The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JAMES E. NOTTINGHAM,
Plaintiff CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:19-CV-00595
v.
(MEHALCHICK, M.J.)
JASON COOLEY, et al,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 74); motion for discovery
(Doc. 75); and motion to quash (Doc. 76), filed by pro se prisoner-Plaintiff James E.
Nottingham (“Nottingham”). This is a pro se civil rights action initiated by Nottingham, a
prisoner incarcerated in the State Correctional Institute at Camp Hill (“SCI-Camp Hill”),
upon the filing of a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on April 5, 2019, seeking relief
for alleged excessive force used by Defendants in effectuating his arrest. (Doc. 1). On July 6,
2020, the Court dismissed Nottingham’s claims and closed this matter. (Doc. 48, Doc. 49).
On April 9, 2021, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dismissed
Nottingham’s notice of appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. (Doc. 59). For the following
reasons, Nottingham’s motions shall be denied. (Doc. 74; Doc. 75; Doc. 76).
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Nottingham filed his complaint on April 5, 2019, asserting, what the Court interpreted
to be, Fourteenth Amendment due process and Fourth Amendment excessive force claims.1
1 In Nottingham’s complaint, he names Defendants Laurel Harry, Nancy Butts,
Richard A. Gray, Matthew Welickovitch, Dance Drier, Jason Cooley, Blake Brown, William
Jones, Janet Smith, Stephanie Smith, Brandon Renner, Thomas Markley, Michael Simpler,
Timothy Reitz, and Mary Kilgus (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 1).
(Doc. 1; Doc. 22, at 9). Nottingham’s claims arose from his arrest after he became involved
in a physical altercation with two of his houseguests on July 12, 2015. (Doc. 1, at 4-9, 11-18).
On October 3, 2019, the Court dismissed all of Nottingham’s claims except for those asserted
against Defendants Cooley and Brown for excessive force. (Doc. 22, at 24; Doc. 28, at 2). On
July 6, 2020, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss and closed this case, finding
that Nottingham’s claims were barred under Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations in
§ 1983 actions. (Doc. 48, at 5-6; Doc. 49). On September 28, 2020, Nottingham filed an appeal
to the Third Circuit, which was denied on April 9, 2021, for lack of appellate jurisdiction as
Nottingham’s appeal was untimely. (Doc. 55; Doc. 59).
On April 19, 2021, Nottingham filed a motion to reopen the time for filing an appeal
or grant him an extension of time to file an appeal, explaining that his limited access to the
prison library and legal books during the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting lock-down
preventing him from filing a timely appeal. (Doc. 60, at 1). On August 30, 2021, the Court
denied the motion to reopen as untimely, finding that (1) Nottingham filed the motion well
beyond the 180-day outer limit imposed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) for
filing a motion to reopen; (2) Nottingham requested an extension of time to file an appeal
well beyond the 30-day outer limit imposed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a); and
(3) even if Nottingham had timely filed his motion for extension of time, he failed to
demonstrate “excusable neglect” or “good cause.” (Doc. 63, at 4-5). Subsequently,
Nottingham filed a motion to strike, a petition to open default judgment, a Rule 60 motion,
a petition to strike Defendants’ default judgment, and a motion to strike default judgment.
(Doc. 65; Doc. 66; Doc. 67; Doc. 68; Doc. 69). On May 6, 2022, the Court denied
Nottingham’s motions and requests for relief because (1) the Court may not strike a motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(f); and (2) Nottingham has not obtained authorization to file a
second or successive § 2254 petition. (Doc. 71; Doc. 72).
On June 24, 2022, Nottingham filed the motion for summary judgment, motion for
discovery, and motion to quash, as well as a brief in support. (Doc. 74; Doc. 75; Doc. 76).
II. DISCUSSION
Nottingham has filed multiple pleadings that request relief from judgment that the
Court will now address simultaneously. First, Nottingham filed a “motion for summary
judgment for false claims” under Rule 56. arguing that Defendants’ December 19, 2019,
motion to dismiss and accompanying brief in support (Doc. 37; Doc. 38), constitute as acts
of bad faith and fraud upon the Court. (Doc. 74, at 1). Second, Nottingham filed a motion for
discovery, requesting to conduct discovery “for the defendants[’] act of bad faith in submitting
false and fraudulent material evidence without evidence to support their claims as pleaded in
document[s] 37, and 38.” (Doc. 75, at 1). Third, Nottingham filed a motion to quash
Defendants’ motion to dismiss and brief in support (Doc. 37; Doc. 38), arguing that such
pleadings were submitted in bad faith in violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. (Doc. 76, at 1). As the Court has dismissed this action with prejudice because
Nottingham’s claims are barred by Pennsylvania’s statute of limitation, Defendants have not
responded to these motions.
Construing Nottingham’s pleadings liberally, it appears that Nottingham is seeking
reconsideration of the Court’s dismissal of this action by granting Defendants’ motion to
dismiss. (Doc. 48; Doc. 49). Specifically, in the motion for summary judgment, Nottingham
states:
The state troopers Jason Cooley and Blake Brown w[ere] not acting in their
official capacity as stated in documents 37 and 38, and therefor[e] there is no
genuine issues for trial. Jurors of reasonable minds could agree that the verdict
would have differed if these facts had been presented to the fact-finder.
(Doc. 74, at 1).
In addition, Nottingham moves for discovery “for the defendants[’] act of bad faith in
submitting false and fraudulent material evidence without evidence to support their claims as
pleaded in document[s] 37, and 38.” (Doc. 75, at 1).
A motion for reconsideration is a device of limited utility, which may “not be used as
a means to reargue matters already argued and disposed of or as an attempt to relitigate a
point of disagreement between the Court and the litigant.” Ogden v. Keystone Residence, 226 F.
Supp. 2d 588, 606 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (citations omitted); see also Baker v. Astrue, Civ. No. 07-
4560, 2008 WL 4922015, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2008). Rather, a court may alter or amend
its judgment only upon a showing from the movant of one of the following: “(1) an
intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence . . . or (3) the
need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Max's Seafood Cafe
v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance
Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)). Mere disagreement with the court, however, does not
translate into a clear error of law or fact. Petruzzi's, Inc. v. Darling–Delaware Co., Inc., 983 F.
Supp. 595, 611 (M.D. Pa. 1996). “A motion for reconsideration is not a tool to relitigate and
reargue issues which have already been considered and disposed of by the court.” Petruzzi’s,
Inc., 983 F. Supp. at 611. “Nor is it to be used to put forth additional arguments which could
have been made but which the party neglected to make before judgment.” Waye v. First
Citizen's Nat'l Bank, 846 F. Supp. 310, 314 (M.D.Pa.1994), aff'd, 31 F.3d 1175 (3d Cir. 1994).
In the interest of finality, courts should grant motions for reconsideration sparingly. Rottmund
v. Continental Assurance Co., 813 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
Here, the Court granted the motion to dismiss filed Defendants Cooley and Brown
because Nottingham’s claims are barred by the Pennsylvania two-year statute of limitations
in § 1983 actions. (Doc. 48, at 5-6); see 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5524; Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235,
250 (1989). Specifically, the Court explained that because all of Nottingham’s alleged injuries
were inflicted on July 13, 2015, and Nottingham filed the initial complaint arising from those
injuries on April 5, 2019, his claims are barred under Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations.
(Doc. 48, at 5-6). The Court rejected Nottingham’s argument that the limitations period began
on September 11, 2018, the date his appeal of his criminal charges was decided, because the
limitations period began when Nottingham knew or had reason to know of the injury forming
the basis of his complaint against Defendants. (Doc. 48, at 5 n.2) (citing Montgomery v. De
Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1998)). Accordingly, the Court granted Defendants
Cooley and Brown’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 37), denied as moot Nottingham’s motion for
summary judgment and motion for default judgment (Doc. 33; Doc. 39), and directed the
Clerk of Court to close this matter. (Doc. 49, at 1). It is immaterial whether Defendants
Cooley and Brown were acting in their official capacity because Nottingham’s claims have
been dismissed with prejudice as they are barred under Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations.
Nottingham has not shown a reason to vacate the Memorandum and Order granting
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint because it is barred under Pennsylvania’s statute
of limitations. (Doc. 48, at 5-6; Doc. 49). He has not shown an intervening change in
controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct clear error of law or
prevent manifest injustice. See Max's Seafood Cafe, 176 F.3d at 677. The Court’s order granting
Defendants’ motion to dismiss merely addressed the timeliness of Nottingham’s claim, and
Nottingham does not challenge that finding in his filings. Nottingham merely objects to a
statement in the brief in support of Defendants’ motion to dismiss regarding whether Cooley
and Brown were acting in their official capacities when effectuating Nottingham’s arrest on
July 20, 2020. (Doc. 77, at 1). Therefore, Nottingham has not shown that he is entitled to
reconsideration of the Court’s Order closing this case. See Max's Seafood Cafe, 176 F.3d at 677.
Accordingly, Nottingham’s motions shall be denied. (Doc. 75; Doc. 76).
Next, the Court liberally construes Nottingham’s filings to be a motion for sanctions
against Defendants pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Middle
District Local Rule 7.3, and the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990
(“FCPIAA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2461, on the grounds that the brief in support of Defendants’
motion to dismiss was submitted in bad faith to present a false and fraudulent claim. (Doc.
75, at 1; Doc. 77, at 1); see 28 U.S.C. § 3729(G). Specifically, Nottingham alleges that
Defendants knowingly made false and fraudulent statements with respect to Cooley and
Brown acting in their official capacities when effectuating Nottingham’s arrest. (Doc. 74, at
1; Doc. 77, at 1). Nottingham requests that Defendants be ordered to pay Nottingham’s
reasonable expenses and be held in contempt of court, or subjected to other sanctions,
including a civil penalty under the FCPIAA. (Doc. 77, at 1).
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, in pertinent part:
(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a pleading,
written motion, or other paper-whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later
advocating it-an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the
person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable
under the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass,
cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing law or for establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or,
if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of
information.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
If a party or its counsel violates this provision, the opposing party may move for the
imposition of sanctions, which may include an order directing payment to the movant of “part
or all of the reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses directly resulting from the
violation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c). The purpose of Rule 11 is to correct litigation abuse. Gaiardo
v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 1987). “Fed.R.Civ.P.11 provides for the imposition
of sanctions against counsel or parties acting pro se if the court finds that pleadings or other
papers signed by the counsel or the party are ‘frivolous, legally unreasonable or without
factual foundation, even though . . . not filed in subjective bad faith.’ ” See Flanagan v. Warden,
U.S. Penitentiary, 784 F. Supp. 178, 182 (M.D. Pa. 1992), aff'd sub nom., Flanagan v. Warden
USP-Lewisburg, 6 F.3d 779 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted); see also Doering v. Union Cty. Bd.
of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 1988) (“This Court and others have
interpreted [the] language [of Rule 11] to prescribe sanctions, including fees, only in the
‘exceptional circumstance’ where a claim or motion is patently unmeritorious or frivolous.”)
(citations omitted).
Further, “[t]he legal standard to be applied when evaluating conduct allegedly
violative of Rule 11 is reasonableness under the circumstances.” Ford Motor Co. v. Summit
Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 289 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Business Guides v. Chromatic
Commc'ns Enter., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 546–47 (1991) ). Reasonableness in the context of Rule
11 is “an objective knowledge or belief at the time of the filing of the challenged paper that
the claim was well-grounded in law and fact.” Ford Motor Co., 930 F.2d at 289. “The wisdom
of hindsight is to be avoided; the attorney's conduct must be judged by what was reasonable
to believe at the time the pleading, motion, or other paper was submitted.” Schering Corp. v.
Vitarine Pharm., Inc., 889 F.2d 490, 496 (3d Cir. 1989). Nonetheless, “the imposition of
sanctions for a Rule 11 violation is discretionary rather than mandatory.” Grider v. Keystone
Health Plan Cent., Inc., 580 F.3d 119, 146 n.28 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also Marlowe
Patent Holdings v. Ford Motor Co., No. CIV.A. 11-7044, 2013 WL 6383122, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec.
5, 2013) (“[I]mposing sanctions is an extraordinary remedy to be exercised with restraint.”).
Here, liberally construing Nottingham’s pleadings, the allegedly false statement in
Defendants’ brief in support of their motion to dismiss seems to be the following: “The
Defendants, acting in their capacity as Pennsylvania State Police Troopers, arrested the
Plaintiff on July 12, 2015.” (Doc. 38, at 2). In his complaint, Nottingham names Cooley and
Brown as defendants in this case in their “official/individual capacities.” (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 9-10).
As noted supra, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss and closed this action
because Nottingham’s claims are barred under Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations
for § 1983 actions. (Doc. 48, at 5-6; Doc. 49, at 1). The Court rejects Nottingham’s suggestion
that Defendants were acting in bad faith or submitted a false or fraudulent statement. The fact
that Nottingham disagrees with Defendants’ statement in the brief in support of the motion
to dismiss does not make those statements sanctionable. (Doc. 74, at 1; Doc. 75, at 1; Doc.
77, at 1); see Camacho v. Dean, No. 1:14-CV-01428, 2015 WL 4478755, at *7 (M.D. Pa. July
22, 2015) (denying prisoner’s motion for sanctions where disagreement with statements did
not make them sanctionable). Accordingly, the challenged conduct is not an “exceptional
circumstance” that merits the imposition of sanctions in this case, and the Court declines to
impose sanction against Defendants. See Doering, 857 F.2d at 194.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Nottingham’s motion for summary judgment, motion for
discovery, and motion to quash are DENIED.2 (Doc. 74; Doc. 75; Doc. 76).
An appropriate Order follows.
s/ Karoline Mehalchick
Dated: August 17, 2022
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
2 Nottingham has “established a pattern of groundless and vexatious litigation,” as he
continues to file repetitive motions even after his case has been closed. Chipps v. United States Dist.
Ct. for the Middle Dist. of Pa., 882 F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir. 1989); (Doc. 49). As the Court has closed
this action because Nottingham’s claims are barred under Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of
limitations for § 1983 actions, Nottingham is directed to stop filing pleadings in this case.