Alford v. Baylor

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CRAIG ALFORD, No. 1:20-CV-01787

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

LEA BAYLOR, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MARCH 10, 2023

Plaintiff Craig Alford filed this pro se Section 19831 action, alleging

constitutional violations during his pretrial detention at Monroe County

Correctional Facility (MCCF) in Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania. Alford now moves to

compel discovery and for sanctions, for declaratory judgment pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 57 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and for summary judgment

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the following reasons, the

Court will deny Alford’s motions.

1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves

as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

This civil action was originally commenced on October 1, 2020, by eight

plaintiffs3 who—at that time—were pretrial detainees at MCCF. The complaint

was styled as a “class action,” seeking to bring collective Section 1983 claims

against four defendants—three prison officials at MCCF and the Monroe County

prothonotary (and clerk of courts). The gravamen of the complaint was that the

plaintiffs were being unlawfully held in pretrial detention and without arraignment

longer than permitted by various Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus

violating the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.4 According to the allegations, some

plaintiffs were being held in pretrial detention longer than allowed after the filing

of a criminal complaint (in violation of Rule 600), and others were being held in

pretrial detention too long without formal arraignment (in violation of Rule 571).5

The plaintiffs specifically noted that they were not “seeking release [from]

custody,” only monetary damages for the purported illegal pretrial confinement.6

2 Local Rule of Court 56.1 requires that a motion for summary judgment be supported “by a

separate, short, and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to

which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” LOCAL RULE OF COURT

56.1. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a separate statement of

material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the moving party’s statement

and identifying genuine issues to be tried. Id. Alford has failed to comply with Local Rule

56.1 because he has not filed a statement of material facts, and thus the Court will largely refer

to Alford’s allegations in his amended complaint in this factual background.

3 Those plaintiffs were Jhon Lora, Luis Medina, Craig Alford, Justin Coate, Christopher J.

Klement, Miguel Eduardo Rosario, Howard Wolfe, and Damaon Webster. See Doc. 1 at 1, 2.

4 Doc. 1 at 5-9.

5 See id. at 7.

On October 13, 2020, the Court7 dismissed the complaint pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), finding that the plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims were

barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey.8 Only one plaintiff,

Craig Alford, appealed.9 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

vacated the October 13, 2020 judgment and remanded for further proceedings as to

Alford’s Section 1983 claim involving failure to timely arraign, holding only that it

was not barred by the favorable termination rule in Heck v. Humphrey.10

On remand, this Court reviewed the complaint to determine if it stated a

claim for relief absent any Heck v. Humphrey bar. On December 8, 2021, the

Court dismissed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure

to state a claim.11 Specifically, the Court determined that the complaint did not

plead facts plausibly establishing how the named Defendants had violated the

Fourteenth Amendment.12 The Court dismissed the complaint but granted leave to

amend.13

7 This case was previously assigned to the Honorable John E. Jones III. It was transferred to the

undersigned following remand by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and

Chief Judge Jones’ August 1, 2021 retirement from the federal bench.

8 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

9 See Doc. 51. As the Third Circuit noted, only Alford signed the notice of appeal and thus only

Alford’s claim was considered by the panel. See Lora v. Lt. Baylor, 853 F. App’x 801, 802

n.1 (3d Cir. 2021) (mem.) (nonprecedential).

10 Lora, 853 F. App’x at 803 & n.4.

11 See generally Docs. 68, 69.

12 See Doc. 68 at 4-5.

13 Doc. 69. The Court additionally explained that, “[t]o the extent that the Third Circuit’s

decision vacating the October 13, 2020 judgment applies to all plaintiffs and not just Alford

In December 2021, Alford filed an amended complaint. He again attempted

to file for himself and on the behalf of other plaintiffs, but those other plaintiffs

were dismissed from this action on January 14, 2022, for failure to file amended

complaints.14 In that January 14 dismissal order, the Court also explicitly noted

that “non-lawyer pro se litigants [like Alford] cannot represent other parties in

federal court,”15 and that because the “amended complaint is signed only by

Alford[,] it applies only to his own claims.”16

Defendants subsequently moved to dismiss Alford’s amended complaint.17

In a detailed opinion, the Court dismissed many of Alford’s claims but permitted

the following to proceed: (1) Alford’s official capacity Fourteenth Amendment due

process claim against defendant Haidle, and (2) Alford’s individual capacity

Fourteenth Amendment due process claims against defendants Baylor, Armond,

and Haidle.18

provided herein requires dismissal of those plaintiffs’ constitutional tort claims as well.” Doc.

68 at 5 n.19.

14 See Doc. 76.

15 Id. (citing In re Cook, 589 F. App’x 44, 46 (3d Cir. 2014) (nonprecedential) (citing 28 U.S.C.

§ 1654; Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1991))).

16 Id.

17 Doc. 79.

Alford now moves to compel discovery and for sanctions,19 for declaratory

judgment,20 and for summary judgment.21 The motions are fully briefed and ripe

for disposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate

and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.”22 Summary judgment is

appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”23 Material

facts are those “that could alter the outcome” of the litigation, and “disputes are

‘genuine’ if evidence exists from which a rational person could conclude that the

position of the person with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.”24

At the Rule 56 stage, the Court’s function is not to “weigh the evidence and

determine the truth of the matter” but rather “to determine whether there is a

genuine issue for trial.”25 The Court must view the facts and evidence presented

“in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” and must “draw all

reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.”26 This evidence, however, must be

19 Doc. 105.

20 Doc. 110.

21 Docs. 112, 127.

22 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

23 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

24 EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Clark v. Modern

Grp. Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993)).

25 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

adequate—as a matter of law—to sustain a judgment in favor of the nonmoving

party on the claim or claims at issue.27 A “scintilla of evidence” supporting the

nonmovant’s position is insufficient; “there must be evidence on which the jury

could reasonably find for the [nonmovant].”28 Succinctly stated, summary

judgment is “put up or shut up time” for the nonmoving party.29

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants oppose each of Alford’s motions. The Court will first address

Alford’s motion to compel discovery and for sanctions, then turn to his motions for

declaratory and summary judgment.

A. Motion to Compel

It is well-established that rulings concerning the proper scope of discovery

and the extent to which discovery may be compelled are within the district court’s

discretion.30 Thus, the Court’s decisions regarding the conduct of discovery,

including whether to compel disclosure of materials sought in discovery, will only

be disturbed upon a showing of an abuse of discretion.31 A party “may obtain

discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim

27 Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250-57; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 587-89 (1986).

28 Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477

U.S. at 252) (alteration in original).

29 Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 391 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Berkeley Inv. Grp.

v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006)).

30 See Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987).

or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.”32 Rule 26(b)(1) provides for

a broad scope of discovery. Accordingly, courts often—and appropriately—

liberally apply discovery rules.33 Nevertheless, a “valid claim[] of relevance or

privilege” operates to restrict a court’s otherwise broad discretion under Rule

26(b)(1).34

Alford’s handwritten filings are difficult to parse. In his motion to compel

discovery and for sanctions, it appears that he claims to have sought to schedule a

deposition of one or several Defendants in October 2022,35 but that defense

counsel did not respond to his request or produce the party witnesses at the date

and time unilaterally set by Alford.36 Alford asks the court to compel “disposition”

of Defendants (which the Court interprets to mean “deposition” of Defendants),

and further seeks “fees for an oath administrator, stenographer, and

videographer.”37

Defendants respond that, despite Alford’s assertions to the contrary, they

have remained in contact with him regarding discovery matters, have explained to

him that they are not opposed to him taking the deposition of one or all remaining

32 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).

33 See Clements v. N.Y. Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 300 F.R.D. 225, 226 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (citing

Great W. Life Assurance Co. v. Levithan, 152 F.R.D. 494, 497 (E.D. Pa. 1994)).

34 See McConnell v. Canadian Pac. Realty Co., 280 F.R.D. 188, 192-93 (M.D. Pa. 2011).

35 See Doc. 105 at 2-3.

36 See, e.g., Doc. 111-2 at 2 (handwritten “notice of deposition” from Alford attempting to

unilaterally schedule a deposition on October 3, 2022, of “Haidle, Baylor, [and] Sgt.

Armond”).

Defendants, and have further explained to him that he would be required to hire

and pay for a court reporter to transcribe any such deposition(s).38

Alford does not seem to understand that he is responsible for the costs of

civil discovery.39 That includes paying for a court reporter (and any other costs)

for a deposition. Thus, if Alford desires to depose one or all of the remaining

defendants, he must secure and pay for a court reporter for each deposition and

must work amicably with defense counsel to establish a date and time for said

deposition (for one Defendant at a time) that is convenient for both parties and for

Alford’s facility of incarceration. Alford will additionally need to move to extend

the discovery deadline in this case, which closed on January 20, 2023.40

Accordingly, Alford’s motion to compel and for sanctions (and, to the extent

requested, for payment of deposition costs by the Court) will be denied.

38 See Doc. 117 ¶¶ 3-4; Doc. 117-1.

39 See Badman v. Stark, 139 F.R.D. 601, 604 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (explaining that witness fees and

costs are not underwritten or waived for indigent civil rights plaintiffs proceeding under 28

U.S.C. § 1915); Brooks v. Quinn & Quinn, 257 F.R.D. 415, 417 (D. Del. 2009) (“Although

plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the court has no authority to finance or pay for a

party’s discovery expenses. . . . It is plaintiff’s responsibility to pay for the costs associated

with the taking of a deposition.”); cf. Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 159 (3d Cir. 1993) (“There

is no provision in [28 U.S.C. § 1915] for the payment by the government of the costs of

deposition transcripts, or any other litigation expenses, and no other statute authorizes courts

to commit federal monies for payment of the necessary expenses in a civil suit brought by an

indigent litigant.”); Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 474 (3d Cir. 1987) (explaining that

there is no “legislative provision” for expert witness fees for indigent civil rights plaintiffs).

40 See Doc. 92 ¶ 1. Because Alford filed his motion to compel prior to the close of discovery, the

B. Motions for Declaratory and Summary Judgment

Alford’s motions for declaratory judgment and summary judgment can be

addressed, and denied, together. That is because there are obvious disputes of

material fact present in the instant case41 and neither declaratory or summary

judgment is appropriate at this time. By way of example, Alford claims that his

Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were infringed by Defendants because

he was held in pretrial detention for too long in violation of Pennsylvania Rule of

Criminal Procedure 600(B)(1). But Defendants assert that, because of the COVID-

19 pandemic, “Monroe County [Court of Common Pleas] President Judge

Worthington suspended Rule 600 from March 16, 2020, through June 30, 2021.”42

If a state-created rule of criminal procedure is the basis for the Fourteenth

Amendment liberty interest,43 and that rule is suspended, as Defendants claim, due

to an international pandemic, there is obviously a dispute of material fact regarding

whether a liberty interest exists and whether any constitutional right has been

infringed.

Additionally, Defendants contend that Alford submitted two petitions for

“bail modification and release” to the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County,

41 This is true despite Defendants’ claim to the contrary that “there are no issues of material fact

that would prevent the court from issuing summary judgment, but for the defendants.” Doc.

118 at 1.

42 Doc. 119 at 5; Doc. 121 at 3.

which rejected those petitions.44 This factual issue likewise informs the question

of whether MCCF officials’ actions infringed Alford’s Fourteenth Amendment

rights. To wit: if Alford was seeking bail modification and pretrial release from

the state court pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the

court specifically denied that relief and provided valid legal reasons for doing so, it

would be difficult (if not impossible) to establish that Defendants’ actions caused

the alleged constitutional deprivation.45

To the extent that Defendants assert that summary judgment should be

granted “for the defendants,”46 or that they are entitled to qualified immunity, they

are free to properly assert such arguments through their own Rule 56 motion that

complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Court.47

As it stands, Defendants are not the “moving” party48 and have simply opposed

Alford’s motions for declaratory and summary judgment, which motions will be

denied for the above-stated reasons.

44 Doc. 121 at 8.

45 It is well settled that, for Section 1983 liability to obtain, the purported unconstitutional

conduct must proximately cause the alleged injury. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277,

285 (1980) (explaining that, for Section 1983 claims, which are “a species of tort liability,” the

alleged constitutional violation must have “proximately caused” plaintiff’s injury); Hedges v.

Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (“It is axiomatic that [a] § 1983 action, like its state

tort analogs, employs the principle of proximate causation.” (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted)) (collecting cases).

46 Doc. 118 at 1.

47 The Court notes that Defendants have recently filed their own motion for summary judgment.

See Doc. 136 (filed March 10, 2023).

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will deny Alford’s motion to compel

discovery and for sanctions (Doc. 105), motion for declaratory judgment (Doc.

110), and motion for summary judgment (Doc. 112). An appropriate Order

follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge