Rodriguez v. Cline

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

AXEL RIVERA RODRIGUEZ, :

Plaintiff : No. 1:21-cv-00343

:

v. : (Judge Kane)

:

SGT. CLINE, :

Defendant :

MEMORANDUM

This is a prisoner civil rights case in which pro se Plaintiff Axel Rivera Rodriguez

(“Rodriguez”) alleges that the only remaining Defendant, Sgt. Cline (“Cline”), violated his civil

rights by pepper spraying and physically assaulting him during an altercation on December 12,

2019. Presently before the Court is Cline’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 55.) For

the following reasons, the Court will deny the motion.

I. BACKGROUND1

On December 12, 2019, Rodriguez was incarcerated in Dauphin County Prison on

charges of possession of heroin with intent to distribute. (Doc. No. 56 ¶¶ 2–3.) Rodriguez, who

is addicted to heroin, was detoxing from heroin in his cell on that date and was feeling sleepy,

tired, and disoriented as a result. (Id. ¶¶ 4–8.) Cline came to his cell and asked him to return

personal property that purportedly belonged to the prison. (Id. ¶ 9.) Rodriguez refused to return

the property and told Cline that he should speak to a supervisor about it. (Id. ¶¶ 10–11.) Cline

1 Unless otherwise noted, the background herein is derived from Cline’s Rule 56.1 statement of

facts. (Doc. No. 56.) Rodriguez has not filed a response to Cline’s statement of material facts in

compliance with Local Rule 56.1. Accordingly, the Court deems the facts set forth by Cline to

be undisputed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1; United States v. Alberto, No.

3:18-cv-01014, 2020 WL 730316, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2020).

told him that if he did not return the property Cline would pepper spray him. (Id. ¶ 12.) Cline

left the cell at that moment. (Id. ¶ 13.)

Cline returned to the cell with other staff members shortly thereafter. (Id. ¶ 14.) He

asked Rodriguez to return the property. (Id. ¶ 15.) Rodriguez again refused and told Cline to

speak to a supervisor. (Id. ¶ 16.) After this refusal, Cline pepper sprayed him. (Id. ¶ 18.) Cline

then hit Rodriguez while the other officers were securing him. (Doc. 56-2 at 18.)2 The parties

also dispute whether Cline kicked Rodriguez during the incident. (Doc. 56 ¶ 19.)3

2 Cline states that he does not recall whether he hit Rodriguez. (Doc. 56-4 at 2.) The Court

considers the evidence in the light most favorable to Rodriguez as the non-movant and

accordingly credits his assertion that Cline hit him.

3 Cline’s statement of material facts states that Rodriguez “admit[ted]” that Cline did not kick

him in a portion of his deposition. (Doc. 56 ¶ 19.) The Court does not agree with Cline that

Rodriguez made such an admission during the deposition. In the relevant portion of the

transcript, Rodriguez gives the following testimony:

Q. And you mentioned in your lawsuit that other people kicked you, some of

the other officers kicked you.

A. That’s correct.

Q. Okay. So you allege that Officer Cline hit you and used OC spray on you.

Is that correct?

A. That’s correct.

(Doc. 56-2 at 18.) In no portion of this transcript does Rodriguez directly admit that Cline did

not kick him. Counsel’s questions during the deposition sought to elicit responses from

Rodriguez admitting that “other officers” kicked him and that Cline allegedly pepper sprayed

and hit him, but counsel never asked Rodriguez whether Cline kicked him. Cline now appears to

reason by negative implication that Rodriguez’s deposition testimony constitutes an admission

by Rodriguez that Cline did not kick him.

The Court declines to give Rodriguez’s deposition testimony such an expansive

construction. Considering that Rodriguez was proceeding pro se and through an interpreter

during the deposition, the Court does not find it reasonable to conclude by negative implication

that Rodriguez “admitted” a fact when counsel did not ask any questions that would directly

elicit such an admission. Counsel could have cured this absence by asking Rodriguez directly

Rodriguez initiated this case by filing a complaint on February 19, 2021, which the Court

received and docketed on February 25, 2021. (Doc. No. 1.) The complaint names Cline as a

defendant along with Seibert, a lieutenant in the prison, and Briggs, the prison’s warden. The

complaint assets claims for excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id.)

Defendants moved to dismiss the claims against Seibert and Briggs for failure to state a

claim upon which relief could be granted on June 14, 2021. (Doc. No. 14.) The Court granted

the motion on December 3, 2021, dismissed the claims against Seibert and Briggs without

prejudice, and granted Rodriguez leave to file an amended complaint. (Doc. Nos. 25–26.)

Rodriguez did not subsequently file an amended complaint, which led the Court to dismiss the

claims against Seibert and Briggs without further leave to amend on January 17, 2023. (Doc.

No. 59.) The case accordingly proceeded as to Rodriguez’s claim against Cline only.

Cline filed the instant motion for summary judgment on November 30, 2022, along with

a supporting brief and a statement of material facts. (Doc. Nos. 55–57.) Rodriguez has not

responded to the motion, and the deadline for doing so has expired under the Local Rules. The

motion is accordingly ripe for review.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the Court to render summary judgment “if

the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[T]his standard provides

that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an

otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no

whether Cline kicked him, but he did not do so. The Court accordingly views the facts in the

light most favorable to Rodriguez and concludes that there is a factual dispute as to whether

Cline kicked him.

genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986).

A disputed fact is “material” if proof of its existence would affect the outcome of the case under

applicable substantive law. See id. at 248; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078

(3d Cir. 1992). A dispute of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v.

Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1287–88 (3d Cir. 1991).

When determining whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact, the Court must

view the facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Moore v.

Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v. Consol. Rail Corp., 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir.

1992); White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). To avoid summary

judgment, however, the nonmoving party may not rest on the unsubstantiated allegations of his

or her pleadings. When the party seeking summary judgment satisfies its burden under Rule 56

of identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, the

nonmoving party is required to go beyond his pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, or the like in order to demonstrate specific material facts that give rise to a

genuine dispute. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The party opposing

the motion “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts.” See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

When Rule 56 shifts the burden of production to the nonmoving party, that party must produce

evidence to show the existence of every element essential to its case that it bears the burden of

proving at trial, for “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” See Celotex, 477 U.S. at

323; see also Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1992).

In determining whether a dispute of material fact exists, the Court must consider the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See White, 862 F.2d at 59. In

doing so, the Court must accept the nonmovant’s allegations as true and resolve any conflicts in

his favor. See id. (citations omitted). However, a party opposing a summary judgment motion

must comply with Local Rule 56.1, which specifically directs the oppositional party to submit a

“statement of the material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the statement

required [to be filed by the movant], as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue

to be tried”; if the nonmovant fails to do so, “[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement

required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted.” See L.R. 56.1. The

Rule further requires the inclusion of references to the parts of the record that support the

statements. See id.

A party cannot evade these litigation responsibilities in this regard simply by citing the

fact that he is a pro se litigant. These rules apply with equal force to all parties. See Sanders v.

Beard, No. 09-cv-01384, 2010 WL 2853261, at *5 (M.D. Pa. July 20, 2010) (stating that pro se

parties “are not excused from complying with court orders and the local rules of court”); Thomas

v. Norris, No. 02-cv-01854, 2006 WL 2590488, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2006) (explaining that

pro se parties must follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

III. DISCUSSION

Cline asserts three arguments in support of his motion for summary judgment: (1) that

Rodriguez failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit; (2) that Rodriguez’s

claims fail on their merits under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) that Cline is entitled to

qualified immunity. (Doc. No. 57.) The Court considers Cline’s arguments below.

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The Court first considers Cline’s exhaustion argument. Under the PLRA, prisoner

plaintiffs must exhaust all available administrative remedies before they may challenge the

conditions of their confinement in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Downey v. Pa. Dep’t

of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 304 (3d Cir. 2020). The statute requires “proper exhaustion,” meaning

the prisoner must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the procedural

rules set by the prison. See id. at 305 (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006)). Failure

to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that must be proven by defendants.

See Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002).

Cline argues that summary judgment based on a failure to exhaust administrative

remedies is appropriate because Rodriguez “admits he did not complete the grievance process

available to him” and “claims the process would have been futile.” (Doc. No. 57 at 5.)

The Court finds Cline’s exhaustion argument unavailing. To begin, Cline does not offer

any evidence or law to indicate what administrative processes are available to prisoners in

Dauphin County Prison or what steps inmates must take to exhaust those processes. Because “it

is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion,”

the Court cannot conclude that Rodriguez failed to exhaust administrative remedies without

information on what the prison requires to exhaust administrative remedies. See Jones v. Bock,

549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007).

Moreover, the Court does not find that Rodriguez “admitted” a failure to exhaust

administrative remedies. In the relevant portion of Rodriguez’s deposition, he testifies as

follows:

Q. [Indicating a physical exhibit] it indicates that you went through two of the

processes on the grievance related to the December the 19th of 2019

event.

A. Okay.

Q. Does that surprise you that you didn’t complete all four phases?

A. I’m not really surprised because of all the irregularities that they created in

my situation. When you look at my documents it will make sense why I

wasn’t able to continue escalating the complaint.

(Doc. No. 56-2 at 25.) Cline argues that this constitutes an admission by Rodriguez that he did

not exhaust administrative remedies because of his belief that exhaustion would be futile on its

merits. (Doc. No. 57 at 5.)

The Court disagrees. As noted above, see supra note 3, Rodriguez’s equivocal response

to a leading question asked through an interpreter during a deposition in which he was

proceeding pro se is simply not sufficient to conclude that he admitted a fact. At no point did

Rodriguez affirmatively state that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies, nor did counsel

ask any questions that could have elicited such an affirmative admission.

Finally, the Court disagrees with Cline’s interpretation of Rodriguez’s testimony as

stating that exhaustion is futile because it would fail on the merits. It appears to the Court that

Rodriguez asserts that exhaustion was futile because staff at the prison interfered with his

attempts to exhaust administrative remedies. See (Doc. No. 56-2 at 25 (“I’m not really surprised

because of all the irregularities that they created in my situation.”)). Exhaustion of

administrative remedies may be excused “when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking

advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation”

because “such interference with an inmate’s pursuit of relief renders the administrative process

unavailable.” See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016). Thus, Rodriguez’s assertion of staff

interference with his attempts to exhaust administrative remedies may be sufficient to excuse

exhaustion. Whether Rodriguez can ultimately prevail on such an argument requires resolution

of factual questions that cannot be determined on the present summary judgment record.

In sum, the Court finds that Cline has not met his burden to show that he is entitled to

summary judgment on the basis of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and that questions

of fact remain as to whether Rodriguez exhausted administrative remedies and whether the

prison’s grievance process was available to him.

B. Plaintiff’s Excessive Force Claim

Turning to the merits, because Rodriguez was a pretrial detainee when the facts of this

case occurred, his excessive force claim is governed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment rather than the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.

See Wharton v. Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 247 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,

535 n.16 (1979)).

Pretrial detainees are entitled to at least as much protection from excessive force as

prisoners who have been convicted of a crime. See Bistrian v. Levi, 912 F.3d 79, 91 (3d Cir.

2018) (citing Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 188 n.10 (3d Cir. 1993)). Unlike prisoners who

have been convicted of a crime, who may not be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment,

pretrial detainees “cannot be punished at all under the Due Process Clause.” See Hubbard v.

Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 166 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 520). Thus, pretrial detainees

may not be subjected to “excessive force that amounts to punishment.” See Jacobs v.

Cumberland Cnty., 8 F.4th 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,

395 n.10 (1989)).

Unlike excessive force claims under the Eighth Amendment, which require plaintiffs to

establish both an objective element and a subjective element to prove excessive force, excessive

force claims under the Fourteenth Amendment are based exclusively on an objective-

reasonableness standard. See id. (citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 578 U.S. 389, 396–400

(2015)). Thus, a pretrial detainee seeking to establish that the use of force was excessive “must

show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively

unreasonable.” See id. (emphasis in original) (citing Kingsley, 578 U.S. at 396–97).

There is no mechanical formula for determining when force is objectively unreasonable

under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Kingsley, 578 U.S. at 397 (citing County of Sacramento

v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998)). Instead, courts and juries must look to the particular facts

and circumstances of the case, including “the relationship between the need for the use of force

and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer to

temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat

reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” See id.

(citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). These circumstances should be considered “from the

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.” See id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). A

plaintiff can establish that the force used was excessive if he shows that the force was “not

‘rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose’” or that the force used was

“excessive in relation to that purpose.” See id. (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 561).

Applying the standard for Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claims to the facts of

this case, the Court will deny Cline’s summary judgment argument because there are genuine

issues of material fact as to whether the force used was excessive in relation to Cline’s purpose.

It is undisputed that Cline was acting to achieve the legitimate government purpose of getting

Rodriguez to comply with staff orders to turn over personal property. A reasonable fact finder

could conclude on the facts of this case, however, that the force Cline used was excessive in

relation to that purpose. At the time Cline approached the cell, Rodriguez was sleepy, tired, and

disoriented as a result of detoxing from heroin, he was locked in his cell, and he had not

threatened Cline with physical force in any way. (Doc. No. 56 ¶¶ 4–8.) There is also no

indication in the record that the personal property that Rodriguez refused to hand to Cline posed

a danger to Cline or anybody else in the prison. A reasonable fact finder viewing this evidence

could conclude that very little, if any, physical force was justified to secure Rodriguez’s

compliance with Cline’s orders. Instead of using a de minimis amount of force, however, Cline

pepper sprayed Rodriguez and may have additionally punched and kicked him. The Court

accordingly finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Cline used excessive

force that precludes the entry of summary judgment.

C. Qualified Immunity

The Court will also deny Cline’s assertion of qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity

shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1)

that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly

established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735

(2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In order to determine whether a

right was clearly established, the Court must ask “whether it would be clear to a reasonable

officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” See Schmidt v. Creedon,

639 F.3d 587, 598 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). “If it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer what the law

required under the facts alleged, then he is entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. Stated

differently, for a right to be clearly established, “existing precedent must have placed the

statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” See al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. As the

Supreme Court recently noted, “[t]his demanding standard protects ‘all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583

U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

Accordingly, “there must be sufficient precedent at the time of action, factually similar to the

plaintiff’s allegations, to put [the] defendant on notice that his or her conduct is constitutionally

prohibited.” See Mammaro v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 169 (3d

Cir. 2016) (quoting McLaughlin v. Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 572 (3d Cir. 2001)). In making this

determination, the Court looks to applicable Supreme Court precedent, but if none exists, “a

‘robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority’ in the Court[s] of Appeals could clearly

establish a right for purposes of qualified immunity.” See id. (quoting Taylor v. Barkes, 575

U.S. 822, 826 (2015)).

The United States Supreme Court’s decision in White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73 (2017),

clarifies the Court’s inquiry. In that opinion, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that its case law

“do[es] not require a case directly on point” for a right to be clearly established, but “existing

precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” See id. at 79

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)). The

Supreme Court reiterated that the clearly established law “must be ‘particularized’ to the facts of

the case,” and cautioned that the presentation of a unique set of facts by a case is an “important

indication” that a defendant’s conduct at issue did not violate a “clearly established” right. See

id. at 79–80 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,

640 (1987)). However, a constitutional deprivation that occurs under unique factual

circumstances does not necessarily warrant an automatic grant of qualified immunity. See Hope

v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (holding that “officials can still be on notice that their

conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances”). There may be the rare

“obvious case,” where “a body of relevant case law” is not necessary, see Brosseau v. Haugen,

543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004), especially when the case in question presents “extreme

circumstances” to which “a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law

may apply with obvious clarity.” See Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53–54 (2020)

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 741).

In this case, Cline asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity because clearly

established precedent recognizes that prison officials may use pepper spray when reasonably

necessary to restore order in a prison. (Doc. No. 57 at 12–13.) Cline’s argument overlooks the

fact that there is record evidence from which a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that

Cline hit and kicked Rodriguez in addition to pepper spraying him. At the time of the incident, it

was clearly established that an officer’s use of physical force that is excessive in relation to the

situation faced by the officer violates the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Kingsley, 576 U.S.

at 392, 397–98. The Court finds there is sufficient evidence in the record that Cline violated this

right to deny his assertion of qualified immunity at this stage and allow Rodriguez’s claim to go

to trial.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Cline’s motion for summary judgment.

(Doc. No. 55.) In order to facilitate a timely and efficient resolution of this matter, the Court will

require the parties to file a joint status report indicating whether they wish to have this case

referred for mediation in the Court’s Prisoner Litigation Settlement Program. If this case is not

resolved through mediation, the Court will schedule an evidentiary hearing on the issue of

administrative exhaustion at which the Court will act as the finder of fact. See Small v. Camden

Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 270–71 (3d Cir. 2013). An appropriate Order follows.

s/ Yvette Kane a

Yvette Kane, District Judge

United States District Court

Middle District of Pennsylvania