Perez v. Ransome

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FRANCISCO PEREZ, :

Plaintiff : No. 1:22-cv-01087

:

v. : (Judge Rambo)

:

SUPERINTENDENT KEVIN :

RANSOME, et al., :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Pro se Plaintiff Francisco Perez (“Plaintiff”), who is a state prisoner currently

incarcerated at State Correctional Institution Dallas (“SCI Dallas”) in Dallas,

Pennsylvania, has commenced the above-captioned action by filing a complaint

pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), asserting violations

of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well

as state law claims for medical malpractice and fraud. (Doc. No. 1.) In accordance

with the Prison Litigation Reform Act,1 the Court has conducted an initial review of

Plaintiff’s complaint. For the reasons that follow, the Court will partially dismiss

Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The Court will, however, grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint.

1 See The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat.

1321 (Apr. 26, 1996).

I. BACKGROUND

On July 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed his Section 1983 complaint in this Court.

(Doc. No. 1.) On that same date, he also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and his prisoner trust fund account statement. (Doc. Nos. 2, 3.) The Court,

having reviewed Plaintiff’s motion and trust fund account statement, will grant him

leave to proceed in forma pauperis and will deem his complaint filed.

In his complaint, Plaintiff names as defendants Johnson and Johnson

Incorporated (“Johnson & Johnson”), the Bureau of Health Services at SCI Dallas,

the Medical Department at SCI Dallas, and the following individuals, all of whom

worked at SCI Dallas during the period of time relevant to Plaintiff’s claims:

Superintendent Kevin Ransome (“Ransome”); Dr. Prince (“Prince”); PA Woolfolk

(“Woolfolk”); CRNP Deboer (“Deboer”); CHCA Martin (“Martin”); Corrections

Officer Bohinski (“Bohinksi”); Nurse Jane Doe (1) (“Jane Doe (1)”); and Nurse Jane

Doe (2) (“Jane Doe (2)”). (Doc. No. 1 at 3-6.)

Plaintiff’s complaint is comprised of two (2) parts: a form complaint (id. at 1-

9) and a typed complaint (id. at 10-24.) In his form complaint, Plaintiff generally

avers that the events giving rise to his claims occurred at SCI Dallas on or about

April 9, 2021, when the Johnson & Johnson vaccine for COVID-19 was

administered to him only days after he had received a cortisone shot. (Id. at 7.)

Plaintiff claims that this combination of the vaccine and the cortisone shot caused

the left side of his “chest/arm/shoulder[,] and bicep to lose mobility/numbness” and

left him “physically impaired.” (Id.) Plaintiff further claims that, following this

incident, he was not afforded adequate medical care, and he was not allowed to be

examined at an outside medical facility for “such injuries.” (Id.)

In his typed complaint, Plaintiff raises additional allegations in further support

of his claims. (Id. at 10-24.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that, on April 9,

2021, he arrived at the SCI Dallas Medical Department to be screened and to have

the Johnson & Johnson vaccine administered to him. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.) Plaintiff alleges

that, when he was screened by Defendant Jane Doe (1), he explained to her that he

had a cortisone shot a few days prior. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.) Plaintiff alleges, however, that

he was directed, presumably by Defendant Jane Doe (1), to have the Johnson &

Johnson vaccine administered by Defendant Jane Doe (2). (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff

alleges that he also explained to Defendant Jane Doe (2) that he had a cortisone shot

a few days prior. (Id. ¶ 19 (alleging that he asked Defendant Jane Doe (2) whether

the vaccine would have any adverse effects in light of his recent cortisone shot).)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Jane Doe (2) assured him that there would not be

any adverse effects (id. ¶ 20), and she administered the vaccine (id. ¶ 21).

After being administered the Johnson & Johnson vaccine, Plaintiff returned

to his housing unit where he ultimately “lost mobility on the left side of his

chest/arm/ bicep[,] and shoulder.” (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff alleges that he has since

suffered from “pain/numbness,” that he “has become physically impaired[,]” and

that he is “possibly permanently disfigured.” (Id. ¶ 23 (alterations in original

omitted).) As a result of these medical complaints, Plaintiff alleges that he signed

up for “[s]ick [c]all” at SCI Dallas Medical Department. (Id. ¶ 24.) At sick call,

the “[p]hysican and/or [d]octor” could not identify the cause for Plaintiff’s “loss

of mobility/physical impairment/disfigurement.” (Id. ¶ 25.) Although Plaintiff

requested to be examined at an outside medical facility, the SCI Dallas Medical

Department would not consider this option. (Id. ¶ 26.)

In August of 2021, Plaintiff had a follow-up visit with Defendant Prince. (Id.

¶ 35.) During that visit, Plaintiff explained to Defendant Prince that he had received

a cortisone shot a couple days before receiving the Johnson & Johnson vaccine, and

Plaintiff reiterated his request to be examined at an outside medical facility for the

injuries he suffered from after receiving that vaccine. (Id. ¶¶ 36-37.) Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Prince agreed that the vaccine should have been “delayed”

for a few weeks. (Id. ¶ 38.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Prince also “indicated

that the State/SCI Dallas lacks funding” to send Plaintiff to an outside medical

facility and, thus, “adamantly refused” Plaintiff’s request. (Id. ¶¶ 36, 38.)

Plaintiff alleges that he spoke with numerous individuals from SCI Dallas

about his injuries stemming from the Johnson & Johnson vaccine and about the SCI

Dallas Medical Department’s refusal to have him examined at an outside medical

facility. (Id. ¶ 28.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Martin, the

assigned grievance coordinator, responded to a grievance that Plaintiff had filed,

wherein he complained about the Johnson & Johnson vaccine that was administered

to him on April 9, 2021.2 (Id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendant Martin

denied his grievance because the vaccine was administrated in Plaintiff’s right arm

while Plaintiff suffered from various symptoms on his left side. (Id.; id. ¶ 32.)

Plaintiff contends, however, that Defendant Martin exercised “deception/fraud”

because he is a corrections officer at SCI Dallas who does not have any expertise in

medicine and, thus, should have known that any decision to opine on the medical

field was “inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice.” (Id. ¶¶ 30-32.)

Plaintiff alleges that he appealed Defendant Martin’s denial of his grievance

to Defendant Ransome, the facility manager. (Id. ¶ 39.) Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant Ransome concluded, among other things, that Defendant Martin had

adequately addressed Plaintiff’s concerns regarding the adverse effects that he was

experiencing from the Johnson & Johnson vaccine. (Id. ¶ 42.) As a result, Defendant

Ransom upheld Defendant Martin’s denial of Plaintiff’s grievance. (Id.) Plaintiff

alleges that he appealed Defendant Ransome’s decision to final review (id. ¶ 43),

but that the decision was upheld, and Plaintiff’s grievance was denied (id. ¶ 44).

2 Plaintiff does not specify when he filed this grievance.

Plaintiff appears to allege that he subsequently filed another grievance with

respect to the adverse side effects he suffered from the Johnson & Johnson vaccine.

(Id. ¶ 54 (alleging that he filed this grievance on May 16, 2022).) Much like his

other grievance, Plaintiff alleges that, even though he appealed this grievance to final

review, his grievance was ultimately denied. (Id. ¶¶ 55-56 (alleging that after his

grievance was denied at the initial level of review, he appealed to Defendant

Ransome who upheld that decision, and that, although he subsequently appealed

Defendant Ransome’s decision to final review, the denial was upheld).)

In addition to filing these two (2) grievances, Plaintiff alleges that, on October

6, 2021, he requested copies of his medical records from Defendant SCI Dallas

Medical Department. (Id. ¶ 47.) In addition, Plaintiff alleges that, on October 20,

2021, he complained about the adverse side effects he had received from the Johnson

& Johnson vaccine3 (id. ¶ 48) and that, on November 29, 2021, he sent a DC-

135(a)/Request to Staff slip to Defendant Bohinksi, who responded to Plaintiff’s

request by stating that Plaintiff was being seen by medical. (Id. ¶ 49.)

In connection with all of these allegations, Plaintiff asserts violations of his

constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution (id. at 8; id. ¶¶ 58-60), as well as state law claims for medical

3 Plaintiff does not specify to whom he complained.

malpractice and fraud (id. at 8; id. ¶¶ 57, 69). As for relief, Plaintiff seeks declaratory

and monetary relief. (Id. ¶ 70.)4

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), district courts are required to review

complaints in civil actions where a litigant is proceeding in forma pauperis. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who

is immune from such relief, then the district court must dismiss the complaint. See

id. In dismissing claims under § 1915(e)(2), district courts apply the standard

governing motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).

To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a civil complaint must set out “sufficient

factual matter” to show that its claims are facially plausible. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

When evaluating the plausibility of a complaint, the Court is required to

“accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, construe the complaint in the

light favorable to the plaintiff, and ultimately determine whether plaintiff may be

4 Although Plaintiff vaguely claims “discrimination” in his complaint (Doc. No. 1

at 8), the legal and factual basis for this claim is unclear to the Court. Because the

Court will ultimately provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to amend his complaint,

Plaintiff, should he wish to do so, shall clarify and expound on the factual and legal

basis for his purported discrimination claim.

entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint.” See Mayer v.

Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010); Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 434

(3d Cir. 2017) (stating that the court “must accept as true all factual allegations in

the complaint and draw all inferences from the facts alleged in the light most

favorable to [the plaintiff]” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Additionally, in the specific context of pro se prisoner litigation, a district

court must be mindful that a document filed pro se “is to be liberally construed.”

See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers[.]” See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983

Plaintiff has filed his complaint pursuant to Section 1983, asserting a violation

of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well

as state law claims for medical malpractice and fraud. (Doc. No. 1.) Section 1983

provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress.

Id. Thus, “Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under

the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” See Shuman

v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

Section 1983 “does not create any new substantive rights but instead provides a

remedy for the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.” See id.

(citation omitted).

1. Claims against Johnson & Johnson

Plaintiff has named Johnson & Johnson as a defendant in the complaint. (Doc.

No. 1 at 4.) “To state a claim under [Section] 1983, a plaintiff must allege the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and

must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color

of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The threshold issue of

whether a defendant is acting under color of state law—that is, whether the defendant

is a state actor—depends upon “whether there is such a close nexus between the

State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated

as that of the State itself.” See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009)

(citation and internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). Here, Defendant

Johnson & Johnson is a private company. Moreover, there are no allegations in the

complaint which would suggest that this Defendant is a state actor. Accordingly,

the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a Section 1983 claim upon

which relief can be granted against Defendant Johnson & Johnson. Plaintiff’s

Section 1983 claims against this Defendant will, therefore, be dismissed.

2. Claims Against the SCI Dallas Medical Department and

Bureau of Health Services

Plaintiff has also named the SCI Dallas Medical Department and Bureau of

Health Services as Defendants in the complaint. (Doc. No. 1 at 4.) However, these

entities are not amenable to suit under Section 1983 since they have Eleventh

Amendment immunity and are not considered “persons” for purposes of Section

1983.

Indeed, “[a]bsent waiver by the State or valid congressional override, the

Eleventh Amendment bars a damages action against a State in federal court.” See

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985); Lombardo v. Pennsylvania, 540

F.3d 190, 194 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining that “[t]he immunity of States from suit in

the federal courts is a fundamental aspect of state sovereignty”). It is well-

established that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not waived this immunity,

see 42 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 8521(b), and that Congress did not abrogate the States’

Eleventh Amendment immunity in enacting Section 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t

of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989) (stating that “Section 1983 provides a federal

forum to remedy many deprivations of civil liberties, but it does not provide a federal

forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of

civil liberties” (citation omitted)); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979)

(explaining that Section 1983 does not override the States’ Eleventh Amendment

immunity).

Moreover, this Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to all agencies or

departments “having no existence apart from the state.” See Laskaris v. Thornburgh,

661 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1981) (citation omitted). As such, the Pennsylvania

Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and its institutions, such as SCI Dallas, are

entitled to the same Eleventh Amendment immunity that the Commonwealth enjoys.

See 71 P.S. § 61(a); Bertalan v. SCI Graterford State Prison, No. 18-cv-00069, 2018

WL 491007, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2018) (explaining that the state correctional

institution’s medical department was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity

because it is, essentially, an “arm[ ] of the Commonwealth”). Similarly, the Bureau

of Health Services is also entitled to this same Eleventh Amendment immunity. See

Sloan v. Chambers, No. 12-cv-01954, 2016 WL 4245550, at *13 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 11,

2016) (explaining that Eleventh Amendment immunity “applies to a subordinate

agency like the Bureau of Health Services” (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted)); Woodell, 2019 WL 4139264, at *8 (stating that the Bureau of Health Care

Services is not amenable to suit under Section 1983 because it has Eleventh

Amendment immunity).

