Milton v. Angle

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KEVIN MILTON, No. 4:21-CV-01479

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

CLINTON COUNTY

CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JULY 19, 2022

Plaintiff Kevin Milton, who is currently in state custody, filed the instant pro se

Section 19831 lawsuit regarding events that allegedly occurred while he was a pretrial

detainee at Clinton County Correctional Facility (CCCF), in McElhattan,

Pennsylvania. Milton filed his original complaint in August 2021, then filed an

amended complaint four months later. Defendants move to dismiss the claims in the

amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court

will grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ motions.

I. BACKGROUND

In his amended complaint, Milton alleges that while he was in pretrial detention

at CCCF, multiple prison officials violated his constitutional rights. He first asserts

1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves

as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.

that, after being brought to CCCF on January 29, 2021, he was assaulted in the

dayroom on February 6, 2021, by a white supremacist gang known as “1488.”2

According to Milton, he was attacked from behind and beaten in the head, back, and

torso by multiple gang members for several minutes before CCCF correctional staff

intervened.3 Milton contends that he was wrongfully accused of fighting, received a

30-day disciplinary sanction, and was placed in segregation near the same gang

members who had attacked him.4 Milton avers that, during the 16 days he spent in

disciplinary segregation, he endured racist verbal abuse and harassment from the gang

members, which was so pervasive that CCCF staff had to intercede several times and,

ultimately, cut Milton’s disciplinary segregation short by two weeks.5

Milton asserts that, even when back in his housing unit, he did not feel safe.6

He alleges that he was threatened often by other inmates inside his housing unit.7

Milton claims that he sent “numerous requests to the administration” regarding his

safety and well-being.8 He recalls that a “Captain Young” responded and told Milton

he would “handle the situation soon,” but that—during the week of May 20, 2021—

Milton was assaulted by several inmates again, this time while lying in his bed in his

cell.9

2 Doc. 25 at 3 (Milton does not use separate paragraph numbers in his amended complaint, so

the Court will refer to the document’s page numbers).

3 Id.

4 Id.

5 Id.

6 Id.

7 Id.

8 Doc. 25 at 3.

The third assault allegedly occurred on July 9, 2021.10 According to Milton, he

was assaulted once more in his housing unit by multiple inmates without

provocation.11 Milton avers that defendant Lieutenant Rausch then falsified a

disciplinary report to indicate that Milton had struck one of the attackers.12 That

charge, however, was dismissed and Milton was removed from disciplinary

segregation after just two days because closed-circuit video surveillance footage

proved that Milton had not assaulted anyone but rather had been the victim of the

attack.13

Milton further avers that he complained “to the correctional staff and to the

medical department staff on numerous occasions” about the injuries he suffered from

the repeated assaults but that adequate medical care was not provided.14 Milton

alleges that he suffered a swollen and split lip, a jaw fracture, loose teeth, headaches

and eye aches, pain in the neck and back, as well as cuts, bruises, and abrasions.15

However, according to Milton, his complaints were met with “total disregard and/or

lack of treatment and care.”16

Milton next contends that, when he filed grievances and staff requests and

made it known that he was going to file a federal lawsuit against Defendants, he was

met with retaliation in the form of inadequate food and refusal to provide appropriate

10 Id.

11 Id.

12 Id.

13 Id.

14 Doc. 25 at 3.

15 Id.

medical treatment.17 It appears that Milton is asserting that the medical and food-

service Defendants—through their actions or inactions—both created unconstitutional

conditions of confinement and retaliated against him for undertaking protected First

Amendment conduct.

Milton names as defendants Warden Angela Hoover, Deputy Warden S. Ruch,

Captain Ross, Lieutenant Rausch, food service providers Gary Angle and David

Houdeshell, and medical providers Kira Munro and Thomas Laniar.18 He asserts that

Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by detaining him in

unconstitutional conditions of confinement, failing to protect him from inmate

assaults, and failing to provide adequate medical care. He further alleges that

Defendants violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for

undertaking protected conduct. Finally, Milton claims that Defendants are liable for

civil conspiracy under Pennsylvania law.19

All Defendants except Laniar have filed motions to dismiss Milton’s claims

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).20 Those motions are ripe for

disposition.

17 Id. at 4-5.

18 See id. at 2. The Court notes that defendant Thomas Laniar was served by U.S. Marshal on

April 4, 2022. See Doc. 78. To date, Laniar has failed to respond to Milton’s amended

complaint in any way. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a).

19 See Doc. 25 at 7 (citing Sullivan v. Rankin, No. 1:16-cv-2546, 2017 WL 4544619, at *9 (M.D.

Pa. Sept. 29, 2017) (applying Pennsylvania law)).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

courts should not inquire “whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the

claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.”21 The court must accept

as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences

from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.22 In addition to the facts alleged

on the face of the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the

complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents”

attached to a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon

these documents.23

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a

three-step inquiry.24 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the]

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”25 Second, the court should distinguish well-

pleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal

conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be

disregarded.26 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations “and

21 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir.

1996).

22 Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).

23 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.

v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

24 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).

25 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)).

then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”27

Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”28

Because Milton proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally construed and

his amended complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”29 This is particularly true

when the pro se litigant, like Milton, is incarcerated.30

III. DISCUSSION

At the outset, the Court observes that Milton has failed to delineate which

constitutional tort claims are directed at which Defendants. As discussed in more

depth below, Milton exacerbates this problem by failing to allege personal

involvement for many of the named Defendants.

Immediately, the Court must dismiss any conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §

1985(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Milton lists these statutory provisions on the first page

of his amended complaint in conclusory fashion but fails to develop them in any way.

In the only section related to conspiracy, Milton alleges that Defendants are liable for

civil conspiracy under Pennsylvania law. Thus, any claims under Sections 1985 and

1986 must be dismissed.31

27 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

28 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

29 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted).

30 Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

31 See Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015) (explaining that

courts must “identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been violated” and

Milton’s amended complaint, liberally construed, appears to raise three types of

Fourteenth Amendment32 violations: failure to protect, deliberate indifference to

serious medical needs, and unconstitutional conditions of confinement. He also

asserts a First Amendment retaliation claim and the aforementioned state-law civil

conspiracy claim. There are pleading deficiencies with nearly all of Milton’s causes

of action.

A. Failure to Protect

Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Kingsley v.

Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit has not yet addressed in a precedential opinion whether the standard for

alleging a Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-protect claim differs from such a claim

raised under the Eighth Amendment. In Kingsley, the Supreme Court held that, for a

pretrial detainee to prove an excessive force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment,

he must show that the officers’ use of force was objectively unreasonable, not that the

(quoting Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000)). Milton also lists Section 1988 on

the front page of his complaint, but again does not develop this claim at all. Section 1988(b)

permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in a civil rights

action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). However, it is well settled that pro se litigants may not

recover attorney’s fees under Section 1988. See Pitts v. Vaughn, 679 F.2d 311, 313 (3d Cir.

1982).

32 Because Milton alleges he was a pretrial detainee during the time in question, his claims of

failure to protect, inadequate medical care, and conditions of confinement must be analyzed

under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d

229, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (Hubbard II) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979));

Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 164 (3d Cir. 2005) (Hubbard I). Stated differently,

“sentenced prisoners are protected from punishment that is ‘cruel and unusual,’ while

pretrial detainees are protected from any punishment.” Paulino v. Burlington Cnty. Jail, 438

officers were subjectively aware that their use of force was unreasonable.33 After

Kingsley, the Third Circuit—albeit in nonprecedential opinions—has continued to

apply the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard to pretrial detainee

failure-to-protect claims.34

Thus, to state a failure-to-protect claim against a prison official, a pretrial

detainee or convicted prisoner must plausibly plead that “(1) he was incarcerated [or

detained] under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, (2) the official

was deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk to [the plaintiff’s] health and

safety, and (3) the official’s deliberate indifference caused [the plaintiff] harm.”35 In

this context, deliberate indifference is a subjective standard; that is, “the prison

official-defendant must actually have known or been aware of the excessive risk to

inmate safety.”36 Actual knowledge or awareness of a substantial risk to an inmate’s

or detainee’s safety can be proven “in the usual ways, including inference from

circumstantial evidence.”37

Milton’s amended complaint fails to state a failure-to-protect claim because he

does not plausibly plead that any named Defendant was deliberately indifferent to a

33 Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 392; see also Jacobs v. Cumberland County, 8 F.4th 187, 194 (3d Cir.

2021) (acknowledging holding of Kingsley and its effect on Fourteenth Amendment excessive

force claims).

34 See Tapp v. Brazill, 645 F. App’x 141, 146 n.5 (3d Cir 2016) (nonprecedential) (citing Thomas

v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 223 n.4 (3d Cir. 2014)); see also Edwards v.

Northampton County, 663 F. App’x 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2016) (nonprecedential) (citing Colburn

v. Upper Darby Township, 946 F.2d 1017, 1024 (3d Cir. 1991)).

35 Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by Mack

v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).

36 Id. (quoting Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001)).

substantial risk of serious harm. Milton alleges that he “made it known to the unit

officer” of his housing unit and to “the administration” that he felt unsafe after the

first attack, and he additionally asserts that he received a response from “Captain

Young” that Young would “handle the situation soon.”38 Milton, however, does not

identify who the unit officer was or who comprised the “administration” and

purportedly was put on notice by Milton’s complaints. Nor did Milton sue Young.

Consequently, none of Milton’s failure-to-protect allegations implicate any of the

named Defendants, so Milton has failed to plausibly allege that these specific prison

officials knew about the prior assaults or acted with deliberate indifference to an

excessive risk to Milton’s safety.39 This claim, therefore, must be dismissed, but

leave to amend will be granted because Milton may be able to cure this deficiency.

B. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

The same issue regarding pretrial detainees and Fourteenth Amendment

standards following Kingsley arises with Milton’s claim of inadequate medical care.

Again, however, it does not appear that the Third Circuit has established or adhered to

a different standard with respect to pretrial detainee medical indifference claims

versus those raised by incarcerated individuals.40 Accordingly, the Court will apply

38 Doc. 25 at 3.

39 Alternatively, it could be said that Milton has failed to properly plead personal involvement by

Defendants in the alleged constitutional violation. See Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374.

40 See Moore v. Luffey, 757 F. App’x 335, 340 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2019) (nonprecedential) (rejecting

plaintiff’s argument to apply Kingsley’s holding to Fourteenth Amendment medical care claim

and instead analyzing under Eighth Amendment jurisprudence); see also Parker v. Butler

County, 832 F. App’x 777, 780 & n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) (nonprecedential) (applying Eighth

Amendment standard to pretrial detainee medical care claim while acknowledging Fourteenth

existing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to Milton’s Fourteenth Amendment

medical indifference claims.

In the context of prison medical care, the Eighth Amendment “requires prison

officials to provide basic medical treatment to those whom it has incarcerated.”41 To

state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim regarding inadequate

medical care, a plaintiff must plausibly plead “(i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts

or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.”42 A

serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring

treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the

necessity for a doctor’s attention.”43

Deliberate indifference by prison officials may be evidenced by intentional

refusal to provide care known to be medically necessary, delayed provision of medical

treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment, or denial

of reasonable requests for treatment resulting in suffering or risk of injury.44

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is an exacting standard, requiring a

2017) (nonprecedential) (same); Goode v. Giorla, 643 F. App’x 127, 129 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2016)

(nonprecedential) (same); Edwards, 663 F. App’x at 136-37 (citing Natale v. Camden Cnty

Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003)).

41 Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).

42 Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).

43 Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987).

44 See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Lanzaro, 834 F.2d

showing of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”45 Claims sounding in mere

medical negligence will not suffice.46

Milton’s medical indifference claims are deficient as well. He repeatedly

alleges that he was denied “adequate and essential medical care and treatment” by

CCCF “staff” or “medical department staff” without explaining how his treatment was

inadequate or who was responsible for the constitutional violations.47 The only place

in Milton’s amended complaint where any prison official is identified in relation to his

medical claims is in the qualified immunity section, where Milton states that “Medical

Officers K. Munro[] and T. Laniar[] have refused to provide adequate and essential

medical care and treatment” to him.48 This type of broad, conclusory pleading does

not meet the requirements of Twombly and Iqbal. Milton does not allege facts that

would establish the high bar of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” required

for a medical care claim against Munro or Laniar (or any other named Defendant).

Certainly, refusal to provide any medical treatment for the injuries Milton claims he

sustained could plausibly state a medical indifference claim, but that is not what

Milton alleges. Consequently, Milton’s Fourteenth Amendment medical indifference

claim must be dismissed, but leave to amend will be granted.49

45 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted).

46 Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.

47 See, e.g., Doc. 25 at 3, 4, 5, 7.

48 Id. at 7.

49 The Court observes that, in his later motion to amend, Milton provides extensive allegations

regarding Munro’s alleged medical indifference. See Doc. 84 at 1-3. These detailed

allegations—if included in a future amended pleading—could potentially state a Fourteenth

C. Conditions of Confinement

When a pretrial detainee asserts a conditions-of-confinement claim, the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires courts to consider “first,

whether any legitimate purposes are served by the[] conditions, and second, whether

the[] conditions are rationally related to these purposes.”50 If pretrial detainees are

subjected to conditions that are not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental

objective, an inference may be made that the purpose of the prison official’s action is

punishment.51 Thus, “a particular measure amounts to punishment when there is a

showing of express intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials, when the

restriction or condition is not rationally related to a legitimate non-punitive

government purpose, or when the restriction is excessive in light of that purpose.”52

As the Third Circuit instructs, courts confronted with a Fourteenth Amendment

conditions-of-confinement claim must “consider the totality of the circumstances of

confinement.”53

The gravamen of Milton’s conditions-of-confinement claim appears to be that

he was denied adequate or diet-appropriate food on numerous occasions.54 Milton

allegations against Laniar in the motion to amend, on the other hand, sound only in respondeat

superior and thus would not state a claim. See id. at 3.

50 Hubbard II, 538 F.3d at 232 (quoting Union Cnty. Jail Inmates v. Di Buono, 713 F.2d 984,

992 (3d Cir. 1983)).

51 Hope v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 326 (3d Cir. 2020).

52 Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999,

1005 (7th Cir. 1999)).

53 Hope, 972 F.3d at 326 (citing Hubbard I, 399 F.3d at 159-60).

54 See Doc. 25 at 1 (alleging failure to provide adequate “medical care” and “food,” and failure

to protect). Although Milton also appears to refer to denial of medical care as an

alleges that he is diabetic and is on a “heart healthy food diet with no soy.”55 He

claims that the food service department was aware of these dietary restrictions yet

served him inappropriate or insufficient meals on at least 32 separate occasions.56 He

asserts that this caused him to “go hungry or solely rely upon the commissary food

stuffs” he purchased on his own.57 Milton further claims that there was no legitimate

penological reason for these actions, but instead that they were intended as retaliation

for his First Amendment conduct. Presumably, this claim is leveled at the food-

service Defendants—Houdeshell and Angle.58

Milton has plausibly stated a Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-

confinement claim against Houdeshell and Angle. His allegations, taken as true, infer

that he was repeatedly denied medically necessary meals for no legitimate reason,

which raises an inference of punishment under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Specifically, he alleges that Houdeshell and Angle “repeated[ly] refused to provide

adequate meals that are medically required for [his] dietary and health specific needs

its own Fourteenth Amendment cause of action. Lastly, in the qualified immunity section of

his amended complaint, Milton avers that Ruch, Ross, and Rausch failed to provide “safe and

adequate housing and shelter (constant unit and cell flooding from the sewer drains, lack of

ventilation in the Housing Unit Quarters, no Fire Sprinklers in the Housing Unit Quarters)[.]”

Id. at 7. Milton does not develop these conclusory allegations or explain how Ruch, Ross, and

Rausch were personally involved in their creation, nor does he explain the extent of the

conditions or how the conditions affected him. Nevertheless, because leave to amend is being

granted, Milton may, if he is able, amend his pleadings to show how Ruch, Ross, and Rausch

were personally involved in causing or perpetuating these alleged conditions of confinement

(beyond mere respondeat superior liability), the extent of the conditions, how they affected

Milton, and how they rose to the level of punishment under the Fourteenth Amendment.

55 Doc. 25 at 5.

56 Id.

57 Id. at 7.

(diabetic and food allergies), in spite of numerous requests (electronic and verbal)

from both [Milton] and correctional staff at this facility[.]”59 Milton likewise asserts

that Houdeshell was aware of these conditions and acted with deliberate indifference

toward them.60 Milton’s Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim

against Houdeshell and Angle, therefore, can withstand Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6)

challenge.

D. Retaliation

Although a prisoner’s constitutional rights are necessarily circumscribed, an

inmate still retains First Amendment protections when they are “not inconsistent”

with prisoner status or with the “legitimate penological objectives of the corrections

system.”61 To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must plausibly

plead that (1) “he was engaged in constitutionally protected conduct,” (2) he suffered

an “adverse action” by prison officials sufficient to deter a person of ordinary

firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights, and

(3) the plaintiff’s protected conduct was a “substantial or motivating factor” in the

prison officials’ decision to take the adverse action.62

All Defendants except Munro and Laniar challenge the final prong: causation.

Munro asserts lack of personal involvement, while Laniar—as previously noted—has

59 Id.

60 See id. at 5 (alleging that Houdeshell responded to one of Milton’s many complaints by stating,

“[T]ell him to eat commissary!”).

61 Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d

775, 781 (3d Cir. 2010)).

62 Id. (quoting Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001)); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d

not responded to Milton’s amended complaint.

Milton argues that the “adverse actions” taken by prison officials were the other

Fourteenth Amendment violations. His argument is confusing because he appears to

simultaneously claim that (a) the adverse actions (the unconstitutional conditions of

confinement, lack of medical care, etc.) existed before he filed the grievances and

were the impetus for his grievances, and (b) the adverse actions (the unconstitutional

conditions of confinement, lack of medical care, etc.) were the retaliatory result of the

grievances he filed. Nevertheless, because Milton is permitted to plead in the

alternative,63 the Court will examine whether Milton has plausibly alleged causation.

Milton alleges that he filed a total of 109 “requests” to the staff of CCCF

beginning in March 2021 and continuing through November 2021.64 He appears to

assert that, once he started filing his “grievances and complaints” and the instant civil

lawsuit, “he start[ed] having problems with his daily meals.”65 He also alleges that

the lack of medical treatment “start[ed] after [he] beg[an] to file his grievances and

continue[d] once it [was] known that he ha[d] engaged in a civil action against the

facility and staff.”66 These statements lack any factual basis explaining how

Defendants had knowledge of Milton’s protected activity such that it would be a

substantial or motivating factor in their allegedly retaliatory conduct.67

63 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(2), (3).

64 Doc. 25 at 5.

65 Id.

66 Id.

67 At one point in his amended complaint, Milton alleges that he had “made known that he was

going to initiate a Federal Civil Action against the prison and the defendants,” Doc. 25 at 4,

The only portion of Milton’s amended complaint that plausibly alleges

causation appears under the qualified immunity heading, where he states that

Houdeshell’s and Angle’s repeated refusals to provide adequate meals “correspond

with complaints and grievances filed,” which Milton contends is “clearly retaliation

against” him.68 As for Munro, she is correct that Milton’s amended complaint does

not allege that she was personally involved in the retaliation, nor does it plausibly

plead causation for her.

Milton’s retaliation claim, as it currently exists, survives only as to Houdeshell

and Angle. Leave to amend will be granted, however, because it is possible that

Milton could cure the noted deficiencies as to other Defendants.

E. State-Law Civil Conspiracy

Milton argues that all Defendants conspired to violate his civil rights by

punishing him in an effort to “coerce or induce him to stop filing his grievances” and

taking other “legal measures.”69 Stated more succinctly, Milton is asserting that

Defendants conspired to violate his First Amendment rights and thus committed the

state tort of civil conspiracy.

Under Pennsylvania law, to state a claim for civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must

plausibly allege “that two or more persons combined or agreed with intent to do an

unlawful act or to do an otherwise lawful act by unlawful means. Proof of malice,

knowledge was imparted by Milton in relation to the timing of the adverse actions. In sum,

this single statement is too vague to plausibly show a causal connection for any Defendant.

68 Id. at 7.

i.e., an intent to injure, is essential in proof of a conspiracy.”70

Defendants argue that Milton’s threadbare recitals do not set forth a plausible

conspiracy claim. Defendants are correct. Milton must do more than simply state that

Defendants “conspired” or “acted in concert” to violate his First Amendment rights.71

A plaintiff asserting a claim for civil conspiracy must aver “material facts which will

either directly or inferentially establish [the] elements of conspiracy.”72 Mere

conclusory allegations stating that there was a “conspiracy” or “an agreement to act

unlawfully” will not suffice.73

Milton’s allegations are conclusory and lack any factual averments regarding

an agreement or common plan between Defendants. Accordingly, the state-law civil

conspiracy claim must be dismissed as to all Defendants.

F. Official Capacity Claim

Milton sues one Defendant—Hoover—in her official capacity.74 This official

capacity claim cannot withstand Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny, however, because Milton fails

to identify a policy or custom by Clinton County that violated his constitutional rights.

70 Skipworth by Williams v. Lead Industries Ass’n, 690 A.2d 169, 174 (Pa. 1997) (citation

omitted).

71 See Doc. 25 at 7.

72 Brown v. Blaine, 833 A.2d 1166, 1173 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (citation omitted).

73 See id.; see also Brown v. Everett Cash Mut. Ins. Co., 157 A.3d 958, 967-68 (Pa. Super. Ct.

2017) (explaining that “bald assertions of conspiracy are insufficient to properly

plead civil conspiracy; [a] plaintiff must set forth facts supporting [the] existence of a

conspiracy that would suggest [a] common plan or scheme” to act unlawfully (citation

omitted)).

An official capacity claim against a prison official is akin to suing the “entity of

which [the] officer is an agent.”75 Here, that entity is Clinton County, a “local

government unit.”76 To assert a Section 1983 claim against Clinton County, Milton

must identify a policy or custom emanating from this entity that caused him

constitutional injury.77 Milton’s amended complaint does not do so. Consequently,

the official capacity claim against Hoover must be dismissed.

IV. LEAVE TO AMEND

Generally, “in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints subject to

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment

would be inequitable or futile.”78 Milton, in fact, has sought leave to file a second

amended complaint.79 His proposed second amended complaint, however, does not

address many of the deficiencies identified herein. That document, moreover,

contains extensive legal argument, which is not required at the pleading stage.

The Court will permit Milton to file a second amended complaint in accordance

with the foregoing discussion. Milton, if able, may amend some or all of the claims

that are being dismissed.

If Milton chooses to file a second amended complaint in conformity with this

Memorandum, it should be a stand-alone document, complete in itself and without

75 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978).

76 Id. at 690.

77 Id. at 690-91.

78 Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).

reference to any previous pleadings. The second amended complaint should set forth

all Milton’s claims in short, concise, and plain statements, and in sequentially

numbered paragraphs. Milton must include every claim that he intends to pursue—

even those that survived Defendants’ motions to dismiss—and should identify which

claim is being asserted against which defendant (or defendants). Milton must also

name proper defendants, specify the offending actions taken by a particular defendant,

sign the second amended complaint, and indicate the nature of the relief sought.

If, on the other hand, Milton chooses not to amend his pleadings, his case will

proceed on his Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim and his First

Amendment retaliation claim. As it currently stands, those two claims would

implicate defendants Houdeshell and Angle only.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant the motions to dismiss (Docs. 31,

74) by defendants Hoover, Ruch, Ross, Rausch, and Munro. The Court will grant in

part and deny in part the motion to dismiss (Doc. 69) by defendants Houdeshell and

Angle, as specified herein. The claims against defendant Laniar will be dismissed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Leave to amend will be granted. An

appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge