The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TIMOTHY MCANDREW, No. 4:22-CV-00834
Administrator of the Estate of
MEGHAN MCANDREW, Deceased, (Chief Judge Brann)
Plaintiff,
v.
NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY,
JAMES HOSKIN, and
JOHN DOES 1-6,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
JANUARY 17, 2024
I. BACKGROUND
Pending before the Court is the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second
Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Now on
the third iteration of this suit, Timothy McAndrew has sued Northumberland
County, Corrections Officer James Hoskin, and six unnamed Corrections Officers
on behalf of his daughter, Meghan McAndrew, following her death by suicide at the
Northumberland County Jail. The motion is now ripe for disposition; for the reasons
that follow, it is granted in part and denied in part.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Dismiss Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), courts dismiss a complaint,
in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Following the landmark decisions of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly1 and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,2 “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’”3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed
that “[u]nder the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court
reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps”: (1) “take note of the
elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim”; (2) “identify allegations that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of
truth”; and (3) “assume the[] veracity” of all “well-pleaded factual allegations” and
then “determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”4
B. Facts Alleged in the Second Amended Complaint
The facts alleged in the Second Amended Complaint, which this Court must
accept as true for purposes of this motion, are as follows.
1 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
3 Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
4 Connelly v. Lane Construction Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
1. The Intake Process and Suicide Watch Protocol
As noted above, Timothy McAndrew (“Mr. McAndrew”) is the father of the
deceased, Meghan McAndrew (“Ms. McAndrew”).5 After being taken into custody
on February 6, 2022, the Northumberland County Jail (the “Jail”) housed Ms.
McAndrew until her death five days later.6 During the intake process, Ms.
McAndrew indicated that she was an addict and that she had used drugs earlier that
day.7 Due to a prior incarceration, the Jail was also aware that she had a history of
mental illness, including a suicide attempt and a stint in a psychiatric facility.8 The
Jail subsequently placed Ms. McAndrew on suicide watch and gave its staff “certain
‘alerts,’ including that she was to be placed in a cell with only a low bunk and [that]
she was to be checked every” fifteen minutes.9 Despite this, her cell had both a top
and bottom bunk.10
2. Ms. McAndrew’s Suicide
Jail staff last checked on Ms. McAndrew at 9:26 a.m. on February 11, 202211
and then failed to perform nine suicide watch checks.12 While unsupervised, Ms.
McAndrew “fashioned her bedsheet into a noose” and proceeded to hang herself
5 See Doc. 31 (Second Amended Compl.) ¶ 2.
6 See id. ¶ 11
7 See id. ¶¶ 13-16.
8 See id. ¶¶ 20-22.
9 Id. ¶ 17.
10 See id. ¶ 18.
11 See id. ¶ 40.
12 See id. ¶ 41.
“from the top bunk in her cell.”13 Inmates alerted Corrections Officer (“CO”) Hoskin
“that something was wrong with Ms. McAndrew” at 11:52 a.m. and she was
pronounced dead after being transported to a hospital.14
3. Other Suicides
Ms. McAndrew is not the Jail’s first inmate suicide. Mr. McAndrew identified
three suicides that occurred at the Jail before his daughter’s death. Andrew Beers
committed suicide at the Jail on August 13, 2013; no further details regarding the
circumstances of his death were provided.15 On June 15, 2014, Cyrus Lewis “was
supposed to be on [fifteen]-minute suicide checks” but “was discovered by other
inmates approximately one hour after he was last checked by a CO.”16 Mr. Lewis
had been “housed alone and [had] placed a sheet in front of the window to his cell
and no CO noticed this for at least one hour until he was discovered by another
inmate.”17 Finally, Sean Beers committed suicide on September 15, 2021 by
“hanging himself using the bedsheets provided to him by the Jail.”18 It is not stated
whether Mr. Beers was on suicide watch, but it is alleged that no investigation
occurred and no remedial actions were taken following his suicide.19
13 Id. ¶ 42.
14 Id. ¶ 40, 43.
15 See id. ¶ 77.
16 Id. ¶ 78.
17 Id. ¶ 79.
18 Id. ¶¶ 23-24.
19 See id. ¶ 25.
4. Roles of the Defendants
Northumberland County (“the County”) “owns, operates, manages, directs
and controls the [Jail] and had the responsibility of adopting policies and
implementing procedures and practices which would create an environment whereby
inmates would be safe.”20 The Jail’s COs “are required to monitor and ensure the
safety of individuals identified as suicidal.”21 The investigative report into Ms.
McAndrew’s death further states that COs perform the suicide watch checks.22
Hoskin and the six unnamed COs were on-duty the morning of Ms. McAndrew’s
suicide.23
5. Training in Place at the Jail
Mr. McAndrew contends that “the Jail did not have any consistent suicide
prevention training in place” at the time of Ms. McAndrew’s death.24 It is further
alleged that (1) only “some COs may have been shown a one-hour video on suicide
prevention”;25 (2) the County “failed to provide COs with training regarding warning
signs of potential suicides”26 and (3) the “investigative report completed by [the]
Northumberland County District Attorney’s Office cited only one suicide
20 Id. ¶ 8
21 Id. ¶ 69.
22 See id. ¶ 74.
23 See id. ¶¶ 39-42.
24 Id. ¶ 65.
25 Id. ¶ 67.
26 Id. ¶ 70.
prevention-related policy in place for COs at the Jail: inmates identified as suicidal
were to be checked by COs every fifteen” minutes.27
C. Analysis
The Court will first evaluate the constitutional violations asserted in Counts I
and III of the Second Amended Complaint before proceeding to the state law claims
brought in Counts II, IV, and V.
1. Count I –Violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments Pursuant to Section 1983
Ms. McAndrew’s rights as a pretrial detainee are governed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment.28 The Court has previously concluded that
Mr. McAndrew has satisfied the Third Circuit’s three-prong test for determining if
a pre-trial detainee’s claim “arising from a jail suicide” violated the Fourteenth
Amendment as asserted against the County and the unnamed COs.29 The Court will
therefore focus on Defendant Hoskin.
Although Hoskin’s arguments concerning his lack of personal involvement in
the constitutional violation and his entitlement to qualified immunity are not overly
persuasive, he will nevertheless be dismissed with prejudice from this case. Mr.
27 Id. ¶74.
28 See Doc. 29 (Aug. 21, 2023 Memorandum Opinion) at 7.
29 Id. at 12-13.
McAndrew failed to respond in his Opposition Brief to any of Hoskin’s arguments
and in fact endorses his dismissal.30
2. Count III – Monell Claim
The Court will instead turn its attention to the Monell claim asserted against
the County in Count III.31 “Courts have recognized two avenues to municipal
liability under Monell.”32 “A municipality and its officials acting in their official
capacities can be sued directly under § 1983 only if an action pursuant to a municipal
policy, practice or custom directly causes a constitutional tort.”33 “A plaintiff may
put forth that an unconstitutional policy or custom of the municipality led to his or
her injuries, or that they were caused by a failure or inadequacy by the municipality
that reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.”34
As noted above, the Court has already concluded that Mr. McAndrew has
plausibly asserted a constitutional violation of Ms. McAndrew’s Fourteenth
30 See Doc. 34 (Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim to Second
Amended Compl.) at 6.
31 If Mr. McAndrew were to pursue a claim against the unnamed COs in their official capacities,
these claims would be duplicative of the Monell claim asserted against the County. See Hafer
v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). Further, the Monell framework is inapplicable to the unnamed
COs when they are sued in their personal capacities as Monell is a vehicle for municipal
liability. See id. The appropriate claim against these individuals is the Fourteenth Amendment
violation pursuant to § 1983 as asserted in Count I of the Second Amended Complaint. As
such, the unnamed COs will be dismissed with prejudice from Count III of the Second
Amended Complaint.
32 Alexander v. Bucks Cnty., Civ. A. No. 21-CV-4633, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76883, at *15-16
(E.D. Pa. May 2, 2023).
33 Kelley v. Bradford Cnty., 3:07-CV-1531, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27290, at *20 (M.D. Pa. Mar.
23, 2010).
34 Alexander, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76883, at *16 (quoting Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105
(3d Cir. 2019)).
Amendment rights against the County and the on-duty COs.35 Under the Monell
framework, this is not the end of the analysis; by contrast, it must also be determined
whether Mr. McAndrew has adequately alleged that this constitutional violation was
due to the County’s failure to train its COs. “A municipality may be held liable for
its failure to train employees only where that failure amounts to ‘deliberate
indifference to the [constitutional] rights of persons’” its employees will “come in
contact” with.36 “Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault ‘requiring
proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his
action.’”37 “There are two means of finding such deliberate indifference in a failure
to train claim: (1) through a pattern of similar constitutional violations providing a
municipal actor with notice; and (2) ‘single-incident’ liability.”38
When asserting a failure to train claim based on a pattern of similar violations,
deliberate indifference is sufficiently pled by showing “(1) municipal policymakers
know that employees will confront a particular situation[,] (2) the situation involves
a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling[,] and (3) the wrong choice
by an employee will frequently cause [the] deprivation of constitutional rights.”39
35 See Doc. 29 (Aug. 21, 2023 Memorandum Opinion) at 12-13.
36 Gaymon v. Esposito, Civ. A. No. 11-4170, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116159, at *45 (D.N.J. Aug.
16, 2013) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)).
37 Id. (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011)).
38 Id. at *46.
39 Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Doe v. Luzerne
Cty., 660 F.3d 169, 180 (3d Cir. 2011)).
“Further, causation between the noticed training deficiency and the injury must be
shown.”40
In the limited circumstances where a single incident is sufficient to put a
municipality on notice, “the need for training ‘can be said to be so obvious that [a
municipality’s] failure to do so could properly be characterized as deliberate
indifference to constitutional rights.’”41 The “risk of injury must be a ‘highly
predictable consequence’ of the municipality’s failure to train and supervise its
employees.”42 “Even if that showing can be made, the plaintiff still must demonstrate
that the failure to train ‘proximately caused [the] constitutional injury by identifying
a particular failure in a training program that is closely related to the ultimate
injury.’”43
Although Mr. McAndrew has now provided information regarding three other
suicides, as previously noted by the Court,44 a failure to train claim through a single
incident remains the “most viable Monell theory to come from the” allegations.45
40 Gaymon, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116159, at *47.
41 Alexander, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76883, at *23 (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.
10).
42 Santiago v. City of Harrisburg, Civ. No. 1:19-CV-898, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50359, at *29
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2020) (quoting Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 225 (3d Cir.
2014)).
43 Id. at *29 (quoting Buoniconti v. City of Philadelphia, 148 F. Supp. 3d 425, 441 (E.D. Pa.
2015)).
44 See Doc. 29 (Aug. 21, 2023 Memorandum Opinion) at 20.
45 Id. This conclusion is supported by a comparison to other prison suicide cases. The Western
District of Pennsylvania concluded that “one suicide and two, or perhaps four, suicide
attempts” prior to the decedent’s suicide “hardly constitutes a spate.” Herman v. Clearfield
Cnty., 836 F. Supp. 1178, 1189 (W.D. Pa. 1993).
Mr. McAndrew’s averments in the Second Amended Complaint satisfy the “first
hurdle” of such a claim: it is highly predictable that inmates on suicide watch in a
significantly understaffed jail would be neglected.46 In fact, “after ignoring Ms.
McAndrew for hours, COs were not even the ones to find that she had taken her
life[;]” her “fellow inmates noticed something was wrong and had to alert” Hoskin.47
Thus, the on-duty “COs completely abandoned an at-risk inmate for hours when she
most required supervision.”48 This is particularly confounding given that at least one
other suicide happened under nearly identical circumstances: an individual on
suicide watch used Jail-provided bedsheets to facilitate their suicide after COs failed
to perform the suicide watch checks.49 These allegations are sufficient, at this stage
of the proceeding, to satisfy this initial requirement.
To successfully plead causation, Mr. McAndrew must identify “the training
program that the plaintiff believes is deficient, describe that deficiency, and explain
how the deficiency caused the” injuries.50 Notably, the Second Amended Complaint
46 Doc. 29 (Aug. 21, 2023 Memorandum Opinion) at 20-21.
47 Id. at 21.
48 Id.
49 See Doc. 31 (Second Amended Compl.) ¶¶ 78-79. The Defendants outline at considerable
length allegations they consider to be missing from the Second Amended Complaint. See Doc.
33 (Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim to Second Amended
Complaint) at 13, 17-18. While this information would indeed be relevant, it is not necessary
at this stage of the proceeding. Further, much of the suggested information presumably would
be in the Defendants’ hands and only available through discovery.
50 Alexander, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76883, at *25.
includes new allegations that directly respond to the issues identified by the Court
in its August 21, 2023 Memorandum Opinion.51
First, Mr. McAndrew clarifies the role the County plays in managing the Jail:
it “owns, operates, manages, directs and controls the [Jail] and had the responsibility
of adopting policies and implementing procedures and practices which would create
an environment whereby inmates would be safe.”52 Consequently, the County had
the responsibility to ensure adequate training policies and programs existed at the
Jail.
