Caiby v. Haidle

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ANTHONY V. CAIBY, : Civil No. 3:18-cv-1120

:

Plaintiff : (Judge Mariani)

:

v. :

:

WARDEN GARY HAIDLE, et al., :

:

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Anthony Caiby (“Caiby”), an inmate who was housed at all relevant times at

the Monroe County Correctional Facility, in Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania (“MCCF”),

commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). The matter is proceeding

via an amended complaint (Doc. 95) against the remaining Defendant, PrimeCare Medical,

Inc. (“PrimeCare”). Presently pending before the Court is PrimeCare’s Rule 12(b) motion

(Doc. 97) to dismiss the amended complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will

grant the motion.

I. Allegations of the Amended Complaint

On February 22, 2013, Caiby was transferred pursuant to a writ from the Luzerne

County Correctional Facility to the Monroe County Correctional Facility, where he remained

until June 24th. (Doc. 95 ¶¶ 1, 4). During this time, Caiby alleges that he became ill and

suffered an allergic reaction. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 6). He believes the illness was related to

hyperthyroidism and food poisoning. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 9).

On February 2, 2016, Caiby was assaulted and cut his finger. (Id. ¶ 13). A nurse

treated his wounds and took pictures of the laceration. (Id. ¶ 14). Caiby alleges that

PrimeCare nurses “covered-up” the incident and he did not receive follow-up care. (Id. ¶¶

15, 16, 20). He further asserts that Warden Haidle and Deputy Warden McCoy

implemented an unconstitutional training policy at the MCCF. (Id. ¶ 21).

On March 6, 2016, Caiby was assaulted by fellow inmates. (Id. ¶ 24).

Caiby next alleges that poison was placed in his milk and food, which caused him to

have an allergic reaction. (Id. ¶ 25). He was prescribed Zyrtec, Claritin, and Benadryl for

the allergic reaction. (Id. ¶ 26). Caiby went to sick call for treatment but was never

transferred to an outside medical center. (Id. ¶ 27).

On August 31, 2016, Caiby allegedly fell and hurt his back. (Id. ¶ 29). He states that

he continues to suffer from back pain and a disfigured finger. (Id. ¶ 30).

II. Legal Standard

A complaint must be dismissed under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), if it does not allege

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). The plaintiff must

aver “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct.

1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).

“Though a complaint ‘does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Prop.

Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In other words,

“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Covington v. Int’l Ass’n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2013)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A court “take[s] as true all the factual

allegations in the Complaint and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those

facts, but . . . disregard[s] legal conclusions and threadbare recitals of the elements of a

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ethypharm S.A. France v.

Abbott Laboratories, 707 F.3d 223, 231, n.14 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted).

Twombly and Iqbal require [a district court] to take the following three steps to

determine the sufficiency of a complaint: First, the court must take note of the

elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, the court should

identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not

entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, where there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.

Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013).

“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted). This “plausibility” determination will be a “context-specific task that requires the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

However, even “if a complaint is subject to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court

must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or

futile.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).

[E]ven when plaintiff does not seek leave to amend his complaint after a

defendant moves to dismiss it, unless the district court finds that amendment

would be inequitable or futile, the court must inform the plaintiff that he or she

has leave to amend the complaint within a set period of time.

Id.

III. Discussion

A. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs1

In the context of medical care, the Eighth Amendment “requires prison officials to

provide basic medical treatment to those whom it has incarcerated.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182

F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). To establish an Eighth Amendment claim based on a prison’s

denial of medical care, an inmate must allege acts or omissions by prison officials that were

1 Caiby’s amended complaint does not clarify whether he was a pretrial detainee or a convicted

prisoner during the relevant time period. Pretrial detainees’ claims of inadequate medical care arise under

the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment. See Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility,

318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court, however, has held that the Fourteenth Amendment

affords pretrial detainees protections that are “at least as great” as those afforded to convicted prisoners

under the Eighth Amendment. See id. (quoting City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244

(1983)). In the context of claims for inadequate medical care, the Third Circuit has “found no reason to

apply a different standard than that set forth in Estelle [v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)] (pertaining to

prisoners’ claims of inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment) when evaluating whether a

claim for inadequate medical care by a pre-trial detainee is sufficient under the Fourteenth Amendment.”

See id. Accordingly, the Court will analyze Caiby’s claim under the framework of the Eighth Amendment.

See id. at 582.

sufficiently harmful to establish deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. See

Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004); Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318

F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). The relevant inquiry is whether the defendant: (1) was

subjectively deliberately indifferent (2) to the plaintiff’s objectively serious medical needs.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837; Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 226 (3d Cir.

2015).

The “deliberate indifference” prong of the applicable Eighth Amendment analysis

requires that the defendant actually know of and disregard “an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Circumstantial evidence can establish

subjective knowledge on the part of the defendant if it shows that the excessive risk was so

obvious that the official must have known about it. See Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d

120, 133 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). The Third Circuit has found

deliberate indifference when a prison official: “(1) knows of a prisoner’s need for medical

treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment

based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or

recommended medical treatment.” Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.

The second prong of the Eighth Amendment inquiry is whether the plaintiff’s medical

needs were serious. A serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a

physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily

recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v.

Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987). Not every condition is a serious medical need;

instead, the serious medical need element contemplates a condition of urgency, namely,

one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain. See id.

Moreover, because only egregious acts or omissions can violate this standard, mere

medical malpractice cannot result in an Eighth Amendment violation. White v. Napoleon,

897 F.2d 103, 108-10 (3d Cir. 1990); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“[M]edical

malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a

prisoner.”). The Supreme Court has held that negligence or inadvertence alone do not rise

to the level of a constitutional violation. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986). The

Supreme Court has also noted that “[l]ack of due care suggests no more than a failure to

measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332

(1986). Where a state of mind is relevant, the complaint is inadequate if it merely contains

conclusory allegations describing the requisite state of mind such as “intentionally” or

“recklessly” without supporting factual allegations. Wilson, 501 U.S. 294. Additionally,

prison medical authorities are given considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of

inmate patients, see Young v. Kazmerski, 266 F. App’x 191, 194 (3d Cir. 2008), and a

doctor’s disagreement with the professional judgment of another doctor is not actionable

under the Eighth Amendment. See White, 897 F.2d at 108-10.

Furthermore, it is well-settled that an inmate’s dissatisfaction with a course of

medical treatment, standing alone, does not give rise to a viable Eighth Amendment claim.

See Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[A]s long as a

physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will not violate a prisoner’s

constitutional rights.”); Pearson v. Prison Health Servs., 850 F.3d 528, 535 (3d Cir. 2017)

(“[W]hen medical care is provided, we presume that the treatment of a prisoner is proper

absent evidence that it violates professional standards of care.”).

Caiby has not set forth a plausible Eighth Amendment claim regarding inadequate

medical care. Even assuming, arguendo, that Caiby’s injuries, consisting of hives, a cut on

his finger, and back pain, rise to the level of serious medical conditions, the amended

complaint lacks sufficient allegations that PrimeCare was deliberately indifferent to such

conditions. Caiby acknowledges that he received treatment for these ailments. Nursing

staff examined him, considered his symptoms and complaints, cleaned his wound, and

prescribed medications. To the extent that Caiby believes he should have received different

treatment and should have been transferred to an outside medical center, this constitutes a

“mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment,” and is not an actionable Eighth

Amendment claim. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346. It is clear that the nursing staff employed

professional judgment in treating Caiby’s conditions when he presented with complaints and

symptoms. See Brown, 903 F.2d at 278. This precludes a finding that they acted with the

“obduracy and wantonness” necessary to sustain an Eighth Amendment violation. Whitley v

Algers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Because Caiby fails to allege facts from which it can

reasonably be inferred that PrimeCare exhibited deliberate indifference to his medical

needs, he is not entitled to relief on this claim.

B. Monell Claim against PrimeCare

PrimeCare, as a private entity contracted by a prison to provide health care for

inmates, cannot be held liable for the acts of its employees under respondeat superior or

vicarious liability. Natale, 318 F.3d at 583 (citing Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). To hold PrimeCare liable, Caiby “must provide evidence

that there was a relevant [PrimeCare] policy or custom, and that the policy caused the

constitutional violation [he] allege[s].” Id. (citing Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryan County,

Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)). A plaintiff can establish causation by

“demonstrating the municipal action was taken with ‘deliberate indifference’ as to its known

or obvious consequences.” Id. at 407. Caiby fails to meet his burden. Although not entirely

clear, he appears to assert that PrimeCare is liable for the assault cover-up and

participation in an unconstitutional policy. (Doc. 95 ¶ 31; Doc. 99; Doc. 99-1). Caiby has

failed to set forth sufficient factual allegations identifying the relevant policy or custom,

showing PrimeCare acted deliberately and was the moving force behind the policy or

custom, or explaining how that policy or custom caused a constitutional injury. As such, the

Court will dismiss the Monell claim against PrimeCare.

IV. Leave to Amend

When a complaint fails to present a prima facie case of liability, district courts must

generally grant leave to amend before dismissing the complaint. See Grayson v. Mayview

State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d

Cir. 2000). Specifically, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has admonished that when a

complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim, courts should liberally grant

leave to amend “unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips, 515

F.3d at 245 (citing Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004)). The above claims

against PrimeCare are factually and legally flawed; thus, the Court concludes that granting

Caiby leave to file a second amended complaint would be futile. See Jones v. Unknown

D.O.C. Bus Driver & Transp. Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019) (where an inmate

plaintiff “has already had two chances to tell his story . . . giving him further leave to amend

would be futile.”)

V. Conclusion

The Court will grant Defendant PrimeCare’s motion (Doc. 97) to dismiss the

amended complaint. A separate Order shall issue.

__s/ Robert D. Mariani____

Robert D. Mariani

United States District Judge

Dated: December 16, 2022