, while Cooper points to a suspension he received

in connection with FMLA leave, the relevant suspension notice indicates it was

issued because Cooper tried calling off work after having already used his approved

leave under the statute. (See Doc. 28-12 p. 2.) There is no reason to credit Cooper’s

conclusory claim that the suspension was issued in retaliation for his taking leave in

the first place. And in the absence of any perceptible link between Cooper’s exercise

of FMLA rights and his termination by York, Cooper is unable to satisfy a prima

facie claim. York is accordingly entitled to summary judgment on Cooper’s FMLA

retaliation claim.

E. Hostile Work Environment

Finally, York’s motion re quests summary judgment on Cooper’s claims for

hostile work environment under the ADEA and PHRA. “To prevail on a hostile work

environment claim, a plaintiff must show that his workplace was ‘permeated with

discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] employment and create an abusive working

environment.’” Culler v. Sec’y of U.S. Veterans Affairs, 507 Fed.Appx. 246, 249–50

(3d Cir.2012) (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116,

(2002)) (alteration omitted); see Slater v. Susquehanna Cnty., 465 F. App’x 132, 138

(3d Cir. 2012) (“We assume, without deciding, that the ADEA makes available a

hostile work environment claim for age-based discrimination, analyzed under the

same standards as a Title VII hostile work environment claim.”); Burton v. Teleflex

Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 432 (3d Cir. 2013) (treating PHRA claim the same as plaintiff’s

ADEA and Title VII claims).

York is entitled to summary judgment on Cooper’s hostile work environment

claims because the treatment he claims to have been subjected to was not sufficiently

severe or pervasive. While Cooper testified that he was the target of roughly sixty

age-related comments between October 2020 and March 2021, many of the remarks

appear to have been routine requests for information about Cooper’s disability status,

and the comments went no further than asking about retirement, repeatedly noting

Cooper’s light duty status, and telling Cooper that he was not “get[ting] any

younger.” (See Doc. 26-1 pp. 43-44, 47-48.) The remarks were, by and large, not

inherently discriminatory, and there is no evidence that Cooper was physically

threatened, publicly humiliated, screamed at, or targeted with any epithets. Even

viewing the record in a light most favorable to Cooper, no reasonable jury could find

that the comments to which he testified altered the conditions of his employment or

created an abusive work environment. See Whitesell v. Dobson Comm’n, 353 F.

App’x 715, 717 (3d Cir.2009) (dismissing hostile work environment claims where

plaintiff’s supervisor’s age-related remarks were neither physical threatening nor

humiliating nor interfered with plaintiff’s work performance). York is therefore

entitled to summary judgment on Cooper’s hostile work environment claims.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, York’s motion for summary judgment will be

granted in part and denied in part. An appropriate order shall follow.

Dated: January 17, 2024

/s/ Sylvia H. Rambo

SYLVIA H. RAMBO

United States District Judge