Robertson v. Anglemeyer

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KASHIF M. ROBERTSON, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:20-1736

Plaintiff : (JUDGE MANNION)

v. :

RICHARD ANGLEMEYER, et al., :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

I. BACKGROUND

Presently before the court is Magistrate Judge Schwab’s January 31,

2022 report and recommendation, (hereinafter “report”), (Doc. 48), which

recommends that the defendants’ motion to dismiss, (Doc. 32), the amended

civil rights complaint, under 42 U.S.C. §1983, filed by the pro se prisoner

Kashif M. Robertson, (Doc. 30), be granted. The report finds that the

amended complaint in which the plaintiff alleges that he was unlawfully kept

under supervised release, for about two months, by two county probation

officers after his maximum sentence expired should be dismissed for several

reasons.1

After being granted an extension of time, Robertson filed objections to

Judge Schwab’s report on April 11, 2022. (Doc. 52). The defendants did not

respond to Robertson’s objections and the time within which a response was

due has expired.

For the following reasons, the report, (Doc. 48), will be ADOPTED IN

ITS ENTIRETY, and the defendants’ motion to dismiss, (Doc. 32),

Robertson’s amended complaint, (Doc. 30), will be GRANTED, to the extent

discussed below. Robertson’s objections to the report, (Doc. 52), will be

OVERRULED. Robertson’s requests for a stay of this case, (Doc. 30 at 5,

para. 4.4 & Doc. 52 at 2), will be DENIED.

II. STANDARD

When objections are timely filed to the report and recommendation of

a magistrate judge, the district court must review de novo those portions of

1The report summarizes the relevant 2016 and 2017 criminal dockets

of Robertson and his sentences imposed by the Dauphin County Court. See

Commonwealth v. Robertson, CP-22-CR-0002594-2016 and

Commonwealth v. Robertson, CP-22-CR-0002276-2017. The court takes

judicial notice of Robertson’s state court criminal dockets which can be found

at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/CpDocketSheet. Also, since the

report, (Doc. 48 at 4-10), accurately summarizes Robertson’s sentences in

his 2016 and 2017 criminal cases, it will not be repeated herein.

the report to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); Brown v.

Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011). Although the standard is de novo,

the extent of review is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge,

and the court may rely on the recommendations of the magistrate judge to

the extent it deems proper. Rieder v. Apfel, 115 F.Supp.2d 496, 499 (M.D.

Pa. 2000) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)).

For those sections of the report and recommendation to which no

objection is made, the court should, as a matter of good practice, “satisfy

itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept

the recommendation.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), advisory committee notes; see

also Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 465, 469

(2010) (citing Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1987)

(explaining judges should give some review to every Report and

Recommendation)). Nevertheless, whether timely objections are made or

not, the district court may accept, not accept or modify, in whole or in part,

the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C.

§636(b)(1); M.D. Pa. Local Rule 72.3.

III. DISCUSSION

Since the complete background of this case is stated in Judge

Schwab’s report, (Doc. 48), it will not be repeated herein.2 Suffice it to say

that Robertson, an inmate at the Dauphin County Prison, filed his pro se

amended complaint on April 28, 2021. (Doc. 30). He essentially alleges that

the two Dauphin County probation officer defendants, Richard Anglemeyer

and Jason Snyder, violated his 8th Amendment rights by keeping him on

supervision for about two months, i.e., from March 1, 2020, to April 28, 2020,

after his maximum sentence expired in his 2016 criminal case. On May 18,

2021, defendants filed their motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. 32). Specifically, Anglemeyer and

Snyder argue that the court should dismiss Robertson’s amended complaint

since they are entitled to 11th Amendment immunity and absolute immunity,

since Robertson’s claims are barred by the favorable-termination rule of

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994),

and since they are entitled to qualified immunity. The report analyzes

2Also, since Judge Schwab states the correct applicable legal standard

for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), as well as the correct pleading

standard, they shall not be repeated herein. Further, Judge Schwab states

the correct applicable legal standards with respect to the 11th Amendment

and the Younger abstention doctrine, and they will not be repeated.

defendants’ contentions and Robertson’s claims, and recommends that the

amended complaint be dismissed in its entirety for a myriad reasons.

Robertson sues Anglemeyer and Snyder in both their individual and

official capacities. Robertson seeks injunctive relief as well as compensatory

and punitive damages against the defendants.

The court will now address the report’s findings seriatim.

1. 11th Amendment immunity

The report recommends that the defendants’ motion to dismiss be

granted to the extent that Robertson is deemed as seeking damages against

defendants in their official capacities since they are barred by the 11th

Amendment. However, it finds that the damages claim against defendants in

their individual or personal capacities is not barred by the 11th Amendment.

No doubt that insofar as Robertson has sued defendants Anglemeyer

and Snyder in their official capacities, any claims for damages are barred by

the 11th Amendment. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–67, 105

S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (holding that claims for damages against

a state officer acting in his official capacity are barred by the 11th

Amendment); see also Pisciotta v. Szelewski, 2015 WL 2455166, *3 (W.D.

Pa. May 22, 2015) (holding that “Congress has not expressly abrogated

Pennsylvania’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from civil rights suits for

damages.”). Thus, to the extent Robertson asserts claims for monetary

damages against defendants in their official capacities, they will be

dismissed.

The report is also correct that Robertson’s claims for damages

against Anglemeyer and Snyder in their individual or personal capacities are

not barred by the 11th Amendment. See id.

Next, the report finds that while claims against state officials in their

official capacities for prospective injunctive relief are not barred by the 11th

Amendment under Ex parte Young, see Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d

23, 26 (3d Cir.1981) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52

L.Ed. 714 (1908). However, the report correctly concludes that Robertson’s

claims for injunctive relief against the defendants in their official capacities

are barred by the 11th Amendment since “[h]e does not allege facts that raise

a reasonable inference that either defendant Anglemeyer or defendant

Snyder will in the foreseeable future be in a position to misconstrue or

miscalculate another sentence of his.”

As such, Robertson’s claims against defendants in their official

capacities for injunctive relief will be dismissed because they are barred by

the 11th Amendment since he is seeking relief for past conduct of the

defendants, i.e., he alleges that the defendants in the past miscalculated his

sentence as to the length of his supervision, as opposed to alleging that in

the foreseeable future he is likely to suffer injury from the defendants.

2. Absolute Immunity

The report also finds that defendants are not entitled to dismissal of

the plaintiff’s claims for damages (in their individual capacities) based on

absolute immunity due to their positions as probation officers.

“A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on the basis of absolute immunity is

appropriate so long as the allegations of [the] complaint ... indicate the

existence of absolute immunity as an affirmative defense, and the defense

... clearly appear[s] on the face of the complaint.” Lyszkowski v. Gibbons,

686 Fed.Appx. 87, at 90 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted)

(quoting Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1989). Here, these

conditions are not met as the report finds since “Robertson alleges that the

defendants failed to comply with the court’s sentencing order as to

the 2016 docket and continued his probation supervision even after his

maximum sentence expired” and, these allegations do not show that the

defendants were engaged in adjudicatory duties which would be protected

by absolute immunity.

“When probation officers act in an executive capacity, i.e., charg[ing]

[a defendant] with wrongdoing and present[ing] evidence to that effect,

[supervising a defendant’s probation, investigating his compliance with

probation conditions, and issuing probation violations, and computation of

the amount of prior sentence credit due a defendant], they “are not entitled

to absolute [quasi-judicial] immunity from suit, but only to a qualified, good-

faith immunity.” Lyszkowski, 686 Fed. Appx. at 91 n. 6 (citing Harper v.

Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281, 284 (3d Cir. 1986) (internal quotations omitted). Here,

the defendants were acting in an executive capacity and, thus are not entitled

to absolute immunity. The court will address below the reports finding that

the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Thus, the report correctly recommends that the defendants’ motion to

dismiss be denied based on absolute immunity.

3. Heck Favorable-Termination Rule

Further, the report finds that defendants are not entitled to dismissal of

Robertson’s amended complaint based on Heck’s favorable-termination rule.

“In Heck, ‘the Supreme Court held that where success in a §1983 action

would implicitly call into question the validity of conviction or duration of

sentence, the plaintiff must first achieve favorable termination of his available

state or federal habeas remedies to challenge the underlying conviction or

sentence.’” Lyszkowski, 686 Fed. Appx. at 91 (quoting Williams v. Consovoy,

453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006)). Also, “Heck applies to claims against [a]

probation officer related to probation revocation decisions.” Id. (citation

omitted). The report points out that “Robertson is not challenging the

revocation of his probation as to [his] 2016 [criminal case] or the sentence

he received after that revocation”, [r]ather, he claims that the defendants kept

him on supervision even after the maximum term of his sentence expired.”

Here, the report finds that since Robertson has sufficiently alleged that he

received a favorable termination as to the calculation of his sentence in his

2016 Dauphin County Court criminal case, “the defendants are not entitled

to dismissal of the amended complaint based on the favorable-termination

rule of Heck.”

Thus, the report correctly recommends that the defendants’ motion to

dismiss be denied based on Heck.

4. Qualified Immunity

Finally, the report finds that defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity as to Robertson’s claims for damages in their personal capacities

since it concludes that the defendants did not violate clearly established

federal law.3 Robertson alleges that the two probation officer defendants

3Since the report, (Doc. 48 at 32-34), states the correct applicable legal

standard for qualified immunity as well as the elements for an 8th Amendment

claim for detaining a prisoner beyond his maximum sentence, they shall not

be repeated herein. The court also concurs with the report’s finding that since

the defendants failed to address whether Robertson stated a cognizable 8th

violated his 8th Amendment rights by keeping him on supervised parole for

about two months, i.e., from March 1, 2020, to April 28, 2020, after his

maximum sentence expired. However, the report explains in detail why the

relevant time period for Robertson’s claim is actually from April 1, 2020 to

April 28, 2020, and why Robertson was still on parole as to his 2017 case

during the relevant time frame.4 (Doc. 48 at 37-38).

As mentioned, since the defendant probation officers were acting in an

executive capacity by allegedly continuing Robertson’s supervision after his

maximum sentence expired with respect to his 2016 criminal case, they may

be entitled to qualified immunity with regard to Robertson’s claims for

damages. See Lyszkowski, 686 Fed. Appx. at 91 n. 6 (citing Harper, 808

F.2d at 284). “Qualified immunity ‘protects government officials from liability

for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.’” Andrew v. Buskirk, 775 F.App’x 737, 741 (3d Cir. 2019) (citation

Amendment claim, the focus will be on the qualified immunity analysis and

whether the defendants violated a clearly established right.

4The report, (Doc. 48 at 37 n. 14), correctly notes that Robertson’s

requests for the court to stay his case, (Doc. 30 at 5, para. 4.4 & Doc. 52 at

2), if the court finds that he was still under supervision with respect to his

2017 criminal case during the relevant time, while he proceeds with his state

court appeals. However, this will be denied since the instant case “does not

concern a claim based on the sentence in the 2017 [case].”

omitted). Further, ‘[i]t is available ‘regardless of whether the government

official’s conduct results from a mistake of law, mistake of fact, or mistake

based on mixed questions of law and fact.’” Id. (citation omitted). Generally,

the Third Circuit has “found that claims alleging over-detention [or, similarly,

over-supervision] under state law are best resolved under the ‘clearly

established’ [qualified immunity analysis] prong, rather than the ‘alleged

violation’ prong.” Id.

“A right is clearly established when ‘it would be clear to a reasonable

officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’” Id.

(citations omitted). Further, the court must “assess an alleged right in the

specific context of the case”, and “look to the objective legal reasonableness

of the officer’s actions ‘in light of the legal rules that were clearly established

at the time [the action] was taken.’” Id. (citation omitted).

No doubt that under Pennsylvania law, “[a] sentence for violation of

parole ‘is limited only by the maximum sentence’ that could have been

imposed under the original sentence.” Id. at 740 (citing Commonwealth v.

Presley, 193 A.3d 436, 445 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018). Robertson claims that the

defendants kept him on probation supervision after the expiration of his

maximum term of his sentence in his 2016 case.

The report, (Doc. 48 at 38), concludes that “given that Robertson was

on parole as to the 2017 docket during the relevant time frame, we cannot

say that the defendants violated clearly established federal law in keeping

him under supervision even if they erroneously told him that he was being

supervised during the relevant time frame under the 2016 docket as well as

the 2017 docket.” The report, (Id. at 38-39), then finds that since “the parties

have not pointed to any cases, nor are we aware of any cases, that hold that

a probation or parole officer violates an individual’s Eighth Amendment rights

by continuing supervision under similar circumstances”, “we conclude that

the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from Robertson’s claim for

damages.”

The court agrees with the sound reasoning of the report since the

defendants could not have known that Robertson was being subject to

unwarranted punishment, the first required element of his 8th Amendment

claim, see Wharton v. Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 241 (3d Cir. 2017), since he

was still on supervision as to his 2017 case during the relevant time. As such,

“[b]ecause the defendants did not have knowledge of a constitutional

violation, [Robertson] is unable to satisfy the first element of the ‘clearly

established’ test.” Andrew v. Buskirk, 775 F.App’x at 741-742.5

Thus, the court concurs with the report’s finding that the defendants

did not violate clearly established law in supervising Robertson with respect

to his 2016 case after his maximum sentence expired.

The court has considered all of the findings in Judge Schwab’s report

recommending that the defendants’ motion to dismiss Robertson’s amended

complaint be granted, to the extent stated above, and finds no clear error of

law. As such, the court agrees with the sound reasoning which has led Judge

Schwab to the conclusions in her report.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the court will ADOPT IN ITS ENTIRETY

Judge Schwab’s report and recommendation, (Doc. 48), and it will GRANT

the defendants’ motion to dismiss, (Doc. 32), Robertson’s amended

5As noted above, the report, (Doc. 48 at 34), states the correct three

elements a plaintiff must demonstrate to establish an official’s violation of a

clearly established right with regard to an 8th Amendment over-detention

claim, the court does not repeat it herein. See also Montanez, 603 F.3d at

252.

complaint, (Doc. 30), to the extent stated above. An appropriate order

follows.

s/Malachy E. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

Date: June 27, 2022

20-1736-01