Washington v. Weber

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JEROME JUNIOR WASHINGTON, No. 4:21-CV-01746

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

SUPERINTENDENT SALAMON, et

al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SEPTEMBER 7, 2022

Plaintiff Jerome Junior Washington is a serial pro se litigator in the Middle

District of Pennsylvania. He filed the instant pro se Section 19831 action in

October 2021, claiming constitutional violations by numerous prison officials at

the State Correctional Institution, Rockview (SCI Rockview), located in

Bellefonte, Pennsylvania. Presently pending are Defendants’ motions to dismiss

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court will grant Defendants’

motions.

I. BACKGROUND

Washington’s complaint is a sprawling 43-page, single-spaced document

that is both exceedingly difficult to understand and needlessly verbose. His

1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves

pleadings are so hopelessly complicated that he included an appendix to attempt to

clarify the multitudinous sections of his complaint.2

Washington spends no less than 30 pages recounting what seems to be every

perceived slight and policy violation by SCI Rockview staff during several months

in 2021, verbatim repetition of his numerous grievances and Department of

Corrections (DOC) policies, and unnecessary legal argument.3 In two paragraphs

near the end of his complaint, Washington summarizes his claims as invoking the

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.4

However, he also appears to assert that his First Amendment rights were violated

when prison officials retaliated against him for filing grievances.5

Although Washington’s allegations are rambling and difficult to parse,6 he

appears to base his Section 1983 claims on events that occurred primarily in the

summer months of 2021.7 First, he contends that on June 25, 2021, he was

2 See Doc. 1-1.

3 See generally Doc. 1 ¶¶ 24-76.

4 See id. ¶¶ 77-78.

5 See id. ¶ 24.

6 As just one example, Washington alleges that Defendants are violating his Eighth Amendment

rights through “failure to provide minimally adequate psychiatric and psychological services

to diagnosed prisoners with mental illness in BMU(s) around RHU(s) guards untrain resulting

in unnecessary deprivation of every day life necessities or result in unnecessary pain and

suffering, around this maintenance of RHU(s) guards & inmates that exacerbate prisoners

serious mental health illness including near-constant isolation with little if any human contact

and plaintiff deprivation in of family visits and an failure to make available, maintain, and

utilize adequate therapeutic psychological psychiatric alternative(s) to BMU(s); is an violation

to constitutional laws or prisoners rights for the extended time periods around RHUs guard(s)

or inmates that are confined in BMU(s) creates a substantial risk that those prisoners mental

illnesses will be exacerbated and that their mental health will deteriorate.” Doc. 1 ¶ 78 (all

punctuation and grammatical errors in original).

provided inadequate mental health care in the Behavior Management Unit (BMU)

of SCI Rockview.8 This claim appears to be Washington’s primary allegation. He

repeatedly asserts that he was “caged” for three hours that day, that unqualified

Restricted Housing Unit (RHU) guards were permitted to work in the BMU, and

that RHU inmates were inappropriately comingled with BMU inmates in the law

library.9 Washington further complains that, as a BMU inmate with mental health

problems, he did not receive the appropriate “structured” activities and

programming to which he was entitled under relevant DOC policy.10

Washington next alleges that, on June 30, 2021, he was handcuffed (or at

least correctional officers attempted to handcuff him) “like an animal” to a table

during a Zoom visitation with family members.11 It is unclear whether Washington

had the Zoom visit or whether it was canceled because he refused to be

handcuffed, as his complaint is somewhat contradictory on this point.12 In any

event, Washington claims that prison officials were retaliating against him for

filing grievances, and that is why they tried to “cuff” him “like an animal” to

humiliate him in front of his family.13

Washington also appears to assert a conditions-of-confinement claim. At

various sections of his pleading, he avers that he experienced issues with the

8 Id. ¶¶ 25, 27-29, 78.

9 See id.

10 Id. ¶¶ 25, 27, 28.

11 Id. ¶ 24.

12 See id.

cleanliness of his drinking water, improper ventilation, constant lighting in his

BMU cell, cold temperatures, and rainwater leaking into his cell.14 Again, his

complaint is difficult to decipher, but he seems to allege that he experienced some

of these conditions on November 23, 2020, and some of them in July 2021.15

Washington names the following 14 defendants: former DOC Secretary John

E. Wetzel; Superintendent Salamon; J. Rivello, DSFM; Major H. Haldeman; T.

Miller, CCPM; M. Rowe, DSCS; Major G. Dyke; “LPM”—an unidentified official

in charge of psychology staff at SCI Rockview; Psychiatrist Douglas Weber; BMU

Unit Manager Knapp; Correctional Officers Anna, Steberger, and Hayles; and

Sergeant John Doe (6 to 2 shift June 23, 2021 & June 30, 2021).16 He sues each

Defendant in his or her individual and official capacities.17

Defendants move to dismiss Washington’s Section 1983 claims in their

entirety for failure to state a claim for relief.18 Their Rule 12(b)(6) motions are

fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), courts should not inquire “whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but

14 Doc. 1 ¶¶ 26, 30-32, 51, 57-59.

15 Id. ¶¶ 30-31, 57-59.

16 Id. ¶¶ 7-19, 23.

17 Id. ¶ 22.

whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.”19 The

court must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all

reasonable inferences from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.20 In

addition to the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, the court may also

consider “exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as

undisputedly authentic documents” attached to a defendant’s motion to dismiss if

the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these documents.21

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a

three-step inquiry.22 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the]

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”23 Second, the court should distinguish well-

pleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal

conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be

disregarded.24 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations

“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”25

19 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir.

1996).

20 Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).

21 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.

v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

22 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).

23 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)).

24 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”26

Because Washington proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally

construed and his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”27 This is

particularly true when the pro se litigant, like Washington, is incarcerated.28

III. DISCUSSION

Washington’s complaint, liberally construed, appears to allege two types of

Eighth Amendment violations: (1) unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and

(2) deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. He also attempts to raise a

First Amendment retaliation claim. None of Washington’s claims plausibly state a

constitutional violation.

A. Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement

“[T]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons . . .

which house persons convicted of serious crimes[] cannot be free of discomfort.”29

Nevertheless, the state cannot subject an inmate to cruel and unusual punishment

or “inhumane treatment,” such as deprivation of “identifiable human need[s]” like

26 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

27 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted).

28 Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

29 Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 139 (3d Cir. 2020) (second alteration in original) (quoting

“food, warmth, or exercise.”30 To prevail on an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-

confinement claim, a plaintiff must show both objective and subjective elements.31

Objectively, the prisoner must demonstrate that “the prison official deprived the

prisoner of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” often referred to as

a “sufficiently serious” deprivation.32 Subjectively, the prisoner must show that

“the prison official acted with deliberate indifference” to the prisoner’s “health or

safety.”33 Deliberate indifference means that the defendant “acted or failed to act

despite having knowledge that her actions or inaction, as the case may be, would

subject the inmate to a substantial risk of serious harm.”34

As explained above, Washington avers that he experienced unclean drinking

water, improper ventilation, constant lighting in his cell, cold temperatures, and

rainwater leaking into his cell.35 Washington’s claim fails however, because he

does not adequately plead facts showing when he was subjected to these

conditions, how long he experienced them,36 if he experienced the conditions at the

same time or on separate occasions, or whom he informed (if anyone) about most

30 See Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 226 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Wilson v.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991)).

31 See id.

32 Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297).

33 Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).

34 Id. at 227 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).

35 Doc. 1 ¶¶ 26, 30-32, 51, 57-59.

36 Duration of the deprivation is a critical factor in the conditions-of-confinement analysis. See

Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 139 (3d Cir. 2020) (stressing that “duration” of confinement in

of the issues.37 Without such critical factual assertions, the Court cannot determine

whether Washington has stated an Eighth Amendment claim.

Courts must examine the totality of the circumstances when considering

conditions-of-confinement claims.38 And a plaintiff must allege deliberate

indifference by specific prison officials to those deprivations. After all, “a prison

official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate

humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety[.]”39 Thus, Washington’s conditions-of-

confinement claim will be dismissed but leave to amend will be granted.

B. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

In the context of prison medical care, the Eighth Amendment “requires

prison officials to provide basic medical treatment to those whom it has

incarcerated.”40 To state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim

regarding inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must plausibly plead “(i) a serious

medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate

indifference to that need.”41 A serious medical need is “one that has been

37 Washington claims that he informed Hayles and Knapp about the rainwater leak. See Doc. 1

¶¶ 57-59.

38 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); id. at 362-63 (Brennan, J., concurring).

39 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

40 Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).

diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay

person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”42

Deliberate indifference by prison officials may be evidenced by intentional

refusal to provide care known to be medically necessary, delayed provision of

medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment,

or denial of reasonable requests for treatment resulting in suffering or risk of

injury.43 Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is an exacting standard,

requiring a showing of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”44 Claims

sounding in mere medical negligence will not suffice.45

Washington’s Eighth Amendment claim regarding the mental health care he

received in the BMU is difficult to follow. He appears to base his allegations on

events that occurred on June 25, 2021. The gravamen of his claim seems to be that

he did not receive the structured activity and programming that he was supposed to

receive as a BMU inmate. He also contends that unqualified RHU correctional

officers are permitted to work in the BMU, and that RHU inmates improperly

commingle with BMU inmates. Additionally, he appears to take issue with his

BMU “phase” designation.46

42 Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987).

43 See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Lanzaro, 834 F.2d

at 346).

44 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted).

45 Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.

46 Under DOC policy, there is multi-step phase system in place in the BMU that determines

inmates’ activity restrictions based on their progress within the BMU program. See

None of these allegations—alone or together—meet the high bar of showing

constitutionally deficient medical treatment. Washington has not alleged that

prison officials are failing to provide mental health treatment, or that certain

treatment has been sought and wrongly denied, or that medical treatment is being

denied for non-medical reasons. Nor do these allegations implicate some other

Eighth Amendment infringement.

Rather, Washington’s complaints appear to hinge on his interpretation of

prison policies and procedures, claiming that BMU staff are violating these internal

DOC guidelines. This is a theme that runs throughout Washington’s voluminous

complaint.47 The problem, however, is that a violation of prison policy is not

equivalent to a constitutional violation. It is axiomatic that “a prison policy

manual does not have the force of law and does not rise to the level of a

regulation” and that “a violation of internal policy does not automatically rise to

the level of a Constitutional violation.”48

None of Washington’s numerous complaints about his treatment in the BMU

rise to the level of a constitutional violation. And they certainly do not establish

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Washington’s allegations, rather,

47 See, e.g., Doc. 1 ¶¶ 25, 26, 29, 33, 34, 43, 45.

48 Atwell v. Lavan, 557 F. Supp. 2d 532, 556 n.24 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (citations omitted); see Bullard

v. Scism, 449 F. App’x 232, 235 (3d Cir. 2011) (nonprecedential) (explaining that, even if

prison officials violated a regulation, such a violation “is not actionable”); Jordan v. Rowley,

No. 1:16-CV-1261, 2017 WL 2813294, at *2 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2017); Williamson v. Garman,

No. 3:15-CV-1797, 2017 WL 2702539, at *6 (M.D. Pa. June 22, 2017); see also United States

v. Jiles, 658 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that even violations of state law will not

primarily concern SCI Rockview staff’s compliance (or alleged lack thereof) with

internal prison policies. Any Eighth Amendment claim based on this faulty

reasoning, including medical deliberate indifference, must be dismissed.

C. First Amendment Retaliation

Although a prisoner’s constitutional rights are necessarily circumscribed, an

inmate still retains First Amendment protections when they are “not inconsistent”

with prisoner status or with the “legitimate penological objectives of the

corrections system.”49 To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff

must plausibly plead that (1) “he was engaged in constitutionally protected

conduct,” (2) he suffered an “adverse action” by prison officials sufficient to deter

a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights, and

(3) the plaintiff’s protected conduct was a “substantial or motivating factor” in the

prison officials’ decision to take the adverse action.50

In a single paragraph in his complaint, Washington alleges that several

Defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances by attempting to handcuff

him prior to a Zoom visitation with family. This First Amendment claim fails

because Washington has not identified an adverse action taken against him that is

sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising their constitutional

49 Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d

775, 781 (3d Cir. 2010)).

50 Id. (quoting Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001)); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d

rights. Although the threshold for an adverse action in the retaliation context is

relatively low,51 attempting to handcuff a prisoner—a normal occurrence for an

inmate incarcerated in a state correctional institution—prior to a Zoom visitation

simply does not rise to the level of a “more than de minimis” adverse event.52

Washington cannot state the second element of a retaliation claim, so that claim

must be dismissed.

D. Official Capacity Claims

Washington sues all Defendants in their individual and official capacities.

However, the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents

federal courts from entertaining lawsuits—by United States citizens or citizens of

foreign states—brought against a state.53 This immunity from private suit extends

to state agencies as well as state officials acting in their official capacity, because

such lawsuits are essentially civil actions “against the State itself.”54 States may

waive this immunity if they choose, but Pennsylvania has explicitly not waived its

immunity with respect to claims brought under Section 1983.55 There are two

51 See McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006).

52 Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 423 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting McKee, 436 F.3d at 170); cf.

