‘[A]s long as a physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights’
How later courts described this case
- ‘[A]s long as a physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights’
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GARTOR KIKI BROWN, : Civil No. 3:18-CV-1527
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. :
: (Magistrate Judge Carlson)
LT. MAXWELL, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
We are now called upon to write the final chapter in this longstanding civil
rights lawsuit. This action was brought in 2018 by the plaintiff, Gartor Brown, a
former state inmate who was incarcerated in the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections (“DOC”), against several DOC employees. The remaining defendants
are Lieutenant Maxwell, Officer Plocinik, Officer Johnston, and Officer Fochtman.
Brown alleges that her1 Eighth Amendment rights were violated when she was
placed in a cell at SCI Huntingdon and assaulted by her cellmate over the course of
several days in February of 2018.
1 During the course of this litigation, we were made aware that Brown identifies as
transgender and uses female pronouns. Accordingly, we will refer to Brown by her
preferred pronouns.
Thus, what now remains in this lawsuit is a single Eighth Amendment failure
to protect claim along with a related Eighth Amendment medical care claim lodged
against four individual correctional defendants.2 With respect to these sole surviving
legal claims, the evidence presents us with two stark and irreconcilable factual
narratives. For her part, Brown alleges that the defendants knew she was at risk of
being assaulted when they placed her in a cell with inmate Raheem Allen on
February 3, 2018. Brown insists that she was then immediately and brutally assaulted
by Allen in the presence of the defendants, who did nothing to protect her. According
to Brown, she repeatedly complained of these unrelenting assaults as they happened
over the next five days, and the defendants did nothing to stop her cellmate from
assaulting her. Brown further alleges that she was denied medical care after reporting
the alleged assaults.
The consistent testimony of the defendants is entirely at odds with the factual
narrative presented by Brown. According to the defendants, during the relevant time
frame, from February 3 through 7, 2018, Brown never complained that she was being
assaulted by inmate Allen. Further, there was no evidence or indication that Brown
had suffered any injuries whatsoever until the last day of her confinement with
2 When Brown initially filed this lawsuit in 2018, there were additional claims and
defendants named in her pleadings. Through the process of litigation a number of
those parties and allegations were dismissed prior to the assignment of the case to
the undersigned. Those prior rulings remain the law of the case and are not addressed
in this opinion since no party has invited us to reconsider these prior rulings.
inmate Allen, February 7, 2018, when staff observed that Brown had a bloody nose.
At that time, staff inquired regarding whether Brown had been assaulted by her
cellmate, and the defendants reported that both Brown and Allen denied that she had
been injured by Allen.
In order to attempt to reconcile these conflicting narratives, a three-day
nonjury trial was held in front of the undersigned in January of 2023. As discussed
below, beyond Brown’s own narrative of events, that trial provided only scant
support for her claims that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to her safety
and well-being. In contrast, the testimony of the defendants rebutting Brown’s
claims was consistent, mutually corroborative, and supported by the testimony of
other witnesses, as well as medical records which contradicted Brown’s assertions
that she had suffered repeated severe injuries at the hands of another inmate.
Following this trial we also provided the parties the opportunity to submit
post-trial briefs. Accordingly, this matter is now ripe for resolution.3 After
consideration of the testimony and evidence produced at trial, we find that the
plaintiff has failed to prove that the defendants violated her Eighth Amendment
3 Briefing in this case closed on March 1, 2023. (Doc. 251).
rights.4 Therefore, for the following reasons, we will enter judgment in favor of the
defendants against the plaintiff.
II. Background5
Brown was an inmate in the Pennsylvania DOC housed in the Restricted
Housing Unit (“RHU”) at SCI Huntingdon at all relevant times during the incidents
alleged in the complaint. Brown’s complaints arise out of alleged assaults by her
cellmate, Raheem Allen, in February of 2018 while she was incarcerated in the RHU
at SCI Huntingdon.
At the time of these events, Brown was serving a sentence in state prison for
a crime of violence committed while Brown was in custody; specifically, aggravated
harassment by a prisoner. (Def. Ex. 7, DEF 20). Brown was gay and she also
identified as transgender. In addition, Brown had a significant mental health history,
which had manifested itself in a variety of ways including Brown’s ingestion of her
own excrement. Indeed, during the relevant time period, Brown’s mental illness was
4 Brown proceeded pro se at trial. While we find in favor of the defendants, we
commend Brown for the presentation of her case. We also commend defense counsel
for the skill of their presentation, and for the many professional courtesies they
extended to Brown in the course of these proceedings.
5 This factual background is taken from the evidence and testimony elicited at trial
and represents the facts which we find were established by a preponderance of the
evidence.
documented on numerous occasions by prison psychiatric staff. (Def. Ex. 57, at 25-
29).
These psychiatric treatment notes recorded Brown’s mental health challenges,
which manifested themselves in several ways. First, Brown acknowledged odd
excretory behaviors, admitting that she had been “playing” with her feces. (Id., at
25, 26). Brown also claimed to hear voices. (Id., at 26). Yet, despite asserting that
she suffered from these symptoms of mental illness, Brown frequently resisted
efforts at counseling and treatment. Instead, Brown cited these alleged mental health
symptoms as she repeatedly demanded that she receive single cell status. This
conduct led some health care providers to conclude that Brown’s erratic behavior
was manipulative conduct designed for secondary gain through acquisition of what
is called a “Z code,” or single cell status. (Id., at 26-28).
Brown’s efforts to obtain single cell status were also occasionally marked by
threats of violence. For example, on December 1, 2017, it was reported that Brown
threatened to “ ‘kill’ someone if housed double.” (Id., at 28). Brown also amassed a
significant disciplinary history while housed at SCI Huntingdon. (Def. Exs. 85-89).
These disciplinary infractions frequently involved Brown’s insistence that she be
single celled and her refusal to accept cellmates. Moreover, in several instances
Brown resorted to threats of violence towards staff and others. Thus, in December
of 2017, Brown was disciplined after she informed staff that “if you put me in with
a celly I am going to kill him.” (Def. Ex. 87). This history of institutional misconduct
punctuated by occasional threats of violence led to Brown’s placement in the RHU
at SCI Huntingdon in February of 2018.
At trial, Brown and the defendants testified to the events leading up to the
alleged assaults in February of 2018. Thus, in October of 2017, Brown was
transferred to SCI Huntingdon. According to Brown, upon her intake at Huntingdon,
she informed DOC officials, including Lieutenant Maxwell, that she was
homosexual. Brown also testified that she identified as transgender, but that she did
not inform DOC officials of her transgender status at that time for fear of drawing
attention to herself. Brown stated that at her intake, she had to sign a double celling
agreement, and that she protested this agreement and informed DOC officials that
she needed to be placed in a single cell. Nevertheless, Brown testified that she signed
the agreement under duress. Brown was initially placed in a single cell for the first
few days that she was housed at Huntingdon. After a brief transfer to SCI Camp Hill
relating to a sexual assault allegation Brown had filed at that institution, Brown
returned to SCI Huntingdon on November 13, 2017. Brown contends that Lieutenant
Maxwell and the other defendants knew of her sexual assault allegation that she
made at Camp Hill.
Lieutenant Maxwell testified that he was, in fact, part of the intake team when
Brown arrived at SCI Huntingdon in October of 2017. For his part, Maxwell stated
that Brown was given a double celling agreement, and that signing the papers simply
acknowledged that Brown received the paperwork. Maxwell testified that unless
there was a particular reason for an inmate to be placed in a single cell and receive
“Z code” status, all inmates were housed with a cellmate. The paperwork given to
Brown explained double celling and how to go about requesting a single cell if the
inmate was concerned about double celling.
On this score, Maxwell testified regarding the housing placement of certain
inmates. Maxwell stated that inmates who were in disciplinary custody (“DC”) were
not to be housed with inmates in administrative custody (“AC”). Further, inmates
who were either identified as a victim of prior assaults or an abuser were listed as
“housing concerns.” Maxwell testified that victims labeled a housing concern could
be housed with other victims, and abusers with other abusers, but that victims and
abusers would not be celled together. At the time of the alleged incident in February
of 2018, Brown was listed as a housing concern and was DC status. (Def. Ex. 7).
Allen was not listed as a housing concern at this time and was also DC status. (Id.)
Lieutenant Maxwell testified that there were instances in which an inmate who was
a housing concern could be celled with an inmate who was not designated as a
housing concern.
On January 22, 2018, Brown was issued a misconduct by Officer Plocinik
regarding Brown having property in her cell that belonged to another inmate. Officer
Plocinik testified that he was not responsible for deciding whether any disciplinary
actions were appropriate with respect to this misconduct. Several days later, Brown
received another misconduct for refusing to take a cellmate. As a result of these
misconduct citations Brown was transferred to the RHU at SCI Huntingdon.
Brown testified that on February 2, 2018, Officer Plocinik moved her to a cell
that was covered in blood and mace, and because Brown suffered from asthma, she
asked to be removed from the cell. Brown testified that she was later told by Plocinik
that she would be housed with inmate Allen. Brown stated that she informed Plocinik
that she was afraid of Allen, and that Allen and a former cellmate of Brown’s, Dale
Jackson, knew of the prior assault she suffered at Camp Hill. According to Brown,
notwithstanding her specific warnings to staff, on February 3, 2018, Brown was
moved to cell 1008 in the RHU where she would be housed with inmate Raheem
Allen.6 Brown testified that she did not want to move into the cell with Allen, but
that Officer Plocinik threatened to spray her with OC spray if she did not comply.
6 Like Brown, Allen had a criminal history marked by violence. In Allen’s case, he
was serving a life sentence for murder. Moreover, like Brown, Allen had amassed a
significant disciplinary history. While Brown noted that this disciplinary history
included instances of sexual misconduct, it appears that these disciplinary citations
involved alleged sexual harassment of female prison staff. No party has identified
instances of homophobic violence on Allen’s part prior to February of 2018. Quite
the contrary, it appears that Allen’s prison records contained no notations indicating
that there were housing concerns relating to double celling Brown with other
prisoners.
