The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KENNETH BROWN, : CIVIL NO: 1:20-CV-02395
:
Plaintiff, : (Magistrate Judge Schwab)
:
v. :
:
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting :
Commissioner of Social Security,1 :
:
Defendant. :
:
ORDER
May 19, 2022
I. Introduction.
Plaintiff Kenneth Brown is seeking social security disability benefits. The
Commissioner of Social Security filed a motion to dismiss this action. Brown has
not filed a brief in opposition to that motion to dismiss. For the reasons set forth
below, we will grant the Commissioner’s unopposed motion to dismiss.
1 Kilolo Kijakazi is now the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, and she is
automatically substituted as the defendant in this action. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
25(d) (providing that when a public officer sued in his or her official capacity
ceases to hold office while the action is pending, “[t]he officer’s successor is
automatically substituted as a party”); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any action instituted
in accordance with this subsection shall survive notwithstanding any change in the
person occupying the office of Commissioner of Social Security or any vacancy in
such office.”).
II. Background and Procedural History.
In 2016, Brown filed an application for disability insurance benefits under
Title II of the Social Security Act. See doc. 19-1 at 2–3, ¶ 3(a) (Declaration of
Janay Podraza). An administrative law judge denied his application after a
hearing, and the Appeals Council later denied his request for review. Id. at 3,
¶¶ 3(a), 3(b). Brown, represented by counsel, then filed a civil action in this court
challenging the final decision of the Commissioner denying him benefits. See
Brown v. Berryhill, 1:19-cv-00389 (M.D. Pa.). On October 7, 2020, then Chief
Judge Jones affirmed the decision of the Commissioner and entered judgment in
favor of the Commissioner. Id. at doc. 26. Brown did not appeal that decision to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. See docket sheet in Brown
v. Berryhill, 1:19-cv-00389 (M.D. Pa.).
On December 18, 2020, Brown, proceeding pro se, began this action by
filing a complaint under Title II of the Social Security Act again seeking disability
insurance benefits. Doc. 1. The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate
judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and the case was referred to the undersigned.
Doc. 13. On September 10, 2021, the Commissioner filed motion to dismiss the
complaint and a brief in support of that motion. Docs. 18, 19. We ordered Brown
to file a brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss. See doc. 20. But Brown has
not filed a brief in opposition. For the reasons set forth below, we will grant the
Commissioner’s unopposed motion to dismiss.
III. Discussion.
At the outset, we note that it is not clear from Brown’s complaint in this case
if he is seeking benefits for the same, or a different, period than that at issue in his
prior case (Brown v. Berryhill, 1:19-cv-00389 (M.D. Pa.)). Either way, the case
must be dismissed. But the reasons for dismissal differ depending on whether
Brown is seeking benefits for the same period at issue in his prior case or whether
he is seeking benefits for a different period.
A. To the extent that Brown is seeking benefits for a different period
than that at issue in the prior case, this court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction.
The Commissioner contends that because Brown “has not completed his
Federal Court Appeal process or exhausted the administrative process,” the court
should dismiss this action because the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Doc.
19 at 5. The Commissioner’s argument is based on the judicial-review provision
of the Social Security Act, which provides, in pertinent part:
Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party,
irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review
of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days
after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within
such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may
allow.
42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g). “This provision clearly limits judicial review to a particular
type of agency action, a ‘final decision of the [Commissioner of Social Security]
made after a hearing.’” Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 108 (1977) (quoting
§ 405(g)). This requirement “contains two separate elements: first, a
‘jurisdictional’ requirement that claims be presented to the agency, and second, a
‘waivable . . . requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the
[Commissioner] be exhausted.’” Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1765, 1773 (2019)
(quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328 (1976)). “Without a ‘final
decision,’ a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review a Social
Security benefit determination.” Chailla v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 838 F.
App’x 653, 655 (3d Cir. 2020).
Here, the Commissioner contends, and Brown does not dispute, that after
judgment was entered in favor of the Commissioner in his prior case in this court,
Brown did not file another application for benefits with the Commissioner or
obtain a final decision after a hearing. Given that it is not in dispute that Brown
has not obtained a final decision, to the extent that Brown is seeking benefits for a
period different from that at issue in his prior case, we agree with the
Commissioner that we do not have subject-matter jurisdiction.
B. To the extent that Brown is seeking benefits for the same period as
that at issue in the prior case, his claim is barred by claim preclusion or
res judicata.
The Commissioner also points out that Brown did not appeal the prior
judgment in favor of the Commissioner in Brown v. Berryhill, 1:19-cv-00389
(M.D. Pa.). Instead, Brown filed this second action. To the extent Brown is again
seeking judicial review of the same decision of the Commissioner denying him
benefits based on his earlier (2016) application for benefits, Brown is challenging a
final decision after a hearing. Thus, subject-matter jurisdiction is not at issue. But
Brown’s complaint fails for a different reason—claim preclusion or res judicata.
“Claim preclusion—which some courts and commentators also call res
judicata—protects defendants from the risk of repetitious suits involving the same
cause of action once a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a final judgment
on the merits.” Beasley v. Howard, 14 F.4th 226, 231–32 (3d Cir. 2021) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). There are three requirements for claim
preclusion based on a federal court judgment: ‘“(1) a final judgment on the merits
in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent
suit based on the same cause of action.”’ Id. at 232 (quoting In re Healthcare Real
Est. Partners, LLC, 941 F.3d 64, 72 (3d Cir. 2019)).
Here, all three requirements for claim preclusion or res judicata are met:
there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior case; this case and the prior
case involve the same parties—Brown and the Commissioner; and to the extent
that Brown is seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision denying him benefits
based on his 2016 application for benefits, this case and the prior case are based on
the same cause of action.
In sum, to the extent that the Brown is seeking benefits for a different period
from that at issue in his earlier case, this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
And to the extent that Brown is seeking benefits in this case for the same period as
was at issue in the prior case, his claim is barred by claim preclusion or res
judicata. Either way, this action must be dismissed. Thus, we will grant the
Commissioner’s unopposed motion to dismiss.
IV. Order.
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner’s
unopposed motion (doc. 18) to dismiss is GRANTED and this case is dismissed.
The Clerk of Court shall close this case.
S/Susan E. Schwab
Susan E. Schwab
United States Magistrate Judge