The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOSEPH MCQUAID, individually and as : Civil No. 4:21-CV-02019
the administrator of the Estate of :
Dominic Ingle, :
:
Plaintiff, :
: Judge Jennifer P. Wilson
v. :
:
JOHN WETZEL, et al. :
:
Defendants. : Magistrate Judge William I. Arbuckle
ORDER
Before the court is the report and recommendation of United States
Magistrate Judge William I. Arbuckle recommending that the motion to dismiss
filed by Defendants John Wetzel, Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections, and Laurel Harry, Superintendent of SCI Camp Hill (collectively,
“Supervisory Defendants”), be granted in part and denied in part. (Doc. 50.)
Defendants timely filed objections to the report and recommendation, which
Plaintiff Joseph McQuaid (“McQuaid”) opposed. (Docs. 54, 58.) For the reasons
that follow, the court will adopt the report and recommendation in part, and grant
the Supervisory Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Review of a Magistrate Judges’ report and recommendation
When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the
district court is required to conduct a de novo review of the contested portions of
the report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3);
Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1106 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989). The district court may
accept, reject, or modify the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation in
whole or in part. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court may also receive further
evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with further instructions.
Id. “Although the standard is de novo, the extent of review is committed to the
sound discretion of the district judge, and the court may rely on the
recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent it deems proper.” Weidman
v. Colvin, 164 F. Supp. 3d 650, 653 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (citing Rieder v. Apfel, 115 F.
Supp. 2d 496, 499 (M.D. Pa. 2000)). For the uncontested portions of the report
and recommendation, the court affords “reasoned consideration” before adopting it
as the decision of this court. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d at 100 (quoting
Henderson, 812 F.2d at 878).
B. Motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
In order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Conclusory allegations of liability are insufficient” to
survive a motion to dismiss. Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir.
2019) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678−79). To determine whether a complaint
survives a motion to dismiss, a court identifies “the elements a plaintiff must plead
to state a claim for relief,” disregards the allegations “that are no more than
conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and determines
whether the remaining factual allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012).
DISCUSSION1
A. The court adopts the uncontested portions of the report and
recommendation.
At the outset, no party objects to Sections I, II, III, and IV(A) of the report
and recommendation. In these sections, Judge Arbuckle details the factual
allegations and procedural history of this case as well as the standard of review for
a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 50, pp. 1–13.)2 Next, Judge
Arbuckle addresses the Monell claim pled in Count II of McQuaid’s complaint.
(Id. at 13–19.) After detailing the allegations in the complaint and the parties’
arguments, Judge Arbuckle opines that a claim pursued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
1 Because the court is writing for the benefit of the parties, only the necessary information is
included in this order. For a more fulsome discussion of the facts and issues in this case, the
court refers to the report and recommendation. (Doc. 50.)
2 For ease of reference, the court uses the page numbers from the CM/ECF header.
and Monell may only be pursued against municipalities, not individuals. (Id. at
19.) Thus, it is recommended that Count II be dismissed against the Supervisory
Defendants. (Id. at 32.)
After giving “reasoned consideration” to the uncontested portions of the
report and recommendation, the court finds that Judge Arbuckle’s analysis is well-
reasoned and fully supported by the record and applicable law. See City of Long
Branch, 866 F.3d at 99 (quoting Henderson, 812 F.2d at 878.) The court will
adopt these portions of the report and recommendation in full.
B. The court declines to adopt the recommendation regarding Count I
of Plaintiff’s complaint.
In Section IV(B) of the report and recommendation, Judge Arbuckle
addresses the Supervisory Defendants argument that Count I should be dismissed
because they were not personally involved in the incident alleged in the complaint.
(Doc. 50, pp. 19–24.) Therein, Judge Arbuckle outlines the relevant case law
requiring personal involvement in civil rights actions. (Id. at 23.) Then, the report
and recommendation identifies “two theories of supervisory-type liability that
could be applicable in this case,” and cites to case law relating to Monell claims.
(Id. at 23–24.) In conclusion, Judge Arbuckle opines:
The DOC Supervisor Defendants are correct that Plaintiff has not
alleged any facts that suggest Defendant Wetzel or Harry ever
interacted with Ingle. Therefore, Plaintiff has not alleged that
Defendant Harry or Wetzel directly participated in the violation of
Ingle’s constitutional rights. However, Plaintiff has pleaded enough
facts to support a claim based on a theory of supervisory liability.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Wetzel and Harry were responsible for
training and supervising the non-supervisory Defendants, and that these
Defendants ignored Ingle’s suicide attempt at the institution, ignored
Ingle’s self-injurious behavior, and failed to take reasonable action
when notified by Ingle’s girlfriend that Ingle planned to commit
suicide. Accordingly, the individual capacity claims against
Defendants Wetzel and Harry based on a theory of supervisory liability
should be permitted to proceed.
(Id. at 24.)
In their objections, the Supervisory Defendants argue that this
recommendation is inconsistent with Judge Arbuckle’s earlier finding that the
Monell claim at Count II must be dismissed. (Doc. 54-1, pp. 5–8.) The
Supervisory Defendants assert that the law requires personal involvement to pursue
a civil rights claim against them; theories of respondeat superior, i.e. supervisory
liability, are insufficient. (Id. at 6.) By finding that the individual capacity claims
against the Supervisory Defendants can proceed on a theory of supervisory
liability, the Supervisory Defendants submit that liability is imputed “simply
because of title, without pointing to any actual involvement,” which is “improper.”
(Id. at 7.) Additionally, the Supervisory Defendants argue that the report and
recommendation “runs afoul of Iqbal” because the complaint fails to even allege
that “that the supervisors adopted a policy that resulted in suicide,” rather, the
complaint alleges “that they did not do something that might have prevented
Decedent’s suicide.” (Id. at 8.)
McQuaid, in opposition, asserts that Judge Arbuckle correctly analyzed the
difference between a Monell claim and individual civil rights claims. (Doc. 58,
pp. 8–13.) In setting forth this argument, McQuaid states that the report and
recommendation should be adopted because, as to the individual civil rights
claims, he “adequately alleged that the [Supervisory] Defendants were ‘personally
involved’ in the deprivations of Ingle’s rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.” (Id. at 9.) Next, McQuaid cites to the case
law outlining the requirement of personal involvement for McQuaid, and then
heavily relies on the Third Circuit’s decision in Barkes v. First Correctional
Medical, Inc., 766 F.3d 307 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Taylor v. Barkes, 575
U.S. 822 (2015), to overcome the Iqbal standard. (Id. at 9–15.)
First, addressing McQuaid’s arguments, McQuaid either misstates or
misunderstands Judge Arbuckle’s ruling. The report and recommendation finds
that there are no facts to suggest that the Supervisory Defendants had personal
involvement in the alleged deprivation of Ingle’s rights. (Doc. 50, p. 24.) Second,
McQuaid’s reliance on Barkes is misplaced, as the United States Supreme Court
reversed the Third Circuit’s decision and found that the commissioner and warden
of the state department of corrections were entitled to qualified immunity. Taylor
v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015).
The court agrees with the Supervisory Defendants that Judge Arbuckle’s
recommendation as to Count I is inconsistent with his earlier opinion regarding
Count II. There is no dispute regarding the need for the plaintiff to allege personal
involvement by defendants to be held responsible for the alleged constitutional
violations in this case. The disagreement derives from the application of
respondeat superior, i.e. supervisory liability, to establish a legal basis for Count I
of the complaint to proceed against the Supervisory Defendants. However, outside
of the Monell context, the claims for violation of Ingle’s Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights in Count I asserted against the Supervisory Defendants without
personal involvement are not legally tenable. See Rode v. Dellaciprete, 845 F.2d
1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Accordingly, the court will sustain the objection,
decline to adopt this portion of the report and recommendation, and grant the
Supervisory Defendants’ motion to dismiss in this regard.
A. The court declines to adopt the recommendation regarding qualified
immunity.
Because the court grants the motion to dismiss as to Counts I and II of the
complaint, there are no claims that require the qualified immunity analysis.
Accordingly, the court will decline to adopt Section IV(C) of the report and
recommendation and overrule the Supervisory Defendants’ objection in this
regard.
B. The court will dismiss the wrongful death and survival causes of
action in the complaint against the Supervisory Defendants.
In the complaint, McQuaid also pleads wrongful death and survival claims
under Pennsylvania law against the Supervisory Defendants. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 133–
137.) To the extent McQuaid attempts to plead those causes of actions as
independent claims from Counts I and II, the court will dismiss the wrongful death
and survival actions because no underlying cause of action remains against the
Supervisory Defendants. See McEntyre v. Se. Veterans’ Center, No. 21-3622,
2022 WL 5027202, *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2022) (dismissing wrongful death and
survival actions because no substantive causes of action remained in the case);
Salvio v. Amgen, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 745, 757 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (same).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, IT IS ORDERED AS
FOLLOWS:
1) The report and recommendation, Doc. 50, is ADOPTED IN PART.
Specifically, Sections I, II, III, and IV(A) of the report and
recommendation are ADOPTED. The court DECLINES TO
ADOPT the remaining sections of the report and recommendation.
2) The court SUSTAINS the Supervisory Defendants objection to
Section IV(B) of the report and recommendation and OVERRULES
the objection to Section IV(C).
3) The Supervisory Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Doc. 40, is
GRANTED. Specifically, Count II is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. Count I, as well as the causes of action for wrongful
death and survivor, are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
4) Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within 21 days of the date of
this order. Should Plaintiff fail to file an amended complaint, the
Clerk of Court is directed to terminate Defendants Wetzel and Harry
from this action.
5) This case is referred back to Judge Arbuckle for pretrial management.
s/Jennifer P. Wilson
JENNIFER P. WILSON
United States District Court Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: November 2, 2022