The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTANCE WILSON ANDRESEN, : CIV NO. 1:20-CV-989
:
Plaintiff, : (Judge Conner)
:
v. : (Magistrate Judge Carlson)
:
COMMONWEALTH OF :
PENNSYLVANIA, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I. Factual Background
This is a pro se civil rights lawsuit that was originally brought by Constance
Wilson Andresen against six individual and institutional defendants. (Doc. 1). This
civil lawsuit arose out of prior criminal proceedings brought against Andresen in the
Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County. As to these underlying criminal
proceedings, state court records reveal that on October 4, 2019, Andresen entered a
plea of nolo contendere to barratry, a violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5109.1
See Commonwealth v. Andresen, Crim. No. CP-31-CR-0000442 (Court of Common
1 Pennsylvania defines the crime of barratry in the following terms: “A person is
guilty of a misdemeanor of the third degree if he vexes others with unjust and
vexatious suits.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5109.
Pleas of Huntingdon County, Pennsylvania). As a result of her conviction, Andresen
was required to pay costs of prosecution and was fined. Wilson Andresen’s guilty
plea conviction on this state charge has proven to be an insurmountable obstacle to
her sweeping false arrest and malicious prosecution claims and many of these claims
and defendants have been dismissed from this case. Currently only one defendant,
Trooper Thomas, and one legal claim, a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim,
remain in this lawsuit.
With the issues framed in this fashion, there are several motions pending
before the court. These motions include a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
which alleges that the plaintiff’s allegations against Trooper Thomas fail to state a
Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. These allegations are limited to claims of
verbal harassment of the plaintiff while she was attempting to dress at the time of
her arrest, verbal harassment which the plaintiff contends caused her to stumble and
fall. (Doc. 164). In addition, the plaintiff has filed two motions, which seek further
discovery while this potentially dispositive motion is pending. (Docs. 173 and 184).
We believe that the motion for judgment on the pleadings raises significant
legal issues which should be addressed prior to engaging in further discovery,
particularly when we consider whether the defendant may be entitled to qualified
immunity. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, we will: (1) order
supplemental briefing on the question of whether Trooper Thomas is entitled to
qualified immunity; (2) stay further discovery pending the resolution of this motion
for judgment on the pleadings; and (3) deny Wilson Andresen’s motions for
discovery without prejudice to renewal of these motions, if necessary, following the
resolution of this potentially dispositive motion.
II. Discussion
Rulings regarding the proper scope and timing of discovery are matters
consigned to the court’s discretion and judgment. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus, a court’s decisions regarding the
conduct of discovery will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion.
Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983). This far-reaching
discretion extends to rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on discovery
matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l
Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585
(D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States,
943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and is reversible
only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and
Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999)
(holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223
F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and
should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
We also note that our broad discretion over discovery matters extends to
decisions under Rule 26 relating to the issuance of protective orders limiting and
regulating the timing of discovery. Indeed, it is undisputed that: “ ‘[t]he grant and
nature of [a protective order] is singularly within the discretion of the district court
and may be reversed only on a clear showing of abuse of discretion.’” Dove v.
Atlantic Capital Corp., 963 F.2d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Galella v. Onassis,
487 F.2d 986, 997 (2d Cir. 1973) (citation omitted)).
This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. One of these
cardinal principles, governing the exercise of discretion in this field, is that the
district court may properly defer or delay discovery while it considers a potentially
dispositive pretrial motion, provided the district court concludes that the pretrial
motion does not, on its face, appear groundless. See, e.g., James v. York County
Police Dep’t, 160 F.App’x 126, 136 (3d Cir. 2005); Nolan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
973 F.2d 843,849 (10th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. New York Univ. Sch. of Ed., 205
F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Briefly deferring discovery in such a case, while
the court determines the threshold issue of whether a complaint has sufficient merit
to go forward, recognizes a simple, fundamental truth: parties who file motions
which may present potentially meritorious and complete legal defenses to civil
actions should not be put to the time, expense, and burden of factual discovery until
after these claimed legal defenses are addressed by the court.
In such instances, it is clearly established that:
“[A] stay of discovery is appropriate pending resolution of a potentially
dispositive motion where the motion ‘appear[s] to have substantial
grounds' or, stated another way, ‘do[es] not appear to be without
foundation in law.’ ” In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust
Litigation, 2002 WL 88278, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2002) (quoting
Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Century Power Corp., 137 F.R.D. 209, 209-
10 (S.D.N.Y.1991)) ( citing Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 203
F.R.D. 92, 2001 WL 396422, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2001); Anti-
Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 1996 WL 101277, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
March 7, 1996)).
Johnson, 205 F.R.D. at 434.
Guided by these legal tenets, we conclude that further discovery should be
briefly stayed at this time until after the court resolves the pending motion for
judgment on the pleadings, finding that “a stay of discovery is appropriate pending
resolution of a potentially dispositive motion where the motion ‘appear[s] to have
substantial grounds' or, stated another way, ‘do[es] not appear to be without
foundation in law.’” Id.
In this regard, we find that the defense motion for judgment on the pleadings
raises substantial legal issues regarding whether alleged verbal abuse of an arrestee
constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment. These issues have particular
gravity when we consider whether Trooper Thomas may be entitled to qualified
immunity in this case, an issue we may raise sua sponte. Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309,
312 (3d Cir. 2001).
On this score, as we have noted in the past:
“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages
liability unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right
that was clearly established at the time of the challenged
conduct.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 182
L.Ed.2d 985 (2012). A qualified immunity analysis involves two
questions: whether the official violated a statutory or constitutional
right, and whether that right was clearly established at the time of the
challenged conduct. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735, 131 S.Ct.
2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). Lower courts have the discretion to
decide which question to analyze first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). The Supreme Court
has cautioned courts to “think carefully before expending scarce
judicial resources to resolve difficult and novel questions of
constitutional or statutory interpretation that will have no effect on the
outcome of the case.” Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also al-
Kidd, 563 U.S. at 735, 131 S.Ct. 2074.
An official's conduct violates clearly established law when, “at the time
of the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently
clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would [have understood] that what
he is doing violates that right.’ ” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741, 131 S.Ct.
2074 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct.
3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). The Supreme Court has stated that this
standard does not require a case directly on point, but requires that
“existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional
question beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741, 131 S.Ct.
2074. “When properly applied, [qualified immunity] protects all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. at
743, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106
S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)); see also Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S.
822, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044, 192 L.Ed.2d 78 (2015).
The dispositive question that the court must ask is “whether the
violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Mullenix
v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015)
(quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742, 131 S.Ct. 2074). The inquiry “must
be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad
general proposition.” Id.; see also Davenport v. Borough of
Homestead, 870 F.3d 273, 281 (3d Cir. 2017). This “clearly
established” standard ensures that an official can reasonably anticipate
when his or her conduct may give rise to liability, and “protects the
balance between vindication of constitutional rights and government
officials' effective performance of their duties.” Reichle, 566 U.S. at
664, 132 S.Ct. 2088.
Woodward v. Sabo, No. 1:19-CV-2048, 2022 WL 620597, at *4–5 (M.D. Pa. Jan.
21, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:19-CV-2048, 2022 WL
614920 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2022). Furthermore, when undertaking this qualified
immunity analysis:
At the “clearly established” step of the qualified immunity analysis, the
question is “whether the officer had fair notice that her conduct was
unlawful.” Courts judge reasonableness against the backdrop of the law
at the time of the conduct. “Although there need not be ‘a case directly
on point for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must
have placed the ... constitutional question beyond debate.’ ” We first
look to factually analogous precedent in the Supreme Court and the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals to determine whether that body of law
clearly establishes the right at issue in such a way that “a reasonable
officer would anticipate liability for this conduct.” We then consider
whether a “robust consensus” of persuasive authority clearly
establishes the right.
Rivera v. Monko, 37 F.4th 909, 919 (3d Cir. 2022) (footnotes omitted).
The instant case calls to mind these guiding legal principles governing
qualified immunity since the parties’ briefs have not identified a single case in which
alleged verbal harassment of an arrestee constituted excessive force in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. Thus, no one has identified factually analogous Supreme
Court precedent or a robust consensus of case law supporting the plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment verbal harassment claims. Finding that there are substantial and
unresolved questions regarding the application of qualified immunity to Trooper
Thomas’ conduct, and acknowledging that qualified immunity is intended “to avoid
‘subject[ing] government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of
broad-reaching discovery’ in cases where the legal norms the officials are alleged to
have violated were not clearly established at the time,” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 526 (1985), we conclude that a stay of discovery is necessary while we address
this legal issue.
An appropriate order follows.
III. Order
In accordance with the accompanying memorandum, IT IS ORDERED as
follows:
First, on or before August 17, 2022, the parties shall submit supplemental
briefs addressing whether Trooper Thomas is entitled to qualified immunity in this
case.
Second, discovery is STAYED pending resolution of the outstanding motion
for judgment on the pleadings. (Doc. 164).
Third, the plaintiff’s motions for additional discovery, (Docs. 173 and 184),
are DENIED without prejudice to renewal of these motions, if necessary, following
the resolution of this potentially dispositive motion.
So ordered this 2d day of August 2022.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge