concluding exhaustion is not required where petitioner demonstrates futility
How later courts described this case
- concluding exhaustion is not required where petitioner demonstrates futility
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TIMOTHY WALLACE, :
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-0257
Petitioner :
(JUDGE MANNION)
V. :
WARDEN S. SPAULDING, :
Respondent :
MEMORANDUM
Timothy Wallace, an inmate currently confined in the United States
Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, filed the above captioned petition for
writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241. (Doc. 1). Wallace
challenges a January 10, 2022 denial of parole by the United States Parole
Commission (“USPC”). Id. Specifically, Wallace claims that the Parole
Commission violated his due process by relying on “incorrect information” and
not considering “Petitioner's 27 years of working and programming’ in denying
him parole. Id.
A response to the petition was filed on April 8, 2023. (Doc. 9). Although
Petitioner was provided an opportunity to file a traverse, none was filed. For
the reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss the petition for writ of habeas
corpus for Petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
l. Background
On July 15, 1986, the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland sentenced Timothy Wallace, Petitioner, to a life sentence for
conspiracy to violate civil rights to be followed by a consecutive ten-year
sentence for witness tampering, aiding, and abetting. (Doc. 9-1 at 4-7,
Sentence Monitoring Computation Data). Wallace also has another
consecutive five-year non-parole eligible sentence for using a firearm during
a crime of violence, aiding and abetting. Id.
On December 7, 2021, Wallace applied for his most recent parole
hearing. (Doc. 9-2 at 2, Parole Form 1-24).
On December 14, 2021, the USPC conducted Petitioner's parole
hearing. (Doc. 9-3 at 2-11, Pre-Hearing Assessment and Hearing Summary).
In conducting Wallace’s hearing, the USPC reviewed and listed all of
Wallace’s programming in his prehearing assessment. Id. at 6. Furthermore,
the USPC reviewed Wallace’s programming with him at his hearing. Id. at 7.
The USPC’s hearing examiner also explicitly stated in his assessment that
..the offender has completed a minimal amount of programs and [it] does
not appear he ever completed any counseling/psychology programs related
to his underlying offense.” Id. at 8.
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On January 10, 2022, the USPC issued its Notice of Action denying
Wallace parole, based on the following:
After consideration of all factors and_ information
presented, at this time, the Commission is denying your
release under the standards at 18 U.S.C. §4206(d) for the
following reasons: During your term of incarceration, you
committed numerous serious rules infractions to include:
Use of Drugs/Alcohol (x2); Possessing Drugs/Alcohol;
Engaging in a Group Demonstration; and Threatening
Bodily Harm. You also continue to deny any responsibility
in the offense conduct and have not completed any
meaningful programs that would potentially reduce your
risk to reoffend. You committed a senseless crime and
displayed a lack of humanity by shooting another person
5 times at close range. For these reasons, there is a
reasonable probability you would commit another crime if
released.
(Doc. 9-4 at 2-3, Notice of Action).
To date, Wallace has not administratively appealed the USPC’s January
10, 2022, decision to the USPC’s National Appeals Board. (Doc. 9-5 at 2,
Declaration of Gregory Thornton, Assistant Counsel for the USPC).
Il. Discussion
Respondent argues that Wallace’s petition should be dismissed based
on his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to seeking review in
federal court. Despite the absence of a statutory exhaustion requirement
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attached to §2241, courts have consistently required a petitioner to exhaust
administrative remedies prior to bringing a habeas claim under §2241.
Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000); Moscato_v. Federal
Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996). Exhaustion is required
“for three reasons: (1) allowing the appropriate agency to develop a factual
record and apply its expertise facilitates judicial review; (2) permitting
agencies to grant the relief requested conserves judicial resources; and (3)
providing agencies the opportunity to correct their own errors fosters
administrative autonomy.” Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761-62 (citing Bradshaw _v.
Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981)). Significantly, exhaustion is not
required where it “would be futile, if the actions of the agency clearly and
unambiguously violate statutory or constitutional rights, or if the administrative
procedure is clearly shown to be inadequate to prevent irreparable harm.”
Lyons v. U.S. Marshals, 840 F.2d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 1988). See also, Gambino
v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156, 171 (3d Cir. 1998) (concluding exhaustion is not
required where petitioner demonstrates futility); Carling v. Peters, No. 00-
2958, 2000 WL 1022959, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 10, 2000) (finding that
exhaustion is not required where delay would subject petitioner to “irreparable
injury”).
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In the instant case, the record establishes that on January 10, 2022, the
Parole Commission denied Petitioner parole at the end of his hearing. (Doc.
9-4 at 2). The January 10, 2022 Notice of Action clearly indicated that the
decision is appealable to the National Appeals Board. Id. Yet, Petitioner never
appealed that decision to the National Appeals Board. (Doc. 9-5 at 2).
Petitioner does not refute this. Thus, it is apparent that Petitioner never
exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to the most recent
decision to deny him parole.
lll. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241 is dismissed without prejudice for
Petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
A separate Order will issue.
Ke Uy SL
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
DATED: July /° , 2023
22-0257-01
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