These allegations were specifically denied by Officer Plocinik and no other
witness confirmed Brown’s account of these events. For his part, Officer Plocinik
testified that Brown was never placed in a cell covered in mace and blood, and that
he would not place an inmate in such a cell. He further stated that Brown never
expressed concerns about Allen to him, and that while he was part of the team of
officers that transferred Brown to cell 1008, he never threatened to spray Brown with
OC spray.
Thus, Brown was transferred to cell 1008 on February 3, 2018. Brown
testified that Allen was refusing to take Brown as a cellmate, and that he was
referring to Brown as a “rat” and a “faggot.” Brown further testified that Allen
immediately began to assault her even while she was still handcuffed by the transport
team, and that Officer Plocinik stood by and laughed as Allen hit Brown. She further
stated that Officer Plocinik told Allen that Brown was a “rat” and a “faggot.”
For his part, Officer Plocinik testified that Brown never refused to go into the
cell, and that if Brown had refused or if Allen was refusing Brown as a cellmate,
Brown would not have been placed in the cell with Allen. Officer Plocinik further
testified that he did not witness Allen hit Brown while Brown was still handcuffed,
and he did not call Brown any derogatory names in front of Allen. Moreover, there
was no physical or medical evidence which supported Brown’s claims that she was
subjected to an immediate, severe beating at Allen’s hands in the presence of
correctional staff.
Brown’s allegations then span the next four days, in which she alleges she
was assaulted each day by Allen, and that even after she reported the assaults to staff,
nothing was done to stop the assaults. Thus, Brown claims that on February 4, 2018,
she encountered Officers Plocinik and Fochtman, who brought the inmates their
dinner trays. She alleges that Plocinik gave Brown’s dinner tray to Allen, who would
allegedly keep it from Brown and not let Brown eat her dinner. Brown testified that
this happened several days in a row, and that she complained to staff about it.
However, Officer Plocinik testified that Allen had dietary restrictions, whereas
Brown did not, and they received different meals. Plocinik further testified that
Brown never expressed a concern regarding her meals.
On February 5, 2018, Brown claimed that she was violently assaulted by Allen
who beat her about her head. Had Brown suffered severe head injuries at this time,
as alleged by the plaintiff, her injuries would have been immediately apparent.
However, no prison staff reported seeing evidence that Brown had been harmed on
February 5, and her medical records do not document any clinical evidence of
assault. Quite the contrary, inmate contact notes prepared by prison psychiatric staff
on February 5 and 9, 2018, contain no reference to Brown reporting these physical
assaults by inmate Allen. However, the treatment notes from February 5, 2018, state
that Brown “present[ed] as dangerous and manipulative in order to get what [s]he
wants.” (Def. Ex. 57, at 26).
Brown also alleges that she was sexually assaulted by Allen on February 7,
2018, and that Officers Plocinik and Johnston were present but walked away from
the cell during the assault. Brown testified that she had blood all over her linens and
jumpsuit, and she requested new linens and a new jumpsuit from Johnston. For his
part, Officer Johnston testified that he was a CO Trainee working in the RHU on
February 7. Johnston stated that he was making his rounds as the “punch man” in
the unit when he was flagged down by Brown claiming that she had a bloody nose.
Johnston contends that both Brown and Allen were in the cell at that time, that
nothing looked out of order and there were no signs of a fight, and that Brown never
told him Allen assaulted her. Rather, Johnston testified that he asked Brown if she
needed medical attention, and Brown told him that she did not, and she requested
new linens and a new jumpsuit.
Johnston reported Brown’s complaint of a bloody nose to Sergeant Heaster in
the control room. Sergeant Heaster testified that he sent Officer Fochtman to cell
1008 to check on the situation after Johnston reported it. He further testified that
Officer Fochtman returned to the control room and reported that there were no signs
of a fight, and that Brown requested new linens and a jumpsuit due to the bloody
nose. Indeed, Officer Fochtman’s testimony corroborates this account of events. On
this score, Fochtman testified that he went to cell 1008 at the direction of Sergeant
Heaster. He asked both Allen and Brown if they had been fighting, and they both
said they had not. Fochtman ordered them to come to the door one at a time so that
he could inspect them, and he saw no physical injuries on either Brown or Allen or
any indication that Brown had been assaulted. Fochtman stated that Brown told him
that she sometimes gets bloody noses and that she did not need medical attention.
Johnston, Heaster, and Fochtman all testified that Brown was asked if she needed to
see medical, and Brown responded that she did not need medical attention at this
time.
Brown further testified that on February 5, 6, and 7, 2018, she informed
Plocinik that Allen assaulted her. Brown also stated that Officer Fochtman served
her dinner trays with Plocinik on February 4 and 5, and that Fochtman was aware
that Allen was assaulting her and threatened to continue to assault her. Both Plocinik
and Fochtman deny that Brown ever told them she was being assaulted by Allen.
According to Fochtman, both inmates asked to be moved to a different cell because
they could not see the television on the unit from cell 1008, but neither inmate asked
to be transferred for any other reason. Moreover, Maxwell, Johnston, Plocinik, and
Fochtman all testified that there was no indication prior to Brown’s alleged assault
that Brown had any safety concerns about being housed with Allen.
On February 8, 2018, Brown was issued a misconduct for refusing to go to
her cell after showers, stating that she was “not taking a cellie.” Due to Brown’s
refusal to return to the cell, she was placed in a cell by herself. Brown was visited
the next day by her counselor, Ms. Richards. Ms. Richards’ notes reflect that during
this contact, Brown’s concerns were about her misconducts. Brown asked Ms.
Richards if she could help get the misconducts resolved, and Ms. Richards declined
to do so. Brown’s only other concern was whether her family had called to check on
her, and Ms. Richards told Brown they had not. Ms. Richards testified that if she had
seen any indication that Brown was injured, she would have been required to report
it.
Several days later, around 4:00 p.m. on February 13, 2018, while Brown was
housed in a single cell, Plocinik ordered Brown to take a cellmate. Brown refused,
and Plocinik issued Brown a misconduct for refusing an order. A few hours after
Plocinik issued the misconduct, Brown submitted a sick call slip in which she
claimed that she had been sexually assaulted by Allen. The sick call slip reflects that
Brown claimed she was assaulted by Allen from February 3 to February 7, and that
Allen sexually assaulted her on February 7. Brown complained of a broken nose and
bleeding from her anus. This sick call slip was received by LPN Anata Trice. LPN
Trice testified that when she received the sick call slip, she considered it to be an
issue implicating the Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”). Accordingly, she
immediately notified her supervisor and Lieutenant Orndorf, the PREA coordinator
who was working that night.
LPN Trice testified to the procedure that was followed when staff received a
PREA allegation. She stated that inmates who filed a complaint implicating PREA
were seen the same day they make the complaint. She testified that DOC staff do an
initial medical workup of the inmate to get a basic medical assessment, and within
72 hours, the inmate would be sent to an outside provider to be examined. The case
is then turned over to the PREA Lieutenant to conduct an investigation. Lieutenant
Maxwell, who was a PREA Lieutenant at this time, testified that when he received
a PREA complaint, he would speak to the alleged victim and abuser separately, pull
their cell histories and any video evidence if it was deemed relevant, and if a sexual
assault was alleged, he would contact the Pennsylvania State Police.
Thus, LPN Trice testified that Brown and Allen were separated that night, and
Brown was taken to another room to talk about the allegations she made in her sick
call slip with Trice and Lieutenant Orndorf. LPN Trice described Brown’s demeanor
as calm, and she noted no visible physical injuries or signs of a struggle. Brown
reported to her that she was physically abused by Allen and sexually assaulted.
Brown claimed that she requested medical attention, but the correctional staff
refused. When it came time to do a medical assessment, LPN Trice testified that
Brown refused to cooperate and refused all medical attention. Brown would not
allow Trice to take pictures or render any medical attention to her. LPN Trice further
stated that Brown reported that she was fine now that she was in a single cell.
LPN Trice testified that it was unusual for an inmate who had reported a
sexual assault to refuse to cooperate and refuse all medical care, and further, that the
report was made almost a week after the alleged assault. Indeed, according to LPN
Trice, Brown’s refusal to cooperate in a physical examination was unique in her long
experience dealing with inmates who alleged that they had been sexually assaulted.
Simply put, LPN Trice testified that prior to this encounter with Brown, no inmate
who claimed to be a victim of sexual assault had refused examination and treatment.
Given Brown’s refusal to cooperate, and her statement that she was fine now that
she had a single cell, LPN Trice stated that her impression was that Brown was trying
to obtain Z code status by making the PREA complaint. For her part, Brown denies
this, and she testified that LPN Trice refused to provide her medical attention. On
the following day, February 14, 2018, Brown finally agreed to allow medical staff
to conduct a physical examination. That examination provided no clinical support
for Brown’s claims that she had endured repeated beatings and sexual assaults at the
hands of inmate Allen the week before. Instead, these clinical notes indicated that
Brown had no apparent injuries whatsoever. (Def. Ex. 7, DEF 118-19, 125-32).
Lieutenant Maxwell also testified as to his PREA investigation conducted in
Brown’s case. Thus, following Brown’s complaint, Maxwell opened an
investigation the next day, February 14, 2018, and contacted the state police. He
stated that a PSP Trooper arrived that day, and they began conducting interviews of
staff, as well as interviews of Brown and Allen. During the investigation, Brown
refused to submit a written statement, which Lieutenant Maxwell testified was
unusual in cases involving sexual assault, but Brown verbally stated that Allen had
physically and sexually abused her. Allen was also interviewed, and he gave a
written statement denying that he assaulted Brown. Several staff members, including
Officers Plocinik, Fochtman, and Johnston, as well as LPN Trice, were interviewed.
Fochtman stated that Brown never informed him of any assault by Allen, and that
the only complaint he received from both inmates was that they wanted to move to
a different cell so they could see the television. Johnston stated that the only
complaint he received from Brown was a complaint of a bloody nose. Plocinik stated
that he never witnessed Allen assaulting Brown, and that Brown never complained
to him that she was being assaulted by Allen. LPN Trice stated that Brown refused
medical treatment following her complaint, and that Trice saw no injuries on Brown.
Thus, Lieutenant Maxwell testified to his investigative findings and his
conclusion that Brown’s allegations of physical and sexual assault by Allen were
unfounded. Maxwell stated that he determined the staff reports to be credible, and
that there were multiple records in Brown’s file indicating she attempted to
manipulate staff and obtain a Z code. He further testified that he found Brown’s
allegations not credible because Brown had opportunities to report the alleged
assault and did not, and that Brown refused to cooperate with the medical assessment
or with the investigation. The PSP investigation similarly concluded that Brown’s
allegations were unfounded. Accordingly, Lieutenant Maxwell’s recommendation
was to close the investigation. Maxwell testified that after he made his
recommendation, the investigation went through a chain of command, up to and
including the Superintendent of the facility and the Central Office, before it was
closed.
Brown received notice of the results of the investigation on April 26, 2018.
That same day, she received a misconduct from Maxwell for lying to staff given that
her allegations were unfounded. Lieutenant Maxwell testified that a misconduct for
lying to staff was the course of action followed when a PREA complaint was deemed
unfounded. Following the results of the investigation, Brown later made allegations
against Officer Plocinik, which were also determined to be unfounded. Brown again
received a misconduct for lying to staff regarding this incident in December of 2018.
Brown initially filed the complaint in this case on August 1, 2018 and
amended the complaint thereafter. (Docs. 1, 25). After the defendants moved for
summary judgment, only the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference and failure
to protect claims against all four defendants, as well as a claim for the denial of
medical care against Officers Johnston and Fochtman, remained. (Doc. 137). A
three-day7 nonjury trial was then held in this case in January of 2023, during which
time the parties presented testimony and evidence regarding the Eighth Amendment
claims against the remaining individual defendants. After the presentation of
evidence had concluded, we took the matter under advisement.
After consideration of the evidence and testimony presented at trial, as
discussed below, we conclude that the plaintiff has not proven the Eighth
Amendment failure to protect or denial of medical care claims against any of the
remaining individual defendants. Therefore, we will enter judgment in favor of the
individual defendants.
III. Discussion
As we have explained, Brown’s claims against the defendants implicate the
Eighth Amendment, as she contends that the defendants failed to protect her from
being assaulted by Allen, and that she was refused medical care following the alleged
assault. However, after a review of all of the evidence, we conclude that Brown has
not proven that the defendants violated her Eighth Amendment rights. Specifically,
Brown has not shown that she suffered any serious risk of harm. Furthermore, Brown
has not carried her burden of proving that any of the individual defendants knew of
7 Given the numerous logistical hurdles we encountered while scheduling trial dates
in this matter, including the fact that the plaintiff is now in the custody of
immigration officials rather than the DOC, as well as COVID-19 concerns, we
elected to proceed with this nonjury trial over the course of several, nonsequential
days, with trial testimony taken on January 10, January 18, and January 23, 2023.
a serious risk of harm to her, or that they were deliberately indifferent to that risk.
Moreover, Brown has not shown that Defendants Johnston and Fochtman were
aware of a serious medical need of Brown’s, and further, that they ignored that
serious medical need and failed to provide Brown with medical attention.
Therefore, we will enter judgment in favor of the defendants.
A. Eighth Amendment – Legal Standards
Several overarching and animating constitutional considerations govern
analysis of any Eighth Amendment claim. As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Eighth Amendment protects against infliction of “cruel and
unusual punishment.” However, “not every governmental action
affecting the interests or well-being of a prisoner is subject to Eighth
Amendment scrutiny.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct.
1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986). “After incarceration, only the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Id. (citation and
internal quotations omitted). “It is obduracy and wantonness, not
inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct
prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that
conduct occurs in connection with establishing conditions of
confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official control over
a tumultuous cellblock.” Id.
Resolution of an Eighth Amendment claim therefore “mandate[s] an
inquiry into a prison official's state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.
294, 299, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991). Two considerations
define that inquiry. We must first determine if the deprivation was
sufficiently serious to fall within the Eighth Amendment's zone of
protections. Id. at 298, 111 S. Ct. 2321. If not, our inquiry is at an end.
However, if the deprivation is sufficiently serious, we must determine
if the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. In
other words, we must determine if they were motivated by a desire to
inflict unnecessary and wanton pain. “What is necessary to establish an
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain ...’ varies according to the
nature of the alleged constitutional violation.” Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U.S. 1, 5, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992).
Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 344–45 (3d Cir. 2000).
Thus, while prison officials may violate an inmate's rights under the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution by displaying deliberate indifference
to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate, an inmate asserting a failure to
protect claim must make a precise showing to prove that claim. To sustain such a
claim an inmate must:
[M]eet two requirements: (1) “the deprivation alleged must be,
objectively, sufficiently serious;” and (2) the “prison official must have
a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). In prison conditions cases, “that state of mind is one
of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Id. “Deliberate
indifference” is a subjective standard under Farmer-the prison official-
defendant must actually have known or been aware of the excessive risk
to inmate safety.
Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001).
This deliberate indifference standard is an exacting benchmark for
constitutional tort liability under the Eighth Amendment. As we have observed:
As explained in Beers–Capitol, in cases based on allegations of
deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials or other
supervisory defendants, the Supreme Court has “rejected an objective
test for deliberate indifference; instead it looked to what the prison
official actually knew rather than what a reasonable official in his
position would have known.” Id. at 131. Specifically, the Supreme
Court “held that ‘a prison official cannot be found liable under the
Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of
confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive
risk to inmate health or safety.’ ” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837,
114 S.Ct. 1970). This requirement of actual knowledge on the part of
supervisory officials “means that ‘the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’ ” Id. (quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970).
At the same time, this subjective standard does not insulate officials
from liability where such officials choose to remain deliberately
indifferent to an excessive or substantial or serious risk of harm to
inmates. The Supreme Court explained:
We are no more persuaded by petitioner's argument that, without
an objective test for deliberate indifference, prison officials will
be free to ignore obvious dangers to inmates. Under the test we
adopt today, an Eighth Amendment claimant need not show that
a prison official acted or failed to act believing that harm would
actually befall an inmate; it is enough that the official acted or
failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious
harm.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, 114 S.Ct. 1970. The Supreme Court also noted
that a supervisory defendant's knowledge of a risk may be proved
through circumstantial evidence, so that “a factfinder may conclude that
a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the
risk was obvious.” Id.
Quarles v. Palakovich, 736 F.Supp.2d 941, 947–48 (M.D. Pa. 2010).
Thus, the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard, at a minimum,
calls for knowledge of some substantial risk to the health and safety of inmates, and
a failure to act in the face of that known danger. There is a necessary corollary to
this deliberate indifference standard. Specifically, it is clear that the concept of
“deliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence.” Farmer, 511
U.S. at 835, 114 S.Ct. 1970. Therefore, a mere accident or inadvertence on the part
of corrections officials does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 105, 97 S. Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Even where a plaintiff
has presented sufficient evidence to allow a factfinder to reach the inference that a
prison official had knowledge of the risk on the basis that risk was obvious, it is clear
that an inference may not be compelled, and that the prison official must be permitted
to show that he was actually unaware of the risk in question. Beers–Capitol, 256
F.3d at 132. Lastly, a prison official who is shown to have been actually aware of a
risk to a prisoner-plaintiff can avoid liability if he shows that he responded
reasonably to the risk, even if the response did not avoid the ultimate harm. Id.
These principles also apply with particular force to Eighth Amendment claims
premised upon inadequate medical care. In the medical context, a constitutional
violation under the Eighth Amendment occurs only when officials are deliberately
indifferent to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. To
establish a violation of his constitutional right to adequate medical care in
accordance with this standard, an inmate is required to point to evidence that
demonstrates (1) a serious medical need, and (2) acts or omissions by prison officials
that indicate deliberate indifference to that need. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192,
197 (3d Cir. 1999). Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need involves the
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, 97 S.Ct. 285.
Such indifference may be evidenced by an intentional refusal to provide care,
delayed provision of medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed
medical treatment, denial of reasonable requests for treatment that results in
suffering or risk of injury, Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993), or
“persistent conduct in the face of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury.” White
v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1990).
However, it is also clear that the mere misdiagnosis of a condition or medical
need, or negligent treatment provided for a condition, is not actionable as an Eighth
Amendment claim because medical malpractice is not a constitutional violation.
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. 285. “Indeed, prison authorities are accorded
considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners.” Durmer, 991 F.2d
at 67 (citations omitted). Furthermore, in a prison medical context, deliberate
indifference is generally not found when some significant level of medical care has
been offered to the inmate. Thus, such complaints fail as constitutional claims under
§ 1983 since “the exercise by a doctor of his professional judgment is never
deliberate indifference. See e.g., Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274,
278 (3d Cir. 1990) (‘[A]s long as a physician exercises professional judgment his
behavior will not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights’).” Gindraw v. Dendler,
967 F.Supp. 833, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1997). “The key question ... is whether defendants
have provided plaintiff with some type of treatment, regardless of whether it is what
plaintiff desires.” Little v. Lycoming Cnty., 912 F.Supp. 809, 816 (M.D. Pa. 1996)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
It is against these legal benchmarks that we assess Brown’s claims against the
defendants.
B. Brown has Not Shown that the Defendants Violated Her Eighth
Amendment Rights.
Turning to the case before us, we find that Brown has not proven that the
individual defendants violated her Eighth Amendment rights. At bottom, there are
two elements to any Eighth Amendment claim. To establish this claim Brown must
show both: (1) a risk of some serious injury and (2) the defendants’ deliberate
indifference to that risk.
In this case, Brown has failed to carry her burden of proof on either of these
two essential elements of her Eighth Amendment claims. At the outset, Brown has
not shown that she was subjected to serious bodily injuries at the hands of a fellow
inmate between February 3 and 7, 2018. In fact, a number of the specific injury
claims made by Brown are thoroughly contradicted by the greater weight of the
evidence. For example, Brown’s assertion that she was immediately and savagely
beaten by Allen in the presence of correctional staff while she was still held in
restraints is contradicted by every other witness and draws no support from the
prison’s medical records. Likewise, Brown’s allegations that she was brutally beaten
about the head on the evening of February 5, 2018, is completely unsupported by
any other proof and seem at odds with the clinical evidence. Furthermore, inmate
contact notes prepared by prison psychiatric staff on February 5 and 9, 2018, contain
no reference to Brown reporting these physical or sexual assaults by inmate Allen,
but state that Brown “present[ed] as dangerous and manipulative in order to get what
[s]he wants.” (Def. Ex. 57 at p. 26).
In fact, the only physical evidence of any injury to Brown was the nosebleed
that she suffered on February 7, 2018. However, this injury, standing alone, is
insufficient to establish Brown’s Eighth Amendment claim for several reasons. At
the outset, it is well settled that in the absence of some expert witness testimony to
the contrary, the seriousness of a nosebleed as a medical condition would not be
apparent to a layperson like the defendants. McFadden v. Dalmasi, No. CV 17-5787,
2019 WL 6218220, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2019), aff'd, 837 F. App’x 135 (3d Cir.
2020) (citing Williams v. Guard Bryant Fields, 535 F. App’x 205, 212 (3d Cir.
2013)).
Moreover, the evidence indicates that both Brown and Allen denied that the
nosebleed was the result of any physical confrontation between these prisoners, and
for her part, Brown declined medical care at this time. Moreover, even when Brown
belatedly reported this alleged assault one week later, she initially declined any
medical examination by prison staff. Finally, once Brown consented to an
examination on February 14, 2018, that examination revealed no apparent injuries.
Therefore, Brown simply has not carried her burden of proof regarding this first
essential element of her Eighth Amendment claims, that she actually suffered
significant physical injuries at the hands of a fellow prisoner.
In addition, Brown has not shown that the individual defendants knew of any
substantial risk to her safety. While Brown testified that she informed these prison
officials that she was afraid of Allen, all four defendants testified that Brown never
expressed a concern about being housed with Allen.8 Rather, the defendants’
testimony, as well as testimony from other witnesses, credibly established that
Brown did not want to have any cellmate, and that Brown tried to obtain Z code, or
single-cell status and refused to take cellmates on many occasions. Indeed, Brown
was issued several misconducts for refusing a cellmate prior to being celled with
Allen in February of 2018. Additionally, while Brown testified that she had
requested a separation from Allen, and thus the defendants should not have celled
her with Allen, the evidence indicates that Brown did not request a separation from
Allen until February 16, 2018, nine days after the alleged assault took place. (Pl. Ex.
36).
8 Brown attempted to bolster this testimony by presenting copies of various
documents she alleged that she submitted to correctional staff reporting her
concerns. However, the vast majority of these documents were prepared by Brown
after-the-fact and provided no basis for concluding that these defendants were aware
of risks to her safety at the time of these events between February 3 and 7, 2018.
Moreover, while Brown testified that Lieutenant Maxwell knew of her
homosexual status and prior allegations of assault at Camp Hill, Maxwell testified
that an inmate is not given a Z code simply because he or she is homosexual or has
made prior complaints of assault. Indeed, Maxwell stated that Brown was listed as a
“housing concern” and Allen was not, but that there were instances in which an
inmate labeled a “housing concern” could be celled with an inmate who was not.
Brown points to Allen’s history of misconducts involving sexual harassment and
invites us to infer from these misconducts that Allen was a sexual predator and that
the defendants knew he was a predator. However, as we have noted, Allen’s
misconducts related to Allen exposing himself to female staff members. On this
score, Maxwell testified that Allen’s misconducts for those instances would not have
given staff any indication that Allen would assault a cellmate. Maxwell further stated
that while he was aware that Brown made a complaint at Camp Hill, he was not
involved in, nor did he know the results of that investigation. Accordingly, as to
Lieutenant Maxwell, Brown has not established that this defendant knew of a
substantial risk of harm to her and was deliberately indifferent to that risk.
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the other individual defendants.
First, with respect to Officers Johnston and Fochtman, the evidence established that
Johnston’s only contact with Brown was on February 7, 2018. While Brown testified
that Johnston witnessed Brown being assaulted by Allen, and that Johnston failed to
intervene, Johnston testified that he never witnessed an assault by Allen on this date.
Rather, Johnston testified that he was flagged down by Brown because she had a
bloody nose, and that there was no evidence that Brown and Allen had been fighting
or that Brown was injured. We credit this testimony, which was corroborated by
Officer Fochtman’s testimony that he went to Brown’s cell and found no evidence
of a fight, no injuries on either Brown or Allen, and that both inmates told Fochtman
they had not been fighting. Accordingly, Brown has not shown that Johnston was
aware of a substantial risk of harm to Brown and was deliberately indifferent to that
risk.
With respect to Officer Fochtman, the evidence established that Fochtman
encountered Brown on February 4, 6, and 7, 2018. Fochtman testified credibly that
Brown never reported any assaults to him on these dates. He further testified that
Brown’s only complaint about the cell was that she could not see the television.
Indeed, Fochtman stated that both Brown and Allen complained of the inability to
see the television from cell 1008. With respect to the encounter on February 7,
Fochtman testified that he was sent by Sergeant Heaster to check on Brown and
Allen after Johnston reported Brown’s bloody nose to the control room. He stated
that he inspected both Brown and Allen through the cell door, and that neither inmate
had any visible injuries. He asked both inmates if they had been fighting, and they
both responded that they had not. Further, he stated that Brown requested new linens
and a jumpsuit due to a bloody nose. We credit Officer Fochtman’s testimony, which
is corroborated by the testimony of both Officer Johnston and Sergeant Heaster.
Accordingly, we find that Officer Fochtman was not deliberately indifferent to a risk
of harm to Brown.
Nor can we conclude that either of these two defendants denied Brown
medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. First, Brown has not established
that she had a serious medical need to which the defendants were deliberately
indifferent. As one court in this district has aptly stated, “[n]ot every condition is a
serious medical need; instead, the serious medical need element contemplates a
condition of urgency, namely, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme
pain.” Millhouse v. United States, 2021 WL 2412930, at *13 (M.D. Pa. June 14,
2021) (Kane, J.) (citing Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d
326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987)). Brown simply has not made the necessary showing here,
where the evidence shows that the only injury Brown suffered at this time was a
bloody nose that was not actively bleeding at the time she encountered correctional
staff. Furthermore, both Johnston and Fochtman unequivocally testified that they
asked Brown if she needed to see medical, and that Brown said she did not need to
see medical. Sergeant Heaster’s testimony confirms that of Johnston and Fochtman.
Accordingly, we find that Brown has failed to establish that these defendants denied
her medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Finally, with respect to Officer Plocinik, we find that Brown’s failure to
protect claim fails. On this score, Officer Plocinik testified that prior to moving
Brown into cell 1008, he was not aware of any concerns that Brown had with respect
to Allen. While Brown testified that she told Plocinik that she did not want to be
celled with Allen, and that Allen assaulted her in front of Plocinik, Plocinik testified
that he never witnessed Allen assault Brown, and that Brown never expressed safety
concerns to him. Moreover, Plocinik testified credibly that had Brown refused to cell
with Allen, or if Allen had refused to take Brown as a cellmate, Brown would have
never been placed in cell 1008. Plocinik also testified that throughout the period
between February 3 and February 7, 2018, Brown never told him that Allen was
assaulting her. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Officer Plocinik knew of and
disregarded a substantial risk to Brown’s safety.
In sum, Brown’s allegations against these correctional staff are not supported
by the record.9 While Brown testified to her recollection of the events, her testimony
is belied by every other witness who testified at the trial in this matter. Indeed, as we
9 In her post-trial brief, Brown raises a host of issues pertaining to our evidentiary
rulings at trial. (See Doc. 255). On this score, it is well settled that “[t]he admission
or exclusion of evidence is a matter particularly suited to the broad discretion of the
trial judge,” United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 902 (3d Cir. 1991), and our
rulings on these evidentiary matters were put on the record during the trial in this
case. Accordingly, while we decline Brown’s invitation to revisit these evidentiary
issues at this time, we note that Brown objected to these rulings on the record and
thus, has properly preserved these issues for appeal.
have noted, the four correctional defendants testified that Brown never expressed
safety concerns regarding being celled with Allen, and that Brown never reported an
allegation of assault to them. Brown’s counselor, Ms. Richards, testified that Brown
never expressed safety concerns to her. LPN Trice testified that while Brown had
accused Allen of physical and sexual assault, Brown refused all medical attention
and had no visible physical injuries on her person when LPN Trice attempted to
examine her. Moreover, Brown’s testimony is contradicted by other undisputed
evidence in the record, which we find establishes that Brown consistently refused to
take cellmates, tried to obtain single-cell status, and made unfounded accusations
against other inmates and staff. Thus, we simply cannot credit Brown’s allegations
in light of the overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, given that the
evidence does not support Brown’s Eighth Amendment claims in this case, we will
enter judgment in favor of the defendants.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we find that the plaintiff has failed to
prove that the defendants violated her Eighth Amendment rights. Thus, we will enter
judgment in favor of the remaining individual defendants.
An appropriate order follows.
S/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
DATED: March 3, 2023