Subsection 302(a)(2) applies “only when the Defendant is physically present in the state when the tort is committed.”
How later courts described this case
- Subsection 302(a)(2) applies “only when the Defendant is physically present in the state when the tort is committed.”
- Without some “documentation showing that transfer would be financially burdensome, this factor is neutral.”
- transfer in the interest of justice where it “would apparently enable appellant to obtain personal jurisdiction over some or all of the defendants”
- Per the plaintiff’s “own telling,” “the shortcomings of this investigation were centered in Michigan,” not New York.
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------x
DALE MORGAN,
Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER
21-CV-4581(EK)(RLM)
-against-
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, CENTRE
COUNTY-PA, MICHAEL D. BROWN, et al.,
Defendants.
------------------------------------x
ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:
This action arises from the arrest and nine-day
detention of Plaintiff Dale Morgan, which Morgan alleges was the
product of mistaken identity. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Morgan claims that the defendants — the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania; the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”); Centre
County, Pennsylvania; Trooper Michael Brown; and certain John
Doe law enforcement officers — violated his constitutional
rights. Morgan asserts claims for false arrest, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution against all defendants,
and a Monell claim against the Commonwealth, the PSP, and Centre
County. The defendants now move to transfer venue to the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1404. As set forth below, the defendants’ motion
is granted.
Background1
In early 2019, the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, the Pennsylvania State Police, and local law
enforcement agencies in Centre County, Pennsylvania, were
investigating an identity theft ring. See Am. Compl. ¶ 10, ECF
No. 28. On January 4, 2019, PSP troopers stopped a vehicle
whose driver they believed was associated with the criminal
operation. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. During that encounter, the driver —
later determined to have been an individual named Horace Henry —
tendered a false New York State driver’s license containing Dale
Morgan’s identifying information. Id. ¶ 14. Following the
traffic stop, Trooper Michael Brown applied for an arrest
warrant for Morgan. Id. ¶ 20. On February 1, 2019, a Centre
County magistrate judge issued a warrant for Morgan’s arrest for
offenses including identify theft and receiving stolen property.
Id. ¶ 21.
On March 5, 2019, after receiving the Centre County
arrest warrant, Detective Michael Langellotti of the New York
Police Department issued a fugitive-from-justice complaint
against Morgan, a resident of Brooklyn. Id. ¶ 22. Thereafter,
NYPD officers arrested Morgan at his home in the presence of his
wife and eight-year-old daughter. Id. Following his arrest,
1 The following factual allegations are taken from the amended complaint
and assumed to be true.
Morgan appeared before a judge in Queens County, who denied bail
and remanded him to custody. Id. ¶ 33. Morgan was detained for
“approximately nine days” at the Vernon C. Bain Correctional
Facility in Bronx County. Id. ¶ 34. On or about March 26,
2019, Trooper Brown emailed the Queens County District
Attorney’s Office to inform the office that the “investigation
has led to the withdraw[al] of all charges against Mr. Dale
Morgan.” Id. ¶ 38. After further investigation, Horace Henry
was ultimately charged with identity theft and other offenses
and convicted. Id. ¶ 13-14.
Legal Standard
“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might have
been brought . . . .” 28 U.S.C § 1404(a). The court must first
determine whether the lawsuit “might have been brought” in the
forum where the defendants seek to transfer the case. Id. If
so, the court then considers the following non-exhaustive set of
factors:
(1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum, (2) the convenience of
witnesses, (3) the location of relevant documents and
relative ease of access to sources of proof, (4) the
convenience of parties, (5) the locus of operative facts,
(6) the availability of process to compel the attendance of
unwilling witnesses, and (7) the relative means of the
parties.
N.Y. Marine & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d
102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010).2 Courts in the Second Circuit also
consider factors including “the forum’s familiarity with the
governing law” and “trial efficiency and the interest of
justice.” Children’s Network, LLC v. PixFusion LLC, 722 F.
Supp. 2d 404, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Ultimately, the moving party
must show by clear and convincing evidence that transfer is
warranted. See N.Y. Marine, 599 F.3d at 113-14.
Discussion
Morgan could have brought this action in the Middle
District of Pennsylvania because all defendants reside there.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1); Defs. Mot. to Transfer Venue 2
(“Def. Transfer Br.”), ECF No. 30. Moreover, although Morgan’s
choice of forum weighs against transfer, the remaining factors
either favor transfer or are neutral.
A. Convenience of the Witnesses
The convenience of the witnesses favors transfer.
This factor is “typically the most important.” Tlapanco v.
Elges, 207 F. Supp. 3d 324, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). In weighing
this factor, courts accord more weight to the convenience of
non-party witnesses than that of party witnesses. See id. The
defendants advise that all of the witnesses whose testimony they
2 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order
accepts all alterations and omits citations and internal quotation marks.
intend to present reside in Pennsylvania, including non-party
witnesses. See Def. Transfer Br. 3. In response, Morgan argues
that a majority of, if not all, non-party witnesses reside in
New York, including the NYPD officers who arrested him and the
prosecutors who requested his detention. See Pl. Opp. Br. 11,
ECF No. 38. But those witnesses would offer testimony about
Morgan’s arrest and detention — the facts of which are not in
dispute. The key issue in this case is whether probable cause
existed for Morgan’s arrest, and this question turns on the acts
(and omissions) of the defendants and others who participated in
the criminal investigation in Pennsylvania. See Tlapanco,
207 F. Supp. 3d at 330 (“The central question in this case is
whether the police had sufficient cause to take each of those
investigative steps, not whether they actually did so.”).
B. Locus of Operative Facts
For the same reason, the locus of operative facts lies
in Pennsylvania. This factor concerns the place where the “acts
or omissions for which Defendants could be held liable
occurred,” and is a “primary” consideration. Tlapanco, 207 F.
Supp. 3d at 331. While Morgan was arrested and detained in New
York, the investigate failures for which Morgan seeks to hold
the defendants liable occurred in Pennsylvania. See id. at 332
(Per the plaintiff’s “own telling,” “the shortcomings of this
investigation were centered in Michigan,” not New York.).
C. Availability of Process to Compel Testimony
The availability of process to compel unwilling
witnesses to testify at trial also weighs in favor of transfer.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(c)(1)(A), a
district court generally cannot compel a non-party witness to
travel more than 100 miles. See EasyWeb Innovations, LLC v.
Facebook, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 2d 342, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). As
discussed above, the relevant non-party witnesses are likely to
reside in Pennsylvania, where the alleged acts and omissions of
the defendants occurred. Thus, the ability to compel testimony
of witnesses in Pennsylvania is the primary concern here.
D. Trial Efficiency and the Interest of Justice
Trial efficiency and the interest of justice also
favor transfer. Under New York’s long-arm statute, N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 302, a New York court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary in certain circumstances.
Here, Morgan alleges personal jurisdiction under subsections
302(a)(1) and 302(a)(2). See Am. Compl. ¶ 3. Those provisions
provide for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a party
that “[t]ransacts any business within the state or contracts
anywhere to supply goods or services in the state” or “[c]ommits
a tortious act within the state,” respectively. N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 302(a)(1), (2). Morgan does not allege that Centre County
transacts business in New York. Nor does he allege that any
Centre County officials were present in New York when the
allegedly tortious conduct occurred. See Ferri v. Berkowitz,
678 F. Supp. 2d 66, 77 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (Subsection 302(a)(2)
applies “only when the Defendant is physically present in the
state when the tort is committed.”). Morgan does allege that
the NYPD and the Queen’s County District Attorney’s Office acted
as the defendants’ agents, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36, 73, but that is
a legal conclusion for which Morgan alleges no supporting facts.
See Grosz v. Cavalry Portfolio Servs., LLC, No. 17-CV-3166, 2019
WL 4888583, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2019) (“The existence of
an agency relationship is a legal conclusion and thus this
allegation is not assumed to be true.”).
Given that Morgan has not adequately alleged a basis
for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Centre
Country, a transfer to the Middle District of Pennsylvania,
which would have personal jurisdiction over all defendants,
would be in the interest of justice and promote trial
efficiency. See Corke v. Sameiet M.S. Song of Norway, 572 F.2d
77, 80 (2d Cir. 1978) (transfer in the interest of justice where
it “would apparently enable appellant to obtain personal
jurisdiction over some or all of the defendants”).
E. Remaining Factors
The remaining factors are effectively neutral. First,
the convenience of the parties is neutral because each party
would face an inconvenience by having to travel to a different
state. Second, the location of relevant documents is not a
significant consideration, given the availability of electronic
document production and other digital tools. Third, while
Morgan asserts that he “has no financial means to prosecute this
action,” Pl. Opp. Br. 11, he has provided no documentation to
show that transfer would create a financial burden. See
Speedfit LLC v. Woodway USA, Inc., 53 F.Supp.3d 561, 578
(E.D.N.Y. 2014) (Without some “documentation showing that
transfer would be financially burdensome, this factor is
neutral.”). Finally, this Court and the Middle District of
Pennsylvania are equally positioned to adjudicate civil rights
claims under Section 1983.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion to
transfer this case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania is
granted. All other pending motions are denied without prejudice
to renew before the transferee court.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Eric Komitee
ERIC KOMITEE
United States District Judge
Dated: May 24, 2023
Brooklyn, New York