VW Credit Leasing Ltd. v. Lackawanna County

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

VW CREDIT LEASING LTD., :

Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-00378

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

LACKAWANNA COUNTY and :

DeNAPLES AUTO PARTS, INC.,

:

Defendants

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the court is Defendant Lackawanna County’s

(“Lackawanna”) motion to dismiss. (Doc. 11). This dispute arises out of

Defendants Lackawanna and DeNaples Auto Parts, Inc. (“DeNaples”)

allegedly unconstitutional seizure of a 2020 Audi vehicle (“Vehicle”), in which

Plaintiff VW Credit Leasing LTD (“VW”) holds a security interest or lien. For

the reasons stated below Lackawanna’s motion is DENIED.

I. Background

VW alleges that Lackawanna uses DeNaples to regularly tow, store,

and eventually dispose of vehicles seized by the county in the course of its

law enforcement duties. Lackawanna does not directly pay DeNaples for this

service. Instead DeNaples accepts possession of seized vehicles as

payment for the services it provides Lackawanna. DeNaples then holds the

seized vehicle until the owner pays its towing and storage fees. If no one

pays the fees on a given vehicle DeNaples sells that vehicle to recoup its

expenses.

The Vehicle here was owned by Cynthai Lynn Pollick (“Ms. Pollick”)

but VW held a security interest and lien in the Vehicle entitling it to immediate

possession of the Vehicle by reason of default on its credit agreement with

Ms. Pollick. On or about April 25, 2022, Ms. Pollick defaulted on her

agreement with VW, Lackawanna took custody of the Vehicle, and DeNaples

towed it away. On or about July 10, 2022, 76 days later, VW received a

document declaring the Vehicle abandoned and in the possession of

DeNaples. VW informed DeNaples the Vehicle was not abandoned and that

they wished to take possession of it but DeNaples refused to release the

Vehicle unless VW paid its towing and storage fees. VW did not pay the fees

and DeNaples did not release the Vehicle.

On March 2, 2023, VW filed a complaint against Lackawanna and

DeNaples under 42 U.S.C §1983 alleging violations of its Fourth, Fifth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights by both Defendants. VW also brought a

variety of state law causes of action against only DeNaples and seeks a

declaratory judgment that any law cited by either Lackawanna or DeNaples

to justify their actions is unconstitutional. On April 5, 2023, Lackawanna filed

a motion to dismiss VW’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Lackawanna’s

motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for review.

II. Legal Standard

A. Motion to Dismiss

In rendering a decision on a motion to dismiss, a court should not

inquire “whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is

entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416

U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 1996). The

court must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw

all reasonable inferences from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Innis v. Wilson, 334 F. App'x 454, 456 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Phillips v. Cnty

of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008)).

However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do

not suffice.”).

Under the pleading regime established by [Bell Atl. Corp. v.]

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Iqbal, a court reviewing the

sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps. First, it must

“tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a

claim.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Second, it should

identify allegations that, “because they are no more than

conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at

679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Finally, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and

then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement

to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787–88 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal

citations, quotations and footnote omitted). Elements are sufficiently alleged

when the facts in the complaint “show” that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2)). At the second step,

the court distinguishes between legal conclusions, which are discounted in

the analysis, and allegations of historical fact, which are assumed to be true

even if “unrealistic or nonsensical,” “chimerical,” or “extravagantly fanciful.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. Deciding whether a claim is plausible is a “context-

specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id.

B. 42 U.S.C. §1983

42 U.S.C. §1983 is the vehicle by which private citizens may seek

redress for violations of federal constitutional rights committed by state

officials. To state a cause of action under §1983, a plaintiff must allege that:

(1) the conduct complained of was committed by persons acting under color

of state law; and (2) the conduct violated a right, privilege, or immunity

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Harvey v.

Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2005).

III. Discussion

A. VW pleads plausible §1983 claims under Monell.

When a plaintiff alleges under §1983 that a local government is

responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right by its employee, it

must satisfy the requirements identified in Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of

City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). To establish a Monell claim, the

plaintiff must allege: “(1) [it] possessed a constitutional right of which [it] was

deprived; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the policy ‘amount[ed] to

deliberate indifference’ to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) the policy

was the ‘moving force behind the constitutional violation.’” Vargas v. City of

Philadelphia, 783 F.3d 962, 974 (3d Cir. 2015)(quoting City of Canton v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-391 (1989).

It is undisputed that Lackawanna, a county government, is a municipal

entity for the purposes of §1983. Thus, VW’s complaint must establish a

plausible Monell claim. Lackawanna does not dispute that VW possessed a

constitutional right of which it was deprived. Accordingly, the court will not

address that issue. Lackawanna only argues that VW fails to plausibly plea

it had a policy that resulted in the removal of the Vehicle and in turn a

constitutional deprivation. (Doc. 26 at 7). Specifically, Lackawanna argues

that because VW pleas only a single incident of unconstitutional conduct it

fails to establish a policy under Monell. (Id. at 8).

This argument misreads VW’s complaint. VW clearly pleads that

Lackawanna has a pattern and practice of turning over vehicles seized in the

course of its law enforcement duties to DeNaples. (Doc. 1 &&1,2). It is true

that VW does not provide evidence or proof of said policy, but such

information is not required to survive a 12(b)(6) motion.

Likewise, it is true that the Supreme Court has explained that “[p]roof

of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose

liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was

caused by an existing ... municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a

municipal policymaker.” City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–

24, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) (plurality opinion). But the Court

articulated this rule with regards to the validity of jury verdicts not motions to

dismiss. No liability is imposed under rule 12(b)(6) so questions about the

sufficiency of proof required to impose liability are again not appropriate at

this stage of the proceeding.

At this stage of the proceeding all VW needs to allege is that

Lackawanna had a policy that was deliberately indifferent to its constitutional

rights and was the moving force behind the violation of those rights. VW

makes these allegations. VW alleges that Lackawanna had policy and

practice of turning over seized vehicles to a private towing company without

a warrant, without just compensation, and without notice or hearing with

deliberate indifference and in actual violation of its Fourth, Fifth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. 29 at 9-10). If VW fails to provide

evidence at summary judgment to support these allegations, then its claim

will fail then. For now, it is allowed to conduct discovery and collect evidence

in support of its claims.

B. Lackawanna does not challenge the plausibility of VW’s

other claims.

Since Lackawanna does not challenge the plausibility of VW’s other

claims the court will not address those claims.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, VW has stated facially plausible claims

and will be allowed to conduct additional discovery to gather evidence in

support of those claims. Therefore, Lackawanna’s motion to dismiss (Doc.

11) is DENIED at this stage of the proceeding. An appropriate order follows.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

DATE: November 13, 2023

23-0378-01