O'Connor v. Snyder

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JANIS O’CONNOR, : CIV NO. 1:22-CV-1607

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

:

ELMER SNYDER, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

This is a strange case which comes before us for consideration of a motion to

dismiss. (Doc. 31). The pro se plaintiff, Janis O’Connor, is an elderly individual and

is reputed to be a former attorney who has been suspended from the practice of law.

O’Connor’s amended complaint makes sweeping claims of a RICO racketeering

conspiracy involving a couple, Elmer and Lori Snyder, who engage in an equine

boarding business. (Doc. 7). However, stripped of its rhetorical flourishes, the

gravamen of this alleged federal racketeering conspiracy complaint revolves around

disputes which are years old and involve the alleged loss of a broken generator, a

disagreement over horse boarding fees, and the October 2018 disappearance of a

kitten.

Moreover, some aspects of the amended complaint appear to entail matters

that are more imagined than real. For example, the amended complaint indicates that

O’Connor believes the defendants used aerial drones to record and monitor the

movements of the plaintiff’s kitten in October of 2018. (Id., ¶ 32). O’Connor also

essentially alleges that the Snyders kidnapped this kitten in October of 2018 and held

the feline for ransom, telling the plaintiff that unless she acquiesced in their demands,

“you’ll never see your cat again.” (Id., ¶ 37). In addition, O’Connor implies that Mr.

and Mrs. Snyder are engaged in some sort of years’ long pattern of comprehensive

electronic surveillance of the plaintiff which enables them to determine her

whereabouts “24-7”. (Id.) Further, it is evident on the face of the amended complaint

that Ms. O’Connor has attempted to litigate these claims is other courts under other

legal rubrics but to no avail. Thus, the allegations made in this pleading mirror those

previously considered and rejected by state courts both in Pennsylvania and in

Maryland.

The amended complaint, which guides our consideration of this motion to

dismiss, indicates that Ms. O’Connor is an animal lover who has kept horses, a

kitten, and a puppy. (Id., ¶¶ 13, 30-37, 48). The allegations in this lawsuit in large

measure stem from O’Connor’s affinity for, and apparent inability to care for, these

animals.1

According to O’Connor’s amended complaint, in the Fall of 2017 she suffered

a series of debilitating injuries which rendered her, at the age of 72, unable to care

for her horses. (Id., ¶¶ 13-16). Accordingly, in early 2018 Elmer and Lori Snyder,

who were casual acquaintances of the plaintiff, agreed to board O’Connor’s horse

on their property. (Id., ¶ 18). O’Connor asserts that she understood that the Snyders

had agreed to undertake this equine boarding without compensation, a contention

the Snyders have successfully disputed in state court. (Id.)

1 As reflected in the attached table obtained from the Maryland courts’ automated

records, it is an undisputed matter of public record that O’Connor has been cited on

numerous occasions by animal control officials for infractions relating to the

confinement and care of her animals and particularly her horses:

ANIMAL CONTROL DIVISION FREDERICK COUNTY vs O'CONNOR, JANIS MARIE

110100000612010

110100000542006 FREDERICK COUNTY ANIMAL CONTROL DIVISION vs O'CONNOR, JANIS

110100006142012 FREDERICK COUNTY ANIMAL CONTROL DIVISION vs O'CONNOR, JANIS

110100006152012 FREDERICK COUNTY ANIMAL CONTROL DIVISION vs O'CONNOR, JANIS

110100006162012 FREDERICK COUNTY ANIMAL CONTROL DIVISION vs O'CONNOR, JANIS

110100007282015 FREDERICK COUNTY ANIMAL CONTROL vs O'CONNOR, JANIS

110100007302015 FREDERICK COUNTY ANIMAL CONTROL vs O'CONNOR, JANIS

110100014732005 FREDERICK COUNTY ANIMAL CONTROL vs O'CONNOR, JANIS

110100014742005 FREDERICK COUNTY ANIMAL CONTROL vs O'CONNOR, JANIS

110100014752005 FREDERICK COUNTY ANIMAL CONTROL vs O'CONNOR, JANIS

110100014762005 FREDERICK COUNTY ANIMAL CONTROL vs O'CONNOR, JANIS

110100014772005 FREDERICK COUNTY ANIMAL CONTROL vs O'CONNOR, JANIS

110100014782005 FREDERICK COUNTY ANIMAL CONTROL vs O'CONNOR, JANIS

110100028372016 FREDERICK COUNTY ANIMAL CONTROL vs O'CONNOR, JANIS

As the parties were making these animal boarding arrangements, O’Connor

alleges that in early 2018, Mr. and Mrs. Snyder also removed a broken electric

generator from her property. O’Connor avers that she requested the return of the

broken generator, but the defendants never returned it to her. (Id., ¶ 17).

By April 2018, O’Connor alleges that the Snyders prevailed upon her to

entrust additional horses to their care. (Id., ¶ 21). O’Connor grew suspicious of the

motives of Mr. and Mrs. Snyder, who she feared were disposing of her horses and

taking advantage of her difficult personal situation. Accordingly, in May of 2018

she demanded the return of the animals. When the Snyders refused to return the

horses, O’Connor brought a replevin action against them in the Spring of 2018. (Id.,

¶¶ 20-29). This replevin suit was later transferred from state court in Maryland to

the Court of Common Pleas of Adams Count. (Id., ¶ 29). According to court records

tendered by the defendants, whose authenticity has not been challenged, in

November of 2018 the state court declined to issue of writ of seizure in favor of

O’Connor compelling the return of these animals. (Doc. 32, Ex. 6). The state court

reasoned that Mr. and Mrs. Snyder were entitled under state law to retain possession

of the animals because O’Connor had not paid outstanding boarding fees. Further,

by May of 2023, the state court entered a judgment in favor of the defendants in this

replevin action. (Id., Ex. 7(A)). Thus, the state courts have rejected O’Connor’s

claim that she has a legal right to regain possession of these animals.

Pennsylvania court records also indicate that Mr. and Mrs. Snyder have

obtained judgments in their favor on their claim that O’Connor owes them

outstanding boarding fees. (Id., Exs. 8 and 8(A)). Finally, Pennsylvania court records

rebuke O’Connor’s claims that she has some entitlement of access to these horses in

yet another way. In 2020, O’Connor was convicted in state court of trespassing on

the Snyders’ property, the state court having rejected her claim that “she had a right

to see her horses” and search the Snyders’ property for her missing kitten. On appeal,

the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed O’Connor’s trespassing conviction.

Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 264 A.3d 361 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2021).

As O’Connor pursued what was ultimately an unsuccessful replevin action, in

September of 2018 she alleges that she purchased a kitten from a breeder in Europe.

(Doc. 7, ¶ 30). According to O’Connor, shortly after she purchased this kitten:

One afternoon in mid-October 2018, Snyders suddenly appeared in

plaintiff's neighborhood. Standing on a neighbor's lawn, they began

flying a drone low over plaintiff's property. They refused to stop, and

only left when ordered to after the police were called. Plaintiff's kitten

was outside with plaintiff at the time of the incident and was no doubt

seen by defendants in the video taken by the drone.

(Id. ¶32).

O’Connor believes that the drone video surveillance of her kitten was merely

the prelude to a kitten kidnapping undertaken by the Snyders in October of 2018.

Moreover, O’Connor asserts that the defendants kidnapped her kitten as part of a

broader extortion plot designed to force her to withdraw her replevin suit. (Id., ¶¶

33-34). Ultimately, O’Connor avers that this plot came to a head in late October

2018 when:

[P]laintiff was waiting in front of the Thurmont, Maryland, library for

the Sheriff 's deputy to arrive and take plaintiff's report of the cat's theft.

While plaintiff was waiting, Elmer and Lori Snyder, Pennsylvania

residents, suddenly appeared and approached. Plaintiff was thoroughly

shocked, and immediately asked Elmer Snyder how he came to the

library. Snyder replied, “I know where you are 24-7.” Elmer Snyder

then displayed a cell phone on the screen of which was a photo of

plaintiff's missing kitten. Snyder then threatened, with his wife standing

by yelling insults, “if you don't drop the suit, you'll never see your cat

again.”

(Id., ¶ 37). While she was “quite frightened” O’Connor reported this alleged kitten

kidnapping to the police who allegedly “did nothing and opined in his report that the

kitten had run away, on the encouragement of the Snyders.” (Id., ¶ 38).

O’Connor further alleges that she had one other encounter with Elmer Snyder,

more than one year later, at a local fast-food restaurant, where she understood Snyder

to convey implicit threats against her pet puppy. This alleged encounter reprised

familiar themes in O’Connor’s complaint; specifically, her concern that the

defendants have engaged in some longstanding, ongoing electronic surveillance of

the plaintiff. As O’Connor has explained:

48. On December 13, 2019, approximately eighteen months since the

controversy began, plaintiff was sitting in the neighborhood

McDonalds facing the wall and thus did not see defendant Elmer

Snyder approach. He imposed his presence on plaintiff by standing less

than three feet way, until plaintiff turned around and saw him. He then,

uninvited, made remarks about plaintiff’s puppy, at that time outside in

plaintiff’s car. Snyder somehow knew the puppy’s name even though,

significantly, he mispronounced it. He was, of course, signaling that

persons in the neighborhood were in contact with him about plaintiff’s

activities and/or that he was still illegally accessing plaintiff’s cell

phone. His mention of seeing the dog clearly conveyed that he had

approached plaintiff’ s car from where he had parked in the back lot

with his rig, and peered in the tinted windows with no legitimate

purpose, putting plaintiff in fear that the puppy was the next target of

Snyders’ blackmail and theft scheme, as plaintiff recognized his

deliberately accosting her to speak about the puppy was a veiled threat.

49. Plaintiff called the police after Snyder walked away, but again, the

police did nothing. except to take the report.

(Id., ¶¶ 48-49).

Finally, O’Connor alleges that after these events, the defendants “continue to

the present to trespass on plaintiff's property,” illicit conduct which led O’Connor to

sue the Snyders in state court in Maryland for trespass and conspiracy to trespass.

(Id., ¶¶ 50-51). However, like her prior replevin action, this lawsuit appears to have

been unavailing since the defendants have provided the court with a copy of a

February 2023 order dismissing this lawsuit. (Doc. 32, Ex. 1(A)).

On the basis of these averments O’Connor has brought a federal civil RICO

racketeering conspiracy case against Mr. and Mrs. Snyder, alleging that they operate

as a racketeering enterprise and have engaged in theft, extortion, wire fraud, and an

array of criminal acts in pursuit of their racketeering enterprise. (Id., ¶¶ 52-151).

While she makes these sweeping allegations of criminality, the factual basis for her

complaint remains grounded upon her claims which have been largely rejected by

the state courts. Thus, at bottom, these federal RICO racketeering claims rest upon

O’Connor’s perception of events relating to the alleged loss of a broken generator,

her disagreement with the Snyders over horse boarding fees, and the October 2018

disappearance of her kitten. On the basis of these federal racketeering claims,

O’Connor seeks damages and injunctive relief. (Doc. 7).

The defendants, who are also proceeding pro se, have filed a motion to dismiss

this complaint. (Doc. 31). This motion is fully briefed and is, therefore, ripe for

resolution.

For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss will be granted.

II. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss – Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for

the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for

the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal

court, stating that:

Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in

recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our

opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir.

2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s decision in

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S.B, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards

have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more

heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than

the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc.,

20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s

bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v.

Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court

need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not

alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a

plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

actions will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has

underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon

which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to

dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no

more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 679.

According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather,

in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has

advised trial courts that they must:

[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than

conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual

allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Id., at 679.

Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain

more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations

sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere

speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:

[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First,

the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The

District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as

true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court

must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are

sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In

other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s

entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement

with its facts.

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.

As the court of appeals has observed:

The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for

overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The

plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard

when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).

This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts

“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, [ ] “stops short of the

line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’ ”

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,

132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012).

In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a

three-step analysis:

First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead

to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should

identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions,

are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where

there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement for relief.”

Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint,

attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263,

268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic

document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the

plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar.

Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover,

“documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no

party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be

considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir.

2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002)

(holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the

pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be

considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary

judgment”). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in

determining a motion to dismiss, or when determining whether a proposed amended

complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).

These legal tenets guide us in the evaluation of the sufficiency of this

complaint.

B. The Motion to Dismiss Will Be Granted

In her complaint, O’Connor alleges that her curious collection of allegations,

many of which have been rejected when presented in other contexts to state courts,

describe a federal RICO racketeering claim against Elmer and Lori Snyder.

Upon reflection, we disagree.

O’Connor faces exacting and precise burdens of pleading and proof when

advancing federal RICO claims. As this court has observed:

Four elements are required for a § 1962(c) claim: “(1) conduct (2) of an

enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” Sedima,

S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d

346 (1985). “Racketeering activity” is conduct proscribed by a number

of specifically identified provisions under Title 18 of the United States

Code, which include mail fraud (§ 1341) and wire fraud (§ 1343). 18

U.S.C. § 1961. A pattern of racketeering activity requires “at least two

acts of racketeering activity within a 10–year period.” H.J. Inc. v.

Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 229, 109 S.Ct. 2893,

106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989) (internal citations omitted).

Wilson v. Parisi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 637, 658–59 (M.D. Pa. 2008). Likewise, the

elements of a civil RICO conspiracy claim are that:

(1) Defendant is a person who conspired to violate §§ 1962(b) or (c);

(2) Defendant understood the nature or unlawful character of the

conspiratorial plan; (3) Defendant agreed to join with others to achieve

the objective of the conspiracy during the relevant period; (4)

Defendant agreed that the enterprise would be conducted through a

pattern of racketeering activity. This means that the commission of at

least two predicate crimes by the conspiracy was contemplated.

Arunachalam v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 243 F. Supp. 3d 526, 529–30 (D. Del.

2017), aff'd, 759 F. App’x 927 (Fed. Cir. 2019).

Furthermore, the RICO statute proscribes racketeering by an “enterprise.”

Therefore, to establish a RICO violation, the plaintiff must plead facts which

plausibly allege the existence of some criminal enterprise. On this score:

An “ ‘enterprise’ includes any individual, partnership, corporation,

association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals

associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).

“[A]n association-in-fact enterprise must have at least three structural

features: [1] a purpose, [2] relationships among those associated with

the enterprise, and [3] longevity sufficient to permit these associates to

pursue the enterprise's purpose.” Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938,

946, 129 S.Ct. 2237, 173 L.Ed.2d 1265 (2009). “[A]n association-in-

fact enterprise is ‘a group of persons associated together for a common

purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.’ ” Id. (quoting United

States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246

(1981)).

Irish v. Ferguson, 970 F. Supp. 2d 317, 344 (M.D. Pa. 2013).

In addition, civil RICO claims must be timely brought in order to survive. In

this regard:

The statute of limitations for RICO claims is four years. Agency

Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156, 107

S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987). The statutory period runs from the

date that Plaintiffs “knew or should have known of their injury,” and

“kn[ew] or should have known of the source of their injury.” Prudential

Ins. Co. of Am. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 359 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2004)

(citing Forbes v. Eagleson, 228 F.3d 471, 485 (3d Cir. 2000)).

Corman v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 396 F. Supp. 3d 530, 547 (E.D. Pa. 2019).

Judged against these guideposts, we find that O’Connor’s civil RICO claims

fail on numerous grounds. At the outset, we are constrained to note that a number of

O’Connor’s allegations relating to aerial surveillance of her kitten by drones and

years’ long electronic monitoring of her whereabouts by the Snyders have the quality

of matters more imagined than real. This case cannot proceed forward based solely

upon these fantastic allegations. Quite the contrary, we may properly dismiss a

pleading when presented with a complaint which “relies on ‘fantastic or delusional

scenarios.’” DeGrazia v. F.B.I., 316 F. App'x 172, 173 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989)).

Beyond this threshold, fundamental shortcoming, O’Connor’s civil RICO

claims fail because she has not sufficiently alleged the requisite pattern of

racketeering activity by a criminal enterprise. This RICO claim fails in multiple

respects. First, we do not believe that the amended complaint adequately alleges that

Mr. and Mrs. Snyder are, in fact, a racketeering “enterprise” as that term is defined

by RICO. In any event, we find that O’Connor has not sufficiently alleged a pattern

of racketeering activity on the part of the Snyders. On this score, stripped to its

essentials, the factual lynchpin of this RICO claim rests upon four allegations;

namely: (1) O’Connor’s claim that the defendants failed to return a broken generator

to her which they had removed in early 2018; (2) O’Conner’s equine boarding fees

dispute with the Snyders, a matter which has been thoroughly and unsuccessfully

litigated by O’Connor in state court; (3) O’Connor’s allegations that Mr. and Mrs.

Snyder are kitten kidnappers; and (4) O’Connor’s other miscellaneous trespass

claims, which were dismissed by the state courts in Maryland.

In our view these factual averments, the pillars upon which this RICO claim

rests, are upon inspection pillars of sand which collapse under close scrutiny. For

example, O’Connor’s claims regarding her lost, broken generator and the return of

the animals she was boarding with the Snyders, all entail matters which took place

in early to mid-2018, more than four years prior to the filing of this RICO case in

October of 2022. Further, as described by O’Connor, these events had the type of

criminal clarity which would have required her to timely file her RICO claim within

the four years limitation period prescribed by law. Yet, it is undisputed that

O’Connor has failed to timely pursue these particular claims which pre-date October

2018.

Additionally, the doctrine of res judicata further undermines these pillars of

O’Connor’s RICO claim since her allegations relating to the Snyders’ wrongful

retention of her horses, as well as her claims concerns alleged trespasses by the

defendants, have been considered and rejected by the state courts in Pennsylvania

and Maryland. This too is a fatal flaw in this pleading since in federal practice it is

well settled that res judicata or:

Claim preclusion bars suit when three elements are present: “(1) a final

judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or

their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of

action.” Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 963 (3d Cir.

1991). In evaluating whether those elements exist, we do not proceed

mechanically, “but focus on the central purpose of the doctrine, to

require a plaintiff to present all claims arising out of the same

occurrence in a single suit. In so doing, we avoid piecemeal litigation

and conserve judicial resources.” Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767

F.3d 247, 277 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and brackets

omitted), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1738, 191 L.Ed.2d 702

(2015). “The purpose of res judicata is to ‘relieve parties of the cost

and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by

preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.’

”

Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 341–42 (3d Cir. 2016).

Likewise in state practice:

For res judicata to apply, Pennsylvania courts require that the two

actions share the following four conditions: (1) identity of the thing

sued upon or for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the

persons and parties or their privies to the action; and (4) identity of the

capacity of the parties to sue or be sued. R & J Holding Co. v.

Redevelopment Auth., 670 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bearoff

v. Bearoff Bros., Inc., 458 Pa. 494, 327 A.2d 72, 74 (1974) ). The party

asserting a bar under res judicata bears the burden of showing that it

applies. Davis v. U.S. Steel Supply, 688 F.2d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 1982)

(en banc).

Estate of Tyler ex rel. Floyd v. Grossman, 108 F.Supp.3d 279, 290 (E.D. Pa. 2015).

See Farkas v. Rich Coast Corp., No. 1:14-CV-272, 2017 WL 10299096, at *4–5

(M.D. Pa. May 19, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:14-CV-272,

2017 WL 10299208 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2017).

In the instant case, it is undisputed that O’Connor’s claims regarding her right

to possess the horses she boarded with the defendants have been repeatedly rejected

by the state courts, which have dismissed her replevin claim, entered judgment in

favor of the Snyders on the boarding fees dispute, and affirmed O’Connor’s trespass

conviction rejecting her defense that she had a right to enter the Snyders’ property

to visit her horses and look for her kitten. These findings are res judicata, and in our

view, now preclude any claim by O’Connor that the defendants wrongfully

possessed these horses. Likewise, the Maryland state courts have dismissed the

trespassing and trespassing conspiracy claims that O’Connor levelled against Elmer

and Lori Snyder. This state court determination also constitutes res judicata with

respect to any federal RICO claims premised upon illicit trespassing by the

defendants.

Finally, with respect to O’Connor’s largely speculative kitten kidnapping

claim, in our view this averment, standing alone, simply cannot meet the statutory

elements of a federal civil RICO lawsuit. Simply put, a missing kitten, an equine

boarding fees dispute, and the failure to return a broken generator, do not a RICO

racketeering case make. Nor can O’Connor cobble together a federal racketeering

case based upon factual averments which have been rejected by the state courts in

other related litigation. Therefore, finding that O’Conner’s claims all fail as a matter

of law, this complaint will be dismissed.

An appropriate order follows.

S/Martin C. Carlson

Martin C. Carlson

United States Magistrate Judge

DATED: September 19, 2023