Bressi v. Northumberland County Court

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

AARON J. BRESSI, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:22-cv-1878

Plaintiff :

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY :

COURT, et al.,

:

Defendant :

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the court in this fee-paid pro se civil rights lawsuit is

the report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge Joseph F. Saporito Jr.,

(Doc. 24), dated October 20, 2023. Judge Saporito conducted the legally

required screening review of Plaintiff’s amended complaint, (Doc. 17), and

recommends that it be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff filed a timely

objection to Judge Saporito’s report. (Doc. 25). However, based on its own

review of the record as described below, the court agrees with Judge

Saporito’s recommendation and will dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint

with prejudice.

I. Legal Standard

When objections are timely filed to the report and recommendation of

a magistrate judge, the district court must review de novo those portions of

the report to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1); Brown v.

Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011). Although the standard of review is

de novo, the district court “may also, in the exercise of sound judicial

discretion, rely on the Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings and

recommendations.” Bynum v. Colvin, 198 F. Supp 3d 434, 437 (E.D. Pa.

2016) (citing United Stated v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)).

District courts also have an on-going statutory obligation to

preliminarily review a pro se complaint to determine whether any claims are

frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

See 28 U.S.C. '1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). This statutory text mirrors the language of

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a

complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief, a court

must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and accept “all reasonable

inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light

most favorable to the non-movant.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien &

Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required

to accept legal conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice”).

When reviewing a pro se complaint, the court must construe such

complaints liberally “so ‘as to do substantial justice.’” Alston v. Parker, 363

F. 3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting R. Civ. P. 8(f)). The court must apply

the relevant law even if the pro se plaintiff does not mention it by name.

Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F. 3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Higgins v.

Beyer, 293 F. 3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)).

II. Discussion

Since the report correctly states the procedural and factual background

of this case, (Doc. 24, at 1-3), it will not be repeated herein. In short this is a

lawsuit against a host of state courts, judges, prosecutors, court clerks,

prothonotaries, and hearing officers challenging their handling of Plaintiff’s

pro se filings in connection with post-conviction collateral relief proceedings

in his underlying state criminal case.

At the onset Judge Saporito found that the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, and the Northumberland

County Court of Common Pleas are arms of the Pennsylvania state

government, and thus they are immune from suit under the Eleventh

Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Benn v. First Judicial Dist.

Of Pa., 426 F. 3d 233, 240 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that the Pennsylvania

courts are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit). Plaintiff does

not object to this finding. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against these three

state court defendants will be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Judge Saporito also found that Plaintiff’s claims against the remaining

individual Defendants are all bared by absolute judicial, quasi-judicial, or

prosecutorial immunity. Plaintiff’s claim against Judge Rosini, the presiding

judge in his state court criminal proceedings, is barred by absolute judicial

immunity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12-13 (1991) (per curium).

Plaintiff’s claims against county prosecutors, Mr. Matulewicz and Ms.

Zenzinger, are barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). Plaintiff’s claims against court clerks

and prothonotaries based on their handling of litigation papers he submitted

for filings with their courts, are barred by quasi-judicial immunity. See

Marcedes v. Barrett, 453 F.2s 391, 392 (3d Cir. 1971). Likewise, Plaintiff’s

claim against Ms. Skoff, in connection with her actions taken in her role as a

custody and PFA hearing officer for the court of common pleas, is barred by

quasi-judicial immunity as well. See Lepre v. Tolerico, 156 Fed. App’x 522,

525 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curium).

Plaintiff objects to these findings arguing that judges and district

attorneys, including assistant district attorneys, will be deprived of their

immunity and subject to liability when they acted in the clear absence of all

jurisdiction. In support of this proposition Plaintiff cites Stump v. Sparkman,

where the Supreme Court held “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity

because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in

excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has

acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978).

However, in the same case the Supreme Court also found that where a judge

presides over a court of general jurisdiction, “neither the procedural errors

he may have committed nor the lack of a specific statute authorizing his

approval of the petition in question rendered him liable in damages for the

consequences of his actions.” Id. at 359–60.

Here Plaintiff does not plead any facts that would indicate Judge Rosini

acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction. In his objection to Judge Saporito’s

report Plaintiff appears to assert that Defendants failed to follow court rules

and procedures, but according to the case cited by Plaintiff, Judge Rosini,

who presides over a court of general jurisdiction, is not liable in damages for

procedural errors or even acting without specific statutory authorization.

Likewise, the authority cited by Plaintiff does not even mention an exception

to prosecutorial immunity. Thus, neither Judge Rosini nor the individual

prosecutor Defendants will be deprived of their absolute judicial or

prosecutorial immunity.

Plaintiff appears to further object to Judge Saporito’s findings regarding

Defendants’ immunity on the basis that these Defendants violated his clearly

established statutory and constitutional rights and therefore are not entitled

to qualified immunity. However, Judge Saporito found that Defendants are

entitled to absolute judicial, quasi-judicial, and prosecutorial immunity not

qualified immunity. Thus, this objection is of no moment.

Plaintiff also generally objects to Judge Saporito’s report on the basis

that Judge Saporito did not liberally construe his complaint and fails to

distinguish between Plaintiff’s due process and government negligence

claims. However, based on its review of the complaint the court finds that

Judge Saporito liberally construed the complaint in making his

recommendations. Based on the plain text of Plaintiff’s amended complaint

the exact or even general nature of his claims is unclear. Nonetheless Judge

Saporito construed the largely incoherent statements in the amended

complaint into a potential due process claim. The fact that Judge Saporito

does not distinguish such a claim from Plaintiff’s government negligence

claim ultimately does not matter because all the Defendants are entitled to

either sovereign, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutorial immunity from all

claims whether they sound in tort or the constitution. Accordingly, all of

Plaintiff’s claims against the individual Defendants will be dismissed.

Judge Saporito recognizes that generally a district court must permit a

curative amendment, prior to dismissing a complaint, unless an amendment

would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.

3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). However, he found that based on the fact alleged

in Plaintiff’s amended complaint and Plaintiff’s substantial history of meritless

or frivolous serial litigation, further amendments would be futile.1 This court

1 See Bressi v. Gembic, No. 23-5318, 2023 WL 6558730 (U.S. Oct.

10, 2023) (dismissing petition for writ of certiorari and instructing that, “[a]s

petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the Clerk is directed

not to accept any further petition in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless

the docketing fee . . . is paid and the petition” complies with booklet

formatting rules); Bressi v. McCloud, No. 23-5316, 2023 WL 6558728 (U.S.

Oct. 10, 2023) (same); Bressi v. Brennen, No. 23-5317, 2023 WL 6379069

(U.S. Oct. 2, 2023) (same); see also Bressi v. Pa. Parole Bd., No. 4:23-CV-

00440, 2023 WL 5184965 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2023); Bressi v.

Northumberland Cnty. CYS, Civil Action No. 4:22-CV-1776, 2023 WL

3919751 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2023), R&R adopted, 2023 WL 3919543 (M.D.

Pa. June 9, 2023), appeal filed, No. 23-2156 (3d Cir. June 29, 2023); Bressi

v. Pa. Parole Bd., No. 1:21-CV-01265, 2022 WL 617117 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 2,

2022), aff ’d per curiam, No. 22-1462, 2022 WL 17337570 (3d Cir. Nov. 30,

2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2485 (2023); Bressi v. McCloud, Civil Action

No. 4:18-cv-01345, 2019 WL 7372778 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2019), R&R

(footnote continued on next page)

agrees. Plaintiff has already amended his complaint once and even when

viewed in the light most favorable to him his amended complaint is still devoid

of facts cable of supporting a cognizable claim against any Defendant let

alone those entitled to sovereign or absolute immunity. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s amendment complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.

III. Conclusion

In light of the foregoing the Report and Recommendation of Judge

Saporito, (Doc. 24), will be ADOPTED IN ITS ENTIRETY as the decision of

the court. Plaintiff’s objections, (Doc. 25), will be OVERRULED, and his

amended complaint, (Doc. 17), will be DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk

of Court will be directed to close this case. An appropriate order follows.

S/ Malachy E. Mannion_

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

DATE: January 5, 2024

22-cv-1878

adopted, 2019 WL 7290430 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2019), aff ’d per curiam, No.

20-1077, 2021 WL 5054351 (3d Cir. Nov. 1, 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct.

1383 (2022); Bressi v. Brennen, Civil Action No. 4:17cv-01742, 2019 WL

5092529 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2019), R&R adopted, 2019 WL 4386897 (M.D.

Pa. Sept. 13, 2019), aff ’d per curiam, 823 Fed. App’x 116 (3d Cir. 2020),

cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1705 (2021); Bressi v. Gembic, Civil Action No. 4:17-

cv-01405, 2018 WL 3596859 (M.D. Pa. July 2, 2018), R&R adopted, 2018

WL 3584694 (M.D. Pa. July 26, 2018), aff ’d per curiam, 752 Fed. App’x 113

(3d Cir. 2019),cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 166 (2019).