Finefrock v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DANIEL FINEFROCK, :

Petitioner :

: No. 1:22-cv-00934

v. :

: (Judge Kane)

PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF :

PROBATION AND PAROLE, et al., :

Respondents :

MEMORANDUM

Petitioner Daniel Finefrock (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner in the custody of the

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”), commenced the above-captioned action by

filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to, presumably, the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 (“Section 2254”). (Doc. No. 1.) For the reasons set forth below, the petition will be

dismissed.

I. BACKGROUND

On or about October 10, 2020, while Petitioner was on state parole, he “punched” another

individual “on the mouth” in Lebanon County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. No. 9-1 at 3.) He was

arrested and charged with simple assault. (Id. at 2–3.) On May 19, 2021, pursuant to a plea

agreement, he pleaded guilty and received a sentence of incarceration for a minimum of one (1)

year and a maximum of two (2) years. (Id. at 6.) At that time, his controlling minimum date was

October 11, 2022, and his controlling maximum date was October 11, 2023. (Id.) However,

because he had been convicted of a new offense, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole

(“Parole Board”) issued a decision on September 2, 2021, recommitting Petitioner to a state

correctional institution “as a convicted parole violator to serve 12 months backtime.” (Id. at 36.)

In addition, the Parole Board denied Petitioner any credit “for the time spent at liberty on parole”

due to the “assaultive” nature of the new offense. (Id.) As a result, Petitioner’s maximum date

was recalculated to August 13, 2029. (Id. at 36, 37.)

Particularly relevant here, the Parole Board’s decision explained to Petitioner, as follows:

THIS DECISION INVOLVES AN ISSUE THAT IS SUBJECT TO THE

BOARD’S ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES PROCESS. SEE 37 PA. CODE

SEC. 73. FAILURE TO ADMINISTRATIVELY APPEAL THE DECISION

MAY AFFECT YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS. IF YOU WISH TO APPEAL

THIS DECISION, YOU MUST FILE A REQUEST FOR ADMNISTRATIVE

RELIEF WITH THE BOARD WITHIN THIRTY DAYS (30) OF THE

MAILING DATE OF THIS DECISION. THIS REQUEST SHALL SET

FORTH SPECIFICALLY THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES FOR

THE ALLEGATIONS. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY

IN THIS APPEAL AND IN ANY SUBSEQUENT APPEAL TO

THE COMMONWEALTH COURT. YOU MAY BE ENTITLED TO

COUNSEL FROM THE PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE AT NO COST.

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES FORM AND THE NAMES AND

ADDRESSES OF ALL CHIEF PUBLIC DEFENDERS IN THE

COMMONWEALTH ARE AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST FROM THE SCI

PAROLE OFFICE. ANY REQUEST FOR A PUBLIC DEFENDER SHOULD

BE SENT DIRECTLY TO THE PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE IN THE

COUNTY WHERE YOU CURRENTLY RESIDE.

(Id. at 37.)

Thereafter, on June 13, 2022, Petitioner filed the instant Section 2254 petition in this

Court. (Doc. No. 1.) He claims that he is being unlawfully confined by the DOC and State

Correctional Institution Albion. (Id. at 3.) In support, he alleges that his maximum sentence date

has been extended by the Parole Board from May 1, 2027, to August 13, 2029 (id. at 3–4), but

that the Parole Board does not have the authority to extend his judicially imposed maximum

sentence (id. at 5–6). As a result, he asserts, inter alia, that the Parole Board’s recalculation

violates due process and separation-of-powers principles. (Id. at 4).

As for relief, he requests that the Court grant his Section 2254 petition and order

Respondents to show cause why he is not entitled to the relief he seeks, which is to reinstate his

original maximum sentence date, as issued by the original sentencing court, and to release him

from the “unlawful restraint of his liberties[,]” as imposed by the Parole Board. (Id. at 9.) In

support of his request for relief, Petitioner has attached the following three (3) documents to his

Section 2254 petition: (1) the September 2, 2021 Parole Board decision (Doc. No. 1-1); (2) the

Parole Board Order to Recommit Petitioner (Doc. No. 1-2); and (3) the DOC’s DC-16E sentence

status summary form pertaining to Petitioner, which reflects a new maximum sentence date of

August 13, 2029 (Doc. No. 1-3).

On September 1, 2022, the Court, inter alia, deemed the petition filed, directed the Clerk

of Court to serve a copy of the petition on Respondents, and directed Respondents to file a

response to the allegations contained in the petition. (Doc. No. 7.) On September 19, 2022,

Respondents filed a response to Petitioner’s Section 2254 petition, arguing that Petitioner failed

to exhaust his available state remedies before commencing suit in this Court and that,

alternatively, Petitioner’s claims are without any merit. (Doc. No. 9.) As reflected by the

Court’s docket, Petitioner did not file a reply, and the time period for doing so has since expired.

Thus, the instant petition is ripe for the Court’s disposition.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus that is filed by “a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that—(A) the [petitioner] has exhausted the

remedies available in the courts of the State; or (B)(i) there is an absence of available State

corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the

rights of the [petitioner].” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). Thus, based upon AEDPA’s plain

language, a person “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court” who is petitioning for a

writ of habeas corpus in federal court must first exhaust the remedies available in the state

courts, unless the state corrective process is unavailable or circumstances exist that render such

corrective process ineffective. See id.; Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515–16 (1982). The

burden of proving exhaustion of available remedies rests with the petitioner. See Lambert v.

Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997).

“In order for a claim to be exhausted, it must be ‘fairly presented’ to the state courts ‘by

invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.’” Carpenter v.

Vaughn, 296 F.3d 138, 146 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844–

45 (1999)). If a state prisoner has not fairly presented his claims to the state courts, then the

procedural default doctrine “may come into play.” See id. As explained by the United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, “[a] claim is procedurally defaulted if the petitioner failed

to exhaust that claim in state court and if state procedures prohibit the petitioner from later

presenting the claim in state court.” See Collins v. Sec’y of Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 742 F.3d 528,

542 (3d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).

Generally speaking, if a state prisoner has procedurally defaulted his habeas claims,

federal courts do not review the merits of those claims. See generally Martinez v. Ryan, 566

U.S. 1, 9 (2012) (explaining that, under the procedural default doctrine, a federal habeas court

“will not review the merits of claims, including constitutional claims, that a state court declined

to hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state procedural rule” (listing cases)). However,

this doctrine “is not without exceptions.” See id. at 10. A state prisoner “may obtain federal

review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of

federal law.” See id. (citation omitted). A state prisoner may also obtain federal review of a

defaulted claim by showing that a failure to consider the claim will result in a “fundamental

miscarriage of justice.” See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); see also Leyva v.

Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 366 (3d Cir. 2007) (explaining that, ordinarily, a petitioner must show

“actual innocence” in order to satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception

(citation omitted)).

III. DISCUSSION

As discussed above, Petitioner claims that the Parole Board’s recalculation of his

maximum sentence date violates due process and separation-of-powers principles. (Doc. No. 1.)

In this specific context, exhaustion of available state remedies requires a habeas petitioner to first

challenge the Parole Board’s decision to recommit him as a parole violator by filing a request for

administrative relief with the Parole Board within thirty (30) days of the mailing date of the

Parole Board’s decision. See 37 Pa. Code § 73.1. Next, the petitioner must file an appeal to the

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania (“Commonwealth Court”). See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §

763(a). Finally, the petitioner must seek allowance of appeal in the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania (“Supreme Court”). See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 724; see also Williams v. Wynder,

232 F. App’x. 177, 181 (3d Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (concluding that, in order to fully exhaust a

challenge to the Parole Board’s decision, a habeas petitioner must seek allowance of appeal in

the Supreme Court, following an adverse decision by the Commonwealth Court).

Here, Petitioner has neither alleged nor shown that he completed any of these levels of

state review. Additionally, the Court has conducted a search of Petitioner’s name on

Pennsylvania’s electronic docket sheets, including the electronic docket sheets for the

Commonwealth Court and the Supreme Court. That search, however, did not yield any results

for Petitioner. As such, the Court finds that Petitioner did not exhaust available state remedies

with respect to his instant habeas claim against the Parole Board before he commenced this suit.

Because it would be futile for Petitioner to attempt to do so now, as the time to exhaust

state remedies has long since passed, the Court finds that his instant habeas claim against the

Parole Board is procedurally defaulted for purposes of federal review. And, since Petitioner has

not shown the sort of cause and prejudice that is necessary to excuse this procedural default, or

shown that the failure to consider his instant habeas claim will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice, the merits of his claim are not properly subject to this Court’s review. See

generally Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749–50 (explaining that a petitioner’s procedurally defaulted

federal claims are barred from habeas review unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause for the

default and prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or the failure to review

his federal claims will result in a miscarriage of justice); Martinez, 566 U.S. at 9 (explaining that

“[f]ederal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality of a state prisoner’s conviction and

sentence are guided by rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments are accorded the

finality and respect necessary to preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our system of

federalism[,]” and that “[t]hese rules include the doctrine of procedural default, under which a

federal court will not review the merits of claims, including constitutional claims, that a state

court declined to hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state procedural rule” (citations

omitted)).

Thus, for all of these reasons, and consistent with the case law of this Circuit, the Court

will dismiss the instant Section 2254 petition. See Williams, 232 F. App’x at 181 (unpublished)

(concluding that the Section 2254 petitioner, who was challenging the revocation of his parole by

the Parole Board, was required to fully exhaust available state remedies, and further concluding

that, because petitioner failed to do so and because petitioner failed to make a showing of cause

or prejudice to excuse the procedural default, federal review of his habeas claim was precluded

by the default and the district court, therefore, appropriately dismissed the petition); see also

Klein v. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. 22-cv-00984, 2023 WL 3077804, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 25,

2023) (concluding that the Section 2254 petitioner’s challenge to the Parole Board’s decisions

was procedurally defaulted and, thus, “unreviewable” by the district court where the petition

failed to show cause or prejudice to excuse the procedural default (citing Martinez, 566 U.S. at

9)); Wise v. Mason, No. 20-cv-01617, 2022 WL 1109433, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2022)

(finding that the Section 2254 petitioner’s claim was procedurally defaulted and could not be

reviewed by the district court because the petitioner did not exhaust available state remedies as to

his challenge to the Parole Board’s calculation of his maximum sentence date, and because he

failed to demonstrate cause or prejudice to excuse the default (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750)).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss the instant petition for a writ of habeas

corpus. (Doc. No. 1.) In addition, the Court will not issue a certificate of appealability because

jurists of reason would not debate this procedural ruling. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,

484 (2000) (stating that when a habeas corpus petition is denied on procedural grounds, the

petitioner must demonstrate “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition

states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling”). An appropriate Order

follows.

s/ Yvette Kane

Yvette Kane, District Judge

United States District Court

Middle District of Pennsylvania