Long v. Doe 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SPENCER LONG, :

Plaintiff :

: No. 1:22-cv-1346

v. :

: (Judge Rambo)

CO CARA and CO CHARTERS, :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Spencer Long, who is currently in state custody, initiated the above-

captioned pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 He asserts constitutional tort

claims against two corrections officers at the State Correctional Institution, Mahanoy

(SCI Mahanoy), based on an incident of alleged excessive force. Defendants move

to dismiss the complaint in part pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

For the following reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss and

will additionally dismiss several claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Long’s complaint is brief and straightforward. He recounts that, on May 31,

2022, after an altercation with another inmate, he was escorted by two corrections

1 Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional wrongs committed by state

officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves as a mechanism for vindicating

rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002).

officers to the medical department. (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) Long alleges that the

corrections officers used excessive force during the transport when they “push[ed]

his head through the door and caused blood to come out of his head,” leaving him

with “physical pain and damage.” (Id.) In another section of his complaint, he

alleges that the officers “slam[med]” his head “into the door.” (Id. at 2.)

Long asserts that he attempted to grieve the excessive force incident but was

hindered in this process because his grievance and other complaints went

unanswered. (Id. at 1-2; Doc. Nos. 1-1, 1-3, 1-5.) He also claims that he did not

receive proper medical treatment after the incident, alleging that he “submit[ed]

numerous sick-call” requests to the medical department but was not seen. (Doc. No.

1 at 2; Doc. Nos. 1-4, 1-6.)

Long states that he is raising claims “to be free from cru[el] and unusual

punishment under his const[itutional] right 8th and 14th Amendment [sic].” (Doc.

No. 1 at 2.) He also asserts that his “due process rights” were violated because he

has been stymied in his attempts to grieve the incident through the prison grievance

system. (Id.) Long seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive

relief in the form of being transferred to a different prison. (Id. at 3.)

Long initially sued the two corrections officers by naming them as “John Doe”

defendants because he did not know their identities. (See Doc. No. 1 at 1, 3.)

Following several orders to the Superintendent of SCI Mahanoy, the corrections

officers were identified as “CO Cara” and “CO Charters.” (Doc. No. 17.) Cara and

Charters were then issued copies of the complaint and waivers of service of

summons, which they timely returned. (See Doc. Nos. 19, 23.)

Defendants now move to dismiss in part Long’s complaint pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 28.) Long timely filed a brief in

opposition, (Doc. No. 31), and Defendants did not reply. Accordingly, Defendants’

motion for partial dismissal is ripe for disposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire

“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to

offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974);

see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 1996). The court must accept as true

the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from them

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515

F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). In addition to the facts alleged on the face of the

complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint, matters

of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents” attached to a

defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these

documents. Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension

Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a

three-step inquiry. See Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir.

2016) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted). At step

one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a

claim.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in

original)). Second, the court should distinguish well-pleaded factual allegations—

which must be taken as true—from mere legal conclusions, which “are not entitled

to the assumption of truth” and may be disregarded. Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

679). Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations “and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 681.

Because Long proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally construed and

his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007) (citations omitted). This is particularly true when the pro se litigant, like

Long, is incarcerated. See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020)

(citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Before addressing Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) arguments, the Court must

identify the claimed constitutional violation or violations. See Albright v. Oliver,

510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (“The first step in any [Section 1983] claim is to identify

the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.”); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 394 (1989) (explaining that analysis of a Section 1983 claim requires

“identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged”

conduct). Long cites the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and also uses the

phrase “due process.” (See Doc. No. 1 at 2.) He complains of excessive force,

inadequate medical care, and the failure of prison officials to respond to his

grievance and complaints. Accordingly, as best the Court can ascertain, Long is

raising claims sounding in (1) Eighth Amendment excessive force; (2) Eighth

Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs; and (3) Fourteenth

Amendment procedural due process.

Defendants do not challenge the sufficiency of Long’s excessive force claim.

Instead, they argue that, to the extent Long is suing Cara and Charters in their

individual and official capacities, the official-capacity claims are barred by Eleventh

Amendment sovereign immunity. They additionally construe Long’s complaint as

asserting a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim with respect to the

excessive force incident and contend that this claim must be dismissed pursuant to

the “more-specific-provision” rule. Defendants do not address Long’s Eighth

Amendment medical deliberate indifference claim. Nor do they address his

Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process allegations, although this is likely

because they have interpreted Long’s complaint to be asserting a substantive due

process claim. The Court will address Defendants’ arguments and then turn to the

sufficiency of Long’s other claims.

A. Official Capacity Claims

As an initial matter, the Court does not interpret Long’s complaint to be

asserting official capacity claims. He never uses the term “official capacity,” and

his allegations against Defendants appear to be directed at their individual conduct

in allegedly using excessive force. Nevertheless, if Long is asserting official

capacity claims seeking monetary damages, Defendants are correct that those claims

are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents federal

courts from entertaining lawsuits—by United States citizens or citizens of foreign

states—brought against a state. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene

Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267-68 (1997); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10

(1890). This immunity from private suit extends to state agencies as well as state

officials acting in their official capacity because such lawsuits are essentially civil

actions “against the State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,

71 (1989). States may waive this immunity if they choose, but Pennsylvania has

explicitly not waived its immunity with respect to claims brought under Section

1983. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8521(b); Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d

299, 310 (3d Cir. 2020); Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 &

n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8521(b)). There are two exceptions

to the Eleventh Amendment’s bar to private suits against nonconsenting states: (1)

“Congress may abrogate a state’s immunity” and (2) “parties may sue state officers

for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief.” Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v.

Pub. Util. Comm’n of Pa., 141 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 1998) (emphasis added) (citing,

inter alia, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).

Long argues in his opposition brief that he can assert official capacity claims

because he is seeking prospective injunctive and declaratory relief. (See Doc. No.

31 at 3.) There are two problems with this argument. First, nowhere in Long’s

complaint does he request declaratory relief. (See generally Doc. No. 1.)2 Second,

although Long does seek prospective injunctive relief in the form of a prison transfer,

(see id. at 3), it appears that he has already been transferred to a different state

correctional institution. (See Doc. No. 16.) Long’s claim for injunctive relief,

2 In his opposition brief, Long claims that he is seeking nominal damages, compensatory damages,

punitive damages, and a retroactive declaration that his constitutional rights were violated. (See

Doc. No. 31 at 4.) Long, however, cannot amend his complaint through a brief in opposition to a

motion to dismiss. See Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 201-02 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Pa.

ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988)).

therefore, is moot because he has received the relief requested and because he has

been transferred out of the allegedly offending facility. See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323

F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003) (“An inmate’s transfer from the facility complained of

generally moots the equitable and declaratory claims.”); see also Abdul-Akbar v.

Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 197 (3d Cir. 1993).

Accordingly, if Long is attempting to assert an official capacity claim against

Defendants for monetary damages, such a claim is barred by Eleventh Amendment

sovereign immunity. And if he is seeking prospective injunctive relief in the form

of a prison transfer, that claim must be dismissed as moot.

B. Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process

Defendants interpret Long’s complaint as raising a duplicative Fourteenth

Amendment substantive due process claim concerning the excessive force event.

Again, the Court disagrees with Defendants’ interpretation and instead reads Long’s

complaint as asserting a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim. To

the extent that Long is attempting to assert a substantive due process claim regarding

the excessive force incident, Defendants are correct that such a claim is barred by

the more-specific-provision rule.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution contains both procedural and substantive protections. See generally

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The substantive component of the Due Process

Clause safeguards against certain deprivations of individuals’ “life, liberty, and

property” by state actors “regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to

implement them.” L.R. v. Sch. Dist. Of Phila., 836 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2016)

(quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). A substantive

due process claim, however, cannot be maintained when the alleged constitutional

violation is “covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or

Eighth Amendment.” Porter v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 974 F.3d 431, 447 (3d Cir. 2020)

(quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997)). In such situations,

the claim must be analyzed under the rubric of the more specific constitutional

provision rather than substantive due process, see id., as substantive due process is

an “unchartered area” with “scarce and open-ended” guideposts, Collins, 503 U.S.

at 125. The “more-specific-provision rule” will often apply when the challenged

conduct underlying the substantive due process claim is the same conduct that

implicates a more explicit constitutional provision. See Porter, 974 F.3d at 448.

To the extent that Long is asserting a substantive due process claim for the

excessive force incident, that claim is clearly barred by the more-specific-provision

rule. However, the Court construes Long’s complaint as raising a Fourteenth

Amendment procedural due process claim regarding prison officials’ failure to

respond to his grievance and complaints. Although this procedural due process

claim does not implicate the more-specific-provision rule, it must be dismissed for

other reasons.

C. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process

Long appears to assert a procedural due process claim on the basis that SCI

Mahanoy and Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) officials failed to

properly respond to his grievance and complaints about the excessive force incident.

There are several deficiencies with Long’s claim.

First, and most obvious, is the fact that Long has not sued anyone who may

be responsible for the allegedly unconstitutional conduct underlying his due process

allegations. A Bivens claim requires personal involvement to find liability for a

constitutional infringement. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675-77. Cara and Charters

played no role in the grievance process.

Second, and more fundamentally, failure to respond to a grievance or a

complaint does not establish a constitutional violation. As to a procedural due

process claim, it is well settled that a prisoner has no free-standing constitutional

right to an effective grievance process. See Davis v. Samuels, 608 F. App’x 46, 48-

49 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (nonprecedential) (citing Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d

641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he existence of a prison grievance procedure confers

no liberty interest on a prisoner.”); Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991));

Woods v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 446 F. App’x 400, 403 (3d Cir. 2011)

(nonprecedential) (citing Flick, 932 F.2d at 729); Speight v. Sims, 283 F. App’x 880,

881 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (nonprecedential) (quoting Massey, 259 F.3d at

647); see also Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Lab. Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 138 (1977)

(Burger, C.J., concurring) (noting that, while grievance procedures are

“applaud[ed],” they are not “constitutionally mandated”); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d

72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Constitution creates no entitlement to grievance

procedures or access to any such procedure voluntarily established by a state.”).

And if Long is attempting to raise a First Amendment Petition Clause claim,

he is also out of luck. Although it is true that inmates have a First Amendment right

to seek redress of grievances as part of their right of access to courts, see Mack v.

Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 297-99 (3d Cir. 2016), there is no concomitant

First Amendment right to receive a response to a grievance or complaint, see

Kerchner v. Obama, 612 F.3d 204, 209 (3d Cir. 2010); Booth v. King, 346 F. Supp.

2d 751, 761 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (“[A]lthough prisoners have a constitutional right to

seek redress of grievances as part of their right of access to courts, this right is not

compromised by the failure of prison officials to address these grievances.”); see

also Am. Bus Ass’n v. Rogoff, 649 F.3d 734, 739 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Far from holding

that the Petition Clause requires the possibility of a remedy, . . . the clause does not

even guarantee[] a citizen’s right to receive a government response to or official

consideration of a petition for redress of grievances.” (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted)).

Consequently, Long has failed to plausibly state a Fourteenth Amendment

procedural due process claim or a First Amendment right-to-petition claim. And

because this portion of his complaint is legally, rather than factually, deficient, leave

to amend will be denied. In other words, because there is no procedural due process

right to an effective prison grievance system or a First Amendment right to a

grievance response, there is no amendment Long could proffer to cure the pleading

deficiencies with this claim. Granting leave to amend would be futile, so the claim

will be dismissed with prejudice.

D. Eighth Amendment Medical Deliberate Indifference

The Court next turns to Long’s Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. Defendants do not address this claim, but the

Court interprets Long’s complaint as fairly encompassing such a cause of action.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the

infliction of cruel and unusual punishments on prisoners. See Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In the context of prison medical care, the Eighth

Amendment “requires prison officials to provide basic medical treatment” to

incarcerated individuals. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). To

plausibly plead an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference regarding

inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must allege (1) “a serious medical need,” and

(2) “acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that

need.” Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). A

serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring

treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the

necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro,

834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987).

Deliberate indifference by prison officials may be evidenced by intentional

refusal to provide care known to be medically necessary, delayed provision of

medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment,

and denial of reasonable requests for treatment resulting in unnecessary suffering or

risk of injury. See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1993)

(quoting Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346). Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs

is an exacting standard, requiring a showing of “unnecessary and wanton infliction

of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted). Claims

sounding in mere medical negligence will not suffice. Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.

Long’s allegations fail at the second element. Long does not allege that Cara

or Charters were involved with his medical care in any way or acted with deliberate

indifference toward a serious medical need. Long asserts that he requested medical

attention multiple times after the excessive force incident without receiving an

adequate response, but he does not claim that Defendants played any role in this

purportedly unconstitutional medical care. Thus, to the extent that Long is asserting

an Eighth Amendment medical deliberate indifference claim against Cara and

Charters, that claim must be dismissed.

E. Leave to Amend

Generally, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under [the

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995] should receive leave to amend unless

amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Grayson, 293 F.3d at 114. Limited

leave to amend will be granted because it is possible that Long could cure some of

the deficiencies identified in this Memorandum. However, Long’s Fourteenth

Amendment procedural due process claim (or First Amendment Petition Clause

claim, as the case may be), will be dismissed with prejudice because amendment

would be futile.

If Long chooses to file an amended complaint in conformity with this

Memorandum, it should be a stand-alone document, complete in itself and without

reference to any previous pleadings. The amended complaint should set forth

Long’s claims in short, concise, and plain statements, and in sequentially numbered

paragraphs. Long must address the deficiencies identified in this Memorandum, and

he must include all allegations within his pleading. He must also specify the

offending actions taken by a particular defendant, sign the amended complaint, and

indicate the nature of the relief sought.

Long, of course, is not required to file an amended complaint. If he chooses

not to amend his pleadings, this case will proceed as to his Eighth Amendment

excessive force claim against Cara and Charters.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion (Doc. No.

28) for partial dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court

will also sua sponte dismiss Long’s Eighth Amendment medical indifference claim

and his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim for relief. Limited leave to amend

will be granted. An appropriate Order follows.

s/ Sylvia H. Rambo

United States District Judge

Dated: July 24, 2023