Myers v. Harry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL MYERS, : No. 3:23-cv-1989

Plaintiff :

: (Judge Munley)

V. :

DR. FOLEREZELL, :

Defendant :

MICHAEL MYERS, : No. 3:23-cv-1990

Plaintiff :

: (Judge Munley)

V. :

DR. LAUREL HARRY, :

Defendant :

MEMORANDUM

1. Background

On November 14, 2023, in the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Plaintiff, Michael Myers, filed Myers v. Dr.

Folerezell, Civil No. 2:23-cv-04565 (E.D. Pa.), a civil rights action, pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. §1983. (Doc. 1). The complaint names Dr. Folerezell as the sole

Defendant and contains the single allegation that Plaintiff's medications were

“forced without a hearing.” Id. For relief, Plaintiff requests Defendant to “stop

all forced medications” and “release [Plaintiff] to general population.” Id.

Also on November 14, 2023, in the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Petitioner filed Myers v. Harry, Civil No.

2:23-cv-04594, a second civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.

(Doc. 1). The complaint names Dr. Laurel Harry, Pennsylvania Department

of Corrections Secretary, as the sole Defendant and contains the single

allegation that the forced medications “made things worse.” Id. For relief,

Plaintiff seeks a transfer to SCl-Benner. Id.

By Order dated November 30, 2023, the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania transferred both of Plaintiff's civil

rights actions to the United States District Court for the Middle District of

Pennsylvania, where they were received and filed on November 4, 2023.

See Myers v. Folerezell, Civil No. 3:23-cv-1989 (M.D. Pa.) and Myers v.

Harry, Civil No. 3:23-cv-1990 (M.D. Pa.).

Because the Court finds that these civil actions challenge the same

medical treatment and request the same relief, the Court consolidates the

latter action, Myers v. Harry, Civil No. 3:23-cv-1990 (M.D. Pa.) into Myers v.

Folerezell, Civil No. 3:23-cv-1989 (M.D. Pa.) and will conduct a preliminary

screening of the consolidated action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1915(e)(2)(B)

and 1915A to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or

malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or

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because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from suit.

For the following reasons, the Plaintiff's consolidated action will be dismissed

for failure to state a claim.

ll. Standards of Review

A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the

screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B) and §1915A(b) if “the

action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief.” Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013).

In dismissing claims under §§1915(e)(2) and 1915A, district courts

apply the standard governing motions to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Smithson v.

Koons, Civ. No. 15-01757, 2017 WL 3016165, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 26, 2017)

(stating “[t]he legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a

claim under §1915A(b)(1), §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or §1997e(c)(1) is the same as

that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure.”); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa.

2010) (explaining that when dismissing a complaint pursuant to §1915A, “a

court employs the motion to dismiss standard set forth under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”); Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240

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(3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard for dismissal for

failure to state a claim under §1915(e)(2)(B)).

In rendering a decision on a motion to dismiss, a court should not

inquire “whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is

entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416

U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 1996). The

court must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw

all reasonable inferences from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

See Phillips v. Cty of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). In addition

to considering the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, the court may

consider “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and

matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor

Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).

However, “[t]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (stating “[t]hreadbare recitals of

the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,

do not suffice.”). “Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and

Iqbal, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps.

First, it must ‘tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a

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claim.’ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Second, it should identify

allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled

to the assumption of truth.’ Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. See also Burtch v.

Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Mere restatements

of the elements of a claim are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” (citation

and editorial marks omitted)). Finally, ‘[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual

allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d

Cir. 2016) (footnote omitted). Deciding whether a claim is plausible is a

“context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

Because Myers proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and

his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted).

lil. Factual Background

Plaintiff alleges that his psychotropic medication has been

administered through force without a hearing. (Doc. 1). He challenges the

“ineffectiveness of the medications,” claiming that “they made things worse.”

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Id. As a result, Plaintiff seeks to have the medication immediately stopped

and to be transferred to general population or to SC!-Benner. Id.

On October 5, 2023, correspondence from Plaintiff to Defendant Harry

was responded to with the following:

Your correspondence, addressed to Secretary of Corrections Dr.

Laurel Harry, regarding your request to be transferred to SCI-

Benner, has been received and referred to me for review and

response.

Any request for transfer consideration begins with your unit team.

They are in the best position to make a determination if a transfer

is appropriate at this time. Please strive for misconduct free

behavior, be patient, and remain cooperative with staff in the

meantime.

lf you have any immediate concerns, please notify your unit

team.

(Doc. 2-1 at 1).

On October 24, 2023, Plaintiffs Grievance No. 1057695 regarding his

medication was denied as follows:

Upon review of your medical record, it is noted that you are

admitted to the inpatient psychiatric hospital/FTC at SCI-

Waymart and have multiple psychiatric providers that have

reviewed your history and are working together to help you be as

healthy as possible. They’re attempting to work with you as they

meet to discuss your medications and assess their effectiveness

as professionals.

(Doc. 2-1 at 4).

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On October 25, 2023, Plaintiff's Grievance No. 1057964 regarding his

medication was denied as follows:

Upon review of your medical record, you are currently court

committed to the FTC Inpatient psychiatric unit and the use of

force medication over objection has been deemed necessary by

2 psychiatrists.

