Opinion

Brown v. PETCO Animal Supplies Store, Inc. Store 1827

Court
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Mar 6, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.2%

a stray remark “standing on its own” is “insufficient to demonstrate age-related animus”

How later courts described this case

  • a stray remark “standing on its own” is “insufficient to demonstrate age-related animus”
  • “Since this Court has determined that the interpretation of the PHRA is identical to that of federal anti- discrimination laws, including the ADEA, we present a single analysis for [the plaintiff’s] claims under both statutes.”
  • “[T]he Third Circuit has held that the PHRA is treated as identical to federal anti- discrimination laws[.]”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SHIPP BROWN, No. 4:21-CV-00330

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

PETCO ANIMAL SUPPLIES STORE,

INC., Store #1827, a/k/a PETCO

ANIMAL SUPPLIES, INC.,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MARCH 6, 2023

It is undoubtedly unpleasant and personally challenging to be terminated from

a job. It is likely even more unpleasant for an employee who has been with a

company since 2002, who seemed to demonstrate close relationships with his

colleagues, and purports to have consistently received favorable performance marks

in certain categories for many years. Such is the situation of Plaintiff Shipp Brown,

an African American man who worked for Defendant Petco Animal Supplies Store,

Inc. (“Petco”) for nearly twenty years until he was terminated (at age 65) by new

management in 2018. Brown’s termination came about after he received a rather

expedited series of reprimands. Petco kept records of these reprimands and its

observations of Brown’s infractions, and the Court finds all but one of these records

to be credible.

In response to his firing, Brown filed this suit against Petco, asserting various

claims, all of which require a form of racial and/or age-based animus on Petco’s part.

The parties concluded discovery, and Petco has moved for summary judgment on all

of Brown’s claims. After reviewing the record, it appears to the Court that Brown’s

final managers did not like him, and that they may have even harbored animus

toward him. Brown alleges, and his former colleagues agreed in affidavits, that

Brown’s manager was harsh with him and treated him unprofessionally. Another

manager seemingly disliked Brown so much that she conducted an unannounced

walkthrough of the store and, instead of issuing a formal reprimand, felt compelled

to type a stream-of-consciousness list of grievances into an undated Word document.

Be that as it may, the Court is not a workplace mediator, nor is the Court in a

position to tell Petco how to run its stores. The reasons Brown’s managers did not

like him is only the Court’s concern to the extent that there is evidence that such

animus was bred by racial or age-based discrimination. This matter is before the

Court because Brown has leveled serious allegations against Petco, and those

allegations require more than evidence of personal dislike, unprofessionalism, or

friction between employees’ personalities. They require evidence proving that

Brown was fired because he was an older, black employee.

After careful review of the parties’ briefing, the record, and relevant case law,

the Court finds the record bereft of that evidence, which is the most important

evidence needed in order for each of Brown’s claims to survive. Brown simply has

not proven that Petco’s actions were motivated by Brown’s race and/or age. And

despite Brown’s attempt to shoehorn this evidence into the record via a seemingly

sham affidavit, such evidence does not exist in the record.

The Court appreciates that being terminated from a job is upsetting, but when

it is not for discriminatory, harassing, or retaliatory reasons, as established by law

and proven with evidence, that termination does not violate federal law—even when

the terminated employee was the only black individual and the oldest employee at

the store. Consequently, Petco’s motion for summary judgment is granted on all

counts.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court will begin by setting forth the undisputed facts and procedural

history of this matter.

A. Undisputed Facts

i. Brown’s Employment Background at Petco

Brown was hired as a full-time sales associate with Petco in or about

September 2002, at Petco store number 1827 in State College, Pennsylvania (the

“State College Store”).1 Beginning in or about June 2016, Brown assumed a newly-

created position of Guest Experience Leader (“GEL”) in the State College Store.2

Job duties for a GEL at the State College Store included “[l]eading store execution,

1 Doc. 27 ¶ 1; Doc. 32 ¶ 1.

training, communication and maintenance of Pet Services (Grooming Salon and Dog

Training) initiatives as well as guest centric programs, to include but not limited to

Showtime, Demo Program, Welcome to the Family, Meet the Critters, Pals Rewards,

Getting to Know Petco and Adoptions programs, policies, procedures, safety

procedures, and promotions.”3 As the GEL for the State College Store, Brown

reported directly to the Store Leader, who reported to a District Leader.4 On July 30,

2017, Catherine Oharah became the Store Leader for the State College Store, and in

November 2017, Yelena Kharchevka became the District Leader.5

ii. The November 2017 EPN

On November 30, 2017, Brown received an Employee Performance Notice

(“EPN”), signed by Oharah, which included a checked box for “Other (describe)

Failure to lead” under the “Other Violations/Infractions” section.6 The explanation

listed stated:

After multiple conversations surrounding salon standards and

performance, specifically relating to personal items of the salon

partners being stored in the salon, human food in the salon, and

overtime in the salon, Shipp has failed to correct any of these issues, or

hold any of the salon partners accountable for their actions of non

compliance for these matters. Shipp was also directed on 3 separate

occasions to complete EPN’s (sic) for store partners that have failed to

remain in compliance with the attendance policy. These dates of

direction for completion were 10/16, 10/23, and 10/26. Shipp failed to

3 Doc. 27 ¶ 4; Doc. 32 ¶ 4.

4 Doc. 27 ¶ 5; Doc. 32 ¶ 5.

5 Id.

hold any of the partners accountable for their attendance on any of the

occasions when this was requested of him.7

In the section asking the author of the EPN to “[e]xplain the behavior/performance

that needs to be corrected,” the EPN continued:

Shipp must lead the store in all aspects of pet services. The grooming

salon must be brought to brand standard, and remain in compliance with

company policies and procedures. Shipp (sic) ensure that no personal

items are in the salon, and no food is in the salon by 12/5/17. Shipp

must ensure that there is zero unapproved overtime in the salon

immediately. Shipp must take a strong lead with all store partners in

accountability. Partners must remain in compliance with brand

standards and policy and procedures to ensure the business is able to

operate smoothly. Shipp may not incur any unapproved overtime. . . .

