Clark III v. Harry

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KENNETH DOUGLAS CLARK, III, :

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-1236

:

Plaintiff

: (JUDGE MANNION)

v.

:

LAUREL HARRY, et al.,

:

Defendants

:

MEMORANDUM

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Kenneth Douglas Clark, III, an inmate currently confined at the

State Correctional Institution, Dallas (“SCI-Dallas”), Pennsylvania, filed the

above caption civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. (Doc. 1). The

Plaintiff complains of an event which occurred at his prior place of

confinement, the State Correctional Institution, Camp Hill (“SCI-Camp Hill”),

Pennsylvania. Id. The named Defendants are the Pennsylvania Department

of Corrections (“DOC”) and the following SCI-Camp Hill employees:

Superintendent Laurel Harry; Deputy Superintendents Michael Gourley and

William Nicklow; and Major Randy Evans. Id.

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages for alleged

violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.

Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

complaint. (Doc. 18). The motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition. For

the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss.

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff was housed in the Psychiatric Observation Cell (“POC”) at

SCI-Camp Hill from October 16, 2021 through October 18, 2021. (Doc. 1).

He claims that he was not given a mattress while in the POC on

October 16 and October 17. Id.

On October 18, 2021, he states that a “corrections officer slammed

[his] hand in the tray slot between the hours of 12:00 pm and 1:00 pm.” Id.

He believes “there should be a picture of [his] left hand cut, swelling and

scarred” because “the nurse from 6 to 2 took the picture.” Id. Plaintiff does

not know the name of the officer who slammed his hand in the tray slot but

“listed Randy Evans cause he supervises all corrections officers” and “will

know the name of the officer.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges “discrimination towards his race by not giving [him] a

mattress and slamming [his] hand in the tray slot.” Id. He alleges violations

of his Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for “not giving [him] a

mattress for 2 days and not giving [him] medical attention to clean [his] cut.”

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Id. Plaintiff claims that “the nurse only took a picture never asked would [he]

like x-rays or any medicine.” Id. He states that he “never received any

medical attention for [his] left hand” and the “hand was cut and swelling, also

changing colors.” Id.

For relief, Plaintiff “would like money for pain and suffering and for

increasing [his] PTSD.” Id.

III. MOTION TO DISMISS

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for “failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Under Rule 12(b)(6), we

must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable

reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v.

UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)(quoting Phillips v.

County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008)). While a complaint

need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim,” Fed.R.Civ.P.

8(a)(2), and detailed factual allegations are not required, Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a complaint must plead “enough facts

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “The

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for

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more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[L]abels

and conclusions” are not enough, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and a court “is

not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Id. (quoted case omitted). Thus, “a judicial conspiracy claim must

include at least a discernible factual basis to survive a Rule

12(b)(6) dismissal.” Capogrosso v. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, 588

F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

In resolving the motion to dismiss, we thus “conduct a two-part

analysis.” Fowler, supra, 578 F.3d at 210. First, we separate the factual

elements from the legal elements and disregard the legal conclusions. Id. at

210-11. Second, we “determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint

are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief”.” Id. at

211 (quoted case omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

A plaintiff, in order to state an actionable civil rights claim, must plead

two essential elements: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed

by a person acting under color of law, and (2) that said conduct deprived the

plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws

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of the United States. See Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628,

638 (3d Cir. 1995); Shaw by Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1141-42

(3d Cir. 1990).

Furthermore, federal civil rights claims brought under §1983 cannot be

premised on a theory of respondeat superior. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d

1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Rather, each named defendant must be shown,

via the complaint’s allegations, to have been personally involved in the

events or occurrences which underlie a claim. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.

362 (1976); Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir.

1976). As explained in Rode:

A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal

involvement in the alleged wrongs.... [P]ersonal involvement can

be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual

knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of participation or

actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made

with appropriate particularity.

Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. Although a supervisor cannot encourage

constitutional violations, a supervisor has “no affirmative constitutional duty

to train, supervise or discipline so as to prevent such conduct.” Chinchello v.

Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 1986).

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege any personal involvement

whatsoever by Defendants Harry, Gourley, Nicklow, or Evans. In fact,

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Plaintiff does not refer to Defendants Harry, Gourley, or Nicklow in any part

of his complaint except for the caption. As to Defendant Evans, Plaintiff,

himself admits that he is only naming Evans “cause he supervises all

corrections officers.” (Doc. 1 at 4). Thus, it is clear that he is attempting to

pursue a Section 1983 claim against Evans, based solely on respondeat

superior, which he cannot do. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. In the absence

of specific allegations that a defendant played a role in depriving the plaintiff

of a constitutional right, dismissal is appropriate. See, e.g., Mearin v. Swartz,

951 F. Supp. 2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (dismissing Eighth

Amendment claims).

Moreover, Clark’s complaint does not state whether he is suing the

Defendants in their individual or official capacities. To the extent that

Defendants are sued in their “official capacity,” claims for monetary relief are

barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which proscribes actions in the federal

courts against states, their agencies, and state officials acting within their

official capacities. Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23 (3d Cir. 1981)

(Pennsylvania); Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,

97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) (state agencies); Edelman v. Jordan,

415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (state employees acting

in their official capacity).

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Finally, all claims should be dismissed as to the Pennsylvania

Department of Corrections, because that entity is not a “person” within the

meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1983, and the Department enjoys Eleventh

Amendment immunity against suits for damages in federal court. The

Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution provides that “[t]he Judicial power

of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or

equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the ... States ....“, U.S.

Const. amend XI. The Commonwealth has specifically, by statute, invoked

its Eleventh Amendment immunity in 42 Pa.C.S.A. §8521(b). It is well-settled

that a state, a state agency, or a state official acting in an official capacity is

not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't.

of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); see also See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan,

440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974);

Benn v. First Judicial District of Pennsylvania, 426 F.3d 233 (3d Cir.2005).

Although Defendants have set forth valid arguments for entry of

dismissal, given the liberal treatment afforded pro se litigants and the nature

of his claims, the Plaintiff will be afforded an opportunity to submit a curative

amended complaint which sufficiently sets forth facts establishing the basis

for his claims against Defendants Harry, Gourley, Nicklow and Evans.

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V. AMENDED COMPLAINT

The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to

dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative

amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson

v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

As previously discussed, Plaintiff will be provided opportunity to file a

single, curative, all-inclusive amended complaint within twenty-one (21) days

of the date of this Order which adheres to the standards set forth herein.

Clark is reminded that in order to state a viable civil rights claim each

named defendant must be shown, via the complaint’s allegations, to have

been personally involved in the events or occurrences which underlie a

claim. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). He must

also exhaust available administrative remedies with respect to each claim he

wishes to purse before seeking relief in federal court.

The Plaintiff is also reminded that his amended complaint must be

complete in all respects. It must be a new pleading which stands by itself

without reference to the original complaint. The amended complaint should

clearly identify each Defendant, set forth the factual substance underlying

Clark’s claims in short, concise and legible statements, and specify the

constitutional claims and relief being sought.

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VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss will

be GRANTED. Defendant, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections will

be dismissed as a named Defendant. The Plaintiff’s claims against the

Defendants in their official capacity will be dismissed for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, and the Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants in their

personal capacity will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. Plaintiff will be granted an opportunity to file an

amended complaint.

A separate Order shall issue.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

Dated: September 26, 2023

22-1236-01

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