Wilson v. Lt. Kauffman

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WILLIAM WILSON, No. 4:20-CV-00682

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

LT. KAUFFMAN, LT. WIAN,

and ERIN BROWN,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FEBRUARY 8, 2023

On April 24, 2020, Plaintiff William Wilson, a Pennsylvania state inmate,

currently confined in the State Correctional Institution, Frackville, Pennsylvania

(“SCI-Frackville”), filed the above captioned civil rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983.1 The action proceeds via an amended complaint, filed on

September 14, 2020.2 The named Defendants are Erin Brown, Director of the

Office of Population Management (OPM) at SCI-Camp Hill, and the following

employees at the Benner Township State Correctional Institution (“SCI-Benner”),

Bellefonte, Pennsylvania, Plaintiff’s former place of confinement: Superintendent

Scott Klingfelter; Deputy Superintendent Bradley Booher; Program Manager

Jennifer Rossman; Major Curtis Grice; RHU Captain W.P. Foster; Security

1 Doc. 1.

Lieutenants Kauffman and Wian.3 Wilson claims that the named Defendants are

responsible for him being assaulted on March 9, 2019 at SCI-Benner by two

brothers of the victim in his criminal case.4

By Memorandum and Order dated September 15, 2021, Defendants Booher,

Klinefelter, Rossman, Grice and Foster were dismissed from the above captioned

action and remaining Defendants Kauffman, Wian and Brown were directed to file

an appropriate pretrial motion.5

Presently pending is remaining Defendants’ motion for summary judgment6

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons set forth below,

the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment should be granted when the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits show that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.7 A disputed fact is material when it could affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law.8 A dispute is genuine if

3 Id.

4 Id.

5 Docs. 32, 33.

6 Doc. 49.

7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.9 The Court should view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party and make all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.10 When the

non-moving party fails to refute or oppose a fact, it may be deemed admitted.11

Initially, the moving party must show the absence of a genuine issue concerning

any material fact.12 Once the moving party has satisfied its burden, the non-

moving party, “must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly

supported motion for summary judgment.”13 “While the evidence that the non-

moving party presents may be either direct or circumstantial, and need not be as

great as a preponderance, the evidence must be more than a scintilla.”14 “If a party

... fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule

56(c),” a court may grant summary judgment or consider the fact undisputed for

purposes of the motion.15

If the court determines that “the record taken as a whole could not lead a

rational trier or fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

9 Id. at 250.

10 Hugh v. Butler County Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005).

11 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); Local R. 56.1 (“All material facts set forth in the statement

required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless

controverted by the statement required to be served by the opposing party.”).

12 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

13 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.

14 Hugh, 418 F.3d at 267 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251).

trial’.”16 Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment against the party who

fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential

to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.17

II. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

On October 25, 2018, following a jury trial in which Wilson was convicted

of, inter alia, Murder of the Third Degree and Unsworn Falsification to

Authorities, Wilson was sentenced by the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery

County to a period of incarceration within the custody of the Pennsylvania

Department of Corrections (DOC).18

On November 8, 2018, Wilson was received into DOC custody and housed

in the Phoenix State Correctional Institution, (“SCI-Phoenix”), Collegeville,

Pennsylvania.19

On November 16, 2018, while Wilson was housed at SCI- Phoenix, he was

sitting at a table in the dining hall when he was “hit from behind by a guy[,]”

another inmate, that Wilson did not know.20

On November 19, 2018 Wilson appeared for a misconduct hearing on a

misconduct he received as a result of the November 16, 2018 incident.21 The

16 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting First

Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).

17 Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.

18 Doc. 50-1 at 28.

19 Doc. 50-2 at 3.

20 Doc. 50-3 at 1.

misconduct revealed that Wilson “was on the ground fighting Inmate Scott

(#MU6165) [who] was on top punching.”22 The misconduct was dismissed with

prejudice.23

On November 21, 2018, Wilson was transferred from SCI-Phoenix to SCI-

Camp Hill24, so that he could be received and initially classified pursuant to DOC

Po. No. 11.2.1 “Reception and Classification.”25 He remained at SCI-Camp Hill

until January 24, 2019.26

On January 15, 2019, while housed at SCI-Camp Hill, a Permanent Transfer

Petition, transferring Wilson to SCI-Benner Township, was prepared by SCI-Camp

Hill Official Misiti.27 The petition indicated that Wilson, himself, was a risk for

institutional assaultive behavior.28 At the time of the petition, Wilson had one

documented separation from Inmate Conn (#NQ4829), entered on January 8, 2019,

noting that “in 2005 Conn and Wilson were codefendants in a federal case.”29 On

January 16, 2019, the transfer petition was approved by SCI-Camp Hill Official

Hendricks and Wilson was transferred to SCI-Benner Township on January 24,

22 Doc. 50-3 at 2.

23 Doc. 50-3 at 3.

24 Doc. 50-2 at 3.

25 Doc. 50-4.

26 Doc. 50-2 at 3.

27 Doc. 50-5 at 1.

28 Id.

2019.30 Wilson remained in general population at SCI-Benner from January 24,

2019 to January 28, 2019.31

On January 28, 2019, Other Report No. D26991232 was prepared by

Defendant, Lt. Wian, and served on Wilson, indicating that Wilson was being

placed on Administrative Custody pursuant to Administrative Directive 802

Section 1.B.133 as he is in danger from some person(s) in the facility and cannot be

protected by alternate measures.34

On January 29, 2019, the Program Review Committee (PRC) conducted an

in person 802 hearing on Wilson’s Other Report D26992.35 The PRC noted that

Wilson had not yet talked with Security and had no idea why he was housed in the

RHU. 36 The PRC advised that Wilson would need to be reviewed by the Security

30 Doc. 50-5 at 1.

31 Doc. 50-2 at 3.

32 DC-ADM 802 1.B.6 establishes that:

Whenever practical, written notice of the reasons for AC placement is given to the

inmate prior to placement, but in all cases within 24 hours after placement. The

written notice shall be prepared on the DC-141, Part 1, by indicating “Other.”

33 DC-ADM 802 is the Department of Corrections Policy Statement on “Administrative

Custody Procedures, which states, in pertinent part:

1. A general population inmate may be assigned AC status and placed in a Security

Level (SL) 5 Housing Unit, including a Psychiatric Observation Cell (POC), by order

of the Shift Commander and/or by order of a psychiatrist or a Certified Registered

Nurse Practitioner – Psychiatric Service (PCRNP) for the following reason(s):

a. the inmate is in danger from some person(s) in the facility and cannot be

protected by alternate measures and/or the inmate is a danger to some person(s)

in the facility and the person(s) cannot be protected by alternate measures

See DC-ADM 802, Administrative Custody Procedures Manual at § 1(B)(1)(a).

34 Doc. 50-6 at 1.

35 Doc. 64-1 at 7.

Office who will then provide a recommendation to PRC regarding his status.37

While in Administrative Custody, the PRC conducted Administrative

Reviews of Wilson’s Administrative Custody (AC) status on February 5, February

12, February 19, and February 26, 2019.38 Each time, the PRC indicated that

“Inmate Wilson was placed in AC status due to being in danger from others” and

recommended “continue AC status pending Security Office review and

recommendation.”39

On February 19, 2019, Wilson submitted an Inmate’s Request to Staff

Member, inquiring as to why he has been housed in the RHU since January 28,

2019, which he claims is longer than the fifteen days permitted by DOC policy.40

On February 26, 2019, staff responded that Plaintiff’s “802 is for danger to/from

others, not for investigation” and that the “15 day time frame only applies to 802’s

that are specifically written for Letter F-being under investigation.”41

On February 26, 2019, the PRC continued Wilson’s placement in AC status,

approved him for one phone call and indicated that he would be reviewed again in

37 Id.

38 Doc. 50-7 at 1-4.

39 Id.

40 Doc. 62-1 at 8. Wilson also submitted two Inmate’s Request to Staff Members on February

2, 2019 inquiring as to the reason he was detained in Administrative Custody and notifying

staff that while in AC he was being denied use of the phone, his tablet, television and

commissary, which Plaintiff believed to be punishment “for nothing.” Doc. 18-1 at 4,5.

Staff response was that they were waiting for an “update from security” and that “this is

not a form of punishment.” Id.

one week.42

On March 6, 2019, Plaintiff was released back into general population at

SCI-Benner.43

On March 9, 2019 Plaintiff was involved in an inmate on inmate altercation

with four other inmates: “Washington” (#LL3032); “Williams-Smith” (#HJ2598);

“Scott” (#ND8831); and, “Gold” (#ME0952).44 Wilson was immediately seen in

the medical department after the altercation.45 He was assessed by medical,

photographed and released with no treatment rendered, noting that although

Plaintiff “complained of a headache, lightheaded feeling [and] nausea,” he “felt

better after sitting in medical for a few minutes and then was escorted to RHU by

security.”46

After the altercation, Plaintiff was issued an Other Report, pursuant to

ADM-802, Section 1.B.1.f, placing him in Administrative Custody “because he has

been charged with, or is under investigation for a violation of facility rules and

there is a need for increased control pending disposition of charges and completion

of the investigation.”47

42 Doc. 50-7 at4.

43 Doc. 50 at 6; Doc. 64 at 3.

44 Doc. 50 at 6; Doc. 50-9.

45 Doc. 50-9 at 1.

46 Id.

On March 11, 2019, Defendant Kauffman wrote to Superintendent Marsh

concerning a Transfer/Separation Request for Wilson, based on the following:

The Security Office is recommending that Inmate NP9531 William

Wilson be transferred from SCI-Benner Township and separated from

Inmates MV7680 Alexander Scott and ND8831 Aykee Scott.

On March 9, 2019, Inmate Wilson was involved in an altercation at

SCI-Benner Township on the East Walks. During the incident, Inmate

Wilson was knocked to the ground and struck by multiple inmates.

Inmate Wilson was able to evade the attack and get away from the

inmates. Inmate Wilson was pursued and struck again. Responding

staff members ordered the inmates to be restrained.

Following the incident, a BII “Jump Team” was deployed to SCI-

Benner Township. During the interviews it was learned that Inmate

Wilson is incarcerated for conspiracy to commit murder. Inmate

Wilson’s crime was against the 16 year old brother of Inmates MV7680

and ND8831 Scott. The incident was a direct result of Inmate Wilson’s

crime.

Due to the ongoing threat to Inmate Wilson, it is the recommendation

of the Security Office that Inmate Wilson be transferred to another

facility and the above separations be listed in his file.48

Wilson’s Permanent Transfer Petition reveals that additional information

was obtained by the Security Office that required the addition of a separation on

MU6165 Aaron Scott currently housed at SCI-Phoenix.49 Aaron Scott is the

brother of MV7680 Alexander Scott and ND88831 Aykee Scott.50 MV7680 Scott

received third party mail from MU6165 Scott on March 15, 2019 and the letter

48 Doc. 50-11 at 1.

49 Doc. 50-12 at 2.

included information that was used to determine that both inmates were brothers.51

The letter also included information pertaining to NP9531 Wilson being housed at

SCI-Benner Township.52

On March 20, 2019, Wilson filed Grievance No. 793332 regarding the

March 9, 2019 incident, alleging that “SCI-Benner knew of the threats against

[him] but still released [him] from the RHU back into population on March 6,

2019.”53 He requested to be transferred “as soon as possible.”54

On March 22, 2019,55 Wilson was issued Misconduct Report No. D269943,

charging him with Fighting, a Class 1 violation, as follows:

On 3/9/2019 at 1745 hours, inmates LL3032 Washington, HJ2598

Williams-Smith, ND8831 Scott, ME0952Gold and NP9531 Wilson

were observed fighting on the East Walks [while] returning from the

Inmate Dining Hall. All of the listed inmates were observed exchanging

strikes with their hands and feet. The inmates were given direct orders

to stop fighting and dispersed from the area of the incident.56

On April 29, 2019, Wilson’s Grievance No. 793332 was denied as follows:

In your grievance, you allege that you were released to general

population on March 6, 2019 and the staff at SCI-Benner Township

knew that there was a threat to your safety. You are requesting to be

transferred to another institution.

I spoke to you regarding this grievance. I explained to you that at the

time of your release, there was not [a] verified threat to your safety.

51 Id.

52 Id.

53 Doc. 50-13 at 1.

54 Id.

55 The Misconduct Report indicates that the delay in submitting the report was due to an

investigation being conducted into the incident.

You were interviewed by the Security Office on 3-6-19 prior to your

release. Based on the interview with you, a PRC action was drafted

requesting your release to general population. While it is unfortunate

that you were assaulted, every attempt to guarantee your safety was

made by the staff at SCI-Benner Township. The assault on you was

investigated and it was determined that you were not safe in this facility

and the separation procedures were initiated. You were placed on AC

status at that time.

Based on the findings, Grievance #79332 is denied. Your requested

relief of an unspecified amount of compensation for physical,

emotional, and psychological damages and a transfer to a closer jail in

your region is also denied.57

On April 9, 2019 Wilson was transferred from SCI-Benner Township back

to SCI-Phoenix.58

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brings Eighth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which

“provides a cause of action against state actors who violate an individual’s rights

under federal law.”59 Section 1983 does not create substantive rights but instead

“provides only remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere in the

Constitution or federal laws.”60 “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must

allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United

States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person

acting under color of state law.”61

57 Doc. 50-13 at 2.

58 Doc. 50-2 at 3.

59 Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 380 (2012).

60 Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996).

Importantly, a plaintiff must plead a defendant’s personal involvement in the

alleged deprivation of his constitutional right.62 That is because, as stated in the

text of § 1983 itself, only a person who “subjects, or causes to be subjected”

another person to a civil rights violation can be held liable under § 1983. Thus,

each defendant can be held liable only for his or her own conduct.63

The doctrine of respondeat superior, which makes an employer

automatically responsible for the wrongdoing of employees, does not apply under

§ 1983.64 Therefore, supervisor-defendants cannot be held liable for every illegal

act that takes place in a correctional facility. Rather, they can be held liable only

for their own conduct.

Our Court of Appeals has identified two general ways in which a supervisor-

defendant may be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates.

First, liability may attach if the supervisor, “with deliberate indifference to the

consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which

62 See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).

63 See, e.g., id.; see also Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016); Barkes v. First

Correctional Medical, 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014) (rev’d sub nom. on other grounds

575 U.S. 822 (2015)); C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 173 (3d Cir. 2005)

(“To impose liability on the individual defendants, Plaintiffs must show that each one

individually participated in the alleged constitutional violation or approved of it.”) (citing

C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 201-02 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc)).

64 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to

Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant,

through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); see also

directly caused [the] constitutional harm.”65 Second, “a supervisor may be

personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff’s

rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge

of and acquiesced” in the subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.66 “Allegations of

participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with

appropriate particularity.”67

1. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Brown

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Brown, as Director of OPM, should not have

allowed Plaintiff to be transferred to SCI-Benner68 and that she failed in her duty to

protect him from further harm “by her not completely reviewing [his] files/history

and further seeing that it would not be in the Plaintiff’s best interest to be classified

to SCI-Benner.”69 Brown relies heavily on the duties of the OPM as enumerated in

the DOC Pol. No. 11.1.1, Population Management Procedures Manual, Section 2 –

Transfer Petition System.70 In particular, Wilson claims that DOC Pol. No. 11.1.1

sets forth Brown’s responsibilities as follows,

(1) maintain the administration of the Transfer Petition System

(TPS);

65 A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004)

(alteration in original) (quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725

(3d Cir. 1989)).

66 Id. (citing Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995)).

67 Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208.

68 Doc. 18.

69 Doc. 62.

(2) review all Transfer Petition Requests entered into the TPS, to

determine if the required level of approval for each Transfer

Petition has been met;

(3) review and either approve or deny, all transfers outlined in the

Levels of Approval Required for Inmate Transfers, which

require OPM approval;

(4) review and either approve or deny all Administrative Separations

from staff and inmates;

(5) review and either approve or deny Initial Transfer Petitions,

Permanent Transfer Petitions, exceptions for IBTs, and

Temporary Transfers; and

(6) review all Special Transfers.71

The DOC Defendants seeks summary judgment on behalf of Defendant

Brown because she had no personal involvement in the transfer of Plaintiff to SCI-

Benner and because Plaintiff’s claims are premised on respondent superior. The

Court agrees.

The record evidence reveals that Wilson was initially received into DOC

custody on November 8, 2018 and placed in SCI-Phoenix. Plaintiff did not have

any separations from staff or other inmates at this time. On November 16, 2018,

Wilson, in an isolated incident, was assaulted from behind by an inmate Wilson did

not know. As a result of this incident, on January 15, 2019, a Permanent Transfer

Petition was requested by DOC official Misiti; on January 24, 2019, the petition

was approved by DOC official Hendricks. There is no record evidence that

Defendant Brown was personally involved in the transfer of Wilson from SCI-

Phoenix to SCI-Brenner. To the extent that Plaintiff relies on DOC Pol. No. 11.1.1

for the argument that it was Brown’s responsibility to oversee his transfer, DOC

Pol. No. 11.1.1 specifically indicates that the “Director/designee” of OPM shall

conduct the enumerated functions listed by Plaintiff. It is readily plausible that

someone, other than Defendant Brown was an appropriate designee to effectuate

Plaintiff’s transfer. As such, it appears that Plaintiff is attempting to impose

liability on Defendant Brown, solely on the basis of respondent superior, which he

cannot do. As set forth above, only a person who “subjects or causes to be

subjected” a plaintiff to a deprivation of rights can be held liable under § 1983. The

doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply under § 1983. Accordingly,

Defendant Brown is entitled to summary judgment.

2. Defendants Kauffman and Wain

The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment

imposes on prison officials “a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands

of other prisoners.”72 “Being violently assaulted in prison is simply ‘not part of the

penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’ ”73 To

survive summary judgment on a claim for damages against a prison official for

failure to protect an inmate from violence caused by other inmates, as is the case

here, a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence establishing that: (1) he was

incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm (an

72 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994); Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d

Cir. 1997).

objective inquiry); (2) the prison official acted with deliberate indifference to the

substantial risk to his health and safety (a subjective inquiry); and, (3) the prison

official’s deliberate indifference caused him harm.74

The first element sets out an objective inquiry: that the official “knowingly

and unreasonably disregarded an objectively intolerable risk of harm.”75 The

second element, “deliberate indifference,” is a subjective standard: “ ‘the prison

official-defendant must actually have known or been aware of the excessive risk to

inmate safety.’ ”76 That is because “a prison official cannot be found liable under

the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement

unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or

safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the

inference.”77 The plaintiff “need not show that a prison official acted or failed to

act believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the

official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious

harm.”78 “Deliberate indifference is a subjective state of mind that can, like any

74 Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834;

Hamilton, 117 F.3d at 746).

75 Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 132 (3d Cir. 2001).

76 Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 367 (quoting Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 125).

77 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

other form of scienter, be proven through circumstantial evidence and witness

testimony.”79

Prison officials may escape liability for deliberate indifference claims in

several ways. They “might show, for example, that they did not know of the

underlying facts indicating a sufficiently substantial danger and that they were

therefore unaware of a danger, or that they knew of the underlying facts but

believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave rise was

insubstantial or nonexistent.”80 “In addition, prison officials who actually knew of

a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they

responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.”81

“Whether one puts it in terms of duty or deliberate indifference, prison officials

who act reasonably cannot be found liable” on a failure-to-protect claim.82

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Wian and Kauffman were aware of

the dangerous condition general population presented for Plaintiff when they

moved him into Administrative Custody. He further alleges that these Defendants

subsequently exercised deliberate indifference to this danger when they released

him back into general population on March 6, 2019, only for him to be assaulted

79 Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 535 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Bistrian, 696

F.3d at 367.

80 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844

81 Id.

82 Id. at 845; see also Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that prison

officials have “a duty ... to take reasonable measures to protect prisoners from violence at

on March 9, 2109.83 Defendants maintain that Wilson cannot produce competent

admissible evidence establishing that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to

any substantial risk of harm to Wilson’s health and safety.84 The Court disagrees.

The record evidence establishes that on January 28, 2019, Plaintiff was

issued Other Report No. D269912, placing him in Administrative Custody

pursuant to Administrative Directive 802 Section 1.B.1, because he was in danger

from some person or persons in the facility and could not be protected by alternate

measures.85 Although the documentary evidence does not reveal the underlying

danger Plaintiff was facing, Defendants invite the Court’s attention to Exhibit 6,

attached to their Statement of Material Facts to support the underlying basis for

Wilson’s placement in Administrative Custody.86 Defendants reference this

document as the affidavit of Defendant Kauffman.87 Defendants argue that this

Affidavit indicates that the reason Wilson was placed in Administrative Custody

was because Wilson reported that he was approached by Inmate Scott (#MV76870)

and, although Plaintiff allegedly reported to Kauffman that the situation was “not

that serious,” Defendants Wian and Kauffman believed the situation serious

enough to move plaintiff to Administrative Custody.88 Plaintiff refutes these

83 Doc. 18.

84 Doc. 57.

85 Doc. 50-6.

86 Doc. 50-6.

87 Defendants’ Exhibit 6 is a copy of Other Report No. D269912. Defendant Kauffman’s

affidavit does not appear as Defendants’ Exhibit 6, nor is it located elsewhere in the record.

statements in his statement of material facts, claiming that he was never

approached by Inmate Scott (#MV76870), nor did he report to anybody about

being approached or threatened by Inmate Scott (#MV76870).89 He further claims

that the many Inmate’s Requests to Staff Member he submitted, indicate that he

was without knowledge as to his placement in Administrative Custody.90 Clearly a

genuine issue of material fact exists as to the nature of the underlying danger that

placed Wilson in Administrative Custody. However, regardless of the identity of

the underlying danger, the record demonstrates that Plaintiff was moved to

Administrative Custody because general population at SCI-Benner posed to him a

substantial risk of harm.

Additional questions of fact arise as to whether Defendant Wian and

Kauffman were deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of harm to Wilson’s

health and safety when they released him back into general population. Although

the record evidence includes copies of each of Plaintiff’s PRC Administrative

Custody reviews pursuant to DC-ADM 802, the record is devoid of any

documentary evidence pertaining to Plaintiff’s release from Administrative

Custody back to general population.91 Defendants, again relying on an affidavit

that is not part of the record, posit that during a meeting on March 6, 2019 Wilson

89 Doc. 64 at 3.

90 Doc. 62 at 3-5.

91 DC-ADM 802, Section 4 enumerates the procedures for release from Administrative

“believed the situation was ‘not that serious’ and that he wanted to be released

from administrative custody status so that he could resume his legal appeals” and

that “per his request, Wilson was thus released from Administrative Custody and

returned to general population, although not to the original block where he had

been previously approached by Inmate Scott (#MV7680)”.92 Plaintiff, refutes this,

stating that while he did speak to Defendants Wian and Kauffman on March 6,

2019, it was Defendants who “told Plaintiff that they did not find any credible

threats to Plaintiff’s safety and based on the interview with Defendants the Plaintiff

was released into general population.”93 As such, the Court finds that the lack of

documentary evidence for Wilson’s release back to general population and the

parties’ conflicting accounts of Plaintiff’s release to general population create

genuine issues of material fact that preclude an award of summary judgment at this

time. Such issues include, but are not limited to, the underlying threat determining

the need for Wilson’s placement in Administrative Custody,94 and the

reasonableness of Defendants’ actions in releasing Plaintiff to general population.

92 Doc. 57 at 10.

93 Doc. 18 at 8.

94 Pursuant to DC-ADM 802, Section 1.B.7:

The DC-141, Part 1, shall articulate the direct threat to the safety of persons or the clear

threat to the safe and secure operations of the facility posed by the individual and shall

include:

a. the relationship between the threat the inmate poses, and the behaviors observed;

and

b. a description of why alternatives to restrictive housing cannot safely manage the

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant in part and deny in part

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Court will grant Defendants’

Rule 56 motion as to Wilson’s claims against Defendant Brown. The Court will

deny Defendants’ motion as to Wilson’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect

claim against Defendants Kauffman and Wian.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge