The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TODD ALAN BROWN, No. 4:22-CV-01155
Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)
v.
SUPERINTENDENT RIVELLO, et
al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AUGUST 23, 2022
Plaintiff Todd Alan Brown is currently being held in pretrial detention in the
State Correctional Institution, Huntingdon (SCI Huntingdon), in Huntingdon,
Pennsylvania. He filed the instant pro se Section 19831 action, asserting
constitutional violations against various prison officials and medical staff. Because
Brown fails to state a claim for relief against any Defendant, the Court will dismiss
the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) but grant leave to amend.
I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Courts are statutorily obligated to review, “as soon as practicable,” pro se
prisoner complaints targeting governmental entities, officers, or employees.2 One
1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional
wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves
as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.
v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002).
basis for dismissal at the screening stage is if the complaint “fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted[.]”3 This language closely tracks Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, courts apply the same standard to
screening a pro se prisoner complaint for sufficiency under Section 1915A(b)(1) as
they utilize when resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).4
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire
“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to
offer evidence to support the claims.”5 The court must accept as true the factual
allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.6 In addition to the facts alleged on the face of
the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint,
matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents” attached to
a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these
documents.7
3 Id. § 1915A(b)(1).
4 See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 & n.11 (3d Cir. 2002); O’Brien
v. U.S. Fed. Gov’t, 763 F. App’x 157, 159 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (nonprecedential);
cf. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
5 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir.
1996).
6 Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).
7 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.
When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a
three-step inquiry.8 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the]
plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”9 Second, the court should distinguish well-
pleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal
conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be
disregarded.10 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations
“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”11
Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”12
Because Brown proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally construed
and his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”13 This is particularly true
when the pro se litigant, like Brown, is incarcerated.14
II. DISCUSSION
Brown asserts that he has a “life long history of mental health problems” as
well as “past suicide attempts” that are noted in his records.15 In late April 2022,
8 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).
9 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)).
10 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
11 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
12 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.
13 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted).
14 Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
he attempted suicide at SCI Huntingdon.16 He alleges that on April 28, an
unspecified “officer” saw him tying a bedsheet to make a noose to hang himself
and the officer never reported it.17 The next day, following “a bad phone call,”
Brown avers that the unit manager came to his cell, saw him crying, and “let [him]
have it.”18 Brown then wrote a suicide note and told an inmate in a neighboring
cell to “call staff” because he was going to hang himself.19 He claims that he then
attempted to hang himself in his cell.20 According to Brown, he had to be life
flighted to a hospital, was in a coma for 24 hours, and lost feeling in his left ear for
a month, among other injuries.21
Brown appears to be raising a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment,22
although it is unclear exactly what type of constitutional claim he is asserting. As
best the Court can ascertain, Brown is asserting a claim of deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs.23 Brown names the following defendants in his lawsuit:
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. Brown does not explain what the phrase “let [him] have it” means, but the Court presumes
that Brown is alleging that the unit manager spoke harshly to him.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Doc. 1 at 5.
22 Because Brown is a pretrial detainee, his claims implicate the Fourteenth Amendment, not the
Eighth. See Jacobs v. Cumberland County, 8 F.4th 187, 193-94 (3d Cir. 2021); Thomas v.
Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 223 n.4 (3d Cir. 2014).
23 See, e.g., Doc. 1 at 5 (alleging that prisons “are required to provide professional help at all
times” to people with disabilities, and that “failure to follow up on prisoners with known or
suspected mental health disorders . . . may be a serious medical need” and failing to treat that
Superintendent Rivello, Deputy Superintendent Spyker,24 psychologist Jessica
Cousins, psychology counselor Conway, and CHCA Sean McCorkle.25 Brown,
however, fails to plausibly allege personal involvement for most of these
Defendants. As to the single Defendant for which Brown does allege personal
involvement, he fails to plausibly state a medical deliberate indifference claim.
A. Personal Involvement
It is well established that, in Section 1983 actions, liability cannot be
“predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”26 Rather, a Section
1983 plaintiff must aver facts that demonstrate “the defendants’ personal
involvement in the alleged misconduct.”27 Personal involvement can include direct
wrongful conduct by a defendant, but it can also be demonstrated through
allegations of “personal direction” or of “actual knowledge and acquiescence”;
however, such averments must be made with particularity.28
Brown does not include any allegations that would establish personal
involvement in the alleged constitutional violation by Rivello, Spyker, Conway, or
McCorkle. These Defendants’ names, in fact, appear only in the caption and the
24 Brown spells this Defendant’s last name “Spker,” but the correct spelling is “Spyker.” See
https://www.cor.pa.gov/Facilities/StatePrisons/Pages/Huntingdon.aspx (last visited Aug. 17,
2022) (identifying the Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Services at SCI Huntingdon as
“Jill Spyker”).
25 Id. at 1-3.
26 Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556. U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (affirming same principle in Bivens context).
27 Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374 (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).
defendant-identification section.29 Accordingly, the Court must dismiss the claims
against them for lack of personal involvement.
B. Alleged Constitutional Violation
The only person Defendant Brown identifies by name in the factual
allegations is Cousins. According to Brown, “Cousins and staff didn’t perform
the[ir] duties,” did not “follow up” on him, and did not “investigate [his] life[-]long
history of mental health” issues.30 Brown also broadly alleges that “if Jessica
Cousins did her job and looked into [his] file or records,” he would have received
medical help or treatment.31 If Brown is attempting to assert a medical
indifference claim against Cousins, his allegations do not plausibly state a claim
for relief.
As previously noted, Brown is a pretrial detainee, so his claims implicate the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth
Amendment’s cruel-and-unusual-punishment provision. However, it does not
appear that the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has established
or adhered to a different standard with respect to Fourteenth Amendment pretrial
detainee medical indifference claims versus those raised by incarcerated
individuals under the Eighth Amendment.32 Accordingly, the Court will apply
29 See Doc. 1 at 1-3.
30 Id. at 4.
31 Id. at 5.
32 This remains so even following the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Kingsley
existing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to Brown’s Fourteenth Amendment
medical indifference claims.
In the context of prison medical care, the Eighth Amendment “requires
prison officials to provide basic medical treatment to those whom it has
incarcerated.”33 To state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim
regarding inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must plausibly plead “(i) a serious
medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate
indifference to that need.”34 A serious medical need is “one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay
person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”35
Deliberate indifference by prison officials may be evidenced by intentional
refusal to provide care known to be medically necessary, delayed provision of
medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment,
or denial of reasonable requests for treatment resulting in suffering or risk of
detainee excessive force claims. See Moore v. Luffey, 757 F. App’x 335, 340 & n.2 (3d Cir.
2019) (nonprecedential) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument to apply Kingsley’s holding to
Fourteenth Amendment medical care claim and instead analyzing under Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence); see also Parker v. Butler County, 832 F. App’x 777, 780 & n.1 (3d Cir. 2020)
(nonprecedential) (applying Eighth Amendment standard to pretrial detainee medical care
claim while acknowledging Fourteenth Amendment is source of right); Miller v. Steele-Smith,
713 F. App’x 74, 76 n.1, 78 (3d Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential) (same); Goode v. Giorla, 643 F.
App’x 127, 129 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2016) (nonprecedential) (same); Edwards v. Northampton
County, 663 F. App’x 132, 136-37 (3d Cir. 2016) (nonprecedential) (citing Natale v. Camden
Cnty Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003)).
33 Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
34 Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).
injury.36 Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is an exacting standard,
requiring a showing of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”37 Claims
sounding in mere medical negligence will not suffice.38
Brown’s allegations against Cousins do not rise to the level of stating
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Although Brown alleges that Cousins
should have been more familiar with his medical history and should have
investigated his mental health background and provided psychological treatment,
such claims—at most—implicate medical negligence, not deliberate indifference.
Brown himself asserts that Cousins exhibited “negligence or neglect” caused by
“poor judgment.”39 Brown has not alleged any type of intentional refusal to
provide care, denial of prescribed treatment, or denial of requests for treatment.
He simply contends that Cousins failed to investigate his background and then
failed to proactively provide mental health treatment. Simply put, these allegations
are not enough to allege deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.
C. Leave to Amend
Generally, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under [the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995] should receive leave to amend unless
36 See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Lanzaro, 834 F.2d
at 346).
37 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted).
38 Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.
amendment would be inequitable or futile.”40 Because it is not certain that
amendment would be futile, the Court will permit Brown to file an amended
complaint—in accordance with this Memorandum—in the event that he can aver
facts that would plausibly state personal involvement and a constitutional violation.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Brown’s
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) because it fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. Brown, if he is able, may file an amended
complaint in accordance with this Memorandum. An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge