Anstine v. Adams

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TIMOTHY MARK ANSTINE, No. 1:20-CV-02160

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

JEROME MICHAEL ADAMS,

RODNEY R. AKERS, THERON R.

PEREZ, GREGORY G. SCHWAB,

JULIA A. SHERIDAN, and

MATTHEW J. UPDEGROVE,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FEBRUARY 7, 2023

Plaintiff Timothy Mark Anstine, an attorney who formerly worked for the

Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development (“DCED”)

brings this action against several other attorneys working for the Commonwealth.

Anstine was suspended and later terminated by his employer after a confidential

investigation into his conduct. He now challenges his termination, arguing that it

violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process because he was never given

notice of the investigation or an opportunity to be heard before his termination. He

also alleges that his termination violated state law. Defendants now move for

summary judgment on all of Anstine’s claims. For the following reasons, the Court

grants Defendants’ motion as to Anstine’s due process claim and a related state-law

claim predicated on the alleged due process violation, and declines to exercise

jurisdiction over Anstine’s other state-law claims.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Underlying Facts

Anstine began working for DCED in 2003.1 The letter informing Anstine of

his appointment specified that he was an at-will employee in a non-civil service,

management role.2 At DCED, Anstine’s role was to provide legal advice to several

state agencies in the realm of economic development.3 With approval from his

employer, Anstine operated a private real estate brokerage and a title insurance

agency while working for the DCED.4

Shortly after joining DCED, Anstine received an employee handbook.5 He

signed a notice confirming receipt of the handbook, which provided that the

handbook “d[id] not create any employee rights or benefits” and “[was] not a

contract” or an “invitation to contract.”6 The notice did point Anstine’s attention to

the “Commonwealth Personnel Rules” contained in Manual 505.7, which the notice

stated set forth the “rights and benefits of employees.”7 Lastly, the notice indicated

1 See id.; Dep. of Timothy M. Anstine, Doc. 29-17 at 8:5-11.

2 Appointment Letter, Doc. 29-1; Anstine Dep., Doc. 29-17 at 9:10-10:22.

3 See Anstine Dep., Doc. 29-17 at 11:16-14:16.

4 Id. at 6:15-7:13.

5 DCED Employee Handbook Notice, Doc. 31-10.

6 Id.

that the Commonwealth had “sole discretion” to change any rules, policies, or

directives regarding his employment.8

In April 2020, Defendant Rodney R. Akers contacted Anstine to schedule a

conference call.9 When Anstine called Akers, Defendants Julia Sheridan, Jerome

Michael Adams, and Matthew J. Updegrove were all present on the call.10 On the

call, Updegrove informed Anstine that he was immediately being suspended from

his job without pay pending a confidential investigation.11 When Anstine asked why

he was being suspended, Updegrove responded that Anstine was not entitled to that

information at the time.12 The substance of the conversation was confirmed in a letter

sent to Anstine from Defendant Theron R. Perez, on behalf of Defendant Gregory

G. Schwab.13 In July 2020, Updegrove contacted Anstine to inform him that his

services were no longer required at DCED.14 Anstine received a confirmatory letter

soon after.15

B. Procedural History

Following his termination, Anstine filed suit in this Court. He claims

Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights by

8 Id.

9 Anstine Dep., Doc. 29-17 at 32:8-11.

10 Id. at 32:12-15. Both Sheridan and Adams were OGC attorneys. Updegrove served as the Chief

of the Division of Employee Relations in the Pennsylvania Office of Administration.

11 Id. at 32:16-23.

12 Id. at 33:4-1.

13 Id. at 33:18-34:4; April 22, 2020 Suspension Letter, Doc. 29-15. Schwab and Perez were OGC

attorneys.

