Garrus v. Houser

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NAKIA WILLIAM GARRUS, No. 4:21-CV-01580

Petitioner, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

MORRIS HOUSER,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JUNE 7, 2022

Petitioner Nakia Williams Garrus is currently incarcerated at the State

Correctional Institution, Benner Township (SCI Benner), in Bellefonte,

Pennsylvania. He filed the instant pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking to challenge various decisions made by the

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Parole Board). Because Garrus’s

Section 2254 petition fails to implicate cognizable constitutional concerns or

violations of federal law, the Court must deny his petition.

I. BACKGROUND

The factual background of this case is set forth in painstaking detail in the

February 3, 2021 decision of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.1 The

Court need not repeat this lengthy and complicated factual history; rather, the

1 See Garrus v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. 198 C.D. 2020, 250 A.3d 544, 2021 WL 359680,

Court will simply adopt and incorporate it herein, as Garrus does not assert that the

state court made any factual errors.

In the Commonwealth Court, Garrus raised three challenges regarding

decisions by the Parole Board: “(1) whether the [Parole] Board erred by failing to

grant him credit for the time he spent at liberty on parole; (2) whether the [Parole]

Board erred by requiring him to serve his new sentence consecutively to his

original sentence; and (3) whether the [Parole] Board erred by altering his

judicially imposed sentence.”2 The Commonwealth Court affirmed the Parole

Board on all three claims.3 These challenges are, not coincidentally, nearly

identical to the issues Garrus asserts in his Section 2254 petition. The problem,

however, is that his claims do not implicate that he is “in custody in violation of

the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States.”4 Accordingly, for the following

reasons, the Court will deny Garrus’s Section 2254 petition.

II. DISCUSSION

A federal habeas court does not sit as a court of appeals for state-court

adjudications on state-law issues.5 Federal habeas courts are statutorily limited in

2 Id. at *1.

3 See id. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied Garrus’s petition for allowance of appeal

several months later. Garrus v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. 109 MAL 2021, 261 A.3d

1031 (Pa. Aug. 24, 2021) (per curiam) (table).

4 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

5 See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a

federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”).

jurisdiction, and may only “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.”6 Simply put, state-law errors do not create a basis for federal

habeas corpus relief.7

Even when questions of federal law are adjudicated on the merits in state

court, a federal court’s power to grant habeas relief for a state criminal conviction

is narrowly circumscribed by Section 2254(d). That provision precludes habeas

relief unless the state court’s adjudication of the federal claim “(1) resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;

or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”8

It is clear from reviewing Garrus’s Section 2254 petition and memorandum

of law that he misunderstands this Court’s jurisdiction. Garrus opens his

memorandum by “petition[ing] this Court . . . for review of the Commonwealth

Court[’s]” February 3, 2021 decision affirming the Parole Board.9 Although

Garrus states in conclusory fashion that he is “alleging Eighth and Fourteenth

6 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added).

7 Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010).

8 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Wilson, 562 U.S. at 5-6.

9 Doc. 2 at 1.

Amendment” violations,10 he does not explain how his claims of Parole Board

error implicate constitutional concerns. Garrus additionally styles his

memorandum like an appellate brief or a petition for allowance of appeal, further

implying that he is seeking appellate review (or something like it) of the state-

agency and state-court decisions.11 He lists three “Questions Presented for

Review,” all of which assert that the Parole Board or Commonwealth Court erred

in some way in their respective decisions.12 Those issues are:

1. Whether the [Parole Board] lacks statutory authority to revoke

street time credit previously granted to a parolee as a technical

parole violator (TPV) when it subsequently recommits the

parolee as a convicted parole violator.

2. Whether the [Parole] Board erred by not allowing Petitioner to

serve his new sentence concurrently with his original sentence.

3. Whether the Board erred by altering his judicially imposed

sentence and did the Commonwealth Court err in concluding that

Petitioner had waived his argument that the [Parole] Board

lacked authority to change his judicial sentence when the issue

was apparently raised in his administrative appeal as it was

clearly addressed by the Parole Board in its response.13

The Court declines to review the decision of the Commonwealth Court (or

the Parole Board) because it does not have the authority or jurisdiction to do so.

Federal habeas courts cannot “reexamine state-court determinations on state-law

10 See id.

11 See generally Doc. 2. Regardless of styling, the Court will endeavor to determine whether

Garrus raises any cognizable federal habeas claims in his petition.

12 Id. at 5.

13 Id.

questions.”14 Garrus’s “Questions Presented for Review” plainly implicate state-

law issues as determined by a state agency and affirmed by a state court on appeal.

None of his claims involve a federal question or constitutional claim, which is

likely why the only supporting law Garrus cites in his petition is Pennsylvania

statutory and case law regarding parole determinations.15 This Court cannot, and

will not, review for error the state-law determinations of the Parole Board or the

Commonwealth Court.

Applying exceedingly liberal construction, it is possible that Garrus is

asserting that the Parole Board’s decisions were arbitrary, thus violating his

substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.16 The Fourteenth

Amendment’s due process clause “contains a substantive component that bars

certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the

procedures used to implement them.”17 With respect to parole determinations, the

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that a parole board’s

decision can violate an inmate’s substantive due process rights if it applies

“standards that are divorced from the policy and purpose of parole” or other

14 Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68.

15 See Doc. 2 at 3 (table of authorities).

16 See Doc. 10-1 at 34-35, 36 (Garrus alleging, as part of his administrative appeal, “substantive

due process” violations by Parole Board).

17 Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 782 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S.

113, 125 (1990)).

“impermissible criteria.”18 Specifically, the specter of a substantive due process

violation is raised only when “a parole board considers a factor that ‘shocks the

conscience.’”19 If, however, there is “some basis” for the parole board’s decision,

and that basis is not “constitutionally impermissible” or conscience shocking, a

substantive due process challenge must fail.20

The only decision that could possibly be considered a potential substantive

due process issue is the Parole Board’s imposition of 12 months’ “backtime” for

Garrus’s new conviction of unsworn falsification to authorities.21 This 12-month

backtime determination exceeded the regulatory presumptive range of 3 to 6

months.22 However, the Parole Board provided ample justification for its upward

deviation from the presumptive range, basing its decision on “Garrus’s poor

adjustment to supervision, early failure on parole, failure to comply with sanctions,

prior parole violations, and declaration of delinquency.”23 There is nothing

conscience shocking, impermissible, or arbitrary about this determination.

18 See Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 236 & n.2, 238, 240 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Burkett v. Love,

89 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1996) (“In Block, the . . . panel majority concluded that in [using

arbitrary criteria for denying parole], the [Parole Board] violated substantive due process in

grounding its action on constitutionally impermissible reasons.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

19 Holmes v. Christie, 14 F.4th 250, 267 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Newman, 617 F.3d at 782).

20 See Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 487 (3d Cir. 2001).

21 All other issues asserted by Garrus in the Commonwealth Court and in his instant petition deal

with legal determinations regarding Pennsylvania law and Parole Board authority. These

claims do not fall within this Court’s habeas jurisdiction.

22 See Garrus, 2021 WL 359680, at *3.

23 Id.

None of Garrus’s other claims regarding Parole Board or Commonwealth

Court error are cognizable on habeas review. Accordingly, the Court must deny

Garrus’s Section 2254 petition.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Garrus’s petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court will likewise deny a certificate

of appealability, as Garrus has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of

a constitutional right.24 An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

24 See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).