The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DARRYL GARDNER, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:22-CV-1007
:
Plaintiff : (Judge Conner)
:
v. :
:
LAUREL HARRY, et al., :
:
Defendants :
MEMORANDUM
This is a prisoner civil rights case filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff,
Darryl Gardner, who is serving a life sentence in state prison, asserts that the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ policy granting single cell status to
inmates who have been sentenced to death while not affording the same status to
inmates serving life sentences violates his right to equal protection. Defendants
have moved to dismiss and Gardner has moved for summary judgment. The motion
to dismiss will be granted and the motion for summary judgment will be denied.
I. Factual Background & Procedural History
Gardner is incarcerated in Camp Hill State Correctional Institution (“SCI-
Camp Hill”). He filed his initial complaint on June 13, 2022, naming as defendants
Laurel Harry, SCI-Camp Hill’s superintendent; George M. Little, the secretary of
the DOC; and Tanya Heist, SCI-Camp Hill’s grievance coordinator. (Doc. 1). The
court dismissed the complaint pursuant to a screening review under 28 U.S.C. §
1915A on August 9, 2022 and granted Gardner leave to amend. (Docs. 10-11).
Gardner timely filed an amended complaint on August 24, 2022. (Doc. 13).
The amended complaint raises a single claim that the DOC’s policy of granting
inmates who have been sentenced to death single cell status while denying the
same status to inmates who have been given life sentences violates his right to equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 13). The amended complaint
does not specifically name any defendants, but includes a caption listing “Harry, et
al.” as defendants. (Id. at 1). The court liberally construes this as naming the same
defendants named in the original complaint.
Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint on October 24, 2022
and filed a supporting brief on November 4, 2022. (Docs. 18, 20). Defendants argue
that the amended complaint should be dismissed for failure to name defendants.
(Doc. 20 at 5-6). Defendants further argue the complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted and that they are entitled to qualified immunity
because: (1) inmates sentenced to life are not similarly situated to inmates
sentenced to death; (2) the different housing classifications given to the two groups
of inmates are rationally related to a legitimate government interest; and (3) the
right Gardner asserts is not clearly established. (Id. at 6-13). Briefing on the motion
to dismiss is complete and it is ripe for review. (See Docs. 20, 22-24). Gardner has
additionally moved for summary judgment. (Doc. 29).
II. Legal Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the
dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable
reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. County
of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings,
Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)). In addition to reviewing the facts
contained in the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the
complaint, matters of public record, [and] undisputedly authentic documents if the
complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605
F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol.
Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).
Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide “the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To test the sufficiency of the complaint, the court conducts
a three-step inquiry. See Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 130-31
(3d Cir. 2010). In the first step, “the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a
plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’” Id. at 130 (alteration in original) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Next, the factual and legal elements of a
claim must be separated; well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, while mere legal
conclusions may be disregarded. Id. at 131-32; see Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578
F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Once the court isolates the well-pleaded factual
allegations, it must determine whether they are sufficient to show a “plausible claim
for relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts “that allow[]
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Courts must liberally construe complaints brought by pro se litigants. Sause
v. Bauer, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2561, 2563 (2018). Pro se complaints, “however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
III. Discussion
Gardner brings his constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983
creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional wrongs committed by
state officials. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute is not a source of substantive rights, but
serves as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law.
See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d
1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). To state a Section 1983 claim, plaintiffs must show a
deprivation of a “right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United
States . . . by a person acting under color of state law.” Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1204
(quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995)).
We will first consider defendants’ argument that the amended complaint
should be dismissed for its failure to specifically name any defendants. (Doc. 20 at
5-6). Gardner responds that his failure to specifically name defendants should not
result in dismissal because the defendants “are not actually the true subjects to be
sued” because he intends to sue the DOC. (Doc. 22 at 2). Defendants interpret this
as an assertion that Gardner raises only official capacity claims. (Doc. 23 at 2).
Defendants argue that the only official capacity claim Gardner can bring is a claim
for injunctive relief pursuant to Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Defendants
argue that if the amended complaint is construed to assert a claim under the Ex
Parte Young doctrine, defendants Heist and Harry should be dismissed because
they are not sufficiently connected to the challenged single cell policy to be sued in
their official capacity. (Doc. 23 at 5-11).
The court liberally construes the amended complaint to assert only one claim
for injunctive relief requiring defendants to provide Gardner single cell status. (See
Doc. 13 at 6 (“The Complainant is seeking single cell housing and classification by
the Order of the Court in accordance to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and the Equal Protections afforded thereby.”). We also
construe the complaint to assert claims against defendants in their official
capacities only. The complaint does not make any specific factual averments as to
wrongful actions by defendants, but asserts that the “D.O.C. is in violation of the
complainant’s Fourteenth Amendment rights by not affording him single
housing/status.” (Id. at 3).
Gardner’s official capacity claim for injunctive relief is cognizable under the
Ex Parte Young doctrine. Although states and state officials acting in their official
capacity are ordinarily entitled to sovereign immunity from civil suits, the Ex Parte
Young doctrine allows plaintiffs to sue individual defendants in their official
capacity for injunctive relief requiring the defendants to prospectively cease
violating the plaintiff’s rights. See e.g., Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. __, 143 S. Ct. 955,
960 (2023); Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor v. Governor of N.J., 961 F.3d 234, 238
(3d Cir. 2020).
The court agrees with defendants that Heist and Harry are not appropriate
defendants with respect to Gardner’s claim for injunctive relief under the Ex Parte
Young doctrine. Under the Ex Parte Young doctrine, state officials “must have
some connection with the enforcement” of the government policy or action being
challenged. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157; accord Constitution Party of Pa. v.
Cortes, 824 F.3d 386, 396 (3d Cir. 2016). The official’s enforcement of the policy need
not be substantial; the official may be sued based solely on the performance of
ministerial functions. Cortes, 824 F.3d at 396; Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 54
(3d Cir. 1980). The question is not whether a plaintiff has filed suit against the
“most suitable” defendant, but rather whether the defendant has a sufficient
connection to the policy to stand in for the government under the legal fiction of the
Ex Parte Young doctrine. Finberg, 634 F.2d at 53.
We find that defendants Heist and Harry do not have a sufficient connection
to the policy in question to be sued under Ex Parte Young. There is no allegation
that Heist and Harry are involved in the enforcement of the policy granting single
cell status to inmates sentenced to death and not to those sentenced to life. The
DOC’s housing policies are authored by the Secretary of the DOC, defendant Little.
See DC-ADM 11.2.1 (Nov. 8, 2021), available at https://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/
Documents/DOC%20Policies/11.02.01%20Reception%20and%20Classification.pdf.
Heist and Harry, as SCI-Camp Hill officials, appear to have no connection with the
implementation or enforcement of DOC-wide policies. Hence, we will dismiss
Gardner’s claims against Heist and Harry, and we will analyze whether the
amended complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted with respect to
defendant Little only.
The amended complaint alleges that the DOC’s single cell policy violates
Gardner’s right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal
Protection Clause is “essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated
should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). Defendants argue that
the equal protection claim fails because Gardner is not similarly situated to inmates
sentenced to death. (See Doc. 20 at 8-10).
We agree. As defendants note, the DOC houses all inmates who have been
sentenced to death in SCI-Phoenix, see Execution List, DOC, https://www.cor.pa.
gov/About%20Us /Initiatives/Pages/Death%20Penalty.aspx (click link to “Execution
List”),1 while Gardner is housed in SCI-Camp Hill.2 Inmates housed in different
prisons with different housing and security needs are not similarly situated to one
1 The court may consider information from the DOC’s website in resolving
defendants’ motion to dismiss because it is a matter of public record. Mayer, 605
F.3d at 230. The court may also take judicial notice of the information because it
has been made publicly available by a government entity. Vanderklok v. United
States, 868 F.3d 189, 205 n.16 (3d Cir. 2017).
2 Gardner asserts in his opposition brief that “death sentenced inmates are
now currently moving among the general population for the purpose of communal
activities, while maintaining single cell status and classification.” (Doc. 22-1 at 7-8).
Gardner does not assert, however, that any death-sentenced inmates have been
moved from SCI-Phoenix, and publicly available information on the DOC’s website
states that all death-sentenced inmates remain housed in SCI-Phoenix. See
Execution List, supra.
another. See, e.g., Rouse v. Benson, 193 F.3d 936, 942 (8th Cir. 1999); Thomas v.
Duvall, No. 3:16-CV-451, 2017 WL 9532987, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2017), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 3:16-CV-451, 2017 WL 2928153, at *5 (M.D. Pa. July 10,
2017); Hayes v. Lightner, No. 4:14-CV-1922, 2015 WL 6768964, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Oct.
14, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:14-CV-1922, 2015 WL 6758179,
at *1 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2015); see also Johnson v. Horn, 150 F.3d 276, 285 (3d Cir.
1998) (citing Klinger v. Dep’t of Corrs., 31 F.3d 727, 732-33 (8th Cir. 1994) for the
proposition that “men and women at different prisons with different administrative
and security concerns not similarly situated”), overruled in nonrelevant part by
DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47 (3d Cir. 2000).
Moreover, to be similarly situated, plaintiffs and relevant comparators must
be “alike ‘in all relevant aspects.’” Startzell v. City of Phila., Pa., 533 F.3d 183, 203
(3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (3d Cir. 2008)). The only
allegation in the amended complaint as to why Gardner is similarly situated to
inmates who have been sentenced to death is that the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania has not executed a prisoner in many years.3 (See Doc. 13 at 4
3 The court takes judicial notice that the governor of Pennsylvania has
announced that he will not issue any execution warrants during his term. See Press
Release, Governor Josh Shapiro, Governor Shapiro Announces He Will Not Issue
Any Execution Warrants During His Term, Calls on General Assembly to Abolish
the Death Penalty (Feb. 16, 2023), https://www.governor.pa.gov/newsroom/governor
-shapiro-announces-he-will-not-issue-any-execution-warrants-during-his-term-
calls-on-general-assembly-to-abolish-the-death-penalty/. Thus, it appears that the
period in which no executions have occurred in Pennsylvania will continue for the
foreseeable future.
(“Pennsylvania hasn’t had a compulsory execution in forty-nine years4. . . . The
sentence of life is tantamount to a death sentence. Without executions the two are
similarly situated.”). This allegation is not sufficient to plead that the death row
inmates are similarly situated to Gardner. There are a multitude of other relevant
factors—such as institutional security concerns in light of their death row status or
the more serious nature of their underlying offenses as well as certain commissary
restrictions—on which inmates sentenced to death differ from Gardner.
Accordingly, because Gardner has failed to plead that inmates sentenced to death
are similarly situated to him in all relevant respects, his amended complaint fails to
state an equal protection claim upon which relief may be granted.
Before dismissing a civil rights claim for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, a district court must permit a curative amendment unless the
amendment would be inequitable or futile. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245. We will deny
further leave to amend as futile. Gardner has had multiple opportunities to state
4 Defendants dispute the accuracy of this factual assertion, noting that the
last inmate executed in Pennsylvania was Gary Heidnik on July 6, 1999. (Doc. 20 at
8 n.5 (citing People Who Have Been Executed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
(May 2, 1995 to Present), DOC, https://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Initiatives
/Pages/Death%20Penalty.aspx (click link to “List of individuals executed by lethal
injection”)). Gardner replies that Heidnik’s execution cannot be considered
“compulsory” because “Heidnik was executed of his own [volition]. He stopped all
appeals, and ask[ed] the state to kill him.” (Doc. 22-1 at 2).
Gardner’s assertion that no individuals have been executed in Pennsylvania
in forty-nine years appears to be inaccurate, notwithstanding the parties’ dispute
about the circumstances of Heidnik’s execution. Publicly available information
from the DOC indicates that two individuals—Keith Zettlemoyer and Leon Jerome
Moser—were executed by the Commonwealth in 1995. See People Who Have Been
Executed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, supra.
claims upon which relief may be granted but has failed to do so. We will
additionally deny Gardner’s motion for summary judgment in light of our
conclusion that the amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted.
IV. Conclusion
We will grant defendants’ motion to dismiss, dismiss Gardner’s amended
complaint without further leave to amend, deny Gardner’s motion for summary
judgment, and close this case. An appropriate order shall issue.
/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
Christopher C. Conner
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: June 23, 2023