14 Anstine Dep., Doc. 29-17 at 35:7-36:1.

terminating him without notice or a hearing, depriving him of a property interest in

continued employment (Count I); engaged in a civil conspiracy to violate his

constitutional rights (Count II); intentionally interfered in his contractual

relationship with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Count III); and intentionally

interfered with his attorney-client relationships with certain Commonwealth entities

(Count IV).16

Defendants previously moved to dismiss Anstine’s Complaint.17 My former

colleague, the Honorable John E. Jones III, then-Chief Judge of this Court, granted

Defendants’ motion in part, dismissing some of Anstine’s claims.18 Defendants now

move for summary judgment on the rest of Anstine’s claims.19 Their motion has

been fully briefed and is now ripe for disposition.

16 Compl., Doc. 1 ¶¶ 82-107 (Count I), 108-13 (Count II), 114-20 (Count III), 121-38 (Count IV).

17 MTD, Doc. 6.

18 May 24, 2021 Memorandum and Order, Doc. 15. Prior to Judge Jones’ order, Anstine also

alleged two state-law defamation claims. Compl., Doc. 1 ¶¶ 139-46 (Count V), 147-53 (Count

VI). Judge Jones concluded that Defendants had sovereign immunity to intentional tort actions

by virtue of the Pennsylvania Sovereign Immunity Act. See Doc. 15 at 23-24. He therefore

dismissed Count V of Anstine’s Complaint but did not address Count VI. See id. at 25. It

appears that the parties understand Count VI to be dismissed, as indicated by Defendants’

Answer, Doc. 16 ¶¶ 147-53, and the lack of any argument related to Count VI on Anstine’s

part. In any event, Judge Jones’ reasoning for dismissing Count V applies with equal force to

Count VI. See Doc. 15 at 23-24 (concluding that Defendants’ communication of their concerns

about Anstine’s conduct to other Commonwealth officials was within the scope of their

employment as supervisory attorneys for the Commonwealth). Therefore, the Court will

dismiss Count VI on that basis.

II. LAW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate

where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”20 Material facts are those “that

could alter the outcome” of the litigation, “and disputes are ‘genuine’ if evidence

exists from which a rational person could conclude that the position of the person

with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.”21 A defendant “meets this

standard when there is an absence of evidence that rationally supports the plaintiff’s

case.”22 Conversely, to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must “point to

admissible evidence that would be sufficient to show all elements of a prima facie

case under applicable substantive law.”23

The party requesting summary judgment bears the initial burden of supporting

its motion with evidence from the record.24 When the movant properly supports its

motion, the nonmoving party must then show the need for a trial by setting forth

“genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because

they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”25 The United States Court

of Appeals for the Third Circuit explains that the nonmoving party will not withstand

20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

21 EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Clark v. Modern

Grp. Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993)).

22 Clark, 9 F.3d at 326.

23 Id.

24 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

summary judgment if all it has are “assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere

suspicions.”26 Instead, it must “identify those facts of record which would contradict

the facts identified by the movant.”27

In assessing “whether there is evidence upon which a jury can properly

proceed to find a verdict for the [nonmoving] party,”28 a court “must view the facts

and evidence presented on the motion in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party.”29 Moreover, “[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails

to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c),” the

court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.”30 Finally,

although “the court need consider only the cited materials, . . . it may consider other

materials in the record.”31

III. ANALYSIS

Anstine first alleges that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment

rights to procedural due process.32 The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States

Constitution provides in relevant part that “no State . . . shall deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows

26 Betts v. New Castle Youth Development Center, 621 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2010).

27 Port Authority of N.Y. and N.J. v. Affiliated FM Insurance Co., 311 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir.

2002) (quoting Childers v. Joseph, 842 F.2d 689, 694-95 (3d Cir. 1988)).

28 Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252 (quoting Schuylkill & Dauphin Imp. Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S.

442, 448 (1871)).

29 Razak v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 951 F.3d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 2020).

30 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); see also Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613-14 (3d

Cir. 2018).

31 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

private plaintiffs like Anstine to sue state actors for depriving them of their

constitutional rights.

“In analyzing a procedural due process claim, the first step is to determine

whether the nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the ‘liberty or

property’ language of the Fourteenth Amendment.”33 “Protected liberty or property

interests generally arise either from the Due Process Clause or from state-created

statutory entitlement.”34 Once the plaintiff identifies a protected interest, “the

question then becomes what process is due to protect it.”35

Anstine identifies two potential property interests. First, he argues he has an

interest in continued public employment, or at least an interest in having notice of

the investigation into his conduct and an opportunity to respond before he was

terminated.36 Second, he argues he had an interest in receiving retirement benefits.37

Defendants challenge both interests as invalid. For the following reasons, the Court

agrees with Defendants.

33 Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67

(1972)).

34 Id. (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575 (1972)).

35 Id. (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).

36 Opp. Br., Doc. 32 at 14-16.

A. Anstine Does Not Have a Property Interest In His Continued

Employment With DCED

Defendants first argue Anstine has no property interest in his continued

employment because he was an at-will employee.38 “To have a property interest in

a job . . . a person must have more than a unilateral expectation of continued

employment; rather, []he must have a legitimate entitlement to such continued

employment.”39 Generally, at-will employees are not entitled to continued

employment because they serve at the pleasure of their employers.40 Public

employees in Pennsylvania are considered at-will employees unless otherwise

indicated by statute or by contract.41 “In order to rebut the presumption of at-will

employment, a party must establish one of the following: (1) an agreement for a

definite duration; (2) an agreement specifying that the employee will be discharged

for just cause only; (3) sufficient additional consideration; or (4) an applicable

recognized public policy exception.”42

Anstine does not identify a statute that grants him the right to continued

employment. Instead, Anstine argues he had a contractual or quasi-contractual

agreement with DCED granting him the right to continued employment based on

38 Defs’ MSJ Br., Doc. 30 at 17-18.

39 Elmore v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 282 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Roth, 408 U.S. 564).

40 See, e.g., id. (citing Chabal v. Reagan, 841 F.2d 1216, 1223 (3d Cir. 1988)).

41 See id. (citing Scott v. Phila. Parking Auth., 166 A.2d 278 (1960)); Cooley v. Pennsylvania

Hous. Fin. Agency, 830 F.2d 469, 471 (3d Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Foster

v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 1207 (3d Cir. 1991).

representations in the Commonwealth’s personnel manual.43 He also argues that the

Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, which govern the conduct of

Pennsylvania attorneys, constitute a public-policy exception to the at-will

employment doctrine.44 The Court begins its analysis by discussing the legal role

employee handbooks and personnel manuals play in employment settings.

Following that discussion, the Court will turn to Anstine’s arguments.

1. The Contractual Significance of Employee Handbooks in

Pennsylvania

To establish a right to continued employment, Anstine relies on Management

Directive 505.7, a personnel manual that governs employees under the Governor of

Pennsylvania’s jurisdiction.45 The Directive provides certain safeguards before

employees are disciplined.46 It generally provides that employee discipline should

be “corrective and where possible, progressive in nature.”47 It also requires a

“thorough and objective investigation” of the incident and notice to the affected

employee before the imposition of discipline, as well as an opportunity for the

employee to explain their actions.48

43 See Opp. Br., Doc. 32 at 12-13. It is unclear whether Anstine argues for application of both

theories or just one of them. The Court will consider both.

