Opinion

Morgan v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Court
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
May 24, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.2%

Subsection 302(a)(2) applies “only when the Defendant is physically present in the state when the tort is committed.”

How later courts described this case

  • Subsection 302(a)(2) applies “only when the Defendant is physically present in the state when the tort is committed.”
  • Without some “documentation showing that transfer would be financially burdensome, this factor is neutral.”
  • transfer in the interest of justice where it “would apparently enable appellant to obtain personal jurisdiction over some or all of the defendants”
  • Per the plaintiff’s “own telling,” “the shortcomings of this investigation were centered in Michigan,” not New York.

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

------------------------------------x

DALE MORGAN,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

21-CV-4581(EK)(RLM)

-against-

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, CENTRE

COUNTY-PA, MICHAEL D. BROWN, et al.,

Defendants.

------------------------------------x

ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:

This action arises from the arrest and nine-day

detention of Plaintiff Dale Morgan, which Morgan alleges was the

product of mistaken identity. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

Morgan claims that the defendants — the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania; the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”); Centre

County, Pennsylvania; Trooper Michael Brown; and certain John

Doe law enforcement officers — violated his constitutional

rights. Morgan asserts claims for false arrest, false

imprisonment, and malicious prosecution against all defendants,

and a Monell claim against the Commonwealth, the PSP, and Centre

County. The defendants now move to transfer venue to the U.S.

District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1404. As set forth below, the defendants’ motion

is granted.

Background1

In early 2019, the U.S. Department of Homeland

Security, the Pennsylvania State Police, and local law

enforcement agencies in Centre County, Pennsylvania, were

investigating an identity theft ring. See Am. Compl. ¶ 10, ECF

No. 28. On January 4, 2019, PSP troopers stopped a vehicle

whose driver they believed was associated with the criminal

operation. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. During that encounter, the driver —

later determined to have been an individual named Horace Henry —

tendered a false New York State driver’s license containing Dale

Morgan’s identifying information. Id. ¶ 14. Following the

traffic stop, Trooper Michael Brown applied for an arrest

warrant for Morgan. Id. ¶ 20. On February 1, 2019, a Centre

County magistrate judge issued a warrant for Morgan’s arrest for

offenses including identify theft and receiving stolen property.

Id. ¶ 21.

On March 5, 2019, after receiving the Centre County

arrest warrant, Detective Michael Langellotti of the New York

Police Department issued a fugitive-from-justice complaint

against Morgan, a resident of Brooklyn. Id. ¶ 22. Thereafter,

NYPD officers arrested Morgan at his home in the presence of his

wife and eight-year-old daughter. Id. Following his arrest,

1 The following factual allegations are taken from the amended complaint

and assumed to be true.

Morgan appeared before a judge in Queens County, who denied bail

and remanded him to custody. Id. ¶ 33. Morgan was detained for

“approximately nine days” at the Vernon C. Bain Correctional

Facility in Bronx County. Id. ¶ 34. On or about March 26,

2019, Trooper Brown emailed the Queens County District

Attorney’s Office to inform the office that the “investigation

has led to the withdraw[al] of all charges against Mr. Dale

Morgan.” Id. ¶ 38. After further investigation, Horace Henry

was ultimately charged with identity theft and other offenses

and convicted. Id. ¶ 13-14.

Legal Standard

“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the

interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil

action to any other district or division where it might have

been brought . . . .” 28 U.S.C § 1404(a). The court must first

determine whether the lawsuit “might have been brought” in the

forum where the defendants seek to transfer the case. Id. If

so, the court then considers the following non-exhaustive set of

factors:

(1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum, (2) the convenience of

witnesses, (3) the location of relevant documents and

relative ease of access to sources of proof, (4) the

convenience of parties, (5) the locus of operative facts,

(6) the availability of process to compel the attendance of

unwilling witnesses, and (7) the relative means of the

parties.

N.Y. Marine & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d

102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010).2 Courts in the Second Circuit also

consider factors including “the forum’s familiarity with the

governing law” and “trial efficiency and the interest of

justice.” Children’s Network, LLC v. PixFusion LLC, 722 F.

Supp. 2d 404, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Ultimately, the moving party

must show by clear and convincing evidence that transfer is

warranted. See N.Y. Marine, 599 F.3d at 113-14.

Discussion

Morgan could have brought this action in the Middle

District of Pennsylvania because all defendants reside there.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1); Defs. Mot. to Transfer Venue 2

(“Def. Transfer Br.”), ECF No. 30. Moreover, although Morgan’s

choice of forum weighs against transfer, the remaining factors

either favor transfer or are neutral.

A. Convenience of the Witnesses

The convenience of the witnesses favors transfer.

This factor is “typically the most important.” Tlapanco v.

