Herrera v. Doe

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JEFFREY E. HERRERA, :

Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-1992

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

JOHN DOE, et al., :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

I. Background

Plaintiff, Jeffrey E. Herrera, an inmate confined at the Lackawanna

County Prison, Pennsylvania, filed the above caption civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, seeking damages for “false imprisonment

where Petitioner was incarcerated at SCI-Benner Township which took place

from 3/2019 to 10/2019.” (Doc. 1). The named Defendants are ten (10) Jane

and John Does, employed in various positions within the Pennsylvania Board

of Probation and Parole, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and SCI-

Benner. Id. Subsequent to the lodging of his complaint, Plaintiff filed an

application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 7).

At this time, the Court must review the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a) to determine whether it should be

dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from suit. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant

Plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the

action as barred by claim preclusion and res judicata.

II. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff states that “on or about 2017-2018 an increase to [his]

maximum term of imprisonment took place without fair warning [or] notice of

hearing, while [Plaintiff] was incarcerated at SCI-Benner Township.” (Doc.

1). Plaintiff states that “this increase led to [his] ‘over detention’ false

imprisonment from 3-2019 to 10-7-2019,” when he was “abruptly released

after serving an additional eighth (8) months.” Id. Thus, Plaintiff files the

instant action seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Id.

III. Discussion

The doctrine of preclusion limits a party’s ability to raise claims that

either were or could have been litigated in a prior action. See Reaves v.

Pennsylvania Board of Prob. & Parole, 580 Fed.Appx. 49, 52 (3d Cir. 2014)

(unpublished). Claim preclusion, formerly referred to as res judicata, bars a

claim litigated between the same parties or their privies in earlier litigation

where the claim arises from the same set of facts as a claim adjudicated on

the merits in the earlier litigation. Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d

247, 276 (3d Cir. 2014). Res judicata bars not only claims that were brought

in the previous action, but also claims that could have been brought. Id. at

277 (citations omitted). “A claim extinguished by res judicata includes all

rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or

any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which

the action arose.” Id. (citations omitted).

“Claim preclusion requires: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior

suit involving; (2) the same parties or their [privies]; and (3) a subsequent

suit based on the same cause of action.” Id. at 276 (citations omitted). When

analyzing whether the elements have been met, the court does not apply this

conceptual test mechanically, but focuses on the central purpose of the

doctrine, to require a plaintiff to present all claims arising out of the same

occurrence in a single suit. Id. at 277. This avoids piecemeal litigation and

conserves judicial resources. Id. (citations omitted).

The court takes “a broad view of what constitutes the same cause of

action and res judicata generally is thought to turn on the essential similarity

of the underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims.” Id. (citations

omitted). When analyzing essential similarity, several factors are considered:

(1) whether the acts complained of and the demand for relief are the same;

(2) whether the theory of recovery is the same; (3) whether the witnesses

and documents necessary at trial are the same; and (4) whether the material

facts alleged are the same. See id. (citations omitted). It is not dispositive

that a plaintiff asserts a different theory of recovery or seeks different relief

in the two actions. Id. (citations omitted); see also Elkadrawy v. Vanguard

Grp., 584 F.3d 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2009) (“This analysis does not depend on

the specific legal theory invoked, but rather [on] the essential similarity of the

underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims.) (internal quotation

marks omitted).”

Previously, this Court, after conducting an initial screening, dismissed

an identical action, Herrera v. PA Board of Probation and Parole, et al., Civil

No. 3:22-CV-1350, 2022 WL 17640205 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2022).1 The legal

claims and supporting allegations that Plaintiff brings in the instant action are

the same claims and allegations previously dismissed by this Court. Id. Also,

the requirement that the same parties or their privies be involved is met. In

1Finding that Plaintiff could not proceed with his claim for money

damages without first challenging the underlying conviction and achieving a

favorable termination, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s action as barred by

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Id. On reconsideration, the Court,

found no error in barring Plaintiff’s action under Heck and held, alternatively,

that even if Plaintiff’s action were treated as a civil rights action for damages,

it was barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Id.

his previous action, the named Defendants were Agents of the Pennsylvania

Department of Probation and Parole; Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections; Curt Parkins, Public Defender; Doug Vanston, Public Defender;

Kurt Lyons, court appointed counsel; Shane Scanlon, former District

Attorney and “other yet to be named Defendants.” Id. In the instant action,

Plaintiff again names members of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and

Parole and the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. Although

employees of SCI-Benner Township were not named in Plaintiff’s previous

action, they are in privity with the rest of the named Defendants. “Privity ‘is

merely a word used to say that the relationship between one who is a party

on the record, and another is close enough to include that other within the

res judicata.” Shah v. United States, 540 Fed.Appx. 91, 93 (3d Cir. 2013)

(unpublished) (quoting Marran v. Marran, 376 F.3d 143, 151 (3d Cir. 2004)

and Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. U.S. Steel Corp., 921 F.2d

489, 493 (3d Cir. 1990). Because “there is privity between officers of the

same government,” a judgment in one suit between a party and a

representative of the United States precludes relitigation of the same issue

between that party and a different government officer in a later suit.”

Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402–03, 60 S.Ct. 907,

84 L.Ed. 1263 (1940); see also Nelson v. Brown, 2014 WL 1096189 at *7

(S.D. Cal. 2014) (warden named in habeas petition and correctional officers

named in civil rights action in privity).

Finally, in both cases, Plaintiff seeks damages for false imprisonment.

The legal claims and supporting allegations that Plaintiff brings in the instant

action are the same claims and allegations previously dismissed by this

Court. Thus, the conditions for claim preclusion are satisfied and, hence,

Plaintiff’s claims are barred. This Court may dismiss, sua sponte, claims

barred by claim preclusion. See King v. East Lampeter Twp., 69 Fed.Appx.

94 (3d Cir. 2003) (appellate court affirmed district court’s sua sponte

dismissal of complaint on grounds of res judicata).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s application to

proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the complaint as barred by reason of

res judicata and claim preclusion.

A separate Order shall issue.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

DATE: January 18, 2023

22-1992-01