44 Id. at 13-14.

45 Management Directive 505.7, Doc. 31-35 at 1.

46 See id. at 107.

47 Id.

Anstine argues that Management Directive 505.7 contractually entitled him to

the above protections.49 If he was not entitled to them by contract, Anstine argues

Defendants were bound by their representations in the Directive.50 Either way,

Anstine maintains that Defendants failed to observe the above protections, depriving

him of due process.51

In support of his argument that Management Directive 505.7 grants him a

right to continued employment, Anstine cites to two decisions of the Commonwealth

Court of Pennsylvania: Appeal of Colban and Defrank v. County of Greene.52 Both

Colban and Defrank involved local employees who were terminated in a summary

fashion.53 Both had received personnel manuals that their employers held out as the

operative rules governing employee discipline and termination.54

In Defrank, the defendant-county argued that the manual was issued by a

director who did not have the authority to promulgate procedures regarding the

49 Opp. Br., Doc. 32 at 11-12.

50 The parties dispute whether Management Directive 505.7 applies to non-civil service

management employees like Anstine. See MSJ Br., Doc. 30 at 20. Defendants cite to their own

deposition testimony that the Directive does not apply. See MSJ Statement of Facts (“SOF”),

Doc. 29 ¶¶ 9-10. Anstine relies on the document he signed indicating his receipt of the DCED

handbook, which states that “[t]he rights and benefits of employees are set forth in the

Commonwealth Personnel Rules which are contained in Manual 505.7,” which appears to be

a precursor to Directive 505.7. See Opp. Br., Doc. 32 at 11 (citing DCED Employee Handbook

Notice, Doc. 31-10). As the Court ultimately concludes that the Directive is not a legally

binding document, it will assume without deciding that it applies to Anstine.

51 See Opp. Br., Doc. 32 at 12-13.

52 Id. (citing Appeal of Colban, 427 A.2d 313 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981)); Defrank v. County of Greene,

412 A.2d 663 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980)).

53 427 A.2d at 313; 412 A.2d at 664.

54 See Colban, 427 A.2d at 314 (manual provided for three warnings before termination);

Defrank, 412 A.2d at 664-65 (manual provided for a hearing before Board of County

hiring and termination of employees, as that power was reserved to the County

Commissioners.55 The court rejected that argument, concluding that the doctrine of

equitable estoppel was appropriate as the plaintiff’s expectation that the manual was

valid was “fully reasonable” based on her employer’s representations and actions.56

In Colban, the court also applied the estoppel theory, concluding that the personnel

manual’s protections formed an “implicit” guarantee that an employee would not be

terminated until the employer followed the procedures outlined in the manual, citing

to Defrank in support.57

The Court notes that there appears to be some confusion in the law as to the

continued vitality of Defrank and Colban. The Third Circuit, in Lord v. Erie County,

explained that “a legitimate entitlement to continued employment cannot be

premised on employee policies or disciplinary procedures alone.”58 Then, citing to

Defrank and Imdorf v. Public School Employees Retirement System, the Lord court

explained that “terms in an employee handbook are binding only when either the

handbook itself or the employer’s representation of it clearly indicate that the

handbook is to have a binding effect.”59

55 Defrank, 412 A.2d at 665.

56 Id. at 666.

57 Colban, 427 A.2d at 314.

58 476 F. App’x 962, 966 (3d Cir. 2012) (nonprecedential) (citing Elmore, 399 F.3d at 282-83)

59 Id. (quoting Imdorf v. Pub. Sch. Emps. Ret. Sys., 638 A.2d 502, 505 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (citing

Defrank, 412 A.2d at 665-66). The Lord court went on to conclude that the employee failed to

plausibly allege that her employee handbook bound her employer to only terminate her for

cause. See id. at 966-67. In reaching that conclusion, the court noted the handbook itself denied

Imdorf rejected a claim by a public employee that certain terms in a retirement

plan manual bound the defendant to act in a certain way.60 The Imdorf court cited to

Martin v. Capital Cities Media, a decision of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania,

for the proposition that a private employer’s handbook and representations about the

controlling nature of handbook could bind the employer to act in accordance with

the handbook’s provisions.61

The Martin court extensively discussed the question, beginning with the

long-standing tradition of at-will employment in Pennsylvania.62 It noted that

“Pennsylvania law holds that such handbooks are not legally binding on the

employer who distributes them.”63 It cited other authorities suggesting that in certain

unusual circumstances, an employee handbook could constitute an offer to change

the terms of employment from at-will relationship to termination only on just

cause.64 The court gathered from those authorities that a handbook’s provisions

could constitute an offer of new employment terms if there was a clear manifestation

of both the employer and employee’s intent to change the terms.65

60 638 A.2d at 505.

61 Id. (citing 511 A.2d 830 (1986)).

62 See 511 A.2d at 834-38.

63 Id. at 835.

64 See id. at 836-37 (citing Darlington v. Gen. Elec., 504 A.2d 306, 320 (Pa. Super. 1986) (Beck,

J., concurring); Banas v. Matthews Intern. Corp., 502 A.2d 637, 649 (Pa. Super. 1985) (Beck,

J., concurring and dissenting); E.A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 532 (1982)).

65 See id. at 837. In Martin, the employer’s personnel manager affirmatively stated that the

“handbook set forth the terms of employment.” Id. at 831. But even that was not enough for

the Martin court, which concluded that the employer’s statement did not make the manual part

But a series of decisions from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania cast doubt

on Martin’s (and by extension, Lord’s) applicability to this matter. First, Martin

involved a private employer and employee.66 With respect to public employment,

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Stumpp v. Stroudsburg Municipal Authority

held that a public entity cannot grant an employee the right to continued employment

without statutory authorization.67 The Supreme Court noted that “where the

legislature has intended that tenure should attach to public employment, it has been

very explicit in so stating.”68 Therefore, public employers without the power to grant

tenure cannot do so by altering an employee’s contract. Any effort to that effect

would be invalid.

Although that would also appear to foreclose an employee’s reliance on an

employer’s representation, the Stumpp court went further, commenting that

“equitable estoppel has been affirmatively rejected by this Court as an exception to

the at-will rule.”69 “Thus, the issue of whether [an employee] detrimentally relied on

any promises of the [the employer] is simply not relevant in determining whether

[the employee] has a protectable property interest in his employment.”70

unilaterally distributed the handbook and retained the right to unilaterally alter the handbook

at-will.” Id. at 839.

66 Id. at 831.

67 658 A.2d 333, 334-35 (Pa. 1995) (citing Scott, 166 A.2d 278).

68 Id. (quoting Scott, 166 A.2d at 280-82).

69 Id. at 336 (citing Paul v. Lankenau Hospital, 569 A.2d 346, 348 (Pa. 1990)).

The Supreme Court applied its holding in Short v. Borough v. Lawrenceville,

a case that bears some similarity to Colban, Defrank, and this matter.71 In Short, a

terminated public employee, relying on Colban, argued that her employer’s

personnel policy gave her “a reasonable expectation of continued employment with

the guarantee that dismissal could occur only after due process of law.”72 The

Commonwealth Court also relied on Colban to conclude that although the personnel

policy did not grant the employee a contract right or reasonable expectation of

continued employment, it did give her “a reasonable expectation that dismissal can

occur only after due process.”73 On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the

Commonwealth Court’s conclusion, citing to Stumpp.74 As the Commonwealth

Court’s decision in Short largely relied on Colban, it appears that the Supreme Court

overruled Colban and Defrank by implication.

Therefore, under Pennsylvania law, a public employer without the power to

grant tenure cannot do so through either express or implied theories of contract.

Accordingly, a public employee cannot rely on an employer’s representations in

employee handbooks about the continuing nature of their employment, regardless of

how clearly they demonstrate an intent to offer the employee tenured status.

71 696 A.2d 1158, 1158 (Pa. 1997) (per curiam).

72 683 A.2d 1272, 1273-74 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) rev’d by Short, 696 A.2d at 1158.

73 Id.

As such, there appears to be tension between the Supreme Court’s holdings in

Stumpp and Short and the Third Circuit’s observation in Lord, which also involved

a public employee and employer.75 Although none of the Pennsylvania cases Lord

relied upon have been explicitly overruled, Stumpp and Short appear to foreclose

their applicability to public employers without the statutory authority to grant tenure.

2. Management Directive 505.7 Does Not Grant Anstine Any

Rights

In any event, although further guidance from our Court of Appeals would be

helpful, the Court concludes that Anstine fails under both Lord and Stumpp. With

the above principles in mind, the Court turns to Anstine’s argument that

Management Directive 505.7 granted him a contractual or quasi-contractual right to

notice and a hearing or continued employment.

To the extent Anstine argues Management Directive 505.7 grants him any

express contractual rights, the Court disagrees. First, it does not appear that DCED

has the statutory authorization to offer Anstine continued employment. The

Pennsylvania Legislature formed DCED from the prior Pennsylvania Department of

Commerce and then transferred functions from other agencies to DCED.76 Anstine

was appointed as an attorney for DCED.77 Under Pennsylvania’s civil service

75 See Lord, 476 F. App’x at 963.

76 See Community And Economic Development Enhancement Act, P.L. 403 No. 58 (June 27,

1996), codified at 71 P.S. §§ 1709.101-1709.2106.

regulations, appointed attorneys are not civil service employees.78 Any

representation that he was entitled to continued employment—whether express or

implied—is therefore irrelevant.79

But even if DCED was empowered to offer Anstine the right to continued

employment, there are no facts in the record that suggest it did so expressly or

impliedly. As the above decisions indicate, there must be a clear indication that the

employer intended to change the terms of employment through provisions in a

personnel manual.

Anstine fails to identify any evidence that “clearly indicates” that

Management Directive 505.7 has a binding effect.80 Here, like the employers in

Martin and Lord, the Commonwealth retained the right to change any of its

personnel rules—including Directive 505.7—at its sole discretion.81 Anstine has not

identified any other representation from DCED or the Commonwealth suggesting

Directive 505.7 controlled the terms of his employment.82

78 Pennsylvania amended its civil service regulations in 2018, but the relevant provisions

remained the same. See 71 P.S. § 741.3(c)(5), repealed by P.L. 460, No. 71 § 2 (providing that

appointed attorneys are not civil service employees); accord 71 Pa. C.S. § 2103 (same).

79 See Stumpp, 658 A.2d at 336.

80 476 F. App’x at 966 (quoting Imdorf, 638 A.2d at 505).

81 See Lord, 476 F. App’x at 966-67; Martin, 511 A.2d at 838-39; DCED Employee Handbook

Notice, Doc. 31-10.

82 Anstine points the Court’s attention to Sheridan’s deposition testimony that the OGC follows

management directives. Response to Statement of Facts (“RSOF”), Doc. 31 ¶ 9 (citing Dep. of

Julia Sheridan, Doc 31-31 at 90:8-20). Sheridan’s after-the-fact statement is insufficient to

show that DCED ever represented to Anstine that the Directive controlled the terms of his

employment. See Martin, 511 A.2d at 838 (concluding that an employer’s statement that the

With respect to Anstine’s quasi-contractual argument, the Court reaches the

same result for largely the same reasons. Anstine’s reliance on Management

Directive 505.7 as an extracontractual representation is no different than the estoppel

theory the Supreme Court rejected in Stumpp and Short.83 Therefore, Management

Directive 505.7 is not an agreement to modify Anstine’s at-will employment status.

3. The Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct Are Not a

Public Policy Exception to the At-Will Employment Rule

Anstine lastly requests the Court modify Pennsylvania’s long tradition of

at-will public employment because the abrupt termination of government attorneys

interrupts services to government clients.84 Granting Anstine’s request would be a

monumental shift in Pennsylvania employment law and likely upset the internal

dynamics of the Commonwealth’s executive branch.85 For those reasons, the Court

declines Anstine’s invitation.

Therefore, Anstine has failed to rebut the presumption that he is an at-will

employee. As an at-will employee, he has no property interest in his continued public

employment. Accordingly, to the extent he bases his due process claim (Count I) on

a property interest in continued employment, it fails as a matter of law.

83 See Stumpp, 658 A.2d at 336 (“An employee may be discharged with o[r] without cause, and

our law does not prohibit firing an employee for relying on an employer’s promise.” (quoting

Paul, 569 A.2d at 348)).

84 Opp. Br., Doc. 32 at 13-14.

85 Cf. Martin, 511 A.2d at 838 (explaining that a judicial order changing an at-will employment

relationship to a just-cause employment relationship “would be a modification of immense

B. Anstine Has No Protected Property Interest in His Retirement

Benefits

Anstine next claims a protected interest in receiving retirement benefits

through Pennsylvania’s Retired Employees Health Program (“REHP”).86 Like an

interest in continued employment, a person must “have a legitimate claim of

entitlement” to a public benefit to claim a violation of procedural due process when

they are denied the benefit.87 For example, “a person receiving welfare benefits

under statutory and administrative standards defining eligibility for them has an

interest in continued receipt of those benefits that is safeguarded by procedural due

process.”88

Anstine was terminated just before his sixtieth birthday.89 He claims—without

any support—that his termination before his sixtieth birthday resulted in the loss of

“retiree health benefits.”90 Anstine first fails to specifically identify what “retiree

health benefits” he was entitled to. He further fails to identify any statutory or

regulatory basis for his entitlement to retirement benefits beyond a general citation

to the REHP program.

More fundamentally, Anstine had no entitlement to benefits by his own

admission. He claims that he could only receive REHP health benefits if he reached

86 Opp. Br., Doc. 32 at 16-17.

87 Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.

88 Id. at 576 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).

89 RSOF, Doc. 31 ¶ 15.

the age of sixty while still working for the Commonwealth.91 As he was validly

terminated before his sixtieth birthday, he was never entitled to the benefits

accompanying his job to begin with.92 “[A]n employee has no protected interest in a

benefit if the government has ample discretion to deny that benefit.”93 As established

above, the Commonwealth had the discretion to terminate Anstine because he was

an at-will employee. Implicit in that discretion is the ability to deny Anstine the

benefits of public employment that he was not already legally entitled to. Anstine

fails to establish any “mutually explicit understanding” that he was entitled to REHP

benefits before his termination.94

That Anstine blames Defendants for his ineligibility is irrelevant as to

whether he was denied procedural due process.95 His argument is akin to a claim that

an intervening change in benefit eligibility standards denied a potential beneficiary

due process. The potential beneficiary was never eligible for those benefits; he was

91 RSOF, Doc. 31 ¶ 15; Compl., Doc. 1 ¶¶ 79-80.

92 That serves to distinguish this matter from Ransom v. Carbondale Area School District, 982

F. Supp. 2d 397 (M.D. Pa. 2013), which Anstine relies on in his brief. Opp. Br., Doc. 32 at

16-17. In Ransom¸ my colleague, the Honorable Robert D. Mariani, held that a bus driver

plausibly alleged a procedural due process claim where the school district summarily revoked

her certification to drive for the district, analogizing the certification to a driver’s license. See

id. at 402-03. The key distinction is that the bus driver already had her certification before the

school district revoked it. By contrast, Anstine was not eligible for REHP benefits when he

was terminated.

93 Tundo v. County of Passaic, 923 F.3d 283, 287 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Anderson v. City of

Philadelphia, 845 F.2d 1216, 1221 (3d Cir. 1988)).

94 Id.

95 Anstine appears to claim Defendants knew he was going to work past sixty based on his

statements to others in the DCED. See Compl., Doc. 1 ¶¶ 32-35. But Defendants’ knowledge

only potentially eligible for them. Because the potential beneficiary never became

eligible, he was never entitled to them.96 Likewise, because Anstine was validly

terminated before becoming eligible for REHP benefits, he was never entitled to

them. Therefore, Anstine’s due process claim (Count I) must fail as a matter of law.

As Anstine’s state-law civil conspiracy claim (Count II) is premised on his allegation

that Defendants violated his due process rights, it fails as well.97

C. The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over

Anstine’s Remaining State-Law Claims

As noted above, in addition to the due process claim, Anstine brings two

state-law claims against Defendants for their alleged intentional interference in his

contractual and attorney-client relationships.98 But Count I, Anstine’s due process

claim, is the only claim over which the Court has original jurisdiction.99 The Court

had supplemental jurisdiction over his other claims as they all arose from the same

controversy.100

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) “provides that ‘[a] district court may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim’” if “the district court has dismissed

all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”101 The Court must determine

96 Cf. Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 942 (1986) (“We have never held that applicants for benefits,

as distinct from those already receiving them, have a legitimate claim of entitlement protected

by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”).

97 See Compl., Doc. 1 ¶¶ 108-13.

98 Compl., Doc. 1 ¶¶ 114-20 (Count III), 121-38 (Count IV).

99 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

100 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

101 Annulli v. Panikkar, 200 F.3d 189, 202 (3d Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Rotella

whether exercising supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate, considering “judicial

economy, convenience and fairness to the litigants.”102 Given the language of section

1367(c)(3), it appears that dismissal of state-law claims is appropriate on the sole

basis that the federal claims have been dismissed.103

The Court has dismissed Anstine’s due process claim—the only claim over

which it had original jurisdiction. As for economy, convenience, and fairness, the

Court recognizes that the parties have invested a considerable amount of time and

resources in this matter. The Court appreciates their investment. But dismissal of

supplemental claims is the risk federal plaintiffs run when they choose to file in

courts of limited jurisdiction.104

Indeed, the Third Circuit affirmed an order of this Court, issued by the late

Honorable Malcolm Muir in Annulli v. Panikkar, declining to exercise jurisdiction

in a case with “1,800 pages of deposition testimony, and 2,800 pages of discovery

102 New Rock Asset Partners v. Preferred Entity Advancements, Inc., 101 F.3d 1492, 1505 (3d Cir.

1996) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966)).

103 See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Here, the District Court plainly

recognized its discretion to retain jurisdiction over [the plaintiff’s] remaining state-law claims

but, having dismissed all of her federal claims, declined to do so for a reason that Congress

explicitly green-lighted under these circumstances.”). The Court may also decline jurisdiction

pursuant to section 1367(c)(1), which provides that a court may decline jurisdiction if the

remaining claims “raise[] a novel or complex issue of State law.” With respect to his intentional

interference claims (Counts III and IV), Anstine asks the Court to determine whether an

attorney-client relationship exists between an individual attorney working for the

Commonwealth and the Commonwealth entity that the attorney advises. See Opp. Br., Doc. 32

at 6-10. The Court believes it best that the Pennsylvania courts address this matter as it

implicates the Commonwealth’s internal practices.

104 See Annulli, 200 F.3d at 202-03 (collecting cases in which courts dismissed supplemental

documents” where the defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on the

eve of trial.105 As was the case in Annulli, Anstine can use all of the evidence

currently in the record to litigate his claims in state court. Accordingly, the Court

finds it appropriate to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Counts III and IV.106

IV. CONCLUSION

A valid procedural due process claim begins with a valid protected interest.

Anstine has no protected interest in his continued employment or his potential

receipt of retirement benefits. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate on both

his claim that he was denied due process when terminated and his claim that

Defendants conspired to violate his due process rights.

As Anstine’s remaining state-law claims raise complex issues of Pennsylvania

law regarding how Commonwealth attorneys interact with other arms of the

Commonwealth’s government, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over those claims and dismiss them.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

105 Id.

106 See id. at 203 (noting that the plaintiff could use the same evidence to pursue its claims in state

court).

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge