Brown v. Cruz

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TODD ALAN BROWN, No. 4:22-CV-01153

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

OFFICER WEB, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AUGUST 23, 2022

Plaintiff Todd Alan Brown is currently in pretrial detention in the State

Correctional Institution, Huntingdon (SCI Huntingdon) in Huntingdon,

Pennsylvania. Prior to being transferred SCI Huntingdon, he was detained for a

short time at the State Correctional Institution, Smithfield (SCI Smithfield), also

located in Huntingdon, Pennsylvania. Brown filed the instant pro se Section 19831

action concerning allegedly deficient medical care he received at SCI Smithfield,

asserting constitutional violations against the prison’s medical department and

various prison officials. Because Brown fails to state a claim for relief under

Section 1983 against any Defendant, the Court will dismiss the complaint pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) but will grant Brown leave to amend.

1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves

as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.

I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Courts are statutorily obligated to review, “as soon as practicable,” pro se

prisoner complaints targeting governmental entities, officers, or employees.2 One

basis for dismissal at the screening stage is if the complaint “fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted[.]”3 This language closely tracks Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, courts apply the same standard to

screening a pro se prisoner complaint for sufficiency under Section 1915A(b)(1) as

they utilize when resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).4

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire

“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to

offer evidence to support the claims.”5 The court must accept as true the factual

allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from them in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff.6 In addition to the facts alleged on the face of

the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint,

matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents” attached to

2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

3 Id. § 1915A(b)(1).

4 See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 & n.11 (3d Cir. 2002); O’Brien

v. U.S. Fed. Gov’t, 763 F. App’x 157, 159 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (nonprecedential);

cf. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).

5 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir.

1996).

a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these

documents.7

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a

three-step inquiry.8 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the]

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”9 Second, the court should distinguish well-

pleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal

conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be

disregarded.10 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations

“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”11

Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”12

Because Brown proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally construed

and his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”13 This is particularly true

when the pro se litigant, like Brown, is incarcerated.14

7 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.

v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

8 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).

9 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)).

10 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

11 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

12 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

13 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted).

II. DISCUSSION

Brown alleges that he was transferred to SCI Smithfield on February 3,

2022, and that during February and March 2022 he received deficient medical care

at that facility.15 He claims that he arrived at SCI Smithfield with a serious injury

to his finger for which he had previously undergone medical pin placement, and

that during his time at SCI Smithfield “they fail[ed] to treat” him.16 Brown alleges

that, due to “neglect” by “medical staff not cleaning and dressing [his] finger” as

previously ordered by a prior treating physician, he developed an infection.17

After being put on antibiotics, Brown alleges that on March 7, 2022, a

“nurse” accidentally partially removed one of the medical pins, did not notice that

she had done so, and that defendant Officer Fortney had to inform her that it had

occurred.18 Brown avers that he then directed this nurse call the “head nurse,” and

when the head nurse arrived, he or she stated, “Oh you[’re] the guy that fought

with the cops, re[wrap] his finger and tell him to fill out a sick call.”19 Brown

claims that he had to pull the pin the rest of the way out on his own and that he

“never” saw an outside doctor about the pin coming free.20 Although his complaint

is unclear, it appears that Brown maintains that he either underwent a repeat

15 Doc. 1 at 4.

16 Id.

17 Id.

18 Id.

19 Id.

surgery or will have to undergo a future repeat surgery because his finger did not

heal correctly due to the pin or pins coming out.21

Brown appears to be raising a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment22 for

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.23 Brown names the following

defendants: the SCI Smithfield medical department, Officer Web, Officer Fortney,

Superintendent Kauffman, and the “Deputy Superintendent” of SCI Smithfield.24

Brown, however, fails to allege personal involvement for most of these

Defendants. As to the one Defendant for which Brown does allege personal

involvement, he fails to plausibly state a medical deliberate indifference claim.

And because the prison medical department is not a “person” for purposes of

Section 1983, Brown cannot maintain a constitutional tort claim against it. The

Court takes each pleading deficiency in turn.

21 Doc. 1 at 5.

22 Because Brown is a pretrial detainee, his claims implicate the Fourteenth Amendment, not the

Eighth. See Jacobs v. Cumberland County, 8 F.4th 187, 193-94 (3d Cir. 2021); Thomas v.

Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 223 n.4 (3d Cir. 2014).

23 Although Brown identifies other constitutional provisions in his complaint, see Doc. 1 at 5

(citing Eighth and First Amendments), none of them apply to the allegations at issue, nor are

they developed in any way. The Court further notes that, on the first page of his complaint,

Brown checked the section indicating that he was bringing a “Negligence Action under the

Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) . . . against the United States.” Doc. 1 at 1. First, Brown has

sued state officials, not the United States or federal actors. Second, if Brown is attempting to

assert negligence claims only, those claims are grounded in state law and this Court would

have no jurisdiction to hear them without a related federal claim. The Court, therefore, focuses

solely on the apparent Fourteenth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs.

A. Personal Involvement

It is well established that, in Section 1983 actions, liability cannot be

“predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”25 Rather, a Section

1983 plaintiff must aver facts that demonstrate “the defendants’ personal

involvement in the alleged misconduct.”26 Personal involvement can include direct

wrongful conduct by a defendant, but it can also be demonstrated through

allegations of “personal direction” or of “actual knowledge and acquiescence”;

however, such averments must be made with particularity.27

Brown does not include any allegations that would establish personal

involvement in the alleged constitutional violations by Web, Kauffman, or the

Deputy Superintendent. These Defendants’ names, in fact, appear only in the

caption and the defendant-identification section of Brown’s complaint.28 Because

Brown has failed to allege any personal involvement whatsoever for these

Defendants, the Court must dismiss the claims against Web, Kauffman, and the

Deputy Superintendent. Leave to amend will be granted in the event that Brown

can properly plead personal involvement and a constitutional violation.

25 Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (affirming same principle in Bivens context).

26 Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374 (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).

27 Id. (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).

B. Alleged Fourteenth Amendment Violation

As previously noted, Brown is a pretrial detainee, so his claims implicate the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth

Amendment’s cruel-and-unusual-punishment provision. However, it does not

appear that the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has established

or adhered to a different standard with respect to Fourteenth Amendment pretrial

detainee medical indifference claims versus those raised by incarcerated

individuals under the Eighth Amendment.29 Accordingly, the Court will apply

existing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to Brown’s Fourteenth Amendment

medical indifference claims.

In the context of prison medical care, the Eighth Amendment “requires

prison officials to provide basic medical treatment to those whom it has

incarcerated.”30 To state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim

regarding inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must plausibly plead “(i) a serious

29 This remains so even following the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Kingsley

v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), which established a different standard for pretrial

detainee excessive force claims. See Moore v. Luffey, 757 F. App’x 335, 340 & n.2 (3d Cir.

2019) (nonprecedential) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument to apply Kingsley’s holding to

Fourteenth Amendment medical care claim and instead analyzing under Eighth Amendment

jurisprudence); see also Parker v. Butler County, 832 F. App’x 777, 780 & n.1 (3d Cir. 2020)

(nonprecedential) (applying Eighth Amendment standard to pretrial detainee medical care

claim while acknowledging Fourteenth Amendment is source of right); Miller v. Steele-Smith,

713 F. App’x 74, 76 n.1, 78 (3d Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential) (same); Goode v. Giorla, 643 F.

App’x 127, 129 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2016) (nonprecedential) (same); Edwards v. Northampton

County, 663 F. App’x 132, 136-37 (3d Cir. 2016) (nonprecedential) (citing Natale v. Camden

Cnty Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003)).

medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate

indifference to that need.”31 A serious medical need is “one that has been

diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay

person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”32

Deliberate indifference by prison officials may be evidenced by intentional

refusal to provide care known to be medically necessary, delayed provision of

medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment,

or denial of reasonable requests for treatment resulting in suffering or risk of

injury.33 Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is an exacting standard,

requiring a showing of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”34 Claims

sounding in mere medical negligence will not suffice.35

The only Defendant for which Brown includes allegations concerning his

purportedly deficient medical care at SCI Smithfield is Fortney. Yet Brown’s

allegations against Fortney do not come close to plausibly pleading “unnecessary

and wanton infliction of pain.” His single contention is that Fortney recognized

that a nurse had accidentally removed a pin from Brown’s finger and then

informed the nurse about it.36 Such a claim actually demonstrates the opposite of

31 Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).

32 Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987).

33 See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Lanzaro, 834 F.2d

at 346).

34 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted).

35 Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Consequently, the Section 1983

claim against Fortney must also be dismissed.

C. “Person” Under Section 1983

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege “the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and

must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under

color of state law.”37 Only “persons” are subject to suit under Section 1983, and

entities such as state prisons or their medical departments do not qualify as

“persons” for purposes of Section 1983.38 Brown’s Section 1983 claim against the

SCI Smithfield medical department is therefore fatally flawed and must be

dismissed. Dismissal will be with prejudice because Brown cannot cure this

fundamental pleading deficiency.

D. Leave to Amend

Generally, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under [the

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995] should receive leave to amend unless

37 Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (emphasis added) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424

U.S. 409, 417 (1976) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983)).

38 See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-65, 71 (1989); Slagle v. County of

Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 264 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (affirming on other grounds and observing that

district court properly “dismissed Clarion County Jail as a defendant in this case,” quoting

district court’s reasoning that “‘it is well established in the Third Circuit that a prison is not a

“person” subject to suit under federal civil rights laws’”); Stankowski v. Farley, 487 F. Supp.

2d 543, 554 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (finding that Prime Care Medical is not a “person for purposes of

Section 1983” and thus not subject to liability under that statute); see also Fischer v. Cahill,

474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that “New Jersey Prison Medical Department” was

amendment would be inequitable or futile.”39 Because Brown’s allegations are

serious and it is conceivable that he could cure his pleading deficiencies, the Court

will permit Brown to file an amended complaint—in accordance with this

Memorandum—in the event that he can aver facts that would plausibly state

personal involvement and a constitutional violation. The Section 1983 claim

against the SCI Smithfield medical department, however, will be dismissed with

prejudice, as leave to amend that claim would be futile.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss Brown’s complaint pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted. Brown, if he is able, may file an amended complaint in accordance

with this Memorandum. An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge