The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TODD ALAN BROWN, No. 4:22-CV-01155
Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)
v.
SUPERINTENDENT RIVELLO, et
al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AUGUST 31, 2023
Plaintiff Todd Alan Brown filed the instant pro se Section 19831 action in
July 2022, alleging constitutional violations by various SCI Huntingdon officials
and medical staff. The Court performed mandatory screening and dismissed
Brown’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. Brown filed an amended complaint, which was
likewise screened under Section 1915A, with several claims surviving the second
sufficiency review. The remaining Defendants now move to dismiss Brown’s
amended complaint or, alternatively, for summary judgment based on Brown’s
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Defendants’ Rule 56 motion will be
granted in part and denied in part.
1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional
wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves
as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.
I. BACKGROUND
In Brown’s amended complaint, he asserted Section 1983 claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.2
Brown named as defendants psychologist Jessica Cousins, corrections officer Greg
Hicks, unit manager B. Hollibaugh, and “CB officers 2 to 10 shift regulars
Sheeley, Stevens, [and] Singer.”3 The gravamen of Brown’s lawsuit is that these
SCI Huntingdon officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health
needs.
Specifically, Brown avers that he suffers from a mood disorder, depression,
anxiety, restlessness, hyperactivity, impulsivity, and poor reasoning,4 and tried to
take his own life on April 29, 2022.5 Brown alleges that he raised concerns to
prison officials the day before he actually attempted suicide, but no one took any
preventive action.6 According to Brown, following his suicide attempt, he had to
be life-flighted to a hospital, was on life support for 24 hours, and lost feeling on
the left side of his face for a month, among other injuries.7
2 Because Brown was a pretrial detainee at the time of the events, his claims implicate the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, not the Eighth Amendment. See Jacobs v.
Cumberland County, 8 F.4th 187, 193-94 (3d Cir. 2021); Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749
F.3d 217, 223 n.4 (3d Cir. 2014).
3 Doc. 22 at 1, 15.
4 Id. at 5, 12.
5 Id. at 2, 8.
6 Id. at 5-9.
7 See id. at 2, 4; Doc. 1 at 5.
On December 28, 2022, the Court dismissed Brown’s claims against
Cousins and Hollibaugh for failure to state a claim, finding that Brown had not
plausibly alleged deliberate indifference by either Defendant.8 The Fourteenth
Amendment claims against Hicks, Sheeley, Stevens, and Singer, however, were
permitted to proceed past the screening stage.9 Brown plausibly alleged deliberate
indifference against Hicks, claiming that Hicks ignored his mental health crisis and
that he had fashioned a makeshift noose in his cell the day before the suicide
attempt.10 Brown also plausibly alleged deliberate indifference against Sheeley,
Stevens, and Singer, asserting that they had continually harassed him and turned
down his pleas for help, calling Brown “annoying” and “needy.”11
Following service under Rule 4, the four remaining Defendants moved to
dismiss Brown’s amended complaint or, alternatively, for summary judgment
based on Brown’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.12 The Court
subsequently issued an order informing Brown that it would “‘consider exhaustion
in its role as a fact finder under Small[ v. Camden County, 728 F.3d 265 (3d Cir.
2013)]’ and . . . provide him an ‘opportunity to respond.’”13 The Court gave
Brown 21 days to supplement his briefing with any additional argument or
8 See Doc. 20 at 7-11.
9 See id. at 11-13.
10 See id. at 11.
11 See id. at 12.
12 See generally Doc. 26.
13 Doc. 34 (citing Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 208, 211 (3d Cir. 2018)).
evidence in support of his position that he exhausted administrative remedies.14
Brown failed to provide any response beyond his previous brief in opposition. The
Court, however, ordered Defendants to supplement their Rule 56 motion with the
full administrative record for several grievances for which Defendants had only
provided piecemeal documentation.15 Defendants timely complied,16 and their
motion is ripe for disposition.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate
and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.”17 Summary judgment is
appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”18 Material
facts are those “that could alter the outcome” of the litigation, and “disputes are
‘genuine’ if evidence exists from which a rational person could conclude that the
position of the person with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.”19
At the Rule 56 stage, the Court’s function is not to “weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter” but rather “to determine whether there is a
14 See id. at 2.
15 See Doc. 35.
16 See Doc. 37.
17 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
18 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
19 EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Clark v. Modern
Grp. Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993)).
genuine issue for trial.”20 The Court must view the facts and evidence presented
“in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” and must “draw all
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.”21 This evidence, however, must be
adequate—as a matter of law—to sustain a judgment in favor of the nonmoving
party on the claim or claims at issue.22 A “scintilla of evidence” supporting the
nonmovant’s position is insufficient; “there must be evidence on which the jury
could reasonably find for the [nonmovant].”23 Succinctly stated, summary
judgment is “put up or shut up time” for the nonmoving party.24
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants attack Brown’s suit on two fronts. First, they assert that Brown
did not properly exhaust any of his claims against the remaining four corrections
officers. They also contend that Brown’s amended complaint should be dismissed
for failure to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10. The Court
has already screened Brown’s amended complaint and found little difficulty in
understanding his claims despite his less-than-perfect pro se pleading. Dismissal
20 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
21 Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014).
22 Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250-57; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587-89 (1986).
23 Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477
U.S. at 252) (alteration in original).
24 Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 391 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Berkeley Inv. Grp.
v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006)).
under Rules 8 and 10, therefore, is unwarranted. Defendants’ argument regarding
administrative exhaustion, however, requires closer inspection.
A. Exhaustion for Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA)25 requires prisoners to
exhaust available administrative remedies before suing prison officials for alleged
constitutional violations.26 Proper exhaustion is mandatory, even if the inmate is
seeking relief—like monetary damages—that cannot be granted by the
administrative system.27 The exhaustion process a prisoner must follow is
governed by the contours of the prison grievance system in effect where the inmate
is incarcerated.28
Pennsylvania’s Department of Corrections (DOC) employs a three-step
grievance process that must be completed to properly exhaust administrative
remedies in most cases.29 If informal resolution attempts do not solve the problem,
the first step is to file a written grievance (using form DC-804, Part 1) with the
Facility Grievance Coordinator within 15 working days after “the event upon
which the claim is based.”30 An adverse decision by the grievance coordinator
25 42 U.S.C. § 1997e et seq.
26 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639, 642 (2016) (explaining that only
“available” remedies must be exhausted).
27 Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006).
28 Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007); see also Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-91.
29 See Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 292 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002); COMMONWEALTH OF PA., DEP’T
OF CORR., INMATE GRIEVANCE SYS., Policy No. DC-ADM 804 (May 1, 2015) (hereinafter
“DC-ADM 804”).
30 DC-ADM 804 § 1(A)(3)-(5).
must be appealed to the Facility Manager within 15 working days of the initial-
review response or rejection.31 Finally, an adverse decision by the Facility
Manager must be appealed to “Final Review” with the Secretary’s Office of
Inmate Grievances and Appeals (SOIGA), and again must be submitted within 15
working days of the date of the Facility Manager’s decision.32
The DOC has specific requirements for grievances submitted by inmates.
Those requirements include, among other things, that the grievance “be legible
[and] understandable”; “include a statement of the facts relevant to the claim” as
well as “the date, approximate time, and location of the event(s) that gave rise to
the grievance”; that the prisoner “identify individuals directly involved in the
event(s)”; and that the grievance include “the specific relief sought,” including
“compensation or other legal relief normally available from a court.”33
B. Brown’s Grievance History
Brown’s lawsuit concerns alleged medical indifference during pretrial
detention at SCI Huntingdon. His allegations primarily involve events on April 28
and 29, 2022, when he attempted suicide, and his injuries therefrom. In and
around this time (from April 1, 2022, to July 13, 2022), Brown filed twelve
grievances at SCI Huntingdon: numbers 974441, 975666, 976379, 977541,
31 Id. § 2(A)(1).
32 Id. § 2(B)(1).
33 Id. § 1(A)(11).
978098, 978173, 981142, 985177, 985427, 985430, 989308, and 989665.34
Importantly, Brown does not point to any other grievances that would support his
assertion that he exhausted his administrative remedies, so the Court will constrain
its review to these twelve grievances.
The question presented by the instant Rule 56 motion is whether Brown
fully exhausted any of his medical indifference claims against Hicks, Sheeley,
Stevens, and Singer—the only Defendants remaining in this litigation. After
thorough review, the Court finds that Brown exhausted his claim against defendant
Hicks only.
1. Irrelevant Grievances
Multiple grievances can be disposed of summarily. Grievance number
977541 involved complaints regarding prison mail and was not appealed beyond
the initial response.35 Grievance number 978173 concerned the law library and
also was not appealed beyond the initial response.36 Grievance number 985177
raised issues with Brown’s “medical co-pay” and was not appealed beyond the
Facility Manager response.37
34 See Doc. 30-1 at 4 ¶ 12. Brown has not challenged the veracity or accuracy of Defendants’
supporting affidavits in any way. Accordingly, those declarations—made under penalty of
perjury—will be accepted as true unless directly contradicted by the record. See LOCAL RULE
OF COURT 56.1.
35 See Doc. 30-1 at 45.
36 See id.
37 See id.
Grievance number 974441 is dated April 3, 2022, and involves complaints
about Brown’s injured finger.38 Although this grievance was appealed all the way
to the SOIGA, it does not name any remaining Defendant and does not involve
mental health care.39 Grievance number 975666 is dated April 11, 2022, and again
involves complaints concerning the medical treatment Brown received at SCI
Smithfield for his injured finger.40 Although this grievance was appealed to the
SOIGA, it does not name any remaining Defendant and does not involve mental
health care.41
Grievance number 976379 is dated April 13, 2022, and also raises concerns
regarding the medical treatment (or lack thereof) Brown received for his finger.42
This grievance does not identify any remaining Defendant, does not deal with
mental health care, and was not adjudicated beyond the initial rejection.43
Grievance number 978098 is dated April 26, 2022, and concerns complaints
against a “nurse Trice” for failing to properly attend to Brown’s injured finger.44
This grievance was not appealed beyond the Facility Manager response.45
Grievance number 985427 involved claims of retaliation and other improper
38 See Doc. 37-1 at 3.
39 See id.
40 See Doc. 37-2 at 3.
41 See id. at 2, 3.
42 See Doc. 37-3 at 3.
43 See id. at 2-3; see also Doc. 30-1 at 45.
44 See Doc. 30-1 at 47.
45 Id. at 45.
actions by Hollibaugh and a “Ms. Heidel.”46 Grievance 985427 does not name any
of the four remaining Defendants or involve mental health issues, nor was it
appealed beyond the Facility Manger response.47
Finally, although grievance number 989665 does identify Stevens and
Singer (and other nonparty corrections officers), Brown simply complains about
various mistreatments like officers throwing his mail on the floor, cursing at him,
retaliating against him, refusing to give him toilet paper, and being generally
“unprofessional.”48 Brown does not include any complaints regarding his mental
health or his suicide attempt and, importantly, did not appeal this grievance beyond
its first rejection.49
2. Relevant but Unexhausted Grievances
In grievance number 985430, dated June 20, 2022, Brown raised issues
regarding lack of appropriate mental health care.50 He asserted that defendant
Cousins had failed to properly screen him during his intake into SCI Huntingdon,
and alleged that an unidentified “CB block” officer saw him with a sheet and
“talked [him] out of hanging [him]self” but never “reported it.”51 Brown appears
to be discussing his medical indifference claim against defendant Hicks. However,
46 Id. at 51.
47 Id. at 45, 51.
48 Id. at 57.
49 Id. at 45, 57.
50 See Doc. 37-5 at 3.
51 See id.
Brown did not appeal this grievance past its initial rejection, likely because it was
rejected for being duplicative of an earlier pending grievance (number 981142).52
In grievance number 989308, dated July 13, 2022, Brown again raised issues
regarding his mental health treatment and Hicks’ deliberate indifference.53 These
issues appear to mirror many of the allegations made in grievance numbers 981142
and 985430, and in fact grievance 989308 was rejected in part because Brown had
already raised related claims and was told he could “include [his] concerns in [his]
appeal to SOIGA regarding grievance 981142 and 985430.”54 The grievance was
also rejected as untimely and because it contained multiple issues.55 The Facility
Manager upheld the initial grievance rejection,56 and Brown did not appeal to the
SOIGA.57
3. Grievance Number 981142
In grievance 981142, filed on May 15, 2022, Brown asserted claims
regarding his suicide attempt and alleged deliberate indifference to serious mental
health needs against the “psych department” and specifically Cousins.58 Brown
discussed his hanging attempt and claimed that Cousins had been deliberately
52 See id. at 2; see also Doc. 30-1 at 45. To the extent that this grievance was also rejected as
untimely, see Doc. 37-5 at 2, within the grievance Brown avers that he had just returned to SCI
Huntingdon on June 17, 2022, and filed the grievance on June 20, 2022. See id. at 3.
53 See Doc. 37-6 at 6. In this grievance, Brown identifies Hicks by name. See id.
54 Id. at 5.
55 See id.
56 See id. at 2.
57 See Doc. 30-1 at 45.
58 See Doc. 37-4 at 9.
indifferent to his serious medical needs.59 Nowhere in grievance 981142, however,
does Brown discuss the situation with the corrections officer witnessing him
fashioning a makeshift noose and preparing to attempt suicide.
Nevertheless, on appeal to the Facility Manager, Brown provided those
additional details, stating that “on 4-27-2022 a[n] officer on CB on first shift seen
[sic] me prep a sheet to try and [sic] hang myself.”60 Brown asserts that this officer
“confronted” him and told him to “relax” and “be cool” and that “the[y’re] trying
to help [him].”61 He also reiterated later in the appeal, “[S]taff scene [sic] me tie a
sheet and talked me out of hanging myself on 4-27-2022.”62
Although Brown does not identify the officer, it is clear at this stage in the
litigation that this portion of the appeal concerns Brown’s allegations against
Hicks. And, while inmates are generally required to identify the individuals
involved in the events,63 this identification requirement can be waived by the DOC
if a claim is investigated and rejected on the merits at the highest level.64 As the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained, “[W]here the
prison has chosen to forgo a rejection on procedural grounds and has elected to
59 See id.
60 Id. at 7. There is some inconsistency in the record regarding whether this alleged event
occurred on April 27 or April 28. This discrepancy is immaterial for resolution of the instant
motion.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 See DC-ADM 804 § 1(A)(11).
64 See Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 271-72 (3d Cir. 2018).
research, analyze, and deny a claim on the merits, both the purposes of
exhaustion—and exhaustion itself—are satisfied.”65
Here, in contrast to the circumstances in Rinaldi v. United States,66 prison
authorities did not consider Brown’s claim against Hicks on the merits. The
Facility Manager directly addressed and denied Brown’s claims against the
psychology department and Cousins, which were raised in the initial grievance.67
However, the Facility Manager summarily dismissed Brown’s other claims raised
for the first time on appeal, explaining, “As for your other claims made, they will
not be addressed via this appeal as you provided no witnesses nor other evidence to
corroborate your claims. Moreover, DC-ADM 804 [§] 2.A.[1.]c. states, ‘Only an
issue that was raised for initial review, determination of frivolousness, and/or
rejection may be appealed.’”68
Had grievance 981142 been the only grievance asserting Brown’s claim
against Hicks, Brown would be out of luck (and out of court). But recall that, in
65 Id. at 272; see also Travillion v. Wetzel, 765 F. App’x 785, 789 (3d Cir. 2019) (nonprecedential)
(finding that inmate’s identification of “RHU Staff and Unit Management” and “SCI-
Rockview staff and/or administration,” along with inmate’s provision of detailed operative
facts, was sufficient to comply with the identification requirements of DC-ADM 804 §
1(A)(11)(b)); Diaz v. Palakovich, 448 F. App’x 211, 217 (3d Cir. 2011) (nonprecedential)
(determining that inmate’s identification of “mailroom staff,” along with grievance officer’s
subsequent interview of mailroom employees, obviated any procedural default that may have
resulted from failure to specifically name mailroom employees).
66 Cf. Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 270-72 (finding that claim raised for the first time on administrative
appeal, which prison authorities addressed and denied on the merits rather than dismissing for
procedural default, was fully exhausted for PLRA purposes).
67 See Doc. 37-4 at 12.
68 Id.
grievances 985430 and 989308, Brown attempted to assert his claim regarding
Hicks’ deliberate indifference to his mental health needs. Notably, these
grievances were rejected at least in part for being duplicative of grievance 981142.
Moreover, in response to grievance 989308, prison officials specifically told
Brown that he could raise those “concerns” in his appeal of grievances 981142 and
985430.69
The upshot of grievances 981142, 985430, and 989308—when considered
together—is that prison officials created an administrative catch-22 for Brown. In
grievance 981142, his claim against Hicks was rejected on appeal as procedurally
defaulted for not being raised in his initial grievance. When Brown later attempted
to file new grievances against Hicks, those grievances were rejected as duplicative
of grievance 981142 and he was told to raise his “concerns” as part of the appeal of
his earlier grievance (exactly what he had attempted to do). Left with no avenue to
assert his claim against Hicks, the administrative process was simply unavailable
to Brown. And because prison officials’ conduct rendered administrative remedies
unavailable, Brown’s claim against defendant Hicks must be considered exhausted
under the PLRA.70
69 See Doc. 37-6 at 5.
70 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Ross, 578 U.S. at 639, 642; Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview
SCI, 831 F.3d 148, 155 (3d Cir. 2016); Small v. Camden County, 728 F.3d 265, 273-74 (3d
Cir. 2013).
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant in part and deny in part
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Brown failed to administratively
exhaust his claims against defendants Sheeley, Stevens, or Singer, so summary
judgment must be granted in their favor. Brown did exhaust his claim against
defendant Hicks because administrative remedies were made unavailable by prison
authorities. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, therefore, will be denied
as to Hicks. An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge