Amaechi v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ULUOCHA AMAECHI, : Civil No. 1:21-CV-1177

:

Plaintiffs, :

:

v. :

: (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

DISTRICT COUNCIL 89, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

Uluocha Amaechi, the pro se plaintiff and a former employee of the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, filed this action against several individual

Commonwealth employees—Melissa Williams, Donna Enrico, and Anthony

Reda—and District Council 89, American Federation of State, County, Municipal

Employees (“AFSCME”). Amaechi’s pleadings have gone through several iterations

but the current operative pleading is the plaintiff’s second amended complaint. As

we read it, in this second amended complaint Amaechi alleges violations of his First

and Fourteenth Amendment rights against the individual defendants pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 arising from his termination in January of 2021.

These individual defendants have now filed a motion to dismiss the Second

Amended Complaint, arguing that the plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to

support his allegations that they violated his constitutional rights. (Doc. 41). After

consideration, we agree, and we will grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

II. Background

The factual background of this Memorandum Opinion is taken from the well-

pleaded facts alleged in plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 35), which we

must accept as true for purposes of the instant motion to dismiss. Uluocha Amaechi

began employment with the Commonwealth in 2018 as an Economic Development

Analyst. (Doc. 35, ¶ 39). The Second Amended Complaint alleges that in 2019,

Amaechi was placed on a Corrective Action Plan (“CAP”) for his less than

satisfactory job performance, during which he was subjected to periodic employee

performance reviews. (Id., ¶¶ 42-43). Then, on December 2, 2020, a predisciplinary

conference (“PDC”) was held to address Amaechi’s performance issues. (Id., ¶ 12).

At this PDC, Amaechi was suspended without pay pending an investigation into his

alleged unsatisfactory job performance. (Id.) Amaechi voiced his intention at the

PDC to file a grievance pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”).

(Id., ¶¶ 12-13). Amaechi’s suspension without pay was memorialized in a letter he

received on December 7, 2020. (Id., ¶ 15).

With respect to the individual defendants, the complaint alleges that Melissa

Williams was Amaechi’s direct supervisor, and Donna Enrico was Williams’

supervisor. (Id., ¶ 40). As to Williams, Amaechi avers that Williams did not offer

him one-on-one training when he began his employment with the Commonwealth.

(Id., ¶ 41). In March of 2019, Amaechi was placed on a CAP due to his less than

satisfactory job performance, and as his supervisor, Williams took part in reporting

Amaechi’s progress on his Employee Performance Reviews (“EPR”). (Id., ¶ 44).

The complaint alleges a host of assertions that Williams wrote false information in

these EPRs, including allegations that Amaechi was sleeping at his desk, and that he

was having conversations with others during virtual staff meetings, allegations

which Amaechi denies. (Id., ¶¶ 44, 51). Amaechi further alleges that Williams was

reporting poor performance by the plaintiff in the EPRs, while simultaneously

acknowledging via email or phone that Amaechi was improving. (Id., ¶ 52).

The complaint also alleges that Williams disparaged Amaechi and

embarrassed him in front of his colleagues. (Id., ¶ 61). Amaechi contends that his

personal information was left on his desk where others could see it; he was laughed

at on a conference call with Williams and Enrico; he was made to take ownership of

a mistake that was not his; and he was lectured by Williams in front of his colleagues

rather than in private. (Id., ¶¶ 68-71). As to Enrico, Amaechi contends that she did

not step in and intervene when Williams was disparaging him. (Id., ¶ 80). He further

asserts that Williams and Enrico frustrated his job performance and improvement by

failing to timely respond to his questions, giving him burdensome instructions, and

providing incorrect job guidance. (Id., ¶ 62). 

Following his PDC hearing on December 2, 2020, where he was suspended

without pay pending an investigation into his job performance, Amaechi submitted

a three-page grievance with fourteen attachments via email to Williams, on

December 4, 2020. (Id., ¶ 13). On this email, he copied Enrico and Booker Bates, an

AFSCME representative. (Id.) After some back and forth between Amaechi and

AFSCME representatives regarding the proper filing of a grievance and the

documents needed to file a grievance, Amaechi submitted a formal grievance. (Id.,

¶¶ 16-23). A first step meeting ultimately took place on May 20, 2021. (Id., ¶ 31).

Amaechi contends that at this hearing, AFSCME and the Commonwealth failed to

explain why they did not produce documents that the plaintiff had requested. (Id., ¶

31). Amaechi further alleges that the Commonwealth employees acted in concert

with AFSCME by failing to present documents and misrepresenting the facts of

Amaechi’s case. (Id., ¶ 32).

On June 4, 2021, Anthony Reda, a Human Resources Analyst, emailed

AFSCME to inform the union of the Commonwealth’s findings and to inform them

that there was no violation of the CBA when Amaechi was suspended and ultimately

terminated. (Doc. 33-3, at 16-18). Thereafter, on June 4, 2021, Amaechi received a

letter informing him that AFSCME determined his grievance was without merit.

(Doc. 35, ¶ 34). According to Amaechi, AFSCME characterized his grievance as

“mere gripes,” a “list of demands,” and “opinions and disagreements.” (Id., ¶ 37).

The grievance was withdrawn without prejudice on June 15, 2021. (Id., ¶ 35).

It is against this factual backdrop that Amaechi filed the instant action on July

2, 2021. (Doc. 1). The initial complaint named the Commonwealth and AFSCME as

defendants. (Id.) Thereafter, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and Amaechi

filed a motion to amend his complaint. We granted the plaintiff’s motion to amend,

and the amended complaint was filed, omitting the Commonwealth as a defendant

but adding two of the individual defendants—Melissa Williams and Donna Enrico.

(Doc. 18). AFSCME moved to dismiss the amended complaint, and Amaechi again

moved to amend his complaint. We granted the plaintiff’s motion, and the second

amended complaint, which added Anthony Reda as a defendant, is now the operative

pleading in this case. (Doc. 35). The complaint brings claims under § 1983, alleging

that the individual defendants and AFSCME violated Amaechi’s First and

Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Williams, Enrico, and Reda have now moved to dismiss the claims against

them. (Doc. 41). On this score, the amended complaint asserts that these defendants

violated Amaechi’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they allegedly

interfered with the grievance process and provided false information in his EPRs

which led to his termination. He further asserts in a summary fashion that the

Commonwealth employees acted in concert with the union to deprive him of his

constitutional rights. Finally, in one conclusory allegation, Amaechi contends that

he was disciplined more severely than other coworkers because of his race. For their

part, the defendants contend that Amaechi failed to properly serve them, and thus

his complaint should be dismissed. Moreover, they assert that the plaintiff has failed

to state constitutional claims against them. The motion is fully briefed and is ripe for

resolution. (Docs. 42, 45, 47). For the reasons that follow, we will grant the

defendants’ motion to dismiss.

III. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss – Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for

the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for

the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal

court, stating that:

Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in

recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our

opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir.

2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s decision in

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S.B, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards

have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more

heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than

the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc.,

20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s

bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v.

Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court

need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not

alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a

plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

actions will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has

underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon

which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to

dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no

more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 679.

According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather,

in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has

advised trial courts that they must:

[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than

conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual

allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Id., at 679.

Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain

more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations

sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere

speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:

[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First,

the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The

District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as

true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court

must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are

sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In

other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s

entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement

with its facts.

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.

As the Court of Appeals has observed:

The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for

overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The

plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard

when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).

This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts

“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, [ ] “stops short of the

line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’ ”

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,

132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012).

In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a

three-step analysis:

First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead

to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should

identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions,

are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where

there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement for relief.”

Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint,

attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263,

268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic

document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the

plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar.

Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover,

“documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no

party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be

considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir.

2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002)

(holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the

pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be

considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary

judgment”). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in

determining a motion to dismiss, or when determining whether a proposed amended

complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).

B. The Defendants’ Motion Will Be Granted.1

As we have explained, Amaechi brings constitutional claims against

Williams, Enrico, and Reda, alleging violations of his First and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. Amaechi asserts these claims pursuant to § 1983, which does not

by its own force create new and independent legal rights to damages in civil rights

actions. Rather, § 1983 simply serves as a vehicle for private parties to bring civil

actions to vindicate violations of separate and pre-existing legal rights otherwise

guaranteed under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Albright v. Oliver,

510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).

Therefore, any analysis of the legal sufficiency of a cause of action under § 1983

must begin with an assessment of the validity of the underlying constitutional and

statutory claims advanced by the plaintiff.

In this regard, it is also well settled that:

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of federally protected

rights caused by persons acting under color of state law. The two

essential elements of a § 1983 action are: (1) whether the conduct

complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state

law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of a federally

protected right. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).

1 The defendants contend that Amaechi’s complaint should be dismissed because it

was never properly served on the Commonwealth defendants. However, because we

conclude that Amaechi’s constitutional claims are without merit, we do not decide

the question of whether Amaechi properly served these defendants.

Boykin v. Bloomsburg Univ., 893 F. Supp. 409, 416 (M.D. Pa. 1995), aff’d, 91 F.3d

122 (3d Cir. 1996). Thus, it is essential to any civil rights claim brought under §

1983 that the plaintiff allege and prove that the defendants were acting under color

of law when that defendant allegedly violated the plaintiff’s rights. In the instant

case, the individual defendants are Commonwealth employees, and they are alleged

to have violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights with respect to their involvement

in the termination of his public employment. Accordingly, it is undisputed that these

defendants were acting under color of state law for purposes of the plaintiff’s

constitutional claims. See Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 24 (3d Cir.

1997) (“[T]he essence of section 1983’s color of law requirement is that the alleged

offender, in committing the act complained of, abused a power or position granted

by the state”).

With respect to his First Amendment claim, Amaechi contends that these

individual defendants acted in concert with the union representatives to interfere

with the pre-termination and post-termination administrative processes. At the

outset, we note that Amaechi’s grievance regarding his termination may not even

fall within First Amendment’s protections since it appears that this grievance related

to essentially private disputes between Amaechi and his supervisors regarding his

job performance. Thus, the grievance process in this case did not implicate matters

of public concern cloaked in First Amendment protections. See Borough of Duryea,

Pa. v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 397 (2011) (“If a public employee petitions as an

employee on a matter of purely private concern, the employee’s First Amendment

interest must give way, as it does in speech cases”); Thomas v. Delaware State Univ.,

626 F. App’x 384, 388 (3d Cir. 2015) (union-related grievance did not involve matter

of public concern, and thus, was not protected speech under the First Amendment);

Emigh v. Steffee, 442 F. App’x 660, 666 (3d Cir. 2011) (same).

However, even if we concluded that Amaechi’s union grievance regarding his

termination somehow constituted protected activity under the First Amendment,

Amaechi has not shown how that activity was interfered with in a way that violated

his First Amendment rights. Amaechi plainly disagrees with the outcome of this

process but does not allege that his right to speak out was unconstitutionally stifled.

Instead, the second amended complaint seems to simply complain about how others

exercised their right to speak out during these proceedings. The amended complaint

sets forth allegations that Williams provided allegedly false information in her EPRs,

which ultimately led to a PDC and Amaechi’s suspension and termination. However,

Amaechi does not allege that any of the individual defendants interfered with the

grievance process. Moreover, Defendant Reda appears to be the only individual

defendant who was involved post-termination, in that he worked for Human

Resources and issued a letter to the union confirming the investigation into

Amaechi’s work performance. In our view, the amended complaint fails to set forth

factual allegations from which we can infer that any of the individual defendants

interfered with the grievance process. Accordingly, we find no First Amendment

violation here.2

We similarly conclude that Amaechi has failed to state a Fourteenth

Amendment claim against these defendants. First, to the extent that Amaechi raises

an equal protection claim based on race, we note that there is only one single

conclusory allegation, which avers that Amaechi was disciplined more harshly than

other colleagues because of his race. (Doc. 35, ¶ 73). However, and significantly,

there are no other allegations in the complaint which would give rise to a race-based

equal protection claim, and this conclusory allegation, standing alone, is insufficient

to support such a claim. See e.g., Danihel v. Office of President of U.S., 616 F.

App’x 467, 470-71 (3d Cir. 2015) (conclusory allegations that other individuals were

treated better than the plaintiff were insufficient to state an equal protection claim);

Young v. New Sewickley Twp., 160 F. App’x 263, 266 (3d Cir. 2005) (dismissing

a plaintiff’s equal protection claim under Rule 8 where the complaint failed to

identify any occasions or circumstances in which the plaintiff was treated differently

2 We note that the potential implications of Amaechi’s First Amendment claim are

sweeping in that it would convert every factual dispute between a worker and his

supervisors and every adverse grievance resolution in a public employment context

into a constitutional infraction. In the absence of compelling legal authority

accepting this far reaching view of the First Amendment, we are reluctant to embrace

this claim.

than other coworkers). Accordingly, we will dismiss any Fourteenth Amendment

equal protection claim against these defendants.

As for the plaintiff’s due process claim, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits

states from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of

law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The Third Circuit has held that an individual has

a property interest in public employment “when state law confers such an interest by

statute or contract.” Heneghan v. Northampton Community College, 493 F. App’x

257, 259 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Unger v. Nat’l Residents Matching Program, 928

F.2d 1392, 1398 (3d Cir. 1991)). When this is the case, a public employee is entitled

to pre-termination and post-termination administrative procedures. See Cleveland

Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547–48 (1985).

However, on this score, it is well settled that “[w]here a due process claim is

raised against a public employer, and grievance and arbitration procedures are in

place, we have held that those procedures satisfy due process requirements ‘even if

the hearing conducted by the Employer ... [was] inherently biased.’” Dykes v.

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 68 F.3d 1564, 1571 (3d Cir. 1995)

(quoting Jackson v. Temple University, 721 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1983)). Further, the

alleged failure of a union to seek arbitration is a matter that can be brought to the

state courts, as state law authorizes Courts of Common Pleas to order completion of

a CBA’s arbitration procedure. Heneghan, 493 F. App’x at 260 (citing Dykes, 68

F.3d at 1751) (holding that a unions failure to seek arbitration does not “render the

process unavailable or inadequate”). Thus, the Court of Appeals has found that “the

availability of this safeguard under Pennsylvania law satisfies due process even if

the original hearing conducted by the employer was biased and the union refused to

take the employee’s claim to arbitration.” Id.

In the instant case, Amaechi contends that the Commonwealth employees

provided false reports on his EPRs, which led to a PDC and his ultimate suspension

and termination. He then avers in a conclusory fashion that the Commonwealth

defendants acted in concert with his union to deprive him of due process during the

PDC and subsequent grievance process. However, as we have explained, these

administrative processes made available to Amaechi under the CBA, processes of

which he availed himself, are sufficient to satisfy the due process requirements of

the Fourteenth Amendment, even if the employer’s administrative process was

inherently biased. Indeed, “where an adequate grievance/arbitration procedure is in

place and is followed, a plaintiff has received the due process to which he is entitled.”

Dykes, 68 F.3d at 1565. Here, Amaechi took part in the disciplinary process and

subsequent grievance process and had union representation throughout. His

grievance was ultimately withdrawn and found to be without merit, and the union

decided not to submit the grievance to arbitration. As we have noted, Pennsylvania

state law also provides an additional safeguard to employees like Amaechi who are

dissatisfied with their union’s failure to submit a grievance to arbitration. This

constitutes the process that was due to the plaintiff in this setting.

In closing, the complaint in this case simply fails to assert sufficient

allegations to support a First Amendment claim against any of the individual

defendants. Moreover, while Amaechi was dissatisfied with the results of his

Corrective Action Plan, the predisciplinary process, and his ultimate termination, the

second amended complaint makes clear that pre-termination and post-termination

processes were available to Amaechi and that he, in fact, availed himself of these

processes. Although he did not receive the outcome he hoped for, he was afforded

all the process the law requires. Accordingly, we will grant the defendants’ motion

to dismiss the complaint.3

3 We also note that, even if Amaechi had stated a colorable constitutional claim, the

defendants would still be entitled to qualified immunity in this case. Qualified

“immunity from liability attaches to government officials except where 1) the

plaintiff has alleged facts showing a violation of a constitutional right, and 2) at the

time of the challenged conduct, the right the defendant violated was clearly

established.” Rivera v. Monko, No. 20-2531, 2022 WL 2145179, at *3 (3d Cir. June

15, 2022). Further:

At the “clearly established” step of the qualified immunity analysis, the

question is “whether the officer had fair notice that her conduct was

unlawful.” Courts judge reasonableness against the backdrop of the law

at the time of the conduct. “Although there need not be ‘a case directly

on point for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must

have placed the ... constitutional question beyond debate.’ ” We first

look to factually analogous precedent in the Supreme Court and the

Third Circuit Court of Appeals to determine whether that body of law

Finally, we are mindful of the fact that in civil rights cases pro se plaintiffs

often should be afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint

is dismissed in its entirety, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors,

482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless granting further leave to amend is not

necessary in a case such as this where amendment would be futile or result in undue

delay, Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). We note, however, that

we have already provided Amaechi ample opportunity to amend his complaint in

light of prior motions to dismiss filed by the defendants. In fact, the operative

pleading in this case is Amaechi’s second amended complaint. Thus, in the face of

the defendants’ legal objections to the sufficiency of his pleadings Amaechi has

twice endeavored to amend his complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted but to no avail. This pleading still fails to state a claim upon which relief

clearly establishes the right at issue in such a way that “a reasonable

officer would anticipate liability for this conduct.” We then consider

whether a “robust consensus” of persuasive authority clearly

establishes the right.

Id., at *6 (footnotes omitted). Here, Amaechi has not identified any “robust

consensus” of legal authority supporting his claims, nor can he. Therefore, this

complaint also fails on qualified immunity grounds, a basis for dismissal that we

may consideration sua sponte in appropriate cases. Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 312

(3d Cir. 2001).

may be granted. On these facts, we find that further amendment would be futile and

lead to further, undue delay. Accordingly, we will dismiss this complaint with

prejudice.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Commonwealth defendants’

motion to dismiss (Doc. 41) will be GRANTED, and the second amended complaint

will be dismissed as to Williams, Enrico, and Reda.

An appropriate order follows.

Dated: June 17, 2022

S/ Martin C. Carlson

Martin C. Carlson

United States Magistrate Judge