Elges, 207 F. Supp. 3d 324, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). In weighing

this factor, courts accord more weight to the convenience of

non-party witnesses than that of party witnesses. See id. The

defendants advise that all of the witnesses whose testimony they

2 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order

accepts all alterations and omits citations and internal quotation marks.

intend to present reside in Pennsylvania, including non-party

witnesses. See Def. Transfer Br. 3. In response, Morgan argues

that a majority of, if not all, non-party witnesses reside in

New York, including the NYPD officers who arrested him and the

prosecutors who requested his detention. See Pl. Opp. Br. 11,

ECF No. 38. But those witnesses would offer testimony about

Morgan’s arrest and detention — the facts of which are not in

dispute. The key issue in this case is whether probable cause

existed for Morgan’s arrest, and this question turns on the acts

(and omissions) of the defendants and others who participated in

the criminal investigation in Pennsylvania. See Tlapanco,

207 F. Supp. 3d at 330 (“The central question in this case is

whether the police had sufficient cause to take each of those

investigative steps, not whether they actually did so.”).

B. Locus of Operative Facts

For the same reason, the locus of operative facts lies

in Pennsylvania. This factor concerns the place where the “acts

or omissions for which Defendants could be held liable

occurred,” and is a “primary” consideration. Tlapanco, 207 F.

Supp. 3d at 331. While Morgan was arrested and detained in New

York, the investigate failures for which Morgan seeks to hold

the defendants liable occurred in Pennsylvania. See id. at 332

(Per the plaintiff’s “own telling,” “the shortcomings of this

investigation were centered in Michigan,” not New York.).

C. Availability of Process to Compel Testimony

The availability of process to compel unwilling

witnesses to testify at trial also weighs in favor of transfer.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(c)(1)(A), a

district court generally cannot compel a non-party witness to

travel more than 100 miles. See EasyWeb Innovations, LLC v.

Facebook, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 2d 342, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). As

discussed above, the relevant non-party witnesses are likely to

reside in Pennsylvania, where the alleged acts and omissions of

the defendants occurred. Thus, the ability to compel testimony

of witnesses in Pennsylvania is the primary concern here.

D. Trial Efficiency and the Interest of Justice

Trial efficiency and the interest of justice also

favor transfer. Under New York’s long-arm statute, N.Y.

C.P.L.R. § 302, a New York court may exercise personal

jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary in certain circumstances.

Here, Morgan alleges personal jurisdiction under subsections

302(a)(1) and 302(a)(2). See Am. Compl. ¶ 3. Those provisions

provide for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a party

that “[t]ransacts any business within the state or contracts

anywhere to supply goods or services in the state” or “[c]ommits

a tortious act within the state,” respectively. N.Y. C.P.L.R.

§ 302(a)(1), (2). Morgan does not allege that Centre County

transacts business in New York. Nor does he allege that any

Centre County officials were present in New York when the

allegedly tortious conduct occurred. See Ferri v. Berkowitz,

678 F. Supp. 2d 66, 77 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (Subsection 302(a)(2)

applies “only when the Defendant is physically present in the

state when the tort is committed.”). Morgan does allege that

the NYPD and the Queen’s County District Attorney’s Office acted

as the defendants’ agents, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36, 73, but that is

a legal conclusion for which Morgan alleges no supporting facts.

See Grosz v. Cavalry Portfolio Servs., LLC, No. 17-CV-3166, 2019

WL 4888583, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2019) (“The existence of

an agency relationship is a legal conclusion and thus this

allegation is not assumed to be true.”).

Given that Morgan has not adequately alleged a basis

for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Centre

Country, a transfer to the Middle District of Pennsylvania,

which would have personal jurisdiction over all defendants,

would be in the interest of justice and promote trial

efficiency. See Corke v. Sameiet M.S. Song of Norway, 572 F.2d

77, 80 (2d Cir. 1978) (transfer in the interest of justice where

it “would apparently enable appellant to obtain personal

jurisdiction over some or all of the defendants”).

E. Remaining Factors

The remaining factors are effectively neutral. First,

the convenience of the parties is neutral because each party

would face an inconvenience by having to travel to a different

state. Second, the location of relevant documents is not a

significant consideration, given the availability of electronic

document production and other digital tools. Third, while

Morgan asserts that he “has no financial means to prosecute this

action,” Pl. Opp. Br. 11, he has provided no documentation to

show that transfer would create a financial burden. See

Speedfit LLC v. Woodway USA, Inc., 53 F.Supp.3d 561, 578

(E.D.N.Y. 2014) (Without some “documentation showing that

transfer would be financially burdensome, this factor is

neutral.”). Finally, this Court and the Middle District of

Pennsylvania are equally positioned to adjudicate civil rights

claims under Section 1983.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion to

transfer this case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania is

granted. All other pending motions are denied without prejudice

to renew before the transferee court.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Eric Komitee

ERIC KOMITEE

United States District Judge

Dated: May 24, 2023

Brooklyn, New York

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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