Brown v. LT. MAXWELL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GARTOR KIKI BROWN, : Civil No. 3:18-CV-1527

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

:

LT. MAXWELL, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

I. Factual Background

The plaintiff, Gartor Kiki Brown, is a state inmate who filed in the instant

case in 2018, lodging a series of sweeping claims against prison staff arising out of

allegations that Brown was physically and sexually assaulted by another prisoner,

Kaheim Allen, while these two inmates were housed together at SCI Huntingdon

between February 3 and 8, 2018. Over the span of this longstanding litigation, the

remaining claims in Brown’s lawsuit have been narrowed considerably. At this

juncture, Brown’s sole remaining legal claims are Eighth Amendment failure to

protect claims lodged against Defendants Maxwell, Plocinik, Johnston, and

Fochtman, as well as Eighth Amendment medical deliberate indifference claims

brought against Defendants Johnston and Fochtman.

With the extant claims in this case framed in this fashion, the defendants have

filed a motion in limine, (Doc. 174), which seeks to preclude Brown, who is now

proceeding pro se, from referring to or presenting evidence at trial relating to these

claims that have previously been dismissed. This motion is now ripe for resolution.1

Upon consideration of this motion, for the reasons set forth below, the motion is

GRANTED in part as follows: Absent the express approval of the trial judge,

following a proffer of relevance by the plaintiff and a full consideration of the

positions of the parties, the plaintiff shall be precluded from referring to these claims

that have been dismissed.

II. Discussion

A. Motions in Limine—Guiding Principles

The Court is vested with broad inherent authority to manage its cases, which

carries with it the discretion and authority to rule on motions in limine prior to trial.

See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984); In re Japanese Elec. Prods.

Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 260 (3d Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.,

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (the court

exercises its discretion to rule in limine on evidentiary issues “in appropriate cases”).

Courts may exercise this discretion in order to ensure that juries are not exposed to

1 We note that Brown did not respond to this motion and the time for filing a response

has now passed.

unfairly prejudicial, confusing, or irrelevant evidence. United States v. Romano, 849

F.2d 812, 815 (3d Cir. 1988). Courts may also do so in order to “narrow the

evidentiary issues for trial and to eliminate unnecessary trial interruptions.” Bradley

v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1069 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).

However, courts should be careful before doing so.

In considering motions in limine that call upon the Court to engage in

preliminary evidentiary rulings under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, we

begin by recognizing that these “evidentiary rulings [on motions in limine] are

subject to the trial judge’s discretion and are therefore reviewed only for abuse of

discretion . . . . Additionally, application of the balancing test under Federal Rule of

Evidence 403 will not be disturbed unless it is ‘arbitrary and irrational.’ ” Abrams v.

Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1213 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see

Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v. J.H., 42 F.3d 149, 161 (3d Cir. 1994) (reviewing in

limine rulings for abuse of discretion). One of the key guiding principles governing

the exercise of this discretion is reflected in the philosophy that shapes the rules of

evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence can aptly be characterized as evidentiary

rules of inclusion, which are designed to broadly permit fact-finders to consider

pertinent factual information while searching for the truth. Adopting this broad view

of relevance, it has been held that

Under [Rule] 401, evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make

the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of

the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the

evidence.” [Therefore] “[i]t follows that evidence is irrelevant only

when it has no tendency to prove the fact. Thus the rule, while giving

judges great freedom to admit evidence, diminishes substantially their

authority to exclude evidence as irrelevant.”

Frank v. County of Hudson, 924 F. Supp. 620, 626 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing Spain v.

Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 452 (3d Cir. 1994) (quotations omitted)). Rule 402 of the

Federal Rules of Evidence, in turn, provides that all “[r]elevant evidence will be

admissible unless the rules of evidence provide to the contrary.” United States v.

Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 745 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).

Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence then sets legal grounds for

exclusion of some evidence, stating that:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion

of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue

delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

Fed. R. Evid. 403.

These broad principles also shape and define the scope of this Court’s

discretion in addressing motions in limine like those filed by the parties here, which

seek a pre-trial ruling excluding evidence on relevance and prejudice grounds. In the

past, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has cautioned against

the preliminary, wholesale exclusion of evidence, noting that it has “made clear that

rulings excluding evidence on Rule 403 grounds should rarely be made in limine.”

Walden v. Georgia–Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 518 n. 10 (3d Cir. 1997). The reason

for this caution is evident: oftentimes a court “cannot fairly ascertain the potential

relevance of evidence for Rule 403 purposes until it has a full record relevant to the

putatively objectionable evidence.” Id.; see also In re Diet Drugs Products Liability

Litigation, 369 F.3d 293, 314 (3d Cir. 2004). As the Court of Appeals has observed

when advising against excessive reliance on motions in limine to exclude evidence

under Rule 403:

[M]otions in limine often present issues for which final decision is best

reserved for a specific trial situation. American Home, 753 F.2d at 324;

cf. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41–42, 105 S. Ct. 460, 463–64,

83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984) (holding that criminal defendant must testify to

preserve claim of improper impeachment with prior conviction) (“The

[in limine] ruling is subject to change when the case unfolds,

particularly if the actual testimony differs from what was contained in

the defendant’s proffer. Indeed even if nothing unexpected happens at

trial, the district judge is free, in the exercise of sound judicial

discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling.”). This is particularly

true when the evidence is challenged as irrelevant or prejudicial; the

considerations weighed by the court will likely change as the trial

progresses. See Rosenfeld v. Basquiat, 78 F.3d 84, 91 (2d Cir. 1996)

(“Unlike rulings that involve balancing potential prejudice against

probative value, the ruling in the present case was not fact-bound and

no real purpose other than form would have been served by a later

objection.”). We have also made clear that rulings excluding evidence

on Rule 403 grounds should rarely be made in limine. “[A] court cannot

fairly ascertain the potential relevance of evidence for Rule 403

purposes until it has a full record relevant to the putatively

objectionable evidence. We believe that Rule 403 is a trial-oriented

rule. Precipitous Rule 403 determinations, before the challenging party

has had an opportunity to develop the record, are therefore unfair and

improper.” Paoli I, 916 F.2d at 859; see also In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB

Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 747 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Paoli II”). Under these and

similar circumstances, if a district court makes a tentative pre-trial

ruling, it has the opportunity to “reconsider [its] in limine ruling with

the benefit of having been witness to the unfolding events at trial.”

United States v. Graves, 5 F.3d 1546, 1552 (5th Cir. 1993).

Walden, 126 F.3d at 518 n. 10.

There is, however, a caveat to these legal tenets that urge caution in

considering motions in limine. Courts are frequently called upon to consider such

motions in cases like the instant case where it is alleged that a plaintiff is endeavoring

to introduce evidence relating to claims that have been dismissed. Reasoning that

evidence regarding dismissed claims that have failed as a matter of law typically has

little relevance, courts have often excluded evidence of dismissed claims from trial.

See e.g., Branch v. Brennan, No. 2:17-CV-00777, 2019 WL 3892850, at *2 (W.D.

Pa. Aug. 19, 2019); Devine v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Pub. Educ., No. 2:13-CV-220, 2015

WL 7301149, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2015); Brown v. Johnson & Johnson, No.

CV 12-4929, 2015 WL 12834346, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2015); Moore v. Univ.

of Pittsburgh of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., No. CV 02-1734, 2005 WL

8165154, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2005). However, those courts that have excluded

this evidence often have done so without prejudice to the plaintiff presenting some

specific and narrowly tailored offer of proof as to the relevance and admissibility of

particular evidence. Id.

Guided by the principles we turn to consideration of the instant motion in

limine.

B. The Motion in limine will be Granted in Part.

In this case, the defendants seek something that is commonly granted—an

order forbidding reference at trial to claims that have been dismissed. We note that

Brown may contend at trial that some evidence concerning these previously

dismissed claims is still relevant to her sole remaining Eighth Amendment claims.

Accordingly, consistent with caselaw governing the exercise of discretion in this

field, this motion in limine will be granted in part as follows: absent the express

approval of the trial judge, following a proffer of relevance by the plaintiff and a full

consideration of the positions of the parties, the plaintiff shall be precluded from

referring to these claims that have been dismissed.

By adopting this course, we provide clear guidance to Mr. Brown that he may

not refer to claims that have been dismissed at trial without first explaining to the

trial judge why specific evidence is relevant and obtaining the trial judge’s approval.

Following this path avoids the concerns that justify motions in limine—ensuring that

juries are not exposed to unfairly prejudicial, confusing, or irrelevant evidence,

Romano, 849 F.2d at 815, and “narrow[ing] the evidentiary issues for trial and to

eliminate unnecessary trial interruptions.” Bradley, 913 F.2d at 1069 (citation

omitted). Yet following this course does not absolutely preclude Brown from

presenting specific evidence if he can first demonstrate its relevance through a

narrowly tailored offer of proof.

An appropriate order follows.

S/Martin C. Carlson

Martin C. Carlson

United States Magistrate Judge

DATED: July 5, 2022.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GARTOR KIKI BROWN, : Civil No. 3:18-CV-1527

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

:

LT. MAXWELL, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 5th day of July 2022, in accordance with the accompanying

Memorandum, upon consideration of the defense motion in limine (Doc. 174), which

seeks to preclude Brown, who is proceeding pro se, from referring to or presenting

evidence relating to claims that have previously been dismissed at the trial of this

case, IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED in part as follows: Absent the

express approval of the trial judge, following a proffer of relevance by the plaintiff

and a full consideration of the positions of the parties, the plaintiff shall be precluded

from referring to these claims that have been dismissed.

S/ Martin C. Carlson

Martin C. Carlson

United States Magistrate Judge