Furthermore, the SCI Dallas Medical Department and Bureau of Health

Services are not considered “persons” for purposes of Section 1983 and, therefore,

are not amenable to suit under this statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Fischer v. Cahill,

474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973) (concluding that the state prison medical

department could not be sued under Section 1983 since it is not a person); Gerholt

v. Wetzel, 858 F. App’x 32, 34 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Fischer and concluding the

same); Woodell, 2019 WL 4139264, at *8 (explaining that the Bureau of Health

Care Services is not a “person” and, thus, is not amenable to suit under Section

1983).

Thus, for all of the reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Defendants SCI Dallas

Medical Department and Bureau of Health services. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims

against these Defendants will, therefore, be dismissed from the complaint.

3. Eighth Amendment Claims

In the complaint, Plaintiff appears to be asserting that the individual

Defendants failed to provide him with adequate medical care in violation of the

Eighth Amendment. (Doc. No. 1.) In the context of prison medical care, the Eighth

Amendment “requires prison officials to provide basic medical treatment to those

whom it has incarcerated.” See Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment “when they are deliberately

indifferent to an inmate’s serious medical need.” See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d

366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106).

“[T]he concept of a serious medical need, as developed in Estelle, has two

components, one relating to the consequences of a failure to treat and one relating to

the obviousness of those consequences.” See Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946

F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991). The “condition must be such that a failure to treat

can be expected to lead to substantial and unnecessary suffering, injury, or death[,]”

and “the condition must be one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring

treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the

necessity for a doctor’s attention.” See id. (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).

The concept of “deliberate indifference” requires that the prison official

actually knew of and disregarded “an excessive risk to inmate health or safety[.]”

See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The Third Circuit has found

deliberate indifference when a “prison official: (1) knows of a prisoner’s need for

medical treatment and intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary

medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from

receiving needed or recommended medical treatment.” See Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197

(citation omitted).

a. Medical Defendants

Defendants Prince, Deboer, and Woolfolk are the medical defendants named

in Plaintiff’s complaint. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 7 (identifying Defendant Prince as a medical

doctor); id. ¶ 8 (identifying Defendant Deboer as a CRNP); id. ¶ 9 (identifying

Defendant Woolfolk as a PA).) The Court addresses these medical defendants in

turn below.

i. Defendant Prince

In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that in August of 2021, he had a follow-up

appointment with Defendant Prince because of the “severe injuries” that he suffered

from after receiving the Johnson & Johnson vaccine. (Id. ¶ 35.) During that visit,

Plaintiff explained to Defendant Prince that he had received a cortisone shot a couple

days prior to receiving the vaccine, and Plaintiff also requested that he be examined

at an outside medical facility for the injuries he sustained after receiving that vaccine.

(Id. ¶¶ 36-37.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Prince agreed that the Johnson &

Johnson vaccine should have been delayed for a few weeks. (Id. ¶ 38.) However,

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Prince refused to have Plaintiff examined at an

outside facility, indicating “that the State/SCI Dallas lacks funding.” (Id. ¶¶ 36, 38.)

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint has, by the thinnest of margins,

stated an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Prince. In liberally construing

the complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following: that, after he received the Johnson &

Johnson vaccine, he lost mobility and experienced numbness on the left side of his

“chest/arm/shoulder[,] and bicep” and that he was “physically impaired[;]” that

Defendant Prince subsequently examined Plaintiff during a follow-up visit at the

SCI Dallas Medical Department and seemingly acknowledged these complaints and

agreed with Plaintiff that the administration of the vaccine should have been delayed

for a few weeks; that Defendant Prince “adamantly refused” to refer Plaintiff for

treatment to an outside medical facility for non-medical reasons, i.e., for reasons

related to a lack of funding within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or SCI

Dallas; and finally, that following this examination by Defendant Prince, Plaintiff

continued to suffer from his various medical complaints. (Id. ¶¶ 35-40.) Thus, in

liberally construing the complaint, the Court finds that these allegations are

sufficient to survive the Court’s initial review of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

claim against Defendant Prince. Plaintiff is, therefore, permitted to proceed on this

claim.

ii. Defendants Deboer and Woolfolk

In order for liability to attach under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must

sufficiently allege that each defendant was personally involved in the act or acts that

he claims violated his federally protected rights. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d

1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). “A plaintiff makes sufficient allegations of a defendant’s

personal involvement by describing the defendant’s participation in or actual

knowledge of and acquiescence in the wrongful conduct.” Chavarriaga v. New

Jersey Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at

1207); Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (stating that “[p]ersonal

involvement requires particular ‘allegations of personal direction or of actual

knowledge and acquiescence’” (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207)).

Here, there is a complete absence of allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint that

would give rise to a plausible inference that Defendants Deboer or Woolfolk were

personally involved in any asserted deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutionally

protected rights. While these two (2) medical defendants have been named in the

caption of the complaint (Doc. No. 1 at 2) and have also been listed as Defendants

in the “DEFENDANT(S)” section of the complaint (id. at 5), they have not been

mentioned anywhere else in the body of the complaint. Without such allegations of

personal involvement, however, liability cannot be imposed against Defendants

Deboer and Woolfolk under Section 1983. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s

complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Deboer and

Woolfolk. Plaintiff’s purported Eighth Amendment claims against these Defendants

will, therefore, be dismissed from the complaint.

b. Non-Medical Defendants

Defendants Martin, Ransome, and Bohinski are non-medical Defendants.

(Doc. No. 1 ¶ 3 (identifying Defendant Ransome as the Superintendent at SCI

Dallas); id. ¶¶ 29-34 (identifying Defendant Martin as the “CHCA” and corrections

officer who reviewed at least one of Plaintiff’s grievances); id. ¶ 13 (identifying

Defendant Bohinski as a corrections officer).) With respect to each of these

Defendants, Plaintiff challenges their responses to his grievances and inmate request

slip, wherein he complained of inadequate medical care. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 29-34, 39

(concerning Defendant Martin’s response to Plaintiff’s initial grievance); id. ¶¶ 39,

42-43 55, 63 (concerning Defendant Ransome’s responses to Plaintiff’s grievance

appeals); ¶ 49 (concerning Defendant Bohinski’s response to Plaintiff’s inmate

request slip).) In liberally construing the complaint, Plaintiff appears to be claiming

that their various responses to his complaints of inadequate medical care violated his

constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at 8; id. ¶¶ 59-60.)

The Court, however, is unpersuaded. As set forth by Plaintiff’s own

allegations, when these non-medical Defendants responded to his complaints of

inadequate medical care, each one of them pointed to the medical care that Plaintiff

was already receiving or to the medical treatment plan that was in effect for Plaintiff.

(Doc. No. 1 ¶ 33 (alleging that Defendant Martin explained to Plaintiff that “the

provider had ordered blood work/prednisone and a physical therapy consult with

respect to the incident at bar”); id. ¶¶ 42, 45 (alleging that Defendant Ransome had

referenced Plaintiff’s diagnostic testing, course of treatment, and treatment plan, as

well as follow-up appointments that were scheduled); id. ¶ 49 (alleging that

Defendant Bohinski explained to Plaintiff that he was being seen by medical).)

Accordingly, the Court finds that, while these various responses to Plaintiff’s

grievances and inmate request slip show knowledge on the part of Defendants

Martin, Ransome, and Bohinski of Plaintiff’s medical complaints, these responses

do not show any deliberate indifference to such medical complaints because—as set

forth by Plaintiff’s own allegations—it was their understanding that Plaintiff was

already being treated for such complaints by the medical staff at SCI Dallas. See

Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that neither of the non-

medical defendants could be “considered deliberately indifferent simply because

they failed to respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was

already being treated by the prison doctor”); Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850

F.3d 526, 539 (3d Cir. 2017) (recognizing the holding in Durmer); Spruill v. Gillis,

372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004) (concluding that, absent knowledge that prison

doctors are mistreating or not treating a prisoner, “a non-medical prison official . . .

will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of

deliberate indifference”). Thus, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against

Defendants Martin, Ransome, and Bohinski will be dismissed from the complaint.

4. Fourteenth Amendment Claim

In liberally construing the complaint, Plaintiff appears to be asserting a

violation of his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment based upon

his contention that Defendant SCI Dallas Medical Department did not provide him

with copies of his medical records. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 47.) As explained above, this

Defendant is not amenable to suit under Section 1983. Moreover, Plaintiff has not

explained how he was harmed by the alleged failure of this Defendant to provide

him with copies of his medical records. Moreover, the Court is not aware of any

“state or federal constitutional right requiring that a state prisoner be provided with

copies of his medical files upon request.” See Hearns v. Johnson, No. 16-cv-3284,

2016 WL 4690386, at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2016); Hetzel v. Swartz, 909 F. Supp. 261,

263 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (dismissing a prisoner-plaintiff’s due process claim that he was

unlawfully denied copies of his medical records as being “clearly meritless”).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a Fourteenth

Amendment claim upon which relief can be granted against Defendant SCI Dallas

Medical Department. As such, this claim will be dismissed from Plaintiff’s

complaint.

B. State Law Claims

1. Medical Malpractice5

In the complaint, Plaintiff appears to be asserting medical malpractice claims

against Defendant Prince, a medical doctor at SCI Dallas (Doc. No. 1 at 8; id. ¶¶ 35-

38), and against Defendants Jane Doe (1) and Jane Doe (2), Nurses at SCI Dallas

(Doc. No. 1 at 8; id. ¶¶ 17-21). Under Pennsylvania law, in order for a plaintiff to

prevail on a medical malpractice claim, “the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s

treatment fell below the appropriate standard of care.” See Brady v. Urbas, 111 A.3d

1155, 1161 (Pa. 2015) (citations omitted); Toogood v. Rogal, 824 A.2d 1140, 1145

(Pa. 2003) (plurality opinion) (stating that “medical malpractice can be broadly

defined as the unwarranted departure from generally accepted standards of medical

practice resulting in injury to a patient . . . ”).

Thus, “the basic elements of medical malpractice and ordinary negligence are

the same[.]” See Ditch v. Waynesboro Hosp., 917 A.2d 317, 322 (Pa. Super. Ct.

2007), aff’d, 17 A.3d 310 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). Thus, in order to state a

prima facie case for medical malpractice, a plaintiff must demonstrate: a duty owed

5 Plaintiff loosely asserts the following terms in his complaint: “duty to protect[;]

“gross negligence[;]” and “[m]alpractice[.]” (Doc. No. 1 at 8.) The Court

collectively treats these assertions as raising a medical malpractice claim. To the

extent that the Court has unintentionally misconstrued Plaintiff’s state-law claims,

Plaintiff is directed to clarify such claims in his amended complaint, should he file

one.

by the health care professional to the patient; a breach of that duty by the health care

professional; the breach was the proximate cause of the harm suffered by the

plaintiff; and the damages suffered were a direct result of the harm. See Mitchell v.

Shikora, 209 A.3d 307, 314 (Pa. 2019). As “[w]ith all but the most self-evident

medical malpractice actions there is also the added requirement that the plaintiff

must provide a medical expert who will testify as to the elements of duty, breach,

and causation.” See Quinby v. Plumsteadville Fam. Prac., Inc., 907 A.2d 1061,

1070-71 (Pa. 2006); Yacoub v. Lehigh Valley Med. Assocs., P.C., 805 A.2d 579,

591 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (explaining that, in order for the appellant to have met her

burden of proof, she “was required to provide expert testimony to establish, to a

reasonabl[e] degree of medical certainty, that the acts of the . . . nurses deviated from

acceptable medical standards and that such deviation was a proximate cause of the

harm suffered”).

a. Defendant Prince

Here, in liberally construing Plaintiff’s complaint, and in observing that the

Court has already found that Plaintiff’s complaint has alleged an Eighth Amendment

claim against Defendant Prince, the Court is persuaded that Plaintiff has also alleged

a cause of action for medical malpractice against Defendant Prince—again, even if

by the thinnest of margins. As set forth above, Plaintiff alleges the following: that,

after he received the Johnson & Johnson vaccine, he lost mobility and experienced

numbness on the left side of his “chest/arm/shoulder[,] and bicep” and that he was

“physically impaired[;]” that Defendant Prince subsequently examined Plaintiff

during a follow-up visit at the SCI Dallas Medical Department and seemingly

acknowledged these complaints and agreed with Plaintiff that the administration of

the vaccine should have been delayed for a few weeks; that Defendant Prince

“adamantly refused” to refer Plaintiff for treatment to an outside medical facility for

non-medical reasons, i.e., for reasons related to a lack of funding within the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or SCI Dallas; and finally, that following this

examination by Defendant Prince, Plaintiff continued to suffer from his various

medical complaints. (Id. ¶¶ 35-40.) Thus, the Court finds that these allegations are

sufficient to survive the Court’s initial review of Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff is,

therefore, permitted to proceed on his state-law medical malpractice claim against

Defendant Prince.

b. Defendants Jane Doe (1) and Jane Doe (2)

In the complaint, Plaintiff also appears to be asserting a medical malpractice

claim against Defendants Jane Doe (1) and Jane Doe (2). (Doc. No. 1 at 8; id. ¶¶

17-21.) Much like Defendant Prince, the Court is persuaded that Plaintiff has alleged

a cause of action for medical malpractice against Defendants Jane Doe (1) and Jane

Doe (2). More specifically, Plaintiff alleges as follows: that he came into the care

of these Defendants at the SCI Dallas Medical Department on April 9, 2021 (id. ¶¶

16-21); that he informed both of these Defendants that he had a cortisone shot a few

days prior (id. ¶¶ 18-19); that he inquired about being prohibited from receiving the

vaccine, or being at risk for any potential complications, in light of his recent

cortisone shot (id.); and that, regardless of these facts, Defendants Jane Doe (1) and

Jane Doe (2) allowed the vaccine to be administered to him (id. ¶¶ 16-21). Thus, in

liberally construing the complaint, the Court finds that these allegations are

sufficient to survive the Court’s initial review of Plaintiff’s state law medical

malpractice claims against Defendants Jane Doe (1) and Jane Doe (2). Plaintiff is,

therefore, permitted to proceed on this claim.6

2. Fraud

In the complaint, Plaintiff asserts a claim for “fraud.” (Doc. No. 1 at 8.)

“Pennsylvania recognizes a civil action for fraud.” SodexoMAGIC, LLC v. Drexel

Univ., 24 F.4th 183, 205 (3d Cir. 2022). As this civil action has developed in

Pennsylvania common law, a fraud consists of the following six elements:

(1) (a) A misrepresentation or

(b) A concealment;

(2) Which is material to the transaction at hand;

6 The Court notes that neither Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure to provide

adequate medical care claims nor state law medical malpractice claims are models

of clarity or legal prose. However, the Court is mindful of Plaintiff’s pro se status

and the current posture of this case—i.e., that the Court is conducting an initial

review of his complaint.

(3) (a) Made with knowledge of its falsity or recklessness as to

whether it is true or false (for a misrepresentation), or

(b) Calculated to deceive (for a concealment);

(4) With the intent of misleading another into relying on it;

(5) Justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation; and

(6) A resulting injury proximately caused by such reliance.

See id. In order for a plaintiff to prevail on this cause of action, a plaintiff “must

prove each of those elements by clear and convincing evidence.” See id. (citation

omitted).

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a claim for fraud.

In particular, Plaintiff has not alleged the six (6) elements that are necessary to make

a showing of fraud under Pennsylvania law. As such, the Court finds that the

complaint fails to state a claim for fraud upon which relief can granted. This claim

will, therefore, be dismissed from the complaint.

C. Leave to Amend

The only remaining issue is, therefore, whether Plaintiff should be granted

leave to amend his complaint. Due to the applicable liberal pleading standard, a

plaintiff should generally be granted leave to amend before a Court dismisses a

claim that is merely deficient. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d

103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for

amendments to be granted liberally in light of the “principle that the purpose of

pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.” See Foman v. Davis, 371

U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

However, the Court may deny leave to amend where there is “undue delay,

bad faith[,] or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure

deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing

party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment[.]”

See id. The Court may also deny leave to amend where the proposed amendment

would be futile—that is, where the pleading, “as amended, would fail to state a

claim upon which relief could be granted.” See In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306

F.3d 1314, 1332 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

In accordance with this standard, the Court finds that it would be futile to

grant Plaintiff leave to amend with respect to the following claims: Plaintiff’s

Section 1983 claims against the SCI Dallas Medical Department and Bureau of

Health Services; and Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim

concerning a request for copies of his medical records. However, the Court cannot

say that granting Plaintiff leave to amend with respect to his remaining claims

would be futile and, thus, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended

complaint in order to attempt to cure the deficiencies identified above. Plaintiff is

advised that the amended complaint must be complete in all respects. It must be a

new pleading that stands by itself without reference to the original complaint or

any other document already filed. The amended complaint shall set forth

Plaintiff’s claims in short, concise, and plain statements as required by Rule 8 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, Plaintiff is cautioned that neither

conclusory allegations nor broad allegations will set forth a cognizable claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

To conclude, the Court will partially dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. No.

1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court will also grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended

complaint. An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: November 21, 2022 s/ Sylvia H. Rambo

SYLVIA H. RAMBO

United States District Judge