Shipp must manage his time on a daily basis and communicate

immediately when an issue may arise. . . . Shipp is expected to take the

leadership role that will lead the grooming salon to top box standards

of 90% or higher.8

Under Petco’s Grooming Operations Policy, “[f]ood is not permitted in the

[grooming] salon,” “all food must be kept in the breakroom,” and “[p]ersonal items

including purses and cell phones must be kept in the locker located in the

breakroom.”9

iii. The December 2017 Walkthrough

On a quarterly basis, Kharchevka would perform two “walkthroughs” of the

State College Store, during which she would ensure that the store’s pet grooming

salon (the “Grooming Salon”) was in compliance with the Grooming Operations

7 Id.

8 Id.

Policy.10 On December 22, 2017, Kharchevka performed a walkthrough and the

Grooming Salon received what was called a “critical violation” for not following

Petco’s “7-Point Pet Care Check.”11 The 7-Point Pet Care Check required staff to

check a pet’s “nose, ears, mouth, underside, paws/nails, and skin and coat.12

iv. The December 2017 EPN

On or about December 28, 2017, Brown received another EPN, also signed

by Oharah, and again for “failure to lead,” which identified the following incidents:

 The Grooming Salon leader failed to complete a 7-point check of a pet.

 The Grooming Salon team incurred 5.30 hours of unapproved overtime.

 The dog trainer did not follow Petco’s scheduling policies.13

The EPN further stated:

 Shipp must lead the team to proper cleaning standards, presentation

standards, check in and out procedures, and scheduling standards.

Shipp should reference the list that has been provided for him from his

walk through with the district leader. Shipp must ensure that all partners

are properly checking in dogs and that all of the proper information is

documented in the service authorization form for each and every pet.

 Shipp must leverage documented accountability to partners that have

failed to comply with company direction, including infractions such as

[overtime] and pet injuries.

 Shipp must lead the team in dog training by completing the proper

calendar cadence, which will include new classes to be starting each

week. Shipp must also update the dog training kiosk to include all of

the required information including pictures and bios.14

10 Doc. 27, ¶ 18.

11 Doc. 27, Ex. G; Doc. 32, Ex. M.

12 Doc. 27, Ex. E at p. 8; Doc. 32, Ex. M at p. 8.

13 Doc. 27, Ex. H at p. 2; Doc. 32, Ex. N at p. 2.

This EPN, like the November EPN, checked the box for “Other” under the “Other

Violations/Infractions” section.15

v. Additional Walkthroughs

Kharchevka performed two additional walkthroughs, one in January 2018 and

another in February.16 She documented the findings of the January walkthrough in

an Animal Care Audit form.17 The audit form listed a number of questions asking

whether certain areas were clean or if other aspects of the store satisfied company

standards in other respects (e.g., do animal habitats have functional temperature

gauges, is food displayed properly, are wellness cards being completed and

updated).18 Kharchevka responded to each question in the negative.19

Kharchevka documented the findings of the February 2018 walkthrough in a

series of written descriptions and photographs (the “Photo Journal”).20 The Photo

Journal described and depicted a “list of ongoing concerns,” including cleanliness

violations, improper storage, safety hazards, and improper scheduling procedures.21

15 Doc. 27, Ex. E at p. 1; Doc. 32, Ex. M at p. 1.

16 Doc. 27 ¶¶ 31-35, Exs. I, J.

17 Doc. 27, Ex. I; Doc. 32, Ex. R.

18 Doc. 27, Ex. I at BROWN000377; Doc. 32, Ex. R at same.

19 Doc. 27, Ex. I at BROWN000376-BROWN000379; Doc. 32, Ex. U at same.

20 Doc. 27, Ex. J.

vi. Brown’s Termination

Brown was terminated from Petco on February 20, 2018.22 At the time of his

termination, he was the only African American Petco employee in the State College

Store and its surrounding district.23 During that same time period, at 65 years old,

Brown was the oldest GEL in the State College Store and its surrounding district.24

After Brown’s termination, John McHugh—a 31-year old Caucasian man—was

hired to be the GEL for the State College Store.25

B. Procedural History

Brown filed his Complaint on February 23, 2021.26 Petco filed its Answer to

the Complaint on May 14, 2021.27 The parties attended mediation in October of 2021

but reached an impasse and were unable to resolve the matter.28 Discovery for the

matter closed on February 1, 202229 and Petco moved for summary judgment on all

counts August 1, 2022.30 That motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for

disposition.31

22 Doc. 27 ¶ 36; Doc. 32 ¶ 36.

23 Doc. 27 ¶¶ 39-40; Doc. 32 ¶¶ 39-40.

24 Doc. 27 ¶ 41, Ex. C; Doc. 32 ¶ 41.

25 Doc. 32 ¶ 36, Ex. AA (Petco’s Responses and Objections to Brown’s First Set of

Interrogatories, No. 7).

26 Doc. 1.

27 Doc. 7.

28 Doc. 17.

29 Doc. 13.

30 Doc. 26.

II. LAW

The legal standard for summary judgment is well established. “One of the

principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of

factually unsupported claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a

way that allows it to accomplish this purpose.”32 Summary judgment is appropriate

where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”33 “Facts that could alter the

outcome are ‘material facts,’ and disputes are ‘genuine’ if evidence exists from

which a rational person could conclude that the position of the person with the

burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.”34 “A defendant meets this standard

when there is an absence of evidence that rationally supports the plaintiff’s case.”35

“A plaintiff, on the other hand, must point to admissible evidence that would be

sufficient to show all elements of a prima facie case under applicable substantive

law.”36

“The inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a

directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof

that would apply at the trial on the merits.”37 Thus, “if the defendant in a run-of-the-

32 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

33 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

34 Clark v. Modern Grp. Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) and Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).

35 Clark, 9 F.3d at 326.

36 Id.

mill civil case moves for summary judgment or for a directed verdict based on the

lack of proof of a material fact, the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the

evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury

could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.”38 “The mere

existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be

insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the

plaintiff.”39 “The judge’s inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks . . . ‘whether there is

[evidence] upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party

producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.’”40

“A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions

of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.”41 “Regardless of whether the moving party

accompanies its summary judgment motion with affidavits, the motion may, and

should, be granted so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that

the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is

satisfied.”42

38 Id.

39 Id.

40 Id. (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 447 (1871)).

41 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (internal quotations omitted).

Where the movant properly supports his motion, the nonmoving party, to

avoid summary judgment, must answer by setting forth “genuine factual issues that

properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be

resolved in favor of either party.”43 For movants and nonmovants alike, the assertion

“that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed” must be supported by: (i) “citing to

particular parts of materials in the record” that go beyond “mere allegations”;

(ii) “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a

genuine dispute”; or (iii) “showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce

admissible evidence to support the fact.”44

“When opposing summary judgment, the non-movant may not rest upon mere

allegations, but rather must ‘identify those facts of record which would contradict

the facts identified by the movant.’”45 Moreover, “if a party fails to properly support

an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as

required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes

of the motion.”46 On a motion for summary judgment, “the court need consider only

the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.”47

Finally, “at the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself

to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether

43 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 250.

44 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

45 Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 311 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2003).

46 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).

there is a genuine issue for trial.”48 “There is no issue for trial unless there is

sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for

that party.”49 “If the evidence is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly

probative, summary judgment may be granted.”50

III. ANALYSIS

First, the Court must determine whether this matter presents a genuine dispute

of material fact. If it does, then summary judgment may be proper. If it does not,

then the matter is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the Court will analyze

each of Brown’s claims accordingly. The Court finds that the parties do not dispute

the material facts underlying Brown’s claims.

A. Count I (Discrimination Based on Race under Title VII and

PHRA)51

Brown argues that he has established a prima facie case of race discrimination,

and that Petco must establish that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

its action.52 Petco argues that it did have such a reason, which is that Brown was a

poorly performing employee.53 Brown then argues that Petco’s “poor performance”

rationale was a mere pretext for racial discrimination, and that a factfinder could

48 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 249.

49 Id.

50 Id. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted).

51 See Johnson v. Fed. Express Corp., 996 F. Supp. 2d 302, 313-14 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2014)

(“[T]he Third Circuit has held that the PHRA is treated as identical to federal anti-

discrimination laws[.]”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

52 Doc. 38 at pp. 7-8.

reasonably disbelieve that Brown had been terminated for poor performance and

could instead conclude that a discriminatory motive was the reason for Petco’s

termination of Brown.54

Brown cites the EPNs he received and argues that they were created so Petco

could “create[ ] a paper trail to facially support Brown’s termination.”55 Brown also

argues that the Photo Journal created by Kharchevka was illegitimate and inaccurate

for the following reasons:

 Kharchevka claims that employee Christa Rzasa was present for the

walkthrough where the photos were taken, but Rzasa was unable to

recall the specific date of the walkthrough or recognize the

photographs upon which Kharchevka relied.56

 The photographs included in the Photo Journal are not date or time-

stamped.57

 Kharchevka claims that the photos were taken on February 9, 2018,

but Brown claims they were taken on a different day and depict an

issue (dog food and ‘backers rack’ placement) of which Brown had

been previously made aware and ultimately remedied.58

 The Photo Journal included a photograph of a whiteboard calendar,

which Kharchevka claimed had not been properly updated.

Kharchevka claims to have taken the photograph on February 14,

2018.59 Brown claims to have taken his own photograph of the

whiteboard on February 14, 2018, and in that photograph the calendar

was up to date.60

54 Doc. 38 at p. 8.

55 Id. at p. 9.

56 Doc. 32 ¶ 32, Ex. C (Kharchevka Dep. Tr.) 157:14-22, Ex. T (Rzasa Dep. Tr.) 78:19-79:5,

80:16-81:2.

57 Id. ¶ 32.

58 Id., Ex. U at PETCO000698 and PETCO000704.

59 Id., Ex. U at PETCO000711.

Petco argues that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating

Brown, and that Brown cannot establish that his firing was due to any pretextual

reason.61 Petco further clarifies that the “only adverse action at issue is Brown’s

termination,” and that the EPNs issued were not adverse actions for Title VII

purposes because they had no materially adverse effect on Brown’s compensation,

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.62 Petco alleges that Brown “has no

admissible evidence to establish pretext.”63 The Court agrees with Petco.

Title VII provides that it is “an unlawful employment practice for an employer

to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate

against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or

national origin.”64 Title VII claims are governed by a burden-shifting framework,

which requires an employee to show that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2)

he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that adverse employment action

took place under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful race-based

discrimination.65 The last element also requires that the employee demonstrate a

61 Doc. 28 at p. 5.

62 Id. at p. 12, n.5.

63 Id. at p. 4.

64 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); see Thompson v. Kellogg USA, Inc., No. 4:12-CV-02528, 2014

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186286, at *17-18 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2014).

65 Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003); see Jones v. Se. Pa. Transp.

causal connection between his protected status and the allegedly adverse action.66

The elements of a prima facie Title VII discrimination claim “must not be applied

woodenly but must rather be tailored flexibly to fit the circumstances of each type

of illegal discrimination.”67

If a plaintiff provides evidence to support a prima facie case by a

preponderance of the evidence, the defendant must then “articulate some legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s [termination].”68 The employer’s

burden can be satisfied “by introducing evidence which, taken as true, would permit

the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the unfavorable

employment decision.”69 If the defendant is able to articulate this, then the burden

shifts back to the plaintiff who must prove “that the legitimate reasons proffered by

the defendants were not its true reasons, but rather a pretext for discrimination.”70 A

plaintiff can prove this pretext either directly or indirectly by “demonstrating that

the defendant’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”71 Importantly,

“[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally

discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.”72

66 Sarullo, 352 F.3d at 798.

67 Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup Int’l, Inc., 82 F.3d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1996).

68 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

69 Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994).

70 Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 638 (3d Cir. 1993).

71 Id.

Brown has satisfied his burden in making a prima facie case of employment

discrimination based on race. First, as an African American, he is a member of a

protected class.73 Second, he was terminated, which constitutes an adverse

employment action.74 Finally, his firing gives rise to an inference of unlawful race

discrimination because he was replaced by a Caucasian male.75 Under the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the inquiry is now whether Petco

has demonstrated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing Brown. Petco

claims that Brown was terminated due to poor performance, the rationale for which

was documented in the EPNs and Photo Journal.76 Therefore, Petco argues it has

satisfied its burden under McDonnell Douglas.

The inquiry for the Court, then, is whether Brown can demonstrate that the

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons set forth by Petco are not true reasons, but

instead pretext for racial discrimination. In his efforts to satisfy this burden, Brown

73 Taylor v. Harrisburg Area Cmty. Coll., No. 1:12-CV-0169, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11420, at

*26-27 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2014) (citing Tucker v. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 484 F. App’x 710,

712 (3d Cir. 2012)).

74 Bossi v. Bank of Am., No. 3:14-CV-02301, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110885, at *3 (M.D. Pa.

Aug. 19, 2016) (“[T]ermination is an adverse employment action.”)

75 Johnson v. Keebler-Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 214 F. App’x 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation

omitted) (finding that decision to replace an African American plaintiff with a Caucasian

worker was sufficient to establish “the required inference of discrimination at the prima facie

stage of Title VII analysis”); see Lazard v. All Restore, LLC, No. 19-6040, 2021 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 59200, at *18 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2021) (“In the Third Circuit, the fact that a plaintiff

was replaced by an individual who is not a member of their protected class is sufficient to

establish an inference of discrimination.”).

attacks the credibility of Petco’s alleged “paper trail,” which includes the EPNs and

the Photo Journal. The Court will evaluate their veracity separately.

1. The EPNs77

Brown argues that the EPNs were pretextual because their reasoning

“contradict[s] Brown’s objective scores.”78 Specifically, Brown argues that within

less than a month after he received the November 2017 EPN, the State College

Store’s Grooming Salon ranking went from 18 to 10, and the Salon’s “Grooming

Top Box Satisfaction Score” went from 85.19% to 91.67%.79 The EPN also noted

that employees had violated Petco’s policy by improperly leaving personal items in

the Salon, but Brown argues that was due to the fact that there had been a

longstanding “exception” to this policy for the State College Store in light of the

store’s high volume.80

With respect to the November 2017 EPN, Petco argues that Brown himself

“admitted” in his deposition testimony to the incidents which led to the discipline

set forth in the EPN.81 Petco also argues that any former policies regarding personal

items in the salon that may have existed before Kharchevka assumed her role are

77 Brown’s brief in opposition to Petco’s motion also refutes the legitimacy of a third and final

EPN allegedly created in February 2018. Doc. 38 at pp. 12-13; Doc. 32, Ex. GG. Petco does

not set forth facts involving this EPN to support its motion, and the Court therefore finds that

the parties dispute the legitimacy and facts surrounding this EPN. The resolution of that

dispute, however, is not material under the summary judgment standard and has no bearing on

this Court’s analysis. The Court therefore elects not to analyze the February 2018 EPN.

78 Doc. 38 at p. 9.

79 Id. at p. 10.

80 Id.

irrelevant; Kharchevka was a new supervisor who was free to impose different and

new requirements.82

Regarding the December 2017 EPN, Brown argues that he was not working

on the day when Kharchevka conducted this walkthrough, and that he was “not

present for this alleged failure.”83 Brown also takes issue with the fact that this EPN

gave him a one-week period to improve the deficiencies noted.84 “Despite this short

timeframe,” Brown argues, “[he] delivered, maintaining high Scores for the

Salon[.]”85

As for the December 2017 EPN, Petco correctly notes that it is immaterial

whether Brown was working on the date of Kharchevka’s walkthrough.86 As a GEL,

Brown was responsible for leading and training employees to ensure their

compliance with Petco’s policies and procedures; further, Petco argues that Brown

made a number of statements admitting that the infractions listed in the EPN took

place, including “that employees in the Grooming Salon incurred unapproved

overtime” and “that the dog trainer did not follow Petco policy[,] and that it was

[Brown’s] responsibility to ensure that she did so.”87 Most notably, Brown also

acknowledged the following during his deposition:

82 Id. at p. 3, n. 4.

83 Doc. 38 at p. 11.

84 Id. at p. 16.

85 Id. at pp. 16-17.

86 Doc. 41 at p. 4.

87 Id.; see, e.g., Doc. 27, Ex. A (Brown Dep. Tr.) at 79:15-20 (Brown responded “yes” when

Q: And do you believe that you were issued this EPN because of your

race or age?

A: No.88

The Court therefore agrees with Petco and finds that the November 2017 EPN

and December 2017 EPN sufficiently demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

purpose for terminating Brown.

2. The Photo Journal

Petco also cites the Photo Journal as evidence of Brown’s poor performance.89

Brown argues that there are “significant questions regarding the legitimacy and

accuracy of the [P]hoto [J]ournal;”90 the Court agrees with Brown. The Photo

Journal is undated, does not appear to be an official business record (in contrast with

the EPNs), and there is testimony from a Petco employee that reasonably calls into

question whether the walkthrough allegedly depicted in the Photo Journal took place

on the date Kharchevka claims.91 Viewing this evidence and “draw[ing] reasonable

inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to [Brown],” 92 the Court finds that

there was a closed container of food in the Grooming Salon), 82:9 (Q: [Y]our manager, Cathe

Oharah, asked you to do something and you did not do it. Correct? A: That is correct.), 94:3-

13 (Q: And it was your job to train the grooming salon on the proper procedures to follow

though. Correct? A: Correct. . . . Q: During fiscal week 47 the salon team incurred 5.3 hours

of unapproved overtime, even after multiple conversations with explicit direction that no

overtime was approved. Do you agree that that occurred? A: It probably did[.]).

88 Id. at 98:13-15.

89 Doc. 41 at p. 5.

90 Doc. 38 at pp. 13-14.

91 See Doc. 32, Ex. C (Kharchevka Dep. Tr.) at 157:14-22, Ex. T (Rzasa Dep. Tr.) at 78:19-79:5;

80:16-81:2.

92 Burnett v. Sch. Dist. of Cheltenham Twp., No. 04-2680, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48956, at *3,

the Photo Journal is not credible. In sum, the Photo Journal will not be considered

as evidence to support any of Petco’s claims.

3. McHugh

Turning to the question of pretext, Brown argues that John McHugh, a 31-

year old Caucasian male, is similarly situated to Brown and was treated more

favorably—which should support a finding of pretext.93 After Brown was

terminated, McHugh immediately replaced him as the GEL for the State College

Store.94 McHugh “held the same position within the store, oversaw the same

employees[,] and had the same [District Leader], Kharchevka.”95 He was also

“subject to the same uniform standards and expectations” as Brown.96 Brown argues

that during McHugh’s tenure as GEL for the State College Store, the Grooming

Salon’s rank dropped “quickly and dramatically” and received critical and failing

audit scores.97 Unlike Brown, McHugh was not terminated, nor did he receive any

EPNs; instead, Brown alleges that he was promoted.98

Petco, on the other hand, argues that McHugh is not similarly situated and was

not treated more favorably.99 Initially, McHugh did not report to the same supervisor

as Brown.100 Further, McHugh did not “engage in the same performance-deficient

93 Doc. 38 at pp. 14-15.

94 Id. at p. 15.

95 Id.

96 Id.

97 Id. at pp. 15-16.

98 Id. at p. 16.

99 Doc. 41 at pp. 6-9.

conduct as Brown,” such as keeping personal items in the Grooming Salon, failing

to issue EPNs, and incurring unapproved overtime.101 Petco contends that, absent

evidence of similar pre-disciplinary conduct, Brown and McHugh are not similarly

situated.102 The Court agrees with Petco.

In order for a co-employee to be an appropriate comparator for “similarly

situated” analysis purposes, “[he] should hold a similar position, report to the same

supervisor, possess a similar disciplinary record, and engage in the same type of

misconduct as the plaintiff.”103 And “to be considered similarly situated, comparator

employees must be similarly situated in all respects,” the determination of which

will take into account “facts such as the employee’s job responsibilities, the

supervisors and decision-makers and the nature of the misconduct engaged in.”104

Brown and McHugh were not similarly situated because McHugh is not

alleged to have committed the same violations that were listed in the EPNs issued to

Brown. While Brown may well be correct that the Grooming Salon’s various scores

and rankings decreased under McHugh’s leadership, those metrics are

distinguishable from the deficiencies listed on the November and December 2017

EPNs.105 Had McHugh been disciplined for the same violations as Brown (i.e.,

101 Id. at p. 8.

102 Id. at p. 9.

103 Opsatnik v. Norfolk S. Corp., 335 F. App’x 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2009).

104 Wilcher v. Postmaster Gen., 441 F. App’x 879, 882 (3d Cir. 2011).

105 The Court is admittedly concerned by the fact that the State College Store’s various scores

were so low during McHugh’s tenure as GEL, and Brown’s allegations that McHugh was never

leaving personal items in the grooming salon, incurring unapproved overtime, etc.),

then the Court would be more inclined to find that the two were similarly situated as

GELs. Because it is established that employees who do not engage in the same kind

of misconduct are not similarly situated, Brown’s allegations regarding McHugh

fail.106

Because Brown points to no other evidence of pretext, the record does not

include sufficient evidence demonstrating that Petco’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for terminating Brown was pretextual, Brown’s claim for racial

discrimination therefore fails and Petco’s motion is granted as to Count I.

B. Count II (Discrimination Based on Age under the ADEA and

PHRA)107

Similar to his claim of race discrimination, Brown argues that has alleged a

prima facie claim of age discrimination, and that Petco’s “proffered reason for

termination was pretext for age discrimination.”108 Brown cites the following as

this concern would be, e.g., what these scores mean, the weight given to these scores (if any)

during evaluation of employee performance, and whether other employees have been

disciplined or terminated due to declining scores. However, the Court cannot invent evidence

where it does not exist or has not been collected during discovery.

106 Moussa v. Penn. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 413 F. App’x 484, 486-87 (3d Cir. 2011); Montanez

v. Missouri Basin Well Servs., Inc., No. 4:14-CV-00553, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138086, at

*26 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2017); Yan Yan v. Fox Chase Cancer Ctr., No. 12-3858, 2014 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 131746, at *24-25 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2014).

107 See Willis v. UPMC Children’s Hosp. of Pitt., 808 F.3d 638, 643 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Since this

Court has determined that the interpretation of the PHRA is identical to that of federal anti-

discrimination laws, including the ADEA, we present a single analysis for [the plaintiff’s]

claims under both statutes.”); Connors v. Chrysler Fin. Corp., 160 F.3d 971, 972 (3d Cir. 1998)

(“There is no need to differentiate between . . . the ADEA and PHRA claims because . . . the

same analysis is used for both.”).

evidence of pretext: (1) discriminatory remarks made by Oharah (specifically that

she called him “old school”); (2) inconsistencies in Petco’s proffered reason for

terminating Brown; and (3) evidence that McHugh, a younger employee, was treated

more favorably than Brown.109 Brown also cites to the fact that he was the oldest

employee in the State College Store.110

Petco argues that Brown’s status as the oldest employee in the State College

Store is insufficient to establish pretext.111 Next, Petco argues that Oharah’s “old

school” comment fails to establish pretext for three reasons. First, Petco argues that

the comment is inadmissible hearsay.112 Second, Petco argues that the comment

itself was a “stray remark that cannot constitute sufficient evidence of age

discrimination.”113 Oharah was also not the decisionmaker responsible for Brown’s

termination, nor was the remark made “in the context of the decision to terminate

Brown.”114 Finally, Petco argues that placing the comment in the context in which it

was made does not constitute pretext—Oharah’s comment related to Brown’s cash

register accounting technique and was “unrelated to his age, his performance

deficiencies, or his termination.”115

109 Id. at p. 19.

110 Id. at p. 17.

111 Doc. 41 at p. 9.

112 Id. at p. 10.

113 Id.

114 Id. at pp. 10-11.

The ADEA prohibits employers from discriminating against or firing

employees on the basis of age.116 A plaintiff asserting an ADEA age discrimination

claim must allege: (1) that he was 40 years of age or older; (2) that the employer

took an adverse employment action against him; (3) that he was qualified for the

position in question; and (4) that he was ultimately replaced by another employee

“who was sufficiently younger to support an inference of discriminatory animus.”117

To satisfy the fourth element, a plaintiff may either plead that “similarly situated

employees who were under 40 were treated more favorably” than him, or he “may

otherwise plead a causal nexus between [his] age and the adverse action taken.”118

The burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas applies in the absence of

direct evidence of age-based discriminatory animus.119

As with his racial discrimination claim, Brown has established a prima facie

case of age discrimination,120 so the question becomes whether Petco had a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Brown. For the same reasons

stated in its analysis of Brown’s racial discrimination claim, the Court finds that

Petco had such a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason—Brown’s poor

116 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); Willis, 808 F.3d at 643.

117 Studders v. Geisinger Clinic, No. 4:20-CV-00914, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25983, at *21 (M.D.

Pa. Feb. 11, 2021) (citing Smith v. Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 689 (3d Cir. 2009)).

118 Id.

119 Smith, 589 F.3d at 691 (3d Cir. 2009).

120 See Lukens v. Whitemarsh Valley Country Club, No. 02-1279, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20188,

at *7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2003) (stating that replacing an employee with a significantly younger

person creates an inference of age discrimination) (citing Showalter v. Univ. of Pitt. Med. Ctr.,

performance. And the Court agrees with Petco that Brown’s status as the oldest

employee is not sufficient to establish pretext.121

As for evidence of pretext, the only direct evidence of age-based

discriminatory animus the Court can pinpoint is Oharah’s “old school” comment,

which—assuming it is admissible and an exception to hearsay as an admission of a

party opponent under Rule 801(d)(2)(D)—the Court finds to be a “stray remark” that

Brown has not demonstrated was related to the decisional process to terminate

him.122 The Court is also unpersuaded that the remark was even made in reference

to Brown’s age, as the term “old school” could also refer to someone being more

traditional in practice or disposition.123 Because the record does not include

sufficient evidence demonstrating that Petco’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for terminating Brown was pretextual, Brown’s claim for age-based discrimination

fails and Petco’s motion is also granted as to Count II.

121 See Helfrich v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., No. 03-CV-05793, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4420, at *45

(E.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2005) (“[T]he mere fact that [the plaintiff] was the oldest employee in his

department does not create a discriminatory inference capable of surviving summary

judgment.”)

122 See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 767 (internal citations omitted) (stray remarks are “rarely given great

weight”); Kargbo v. Phila. Corp. for Aging, 16 F. Supp. 3d 512, 524 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (a stray

remark “standing on its own” is “insufficient to demonstrate age-related animus”).

123 See Doc. 28 at p. 11 (Petco’s motion citing the definition of “old school” in Merriam-Webster

C. Counts III and IV (Harassment Based on Race and Age under Title

VII and PHRA)124

Brown argues that he suffered harassment via a hostile work environment

based on his race and age for several reasons. Specifically, he argues that “Oharah

behaved in a manner so as to intentionally make Brown feel ostracized” by engaging

in conduct such as refusing to speak to Brown directly, purposely choosing to

communicate with other GELs instead of Brown, cutting off Brown’s access to

Petco’s online portal, leaving excessive amounts of trash in the breakroom for

Brown to clean up, and referring to Brown as “old school.”125

Petco argues that Brown’s allegations fail to satisfy three of the five elements

required for a hostile work environment age or race harassment claim: that he

suffered intentional discrimination because of his race or age; that the discrimination

was pervasive and regular; and that the discrimination would detrimentally affect a

reasonable person of the same race or age in that position.126 Petco avers that Brown

can point to no evidence indicating that Oharah’s conduct was motivated by Brown’s

race or age, or that her conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive as would

detrimentally affect a reasonable person.127 The Court agrees with Petco that there

is insufficient evidence of animus based on race or age.

124 See Jacobsen v. Meron Med., LLC, No. 20-6357, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89155, at *29, n.13

(E.D. Pa. May 18, 2022) (“Because the analysis required for adjudicating Plaintiff’s Title VII

and PHRA claims is identical, the Court will consider those two claims together.”).

125 Doc. 38 at pp. 25-27.

126 Doc. 28 at p. 12.

In order for a plaintiff to establish a claim of racial or age-based harassment,

he must show the following: (1) that he suffered intentional harassment based on

race (or age); (2) the harassment was severe or pervasive; (3) the harassment

detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the harassment would have detrimentally

affected a reasonable person in like circumstances; and (5) there is a basis for

employer liability for the harassment under a theory of respondeat superior

liability.128 Title VII “protects only against harassment based on discrimination

against a protected class; it is not a general civility code for the American

workplace.”129

Brown alleges that he experienced numerous examples of unfair treatment,

and his opposition brief attached affidavits from other Petco employees who pledged

that Brown was a model GEL whom Oharah treated more harshly than other

employees.130 While such treatment was likely unpleasant for Brown—and even if

Oharah was unprofessional in behaving in this manner131—without more, this

evidence is insufficient to establish that the treatment he experienced was due to

Brown’s race or age.

128 See Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013).

129 Reganick v. Sw. Veterans’ Ctr., No. 06-1267, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26726, at *16 (W.D. Pa.

Mar. 19, 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

130 Doc. 32, Ex. X (Baldwin Aff.), Ex. Y (Smeal Aff.), Ex. Z (Jacobus Aff.).

131 If Brown’s allegations, and his former colleagues’ affidavits about, Oharah’s conduct are true,

the Court notes that her conduct was unprofessional, even if not intentionally harassing or

Indeed, incidents that describe a supervisor’s “personality, temperament, and

other various factors” tend to “cause favor or disfavor between co-workers” rather

than implicate racial or age-based issues.132 Such is the conduct Brown cites here.

Giving an employee the silent treatment, leaving trash for him to pick up, and calling

him “old school,” prove at most that Oharah demonstrated a rude and unprofessional

temperament to Brown. As regrettable as this conduct is, and as difficult as it may

have been for Brown, he “cannot sustain a claim by asserting [these events] and then

asserting [that they] were motivated by racial bias” or bias against his age.133 And

the law has made clear that a plaintiff’s “subjective belief” that a protected

characteristic played a role in an employment decision is not enough to sustain an

inference of discrimination.134 The inquiry is whether such discrimination motivated

the employer, and there is no evidence to indicate that Oharah was motivated by bias

against Brown’s race or age.135

The Court therefore finds that Brown does not include evidence proving the

first element of a harassment claim, i.e., that he suffered intentional harassment

based on his race or age. Accordingly, the Court declines to analyze the other

elements. Petco’s motion is granted as to counts III and IV.

132 Davis v. City of Newark, 285 F. App’x 899, 903 (3d Cir. 2008).

133 Id.

134 Rodriguez v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 532 F. App’x 152, 153 (3d Cir. 2013).

D. Counts V and VI (Retaliation Based on Opposition to Race and Age

Discrimination under Title VII and PHRA)136

Brown additionally argues that he has established a prima facie case of both

racial and age-based retaliation as required by Title VII and PHRA, and that—

following the McDonnell Douglas framework—Petco’s decision to terminate him

was pretextual and in retaliation for complaints that Brown describes in his

affidavit.137 Specifically, Brown states that Oharah intentionally treated him

differently and poorly relative to other younger, non-African American employees;

that he “informed Kharchevka of these ongoing issues;” that he “made these reports

to Kharchevka in-person, by telephone, and through e-mail; and that “in these

reports, [he] told Kharchevka [he] believed [he] was being treated this way due to

race and age.”138 Brown also argues that he attempted to submit a complaint via

Petco’s “hotline” designated for such purposes, but was never called back.139

Petco disagrees that Brown has established a prima facie case because he did

not participate in a “protected activity,” and that his affidavit is a “sham” that exists

solely to contradict his deposition testimony, where he stated that he did not tell

Kharchevka that he believed he was being targeted due to this age or race.140

136 See Bentley v. Allbritton Commc’ns. Co., No. 1:07-CV-0889, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93237,

at *16, n.14 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2008) (“The analysis for both discrimination and retaliation

claims under Title VII and PHRA is identical.”) (citing Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d

286, 300 (3d Cir. 2007) (additional internal citations omitted)).

137 Doc. 38 at pp. 21-24.

138 Doc. 32, Ex. B (Brown Aff.) ¶ 35.

139 Doc. 38 at pp. 21-24.

Regarding Brown’s e-mail to Kharchevka, Petco again argues that Brown did not

engage in a protected activity because he did not state in the e-mail that he felt he

was being harassed or targeted due to his age and race.141 And as for Brown’s calls

to the hotline, Petco asserts that the company has no records of having received any

such calls—and that, even if it did have records of Brown’s call(s), attempting to

make a call does not constitute “protected action.”142 Petco further argues that, to the

extent the Court does find that Brown has established a prima facie case, Petco had

a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason (poor performance) for terminating

Brown, and that he has failed to provide evidence demonstrating pretext.143 The

Court agrees with Petco that Brown did not engage in a protected activity.

To establish a prima facie claim of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1)

he engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer took adverse action against him;

and (3) there exists a causal connection between his protected activity and the

adverse employment action.144 A plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim must be able

to show that his participation in protected activity was the “but-for cause” of any

alleged adverse employment action that he suffered.145 The familiar McDonnell

141 Id.

142 Id. at p. 16.

143 Id. at p. 17.

144 Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2015).

Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to race and age-based retaliation claims

brought pursuant to Title VII and the PHRA.146

In order to constitute a “protected activity” for purposes of this claim, a

complaint “must be specific enough to notify management of the particular type of

discrimination at issue.”147 “All complaints or protests must be more than just

general complaints of unfair treatment,” and “[t]he Third Circuit has been clear that

an employee has not engaged in protected opposition activity when he or she

complains about unfair treatment, but stops short of referencing a protected

characteristic as the basis of unfair treatment.”148

Brown points to the following evidence as support for his claim that he

engaged in protected activity: (1) his demographics; (2) verbal complaints he made

to Kharchevka, and discussed during his deposition; (3) an e-mail he sent to

Kharchevka; and (4) his attempted phone call to the Petco hotline.149 The Court will

analyze each in turn.

1. Brown’s Demographics

The parties do not dispute that Brown was both the oldest and the only black

employee at the State College Store. There is no case law indicating that merely

146 Tourtellotte v. Eli Lilly & Co., 636 F. App’x 831, 841 (3d Cir. 2016).

147 Sanchez v. SunGuard Availability Servs. LP, 362 F. App’x 283, 288 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

148 Kier v. F. Lackland & Sons, LLC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 597, 616 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (citing Curay-

Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 134-35 (3d Cir. 2000)).

being a member of a protected class constitutes a protected activity. While these

facts were relevant to Brown’s other claims, his existence as an older African

American man is not an activity in and of itself that warrants protection.

2. Complaints to Kharchevka

Brown alleges that he had a number of telephone conversations with

Kharchevka, and he discussed these conversations in both his deposition and in an

affidavit he appended to his opposition brief.150 The deposition and affidavit provide

distinctly conflicting accounts, and—after reviewing both—the Court finds the

affidavit to be a sham pursuant to the “sham affidavit” doctrine.

In his deposition, Brown stated the following:

Q: . . . How many times did you contact [Kharchevka]?

A: . . . I will say at least two or three times I did talk with her

verbal[.] (sic)

Q: And when you had these telephone conversations with

[Kharchevka], can you tell me everything you specifically

remember telling her?

A: I did tell her that I felt like I was being singled out, that I as being

targeted. And I’m like, I don’t know what the reason for this is, but I’m

like, I don’t feel like I deserve this.151

Later in his deposition, when asked whether—during these verbal conversations

with Kharchevka—he informed her that he felt targeted due to his race or age,

Brown responded: “I told her I felt that I was being harassed. I didn’t mention that.

But obviously that’s what it was.”152

150 Id. at p. 24.

151 Doc. 27, Ex. A (Brown Dep. Tr.) 169:11-170:17.

However, in the affidavit Brown submitted with his opposition brief, he

pledged that “in these reports [to Kharchevka], I told Kharchevka I believed I was

being treated this way due to my race and age.”153 The affidavit is in clear conflict

with Brown’s deposition testimony, which raises a red flag to the Court, pointing to

the possibility that Brown’s affidavit—or at least this portion of the affidavit—may

be a sham.

The plain language of Rule 56 “permits consideration of affidavits in

summary judgment proceedings,”154 and it is established in the Third Circuit that

some affidavits may be shams that cannot defeat summary judgment. “A sham

affidavit is a contradictory affidavit that indicates only that the affiant cannot

maintain a consistent story or is willing to offer a statement solely for the purpose of

defeating summary judgment.”155 And if an affidavit “is offered solely for the

purpose of defeating summary judgment, it is proper for the trial judge to conclude

that no reasonable jury could accord the affidavit evidentiary weight and that

summary judgment is appropriate.”156 Further—and this is particularly notable

here—“[t]he main practical reason supporting the sham affidavit doctrine is that

prior depositions are more reliable than affidavits.”157

153 Doc. 33, Ex. B (Brown Aff.) ¶ 35.

154 Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing FED. R. CIV. P.

56).

155 Id. at 253.

156 Id.

157 Id. at 253-54; see Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 67-68 (7th Cir. 1995) (“We have

Here, Brown’s deposition took place on March 2, 2022.158 During that

deposition, he stated that while he had told Kharchevka that he felt he had been

targeted, he did not tell her that such perceived unfair treatment had been due to his

age or race.159 Indeed, Petco’s attorney conducting the deposition asked Brown point

blank whether he had mentioned his age or race in his verbal complaints to

Kharchevka.160 Brown answered in the negative.161 Then, five months later, on

August 19, 2022, Brown’s explanation changed in the affidavit he submitted with

his opposition brief. There, Brown stated that he had complained of racial and age

discrimination during these conversations with Kharchevka.162 This discrepancy is

not minor, as the definition of “protected activity” requires that Brown’s complaints

specifically mentioned age and/or race.

This contradiction alone does not automatically render Brown’s affidavit a

sham; indeed, “an affiant has the opportunity to offer a satisfactory explanation for

the conflict between a subsequent affidavit and a prior deposition[.]”163 But Brown

has provided no such explanation here, and therefore the Court disregards his

affidavit. Consequently, because Brown’s verbal complaints to Kharchevka did not

affidavit. Almost all affidavits submitted in litigation are drafted by the lawyers rather than by

the affiants and a comparison of the diction of [the] deposition with that of the affidavit makes

clear that his affidavit is no exception.”).

158 Doc. 27, Ex. A (Brown Dep. Tr.).

159 Id. at 169:11-170:17, 171:24-172:5.

160 Id.

161 Id.

162 Doc. 33, Ex. B (Brown Aff.) ¶ 35.

include allegations that he had been targeted due to his race or age, they do not rise

to the level of “protected activity” under the law and fail to satisfy a necessary

element of his retaliation claims.

3. E-Mails to Kharchevka

The next body of evidence is more straightforward for analysis purposes.

Brown states that he engaged in protected activity by stating his opposition to racial

and age-based discrimination in a series of e-mails to Kharchevka.164 Upon review

of those e-mails,165 it is clear that Brown did not actually inform Kharchevka that he

believed the perceived unfair treatment he was receiving was due to his race or age.

As it is established in the Third Circuit that—while informal complaints may

sometimes suffice—“the employee’s opposition to unlawful discrimination must not

be equivocal [or vague].”166 Indeed, even if Brown had used the words “race” or

“age,” the Third Circuit has held that “oblique” references to discrimination, made

in a vague fashion, make it “impossible to judge whether [a plaintiff] reasonably

believed he was protesting a violation of Title VII.”167 Put differently, “[t]he mere

mention of race”—or in this case, race or age—“does not transform a general list of

grievances into opposition to unlawful activity under Title VII.”168 Therefore, Brown

164 Doc. 38 at pp. 24-27.

165 Doc. 27, Ex. T (Jan. 29, 2018 E-Mail Chain between Brown and Kharchevka) and Ex. U (Feb.

2, 2018 E-Mail from Brown to Kharchevka).

166 Perry v. Harvey, 332 F. App’x 728, 733 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Moore v. City of Phila., 461

F.3d 331, 341-43 (3d Cir. 2006)).

167 Id.

cannot rely on these e-mails (that discuss neither race nor age) to establish a prima

facie case of retaliation because they do not rise to the level or protected activity.

4. Calls to the Petco Hotline

For the same reasons as stated above, Brown’s attempted call to the hotline

does not constitute a protected activity. An attempted phone call does not even give

the Court a statement, or complaint, to analyze for “protected activity” purposes.

Therefore, Brown may not rely on it to make his prima facie retaliation claims.

Similarly, Brown may not rely on any of his colleagues’ calls to the hotline because

the elements for his claims require that he be the employee who engaged in the

protected activity.

Accordingly, Brown has not established a prima facie case of racial or age-

based discrimination because he has failed to establish that he engaged in a protected

activity. Because of this, further analysis of any burden-shifting is unnecessary, and

Petco’s motion is granted as to Counts V and VI.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court GRANTS Petco’s motion for summary

judgment. An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.