The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RYAN KLEIN, :
Petitioner :
: No. 1:22-cv-00984
v. :
: (Judge Rambo)
COMMONWEALTH OF :
PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF :
PROBATION AND PAROLE, :
Respondent :
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Ryan Klein initiated the above-captioned pro se action by filing a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Klein challenges
two decisions by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Parole Board) to
adjust his maximum sentence date following parole violations. Because Klein’s
habeas claim is both procedurally defaulted and barred by the relevant statute of
limitations, the Court must dismiss his Section 2254 petition.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2007, Klein pled guilty to, among other charges, aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon,1 aggravated assault causing bodily injury to an on-duty officer,2
burglary,3 and reckless endangerment.4 (See Doc. No. 1-3 at 1.) Klein’s initial
1 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(a)(4).
2 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(a)(3).
3 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3502(a).
4 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2705.
sentence for these offenses had a minimum release date of June 14, 2012, and a
maximum release date of June 14, 2022. (See id.) It appears that Klein was released
on parole on June 17, 2012, three days after his minimum sentence date had elapsed.
(See Doc. No. 1-2 at 1.) However, Klein violated his parole by committing a new
offense and, due to this parole violation, on April 15, 2014, the Parole Board ordered
Klein to serve 12 months’ backtime and adjusted his maximum sentence date to
September 28, 2023. (See id.; Doc. No. 1-1 at 1.)
Klein was reparoled on July 12, 2015, subject to the standard condition that
he not reoffend. (See Doc. No. 1-2 at 3; Doc. No. 13-1 at 2.) Unfortunately, Klein
immediately reoffended and was charged with (and eventually pled guilty to)
multiple felony drug and assault offenses. (See Doc. No. 13-1 at 5-18.) Due to this
second parole violation, on December 8, 2016, the Parole Board ordered Klein to
serve 36 months’ backtime and adjusted his maximum date to December 19, 2024.
(See id. at 26.)
Klein challenged the Parole Board’s December 8 decision on January 15,
2017. (See id. at 29.) In his administrative appeal, he argued that the Parole Board’s
“return to custody” date of October 3, 2016, was incorrect. (See id.; Doc. No. 1-2 at
3.) Although not appearing on the face of the administrative appeal form, it seems
that Klein also implicitly challenged his adjusted maximum date of December 19,
2024. (See Doc. No. 13-1 at 32.)
On February 26, 2018, the Parole Board rejected Klein’s challenges and
affirmed his return-to-custody date and his adjusted maximum date. (See id.) The
Parole Board explained to Klein that, because Pennsylvania law provides that he is
not entitled to credit for the time he was at liberty on parole, upon his recommitment
he still had 3,000 days remaining on his original sentence. (Id. (citing 61 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 6138(a)(2)).) Moreover, the time that Klein spent in pretrial detention for
the new offenses would not count toward his previous sentence, but rather his new
convictions. (Id.) Consequently, because Klein was not credited with the time he
was free on parole and did not become available to begin serving his original
sentence again until October 3, 2016, 883 days were properly added to create a new
maximum sentence date of December 19, 2024. (Id. at 32-33.)
It does not appear that Klein appealed the Parole Board’s decision to the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Instead, over four years later, he filed the
instant Section 2254 petition in this Court. (See generally Doc. No. 1.) Respondent
filed a response to Klein’s Section 2254 petition. (See Doc. No. 13.) Klein did not
file a reply or “traverse” and the time in which to do so has passed, so his habeas
petition is ripe for disposition.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28
U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254, mandates that petitioners demonstrate that they have
“exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State” before seeking federal
habeas relief. Id. § 2254(b)(1)(A). An exhausted claim is one that has been “fairly
presented” to the state courts “by invoking one complete round of the State’s
established appellate review process,” and which has been adjudicated on the merits.
Carpenter v. Vaughn, 296 F.3d 138, 146 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting O’Sullivan v.
Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45 (1999)); see also Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289,
302 (2013).
If a state prisoner has not fairly presented a claim to the state courts “but state
law clearly forecloses review, exhaustion is excused, but the doctrine of procedural
default may come into play.” Carpenter, 296 F.3d at 146 (citations omitted).
Generally, if a prisoner has procedurally defaulted on a claim by failing to raise it in
state-court proceedings, a federal habeas court will not review the merits of the
claim, even one that implicates constitutional concerns. Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S.
1, 9 (2012) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 747-48 (1991); Wainwright
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84-85 (1977)).
A few limited exceptions to this rule exist. One exception is that “[a] prisoner
may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for the default and
prejudice from a violation of federal law.” Id. at 10 (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at
750). “Cause for a procedural default exists where something external to the
petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to him[,] . . . impeded [his]
efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S.
266, 280 (2012) (alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show not merely that there were
errors that created a possibility of prejudice, but that they “worked to his actual and
substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional
dimensions.” Holland v. Horn, 519 F.3d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United
States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)). If cause and prejudice are established,
the federal court reviews the claim de novo “because the state court did not consider
the claim on the merits.” Bey v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 856 F.3d 230, 236 (3d
Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Gilmore v. Bey, 138 S. Ct. 740 (2018) (mem.)
(citation omitted).
Another rare exception that will excuse a procedural default is if the petitioner
can show that “failure to consider the claim will result in a fundamental ‘miscarriage
of justice.’” Carpenter, 296 F.3d at 146 (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750). To
satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception, a petitioner typically will
have to show actual innocence. Leyva v. Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 366 (3d Cir. 2007)
(citation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Klein raises just one argument in his habeas petition. He contends that the
Parole Board’s adjustments of his maximum sentence date violate due process and
separation-of-powers principles. (See Doc. No. 1 at 3-6.) Klein’s habeas claim is
both procedurally defaulted and barred by the statute of limitations.
A. Procedural Default
As explained above, claims raised in a Section 2254 petition must first be
exhausted in state court. Klein administratively appealed only one of the Parole
Board’s decisions extending his maximum sentence date, and he did not exhaust that
appeal. Although Klein took the first step—administrative review with the Parole
Board, see 37 PA. CODE. § 73.1—that is where his exhaustion attempts ended. Yet
proper exhaustion requires appealing to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania,
see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 763(a), as well as seeking review with the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, see Williams v. Wynder, 232 F. App’x 177, 181 (3d Cir. 2007)
(nonprecedential) (explaining that, to fully exhaust a challenge to a Parole Board
decision, a Section 2254 petitioner must seek allowance of appeal with the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court following an adverse decision by the Commonwealth
Court).
Klein did not appeal to the Commonwealth Court or file a petition for
allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The time for doing so
has long since passed, and therefore he has procedurally defaulted the instant habeas
claim. Klein provides no cause or prejudice to excuse his procedural default, so his
claim is unreviewable. See Martinez, 566 U.S. at 9.
B. Statute of Limitations
Klein’s claim is likewise barred by the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Under
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), a petitioner generally has one year from the date on
which a judgment (or agency decision, as the case may be) becomes final in which
to raise a habeas claim in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).5 The one-
year clock is tolled for the period “during which a properly filed application for State
post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or
claim is pending.” Id. § 2244(d)(2).
The Parole Board issued its denial to Klein’s administrative appeal in
February 2018. Klein had 30 days to appeal this denial to the Commonwealth Court.
See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 763(a); PA. R. APP. P. 1512(a)(1). He did not appeal, so
his AEDPA statute of limitations began to run in March 2018. Klein provides no
reason or explanation for why he waited over four years to file his Section 2254
petition, long after the one-year limitations period expired. Nor does he establish
any basis for equitable tolling. Accordingly, his petition must be dismissed as barred
by the AEDPA’s statute of limitations.
5 It is conceivable that subdivision (d)(1)(D) could apply in the instant circumstances. Section
2244(d)(1)(D) requires that a Section 2254 petition be filed within one year of “the date on which
the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Regardless of the subdivision utilized,
Klein’s habeas petition is well out of time.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss Klein’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court will likewise deny a certificate of
appealability, as Klein has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right, see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), or that “jurists of reason would find
it debatable” whether this Court’s procedural ruling is correct, Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). An appropriate Order follows.
s/ Sylvia H. Rambo
United States District Judge
Dated: April 25, 2023