The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LINERO DUFFIS, Civil No. 3:23-cv-496
Petitioner (Judge Mariani)
v .
RACHAEL THOMPSON, .
Respondent .
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Linero Duffis (“Duffis”), an inmate confined at the Low Security
Correctional Institution, Allenwood, in White Deer, Pennsylvania, initiated the above-
captioned action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241. (Doc. 1). Duffis alleges that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) failed to apply his
earned time credits under the First Step Act (“FSA”). (/d.). For the reasons set forth below,
the Court will deny the habeas petition.
I. Background
Duffis is serving a 120-month term of imprisonment imposed by the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida for conspiracy to possess, with intent to
distribute, cocaine on board a vessel of the United States, and possession with intent to
distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on board a vessel of the United States.
(Doc. 6-1, pp. 3-5). His projected release date is November 15, 2023, via good conduct
time. (/d.).
On May 6, 2022, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) lodged an
immigration detainer against Duffis, reflecting that there is “[a] final order of removal against
the alien.” (/d. at pp. 6-9). DHS noted that Duffis’ release is tentatively scheduled for
November 15, 2023. (/d.).
In his § 2241 petition, Duffis contends that the BOP deemed him ineligible for earned
time credits under the FSA due to his deportable status, but that he had not yet been
charged with a final order of removal. (Doc. 1). In response, Respondent argues that
Duffis’ § 2241 petition must be denied because he is subject to a final order of removal
issued by DHS, and, thus, ineligible for earned time credits under the FSA. (Doc. 6). The
petition is ripe for resolution.
Il. Discussion
Under the FSA, the Attorney General was charged with development and release of
a Risk and Needs Assessment System (“the System”) within 210 days of December 21,
2018, the date on which the FSA was enacted. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632. The System is to be
used for: (1) determining an inmate's recidivism risk; (2) assessing an inmate’s risk of
violent or serious misconduct; (3) determining the type and amount of evidence-based
recidivism reduction programming (“EBRRs’) appropriate for each inmate; (4) periodically
assessing an inmate’s recidivism risk; (4) reassigning an inmate to appropriate EBRRs and
productive activities (“PAs”); (5) determining when to provide incentives and rewards for
successful participation in EBRRs and PAs; and (6) determining when the inmate is ready to
transfer to pre-release custody or supervised release. See id. § 3632(a). Moreover, the
System provides guidance on the “type, amount, and intensity of EBRR programs and PAs
to be assigned to each inmate based on the inmate's specific criminogenic needs.” Kurti v.
White, No. 1:19-cv-2109, 2020 WL 2063871, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2020) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 3632(b)).
The FSA allows eligible inmates who successfully complete EBRRs or PAs to
receive earned time credits to be applied toward time in pre-release custody or supervised
release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A). An inmate may earn ten (10) days of credit for
every thirty (30) days of successful participation. See id. Moreover, eligible inmates who
have been assessed at a minimum or low risk of recidivism who do not increase their risk of
recidivism over two (2) consecutive assessments may earn an additional five (5) days of
time credit for every thirty (30) days of successful participation. See id. However, “[a]
prisoner is ineligible to apply time credits under subparagraph (C) [application of time credits
toward prerelease custody or supervised release] if the prisoner is the subject of a final
order of removal under any provision of the immigration laws.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(E).
Here, Respondent presented evidence that Duffis is subject to a final order of
removal. (Doc. 6-1, pp. 6-9; see also Doc. 7-1). Although Duffis claims the immigration
detainer does not constitute a final order of removal, the detainer is an official DHS
document indicating the Duffis is indeed subject to a final order of removal. Because of this
final order of removal, and pursuant to the clear language of 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(E), the
Court cannot grant Duffis the relief he seeks. Thus, the Court must deny the habeas
petition.
Ill. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court will deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). A separate Order shall issue.
\
/ VMUAL|
Robert D. Mariani “
United States District Judge
j/)
Dated: May / ¢ _, 2023