Herrera v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JEFFREY E. HERRARA, :

Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-1530

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

PA BOARD OF PROBATION :

AND PAROLE, et al.,

:

Defendants

MEMORANDUM

I. Background

Plaintiff, Jeffrey E. Herrera, an inmate confined at the Lackawanna

County Prison, Pennsylvania, filed the above caption civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that he was held in excess of his

maximum release date. (Doc. 1). For relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and

punitive damages. Id.

By Memorandum and Order dated November 9, 2022, this Court

conducted an initial screening of Plaintiff’s complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a), granted Plaintiff’s application for

leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed the complaint for failure

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Docs. 12, 13).

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration of

this Court’s November 9, 2022 Memorandum and Order. (Docs. 15, 17). For

the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the Plaintiff’s motions.

II. Discussion

A motion for reconsideration is a device of limited utility, which may

“not be used as a means to reargue matters already argued and disposed of

or as an attempt to relitigate a point of disagreement between the Court and

the litigant.” Ogden v. Keystone Residence, 226 F. Supp. 2d 588, 606 (M.D.

Pa. 2002) (citations omitted); see also Baker v. Astrue, Civ. No. 07-4560,

2008 WL 4922015, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2008). Rather, a court may alter

or amend its judgment only upon a showing from the movant of one of the

following: “(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability

of new evidence ... or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to

prevent manifest injustice.” Max’s Seafood Cafe v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669,

677 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co.,

52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)). A motion for reconsideration is

appropriate when a court has “patently misunderstood a party or has made

a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the [c]ourt by the

parties or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension.”

Rohrbach v. AT&T Nassau Metals Corp., 902 F. Supp. 523, 527 (M.D. Pa.

1995) (quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D.

99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983)), vacated in part on other grounds on

reconsideration, 915 F. Supp. 712 (M.D. Pa. 1996). “It may not be used as a

means to reargue unsuccessful theories or argue new facts or issues that

were not presented to the court in the context of the matter previously

decided.” Gray v. Wakefield, No. 3:09-cv-979, 2014 WL 2526619, at *2 (M.D.

Pa. June 4, 2014); see also Database Am., Inc. v. Bellsouth Adver. & Publ’g

Corp., 825 F. Supp. 1216, 1220 (D.N.J. 1993) (“A party seeking

reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the Court’s

decision, and ‘recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the

court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party’s

burden’.”). “Because federal courts have a strong interest in the finality of

judgments, motions for reconsideration should be granted sparingly.”

Continental Cas. Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 884 F. Supp. 937, 943 (E.D.

Pa. 1995).

In dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court found the following:

When seeking to impose liability due to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws, the appropriate remedy is a civil rights action. See Learner

v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 540 (3d Cir. 2002). However, when a

prisoner challenges either the fact or duration of his confinement,

the appropriate remedy is a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 45, 494 (1973); Tedford v.

Hepting, 990 F.2d 745, 748 (3d Cir. 1993). “The underlying

purpose of proceedings under the ‘Great Writ’ of habeas corpus

has traditionally been to ‘inquire into the legality of the detention,

and the only judicial relief authorized was the discharge of the

prisoner or his admission to bail, and then only if his detention

were found to be unlawful.’ ” Learner, 288 F.3d at 540 (quoting

Powers of Congress and the Court Regarding the Availability and

Scope of Review, 114 Harv.L.Rev. 1551, 1553 (2001)).

Given Herrera’s allegation regarding his detention past his

maximum release date, the Court construes his claim to be one

challenging the execution of his sentence. Such a claim by a

state prisoner must be brought as a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 and is not cognizable in a

complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. See Preiser, 411

U.S. at 488-89 (holding that a prisoner challenging the validity of

his confinement on federal constitutional grounds must rely on

the federal habeas corpus statute, which Congress specifically

designed for that purpose, rather than the broad language of

§1983); Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 484-85 (3d Cir. 2001)

(noting that state prisoners who wish to challenge the execution

of their sentence must proceed under §2254).

Furthermore, the claim for money damages cannot proceed.

Unless a plaintiff has already successfully challenged his

confinement in an appropriate way, a civil rights complaint cannot

proceed as long as it calls into question the validity of the

confinement. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the

Supreme Court clarified the interplay between habeas and civil

rights claims. The Heck Court ruled that a section 1983 claim for

damages does not accrue “for allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence

invalid,” until the plaintiff proves that the “conviction or sentence

has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive

order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make

such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 486-87 (footnote

omitted).

Additionally, as the Supreme Court explained in Wilkinson v.

Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (emphasis in original): “a state

prisoner’s §1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) - no

matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter

the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to

conviction or internal prison proceedings) - if success in that

action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the

confinement or its duration.” The Third Circuit summarized the

holding of Heck as follows: “where success in a §1983 action

would implicitly call into question the validity of conviction or

duration of sentence, the plaintiff must first achieve favorable

termination of his available state or federal habeas remedies to

challenge the underlying conviction or sentence.” Williams v.

Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006). In the case at bar,

Heck’s favorable-termination rule applies because Herrera’s

complaint calls into question the correct duration of his

confinement.

As such, Herrera’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted and must be dismissed. To the extent that

Plaintiff wishes to challenge the execution of his sentence, he

must file a separate petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §2254.

(Doc. 12).

Plaintiff claims that he is not challenging his current conviction or

sentence, but that “the incident in question where actual injury occurred took

place from 03/04/2019 until 11/7/2019 where [he] was held illegally for eighth

(8) months over [his] maximum term of imprisonment.” (Doc. 18).

Specifically, he claims that his maximum term on the sentence he was

serving at that time was increased from March 4, 2019 to February 4, 2020,

“without fair notice or hearing which did lead to the actual injury of loss of

time, wages, etcetera.” Id. He believes that the “actual injury [which] took

place from 3/4/2019 until 11/7/2019 was the result of deliberate indifference

on the part of agency’s personnel of both PA DOC and Pennsylvania Board

of Probation and Parole.” Id. Plaintiff states that he is “not currently being

held pursuant to that matter so [he does] not meet the custody requirement

for a habeas corpus” as the “sentence [has been] served in its entirety” and

he “maxed out the term on October 7, 2019 instead of February 4, 2020.”

(Doc. 16). Thus, Plaintiff files the instant action for damages for the seven

months he was held being held from March 4, 2019, his original max date,

through October 7, 2019, the date he maxed out. (Doc. 1).

Once again, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim for money damages

cannot proceed. Unless a plaintiff has already successfully challenged his

confinement in an appropriate way, a civil rights complaint cannot proceed

as long as it calls into question the validity of the confinement. In Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court clarified the interplay

between habeas and civil rights claims. The Heck Court ruled that a section

1983 claim for damages does not accrue “for allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose

unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” until the plaintiff

proves that the “conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized

to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted).

As the Supreme Court explained in Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74,

81-82 (2005) (emphasis in original): “a state prisoner’s §1983 action is barred

(absent prior invalidation) - no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable

relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to

conviction or internal prison proceedings) - if success in that action would

necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the confinement or its duration.” The

Third Circuit summarized the holding of Heck as follows: “where success in

a §1983 action would implicitly call into question the validity of conviction or

duration of sentence, the plaintiff must first achieve favorable termination of

his available state or federal habeas remedies to challenge the underlying

conviction or sentence.” Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir.

2006). In the case at bar, Heck’s favorable-termination rule applies because

Herrera’s complaint calls into question the correct maximum release date of

his sentence.

Moreover, even if Plaintiff had challenged the sentence at issue in a

properly filed habeas corpus action, his instant civil rights action, challenging

a decision which changed his maximum release date from March 4, 2019 to

February 4, 2020 is untimely.

While a plaintiff is not required to plead that the claim has been brought

within the statute of limitations, Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 297 (3d Cir.

2002), the Supreme Court observed in Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215

(2007), that if the allegations of a complaint, “show that relief is barred by the

applicable statute of limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal for

failure to state a claim.” The same principle applies to screening complaints

under the PLRA. See Whitenight v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania State

Police, 674 F. App’x. 142, 144 (3d Cir. 2017) (“When screening a complaint

under §1915, a district court may sua sponte dismiss the complaint as

untimely under the statute of limitations where the defense is obvious from

the complaint and no development of the factual record is required.”); Paluch

v. Secretary Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 442 F. App’x. 690, 694 n. 2

(3d Cir. 2011) (“Although the statute of limitations applicable to §1983 actions

is an affirmative defense, which may be waived by the defendant, it is

appropriate to dismiss sua sponte under §1915(e)(2) a complaint whose

untimeliness is apparent from the face of the record”); McPherson v. United

States, 2010 WL 3446879 at *4 (3d Cir. Sept.2, 2010) (“[W]hen a statute-of-

limitations defense is apparent from the face of the complaint, a court may

sua sponte dismiss the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915 or 28 U.S.C.

§1915A”); see also Archie v. City of Newark, No. CIV. 12–3657 FSH, 2012

WL 2476229, at *3 (D.N.J. June 27, 2012) (dismissing complaint as time

barred under sua sponte screening authority).

Under Pennsylvania law, there is a two-year statute of limitations

period for personal-injury torts. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5524. Because a §1983

claim is characterized as a personal-injury claim, such claims are governed

by the applicable state’s statute of limitations for personal-injury claims. See

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); see also Cito v. Bridgewater

Township Police Dept., 892 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1989).

The limitation period begins to run on the accrual date, which is

governed by federal law. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009).

Under federal law, a claim accrues when the facts which support the claim

reasonably should have become known to the plaintiff. Sameric Corp. v. City

of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998); Cetel v. Kirwan Fin. Grp. Inc.,

460 F.3d 494, 507 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Mathews v. Kidder Peabody &

Co., 260 F.3d 239, 252 (3d Cir. 2001)); see also Large v. County of

Montgomery, 307 F. Appx. 606, 606 (3d Cir. 2009). “The determination of

the time at which a claim accrues is an objective inquiry; [courts] ask not

what the plaintiff actually knew but what a reasonable person should have

known.” Kach, 589 F.3d at 634. Importantly, accrual is not tied to whether

the potential claimant knew or should have known that the injury constitutes

a legal wrong. Giles v. City of Philadelphia, 542 F. App'x. 121, 123 (3d Cir.

2013) (citing Sandutch v. Muroski, 684 F.2d 252. 254 (3d Cir. 1982)). Rather,

“a cause of action accrues when the fact of injury and its connection to the

defendant would be recognized by a reasonable person.” Kriss v. Fayette

Cty., 827 F. Supp. 2d 477, 484 (W.D. Pa. 2011) aff’d, 504 F. App’x. 182 (3d

Cir. 2012). Accordingly, “[a]s a general matter, a cause of action accrues at

the time of the last event necessary to complete the tort, usually at the time

the plaintiff suffers an injury.” Kach, 589 F.3d at 634. Furthermore, “the rule

that a cause of action accrues upon discovery of the injury does not require

that a plaintiff have identified every party who may be liable on its claim.”

Graff v. Kohlman, 28 F. App’x. 151, 154 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing New Castle

County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997)).

Judged by these benchmarks, Plaintiff’s allegations against

Defendants are plainly time-barred. Plaintiff claims that the “actual injury

occurred took place from March 4, 2019 until November 7, 2019” in which

his release date was changed from March 4, 2019 to February 4, 2020. Thus,

even providing Plaintiff the latest date of February 4, 2020, any challenge to

the extension of his sentence would have had to have been filed on or before

February 4, 2022. Plaintiff’s instant complaint, filed on September 30, 2022

is untimely by seven months.

“A complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim on statute

of limitations grounds only when the statute of limitations defense is apparent

on the face of the complaint.” Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 157 (3d

Cir. 2017).1

Because the statute of limitations defense is apparent on the face of

Herrera’s complaint and he fails to reveal any ground for equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations,2 Plaintiff’s complaint would alternatively be subject

to dismissal as legally frivolous pursuant to the Court’s screening authority

under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and §1915A(b)(1).

1 A District Court can raise the issue of the statute of limitations sua

sponte at the screening stage. See Hunterson v. Disabato, 532 F. App’x 110,

111-12 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[A] district court may sua sponte dismiss a claim as

time-barred under 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b)(1) where it is apparent from the

complaint that the applicable statute of limitations has run.”).

2 Equitable tolling “is only appropriate ‘(1) where the defendant has

actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff's cause of action; (2) where

the plaintiff in some extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting

his or her rights; or (3) where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights

mistakenly in the wrong forum.’ ” Omar v. Blackman, 590 Fed.Appx. 162,

166 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Santos ex rel. Beato v. United States, 559 F.3d

189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009)).

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that its Memorandum and

Order of November 9, 2022, is not troubled by manifest errors of law. A

Plaintiff must first achieve favorable termination of his available state or

federal habeas remedies to challenge any conviction or sentence. Moreover,

to the extent that Plaintiff could present a challenge to his already served

sentence, such challenge is untimely. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration

of this Court’s November 9, 2022 Memorandum and Order will be denied.

A separate Order shall issue.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

DATE: December 13, 2022

22-1530-02