(Doc. 2-1 at 2).

IV. Discussion

A. Eighth Amendment Medical Claim

In order to establish an Eighth Amendment medical claim, a plaintiff

must show “(i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison

Officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” Natale v. Camden

Cty. Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). See also Rouse

v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). A serious medical need is one

that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, or one that

is so obvious that a layperson would recognize the need for a doctor's

attention. Monmouth County Correctiona! Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro,

834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987). In addition, “if unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain results as a consequence of denial or delay in the provision

of adequate medical care, the medical need is of the serious nature

contemplated by the eighth amendment.” Id.

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A prison official acts with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious

medical needs when he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and

he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837

(1994). Thus, a complaint that a physician or a medical department “has

been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state

a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment ...”

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). For instance, a “medical decision

not to order an X-ray, or like measures, does not represent cruel and unusual

punishment. At most it is medical malpractice.” Id., 429 U.S. at 107. “[A]s

long as a physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will not

violate a prisoner's constitutional rights.” Brown y. Borough of

Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990). Further, a doctor's

disagreement with the professional judgment of another doctor is not

actionable under the Eighth Amendment. See White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d

103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990). In sum, negligence, unsuccessful medical treatment,

or medical malpractice does not give rise to a §1983 cause of action, and an

inmate’s disagreement with medical treatment is insufficient to establish

deliberate indifference. See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir.

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4993). A mere difference of opinion between the prison’s medical staff and

the inmate regarding the diagnosis or treatment which the inmate receives

does not support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment. Farmer v.

Carlson, 685 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (M.D. Pa. 1988). See McCracken v.

Jones, 562 F.2d 22, 24 (10th Cir. 1977); Smart v. Villar, 547 F.2d 112, 113

(10th Cir. 1976).

Additionally, if a prisoner disputes the adequacy of the treatment,

courts have consistently been reluctant to second guess the medical

judgment of the attending physician. Little v. Lycoming County, 912 F. Supp.

809, 815 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 101 F.3d 691 (3d Cir. 1996). The key question is

whether the defendant has provided the plaintiff with some type of treatment,

regardless of whether it is the treatment the plaintiff desires. Farmer

Carlson, 685 F. Supp. at 1339.

The documentation attached to Plaintiffs consolidated complaint

clearly demonstrates that Plaintiff is receiving medical attention, and that the

attention he received lacks the requisite deliberate indifference to support a

Section 1983 claim. At best, Plaintiffs complaint demonstrates his

disagreement with the court committed confinement to the FTC Inpatient

psychiatric unit and the doctors’ determination that forced medication is

necessary to treat Plaintiff. Though he may wish to receive different

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medication, or no medication at all, his disagreement with the course of

action that Defendants have taken is not enough to state a §1983 claim.

Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1109 (3d Cir. 1989). This is particularly so

in light of the fact that the consolidated complaint contains no allegations that

any of the Defendants intentionally withheld, or administered, medical

treatment in order to inflict pain or harm upon Plaintiff. Farmer, 511 U.S. at

837; Rouse, 12 F.3d at 197. Thus, the allegations in the Plaintiffs complaint

amount to nothing more than Plaintiffs subjective disagreement with the

treatment decisions and medical judgment of the medical staff at the prison

and do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment constitutional violation.

B. Request for a Transfer

It is well established that prisoners have no inherent constitutional right

to placement in any particular prison, to any security classification, or to any

particular housing assignment. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245

(1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976); Montayne_v.

|| Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 243 (1976); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9

(1976).

Rather, a prison “has a penological interest in the housing placement

of its inmates” and, accordingly, “the decision where to house inmates is at

the core of prison administrators’ expertise.” Thomaston v. Meyer, 519 Fed.

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Appx. 118, 119 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation omitted). Thus, although

Myers may prefer to be housed in general population, or transferred to

another institution, he has no constitutional right to that status. See, e.g.,

Podhorn v. Grondolsky, 350 Fed. Appx. 618, 620 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[P]risoners

have no constitutional right to be assigned to a particular institution, facility

or rehabilitative program.”); Keeling v. Barrager, 2014 WL 1338077, at “6

(M.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 2014) (‘[T]he United States Constitution does not confer

any right upon an inmate to any particular custody or security classification.”).

Thus, Plaintiffs consolidated complaint is without merit.

V. Leave to Amend

The Third Circuit has instructed that if a civil rights complaint is

vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must

permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable

or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

Here, it is clear from the facts alleged in Plaintiffs pro se consolidated

complaint and his attached exhibits that any attempt to amend the Plaintiff's

§1983 claims against the named Defendants would be futile. See Spruill v.

Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). Thus, the Court will dismiss the

Plaintiff's §1983 claims without leave to amend.

VI. Conclusion

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Based on the forgoing, the Court will consolidate, Myers v. Harry, Civil

No. 3:23-cv-1990 (M.D. Pa.) into Myers v. Folerezell, Civil No. 3:23-cv-1989

(M.D. Pa.) and Plaintiff's consolidated complaint, Civil No. 3:23-cv-1989, will

be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A separate Order will be issued.

BY THE COURT:

JUD LIA K:

United States District Jud

Date: December (, 2023 \

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