Next, Mr. McAndrew describes the relevant training programs related to
suicide prevention and detecting suicide warning signs. He contends that the Jail
lacked “any consistent suicide prevention training” before Ms. McAndrew’s death.53
Only “some COs may have been shown a one-hour video on suicide prevention”54
and the COs received no “training regarding [the] warning signs of potential
suicides.”55 The “investigative report completed by [the] Northumberland County
District Attorney’s Office [also] cited only one suicide prevention-related policy in
place for COs at the Jail: inmates identified as suicidal were to be checked by COs
51 See Doc. 29 (Aug. 21, 2023 Memorandum Opinion) at 21.
52 Doc. 31 (Second Amended Compl.) ¶ 8.
53 Id. ¶ 65.
54 Id. ¶ 67.
55 Id. ¶ 70.
every fifteen” minutes.56 Accordingly, Mr. McAndrew has identified with
particularity the deficiencies in these training programs.
Finally, these inadequacies are then linked to Ms. McAndrew’s death. Before
her suicide, Ms. McAndrew slept for “long periods of time without any lights on in
her cell,” had “virtually no contact with other inmates” and suffered from withdrawal
symptoms.57 These “potential warning signs” leading up to her suicide “could have
been identified if Northumberland County had provided its COs with suicide
prevention training.”58 Further, it is alleged that the lack in training regarding “the
necessary precautions to avoid [inmate] suicides” contributed to Ms. McAndrew’s
placement in a cell alone with access to supplies that facilitated her suicide and the
corrections officers’ failure to conduct the required suicide checks.59 In light of these
new allegations, the Court concludes that Mr. McAndrew has adequately pled a
failure to train Monell claim against the County.
3. Wrongful Death and Survival Actions – Counts IV and V
The Defendants contend that the wrongful death and survival actions brought
by Mr. McAndrew are barred by the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims
Act” (“PSTCA”). The PSTCA “provides a general grant of immunity to political
subdivisions, their departments and employees when acting in the scope of their
56 Id. ¶ 74.
57 Id. ¶¶ 29-31.
58 Id. ¶ 72.
59 Id.. ¶¶ 73, 84-85, 87, 112.
employment but provides limited exceptions for such recoveries against political
subdivisions.”60
“The Wrongful Death and Survival Act did not create a new theory of liability
but merely allowed a tort claim of the decedent to be prosecuted.”61 “As a result, a
plaintiff must state all the elements of a valid tort” to pursue these claims.62 Here,
Mr. McAndrew contends that he is permitted to proceed with the wrongful death and
survival actions because he is alleging constitutional violations pursuant to § 1983.63
Neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor the Third Circuit have decided
“whether § 1983, independently or in conjunction with state law, may be used by
survivors when the decedent’s death resulted from a constitutional violation.”64
Although “differing results” have been reached in this Circuit, “I shall take the same
approach as the Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel [in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania] did in Moyer v. Berks Heim Nursing Home,” and “I will allow these
claims to proceed.”65 “After discovery, the parties may address the propriety of these
claims.”66
60 DeJesus v. City of Lancaster, Civ. A. No. 14-CV-3437, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32453, at *6
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2015).
61 Ferencz v. Medlock, 905 F. Supp. 2d 656, 674 n. 10 (W.D. Pa. 2012).
62 Id.
63 See Doc. 34 (Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim to Second
Amended Compl.) at 15-16.
64 DeJesus, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32453, at *7 (citing Berry v. City of Muskogee, Okl., 990 F.2d
1489, 1502 (10th Cir. 1990) and Moyer v. Berks Heim Nursing Home, Civ. A. No. 13-CV-
4497, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36600 (E.D. Pa. 2014)).
65 Id. at *7.
66 Id.
4. Count II – Medical Negligence against the “Medical
Defendants”
Mr. McAndrew has not identified whom the “Medical Defendants” are in the
Second Amended Complaint.67 He will be given two weeks from the date of the
accompanying Order to show cause as to why this claim shall not be dismissed with
prejudice.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) is granted in part and denied in part. Except to show cause regarding the
potential dismissal of the unidentified “Medical Defendants,” Mr. McAndrew will
not be provided any further opportunities to amend this complaint.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge
67 See Doc. 33 (Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim to Second
Amended Compl.) at 19. The “Medical Defendants” similarly were unidentified in the First
Amended Complaint. See Doc. 20 (First Amended Compl.) ¶¶ 84-87.