Cordero v. Warren, 612 F. App’x 650, 653 (3d Cir. 2015) (nonprecedential) (finding that

prospect of losing visitation with close family member for “six months or more” could rise to

the level of an adverse action).

53 U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267-68 (1997);

Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).

54 Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

55 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8521(b); Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir.

2020); Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 42

exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment’s bar to private suits against nonconsenting

states: (1) “Congress may abrogate a state’s immunity” and (2) “parties may sue

state officers for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief.”56

Washington’s response to Defendants’ assertion of Eleventh Amendment

sovereign immunity is—once again—disjointed and nearly impossible to

comprehend. He forays into irrelevant subject areas like qualified immunity,

Bivens claims, and due process rights.57 From his complaint, it appears that

Washington seeks prospective injunctive relief “to stop the constitutional

violations described” and “to ensure that DOC prisoners/plaintiff receive

constitutionally adequate mental health care.”58

However, as Washington has failed to set forth any plausible constitutional

violations concerning any Defendant, the official capacity claims for prospective

injunctive relief likewise fail.

E. Claims Against Defendant Douglas Weber

Washington names psychiatrist Douglas Weber as a defendant but does not

include any allegations against him. It is well established that, in Section 1983

actions, liability cannot be “predicated solely on the operation of respondeat

superior.”59 Rather, a Section 1983 plaintiff must aver facts that demonstrate “the

56 Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Pa., 141 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 1998)

(citing, inter alia, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).

57 See Doc. 36 at 21-22.

58 Doc. 1 ¶ 79(B).

59 Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also Ashcroft

defendants’ personal involvement in the alleged misconduct.”60 Personal

involvement can include direct wrongful conduct by a defendant, but it can also be

demonstrated through allegations of “personal direction” or of “actual knowledge

and acquiescence”; however, such averments must be made with particularity.61

Dr. Weber correctly asserts that, because Washington has failed to plead personal

involvement, any claim against him must be dismissed.

However, Dr. Weber also contends that Washington failed to pursue any

administrative remedy against him through the DOC’s grievance system. Failure

to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense rather than a pleading

requirement, and necessarily will require a factual determination that goes beyond

the complaint.62 The Court therefore cannot grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion on this

basis. Rather, the Court is required to “notify the parties that” it “will consider

exhaustion in its role as a fact finder under Small[ v. Camden County, 728 F.3d 265

(3d Cir. 2013)]” and provide Washington an “opportunity to respond.”63

Thus, Washington will have the opportunity to respond to Dr. Weber’s

failure-to-exhaust challenge. Washington is on notice that the Court will consider

administrative exhaustion in its role as a factfinder. Moreover, because the

exhaustion issue may be dispositive as to the validity of any Section 1983 claim

60 Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374 (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).

61 Id. (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).

62 See Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 208, 211 (3d Cir. 2018).

against Dr. Weber, no leave to amend will be granted with respect Washington’s

claims against Dr. Weber unless the exhaustion challenge is resolved in

Washington’s favor.

IV. LEAVE TO AMEND

Generally, “in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints subject to

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment

would be inequitable or futile.”64 The Court will grant Washington leave to amend

his Eighth Amendment claims to cure the deficiencies more fully explained above.

The First Amendment retaliation claim will be dismissed with prejudice because

Washington’s allegations are insufficient as a matter of law to implicate a

constitutional violation.

Following resolution of the administrative exhaustion issue concerning Dr.

Weber, Washington may file an amended complaint in conformity with this

Memorandum. However, Washington must comply with the following guidance,

or the Court will strike his amended pleading:

 The amended complaint should be a stand-alone document, complete in

itself and without reference to any previous pleading.

 The amended complaint should set forth the claim or claims in short,

concise, and plain statements, and in sequentially numbered paragraphs.

 Washington need not, and should not, include word-for-word recitation

of his grievances or of prison regulations or policies, nor should he

include legal argument.

 Washington may not include claims (or allegations related to claims) that

have been dismissed with prejudice in this Memorandum.

 Washington must name proper defendants and specify the offending

actions taken by a particular defendant. Washington is admonished that

he must comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2) if

attempting to join multiple defendants in a single action.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant Defendants’ motions (Docs. 19,

20) to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Limited leave to

amend will be granted. An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge