Clarke v. Wakefield

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ONIEL CLARKE, Civil No. 3:22-cv-371

Plaintiff (Judge Mariani)

: __FILED

V. SCRANTON

CHAD WAKEFIELD, et af., NOV 1 & 29022

: Fen 7

Defendants

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Oniel Clarke (“Clarke”), an inmate formerly housed at the State Correctional

Institution, Smithfield, Pennsylvania (“SCl-Smithfield”), initiated this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Clarke subsequently filed an amendment to the

complaint. (Doc. 12). Named as Defendants are Superintendent Chad Wakefield,

Superintendent Jamie Sorber, Secretary George Little, and the Pennsylvania Board of

Probation and Parole. Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 19). Clarke failed to respond to

Defendants’ motion and the time for responding has now passed.' Therefore, the motion is

deemed unopposed and ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will

grant the motion.

1 Clarke was directed to file a brief in opposition to Defendants’ motion and was admonished that

failure to file an opposition brief would result in Defendants’ motion being deemed unopposed. (Doc. 23)

(citing M.D, PA. LocAL RULE OF Courr 7.6).

Allegations of the Complaint

Beginning on February 15, 2022, Clarke was held at SCl-Smithfield, under the

supervision of Superintendent Chad Wakefield, pursuant to a parole detainer issued by the

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. (Doc. 1, p. 2). During his admission process,

Clarke alleges that he informed officials of his mental and physical health conditions. (/d. at

pp. 2-3). Specifically, he stated that he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder,

depression, mood swings, a torn rotator cuff, and knee pain. (/d.). From February 15,

2022, through the filing of his complaint on March 8, 2022, Clarke avers that he did not

receive any mental health medication, his underwear and mask were not washed, his cell

was not cleaned, and he did not receive outdoor exercise. (/d.). Due to this alleged

neglect, and his placement on a top bunk, Clarke asserts that his health conditions

worsened. (/d. at p. 3).

For relief, Clarke requests that the Board of Probation and Parole and the

Department of Corrections provide individuals with proper mental health treatment, that the

Department of Corrections clean cells daily and wash clothes on an as-needed basis, and

he seeks payment for his pain and suffering. (/d. at p. 4).

Clarke asserts that George Little, Acting Secretary of Corrections, is entrusted with

the well-being and security of each inmate and is responsible for the conduct of his

employees. (Doc. 12, p. 1). He also asserts that Jaime Sorber, Superintendent of the State

Correctional Institution, Phoenix, Pennsylvania (“SCl-Phoenix’), is responsible for any

violations that occur at SCl-Phoenix. (/d.). On April 26, 2022, Clarke was transferred from

SCl-Smithfield to SCl-Phoenix. (Doc. 11).

Il. Legal Standards

A. — Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A complaint must be dismissed under Feb. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), if it does not allege

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell At!. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). The plaintiff must

aver “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct.

1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).

“Though a complaint ‘does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” De/Rio-Mocci v. Connolly Prop.

Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In other words,

‘[flactual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Covington v. Int'l Ass’n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2013)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A court “take[s] as true all the factual

allegations in the Complaint and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those

facts, but... disregards] legal conclusions and threadbare recitals of the elements of a

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ethypharm S.A. France v.

Abbott Laboratories, 707 F.3d 223, 231, n.14 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted).

Twombly and Iqbal require [a district court] to take the following three steps to

determine the sufficiency of a complaint: First, the court must take note of the

elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, the court should

identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not

entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, where there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.

Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013).

“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n]- that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted). This “plausibility” determination will be a “context-specific task that requires the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” /d.

However, even “if a complaint is subject to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court

must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or

futile.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).

[E]ven when plaintiff does not seek leave to amend his complaint after a __

defendant moves to dismiss it, unless the district court finds that amendment

would be inequitable or futile, the court must inform the plaintiff that he or she

has leave to amend the complaint within a set period of time.

Id.

B. Section 1983 Standard

Section 1983 is the vehicle by which private citizens may seek redress for violations

of federal constitutional rights committed by state officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The

Statute states, in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,

or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress.

Id. “Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights,” but is merely a means through

which “to vindicate violations of federal law committed by state actors.” Pappas v. City of

Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536.

U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002)). To state a cause of action under section 1983, a plaintiff must

allege that: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by persons acting under color of

state law; and (2) the conduct violated a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep't, 421 F.3d

185, 189 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).

lll. Discussion

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) Clarke’s

claim for compensatory damages for pain and suffering is barred; (2) neither the Board nor

the named Defendants in their official capacities are persons subject to section 1983

liability; and (3) Clarke’s claim for injunctive relief is moot. (Doc. 20).

A. | Compensatory Damages for Pain and Suffering

Defendants first argue that Clarke's request for monetary relief, to the extent that it

seeks compensatory damages for pain and suffering, is barred by the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (‘PLRA’), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). (Doc. 20, pp. 4-5). Section 1997e(e) provides

that “[nJo Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other

correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior

showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). More than a de minimis ahysical injury

must be alleged as a predicate to allegations of mental or emotional injury. See Mitchell v.

Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 536 (3d Cir. 2003). In Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir.

2000), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recognized that where a

plaintiff fails to allege actual injury, section 1997e(e) bars recovery of compensatory

damages. However, the Court added that an inmate alleging a violation of his constitutional

rights may still pursue the action to recover nominal and/or punitive damages even in the

absence of compensable harm. See id.

Here, Clarke generally alleges that his health conditions worsened while housed at

SCl-Smithfield. Even construing the complaint liberally, Clarke has failed to allege more

than a de minimis exacerbation to his health conditions over an approximate three-week

period. Under the standards announced in Allah and section 1997e(e), Clarke's request for

compensatory damages for pain and suffering is barred.

B. Defendants are not Persons Subject to Section 1983 Liability

Next, the Defendants in their official capacities, and the Pennsylvania Board of

Probation and Parole, argue that any claims seeking monetary damages against them are

barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Dos. 20, pp. 5-6). -

Personal capacity suits under section 1983 seek to recover money from a

government official, as an individual, for acts performed under color of state law. Official

capacity suits, in contrast, generally represent an action against an entity of which the

government official is an agent. Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 120 (3d Cir. 1988); see

Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978). When suits are brought

against state officials in their official capacities, those lawsuits are treated as suits against

the state. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). However, the doctrine of sovereign

immunity, established by the Eleventh Amendment, protects states, such as the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, from suits by citizens. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-01, 117 (1984); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54

(1996); Lavia v. Pennsylvania, 224 F.3d 190, 195-96 (3d Cir. 2000). That immunity runs to

state officials if they are sued in their offical capacity and the state is the real party upon

which liability is to be imposed. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-38 (1974).

Congress has not abrogated the immunity regarding Clarke’s claims, nor has Pennsylvania

waived this grant of immunity. See 42 PA. STAT. ANN. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8521(b).

Similarly, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole is clearly not a “person” within

the meaning of § 1983. Thompson v. Burke, 556 F.2d 231, 232 (3d Cir. 1977). Hence,

Clarke's claims for money damages against the Defendants in their official capacities, and

his claims against the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, are barred by sovereign

immunity. See Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr, 621 F.3d 249, 254 (3d Cir. 2010).

C. _ Injunctive Relief

To the extent that Clarke seeks injunctive relief, his claim is moot because he is no

longer housed at SCl-Smithfield. (See Doc. 1, p. 4; Doc. 11). Article Ill of the Constitution

provides that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to “cases” and

“controversies.” U.S. CONST., art. Il, § 2. “[FJederal courts may adjudicate only actual,

ongoing cases or controversies,” Lewis v. Cont’! Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990), and

“Tit is a basic principle of Article III that a justiciable case or controversy must remain ‘extant

at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed,” United States v.

Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 936 (2011) (citation omitted). Generally, an inmate’s transfer

from the facility complained of moots claims for equitable and declaratory relief. Sutton v.

Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003); Johnson v. Wenerowicz, 440 F. App’x 60, 62

(3d Cir. 2011) (holding that the prisoner's request for injunctive and declaratory relief

against the named defendants was rendered moot by his transfer to another prison).

Because Clarke is no longer incarcerated at SCl-Smithfield, he does not present a live case

or controversy for injunctive relief regarding the policies or practices at that facility.

IV. Leave to Amend

When a complaint fails to present a prima facie case of liability, district courts must

generally grant leave to amend before dismissing the complaint. See Grayson v. Mayview

State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d

Cir. 2000). Specifically, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has admonished that when a

complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim, courts should liberally grant

leave to amend “unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips, 515

F.3d at 245 (citing Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004)). For the reasons set

forth above, Clarke’s claims are legally and factually flawed; thus, the Court concludes that

granting further leave to amend would be futile. See Jones v. Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver

& Transp. Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019) (where inmate plaintiff “has already had

two chances to tell his story . . . giving him further leave to amend would be futile.”).

V. Conclusion

The Court will grant Defendants’ motion (Doc. 19) to dismiss. A separate Order shall

issue. Gy \

Robert D. Mariani

United States District Judge

Dated: November LE. 2022