Brown v. Cruz

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TODD ALAN BROWN, No. 4:22-CV-01153

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

OFFICER WEB, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NOVEMBER 29, 2022

Plaintiff Todd Alan Brown is currently in pretrial detention in the State

Correctional Institution, Huntingdon (SCI Huntingdon) in Huntingdon,

Pennsylvania. Prior to being transferred SCI Huntingdon, he was detained for a

short time at the State Correctional Institution, Smithfield (SCI Smithfield), also

located in Huntingdon, Pennsylvania. Brown filed the instant pro se Section 19831

action concerning allegedly deficient medical care he received at SCI Smithfield.

Following dismissal of his complaint without prejudice, Brown filed an amended

complaint, which is presently before the Court for screening as required by 28

U.S.C. § 1915A.

1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves

as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.

I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Courts are statutorily obligated to review, “as soon as practicable,” pro se

prisoner complaints targeting governmental entities, officers, or employees.2 One

basis for dismissal at the screening stage is if the complaint “fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted[.]”3 This language closely tracks Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, courts apply the same standard to

screening a pro se prisoner complaint for sufficiency under Section 1915A(b)(1) as

they utilize when resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).4

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire

“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to

offer evidence to support the claims.”5 The court must accept as true the factual

allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from them in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff.6 In addition to the facts alleged on the face of

the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint,

matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents” attached to

2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Section 1915A screening of amended complaints is likewise

required. See Fields v. Venable, 674 F. App’x 225, 228 (3d Cir. 2016) (nonprecedential)

(noting that district court “fulfill[ed] its duty to screen” pro se prisoner’s amended complaint).

3 Id. § 1915A(b)(1).

4 See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 & n.11 (3d Cir. 2002); O’Brien

v. U.S. Fed. Gov’t, 763 F. App’x 157, 159 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (nonprecedential);

cf. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).

5 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir.

1996).

a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these

documents.7

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a

three-step inquiry.8 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the]

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”9 Second, the court should distinguish well-

pleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal

conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be

disregarded.10 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations

“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”11

Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”12

Because Brown proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally construed

and his amended complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”13 This is

particularly true when the pro se litigant, like Brown, is incarcerated.14

7 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.

v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

8 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).

9 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)).

10 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

11 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

12 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

13 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted).

II. DISCUSSION

In his original complaint, Brown alleged that he was transferred to SCI

Smithfield on February 3, 2022, and that during February and March 2022 he

received deficient medical care at that facility.15 He claims that he arrived at SCI

Smithfield with a serious injury to his finger for which he had previously

undergone medical pin placement, and that during his time at SCI Smithfield “they

fail[ed] to treat” him.16

Brown appears to be raising a claim in his amended complaint under the

Fourteenth Amendment17 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

However, it does not appear that the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit has established or adhered to a different standard with respect to Fourteenth

Amendment pretrial detainee medical indifference claims versus those raised by

incarcerated individuals under the Eighth Amendment.18 Accordingly, the Court

15 Doc. 1 at 4.

16 Id.

17 Because Brown is a pretrial detainee, his claims implicate the Fourteenth Amendment, not the

Eighth. See Jacobs v. Cumberland County, 8 F.4th 187, 193-94 (3d Cir. 2021); Thomas v.

Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 223 n.4 (3d Cir. 2014).

18 This remains so even following the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Kingsley

v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), which established a different standard for pretrial

detainee excessive force claims. See Moore v. Luffey, 757 F. App’x 335, 340 & n.2 (3d Cir.

2019) (nonprecedential) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument to apply Kingsley’s holding to

Fourteenth Amendment medical care claim and instead analyzing under Eighth Amendment

jurisprudence); see also Parker v. Butler County, 832 F. App’x 777, 780 & n.1 (3d Cir. 2020)

(nonprecedential) (applying Eighth Amendment standard to pretrial detainee medical care

claim while acknowledging Fourteenth Amendment is source of right); Miller v. Steele-Smith,

713 F. App’x 74, 76 n.1, 78 (3d Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential) (same); Goode v. Giorla, 643 F.

App’x 127, 129 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2016) (nonprecedential) (same); Edwards v. Northampton

County, 663 F. App’x 132, 136-37 (3d Cir. 2016) (nonprecedential) (citing Natale v. Camden

will apply existing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to Brown’s Fourteenth

Amendment medical indifference claims.

In the context of prison medical care, the Eighth Amendment “requires

prison officials to provide basic medical treatment to those whom it has

incarcerated.”19 To state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim

regarding inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must plausibly plead “(i) a serious

medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate

indifference to that need.”20 A serious medical need is “one that has been

diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay

person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”21

Deliberate indifference by prison officials may be evidenced by intentional

refusal to provide care known to be medically necessary, delayed provision of

medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment,

or denial of reasonable requests for treatment resulting in suffering or risk of

injury.22 Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is an exacting standard,

requiring a showing of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”23 Claims

sounding in mere medical negligence will not suffice.24

19 Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).

20 Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).

21 Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987).

22 See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Lanzaro, 834 F.2d

at 346).

23 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted).

Brown’s amended complaint is disjointed and difficult to follow. He

appears to assert that an unidentified nurse and “head nurse” at SCI Smithfield

failed to provide adequate medical care for his finger. He admits that he was given

some treatment by the nursing staff, but claims that they were “confused” or did

not know what they were doing.25 He then alleges that his finger became infected

because the nursing staff refused to clean his finger or change the dressing daily as

ordered by a prior treating doctor or physician’s assistant.26 He additionally

alleges that he was refused medical treatment after his finger became noticeably

infected.27 He maintains that he was suffering “chronic” and “intense” pain but

was essentially ignored by the nurse and head nurse.28

Brown’s allegations, taken as true, are sufficient to state a Section 1983

claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Although Brown has not

identified the subject nurse or head nurse by name, a “Jane Doe” designation29 may

be utilized until these defendants can be properly identified. The other defendants

named in the original complaint—Officer Web, Officer Fortney, the Deputy

Superintendent of SCI Smithfield, and the Superintendent of SCI Smithfield—will

25 Doc. 13 at 5.

26 Id. at 6, 7-8. In his original complaint, Brown states that a “PA” prescribed pain medication

and ordered that his finger be “buddy taped” and that his dressing be changed daily. See Doc.

1 at 4. In his amended complaint, Brown claims that it was a “prison doctor” who ordered the

daily follow-up care. See Doc. 13 at 3.

27 Doc. 13 at 5.

28 Id. at 8, 10.

29 Brown alleges that the nurse involved was female but does not specify the gender of the head

be dismissed with prejudice because Brown again fails to include any allegations

in his amended complaint against these Defendants that would implicate a

constitutional violation.30 In fact, of these four prison officials, Brown only

mentions Officer Fortney, but the scant allegations concerning Fortney do not

come close to stating a claim for medical deliberate indifference.31

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will permit Brown’s Fourteenth

Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs to proceed

against the unidentified “nurse” and “head nurse” at SCI Smithfield. An

appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

30 See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (explaining that leave to amend may be denied

when a plaintiff has repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies through previous amendments

allowed).

31 See Doc. 13 at 2, 8 (identifying Fortney as a witness); id. at 3 (alleging that Fortney showed