Cooper v. Ransom

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BRUCE X. COOPER, No. 4:21-CV-01793

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

JOHN WETZEL, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

APRIL 28, 2022

Plaintiff Bruce X. Cooper filed the instant pro se Section 19831 action,

claiming constitutional violations and state-law negligence with respect to COVID-

19 pandemic management at his prison. Defendants have moved to dismiss the

complaint in its entirety pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The

Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

During all relevant times, Cooper has been incarcerated at the State

Correctional Institution in Dallas, Pennsylvania (SCI Dallas).2 At the time he filed

his complaint, Cooper described himself as a 65-year-old “elderly male” who has

1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves

as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.

v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002).

been in state custody for over 30 years.3 He alleges that he has preexisting

hypertension, heart disease, pulmonary disease, and “a host” of other serious

medical conditions.4

Cooper avers that, due to gross mismanagement, facility disrepair and lack

of ventilation, absence of oversight, insubordination of rank-and-file correctional

officers, and failure to enforce Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC)

policy, the COVID-19 virus5 spread unchecked throughout SCI Dallas and he was

eventually infected.6 He asserts that, as a result of his infection, he suffered serious

side effects including deep vein thrombosis (DVT) and long-term respiratory

problems, as well as mental and emotional injuries.7 He names as defendants three

DOC officials: John Wetzel (then-Secretary of Corrections), Kevin Ransom

(Superintendent of SCI Dallas), and Erin Brown (Director of the Office of

Population Management).8 Cooper claims that these officials had full knowledge

3 Id. ¶ 7.

4 Id.

5 The COVID-19 virus is also known as “severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2”

and “SARS-CoV-2.” Naming the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) and the Virus that

Causes It, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-

coronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/naming-the-coronavirus-disease-(covid-2019)-and-the-

virus-that-causes-it (last visited Apr. 25, 2022). The Court refers to the virus herein as “the

COVID-19 virus” and to the disease it causes as “COVID-19.”

6 See generally Doc. 11 ¶¶ 8-74.

7 Id. ¶¶ 60, 75, 77.

8 Id. ¶¶ 4-6.

of the conditions at SCI Dallas and either took no action or instituted practices that

exacerbated the pandemic’s effects at the facility.9

In September 2021, Cooper filed a lengthy, detailed complaint in the Court

of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania.10 After being served,

Defendants removed the case to this Court.11 In his complaint, Cooper asserts a

Section 1983 Eighth Amendment claim against all Defendants alleging

unconstitutional conditions of confinement.12 He also sets forth state-law

negligence claims against Wetzel and Ransom.13 Defendants move to dismiss

Cooper’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).14 That

motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire

“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to

offer evidence to support the claims.”15 The court must accept as true the factual

allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from them in the

9 Id. ¶¶ 39, 46, 50-51, 55, 68-73.

10 See Doc. 1-1 at 1.

11 Doc. 1 at 1.

12 Doc. 11 ¶¶ 80-84. Cooper sets out two counts under an Eighth Amendment umbrella, but these

purportedly separate counts are really a single conditions-of-confinement claim involving the

alleged conditions at SCI Dallas to which Cooper was subjected during the height of the

COVID-19 pandemic. See id.

13 Id. ¶¶ 85-89.

14 Doc. 4.

15 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir.

1996).

light most favorable to the plaintiff.16 In addition to the facts alleged on the face of

the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint,

matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents” attached to

a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these

documents.17

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a

three-step inquiry.18 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the]

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”19 Second, the court should distinguish well-

pleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal

conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be

disregarded.20 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations

“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”21

Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”22

Because Cooper proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally construed

and his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent

16 Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).

17 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.

v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

18 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).

19 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)).

20 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

21 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

22 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”23 This is particularly true

when the pro se litigant, like Cooper, is incarcerated.24

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that Cooper’s allegations do not state a cognizable Eighth

Amendment claim. They also posit that Brown should be dismissed because the

allegations concerning prison transfers do not, as a matter of law, set forth a

constitutional violation. They further contend that, as to the negligence allegations

against Wetzel and Ransom, such claims are barred by sovereign immunity. The

Court will address the sufficiency of Cooper’s claims in turn.

A. Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement

“[T]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons . . .

which house persons convicted of serious crimes[] cannot be free of discomfort.”25

Nevertheless, the state cannot subject an inmate to cruel and unusual punishment

or “inhumane treatment,” such as deprivation of “identifiable human need[s]” like

“food, warmth, or exercise.”26 To prevail on an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-

confinement claim, a plaintiff must show both objective and subjective elements.27

Objectively, the prisoner must demonstrate that “the prison official deprived the

23 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted).

24 Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

25 Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 139 (3d Cir. 2020) (second alteration in original) (quoting

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981)).

26 See Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 226 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Wilson v.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991)).

27 See id.

prisoner of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” often referred to as

a “sufficiently serious” deprivation.28 Subjectively, the prisoner must show that

“the prison official acted with deliberate indifference” to the prisoner’s “health or

safety.”29 Deliberate indifference means that the defendant “acted or failed to act

despite having knowledge that her actions or inaction, as the case may be, would

subject the inmate to a substantial risk of serious harm.”30

Defendants claim that Cooper has not stated a plausible conditions-of-

confinement claim. They argue that, in light of the measures the DOC has taken to

address the COVID-19 pandemic,31 Cooper’s allegations are insufficient as a

matter of law to state an Eighth Amendment violation. Taking Cooper’s

allegations as true, as required at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the Court cannot agree.

The gravamen of Cooper’s complaint is that Wetzel and Ransom knew of

the unsafe conditions, policy violations, and deliberate insubordination by

correctional staff at SCI Dallas and took no action. Cooper alleges, for example,

that during the height of the COVID-19 Delta variant spread, SCI Dallas

correctional officers and staff were intentionally refusing to wear masks, ignoring

social distancing protocol, coming to work when sick or after being in contact with

infected individuals instead of quarantining, carelessly intermingling with other

28 Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297).

29 Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).

30 Id. at 227 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).

31 See Doc. 8 at 7-8 (listing DOC mitigation measures).

staff and prisoners, and refusing to undergo COVID-19 testing. Cooper avers that

these actions went unpunished and uncorrected, causing his infection as well as

widespread infection of other inmates at SCI Dallas and leading to severe sickness

and even inmate deaths.

Cooper additionally alleges that Ransom toured SCI Dallas on a regular

basis, held conversations with inmates, and was fully aware of the complained-of

conditions but “in most cases did absolutely nothing.”32 According to Cooper,

Ransom failed to implement DOC directives regarding COVID-19 pandemic

protocol, knew that staff were reporting to work with COVID-19 infections, and

also knew that those employees were commingling with inmates, causing

infections and deaths. As to Wetzel, Cooper asserts that Wetzel was aware of the

conditions at SCI Dallas but failed to enforce his department’s own directives.

Cooper claims that he and other inmates wrote letters to Wetzel informing him of

the unsafe conditions and compliance failures, but that Wetzel failed to act.

The Court finds that such detailed allegations, taken as true, implicate

potential violations of the Eighth Amendment. It is well settled that conditions of

confinement that may pose a risk of serious illness or death may not be ignored by

prison officials.33 Almost three decades ago, the Supreme Court of the United

States admonished that prison authorities cannot “ignore a condition of

32 Doc. 11 ¶ 69.

33 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993).

confinement that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless

suffering[.]”34 This includes commingling of inmates with “infectious maladies”

or “serious contagious diseases.”35

To be sure, the COVID-19 pandemic presents substantial challenges to the

DOC and facilities like SCI Dallas, where space constraints are unavoidable and

social distancing is not always possible. But Cooper’s complaint goes beyond

basic allegations (like lack of social distancing or inadequate ventilation) that have

been found to be insufficient as a matter of law by other courts.36 In particular,

Cooper alleges that Wetzel and Ransom had direct knowledge of the above-

referenced unsafe conditions and failed to take any action whatsoever.

In light of the obvious and substantial health risk that the COVID-19 virus

presents to vulnerable people like Cooper, who are over age 65 and have multiple

preexisting medical conditions,37 deliberately failing to implement or enforce DOC

directives specifically intended to address the serious health and safety risks

presented by the virus may violate the Eighth Amendment. Indeed, to hold

otherwise would have the perverse effect of insulating prison officials who

34 Id.

35 Id. at 33, 34 (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682 (1978); Gates v. Collier, 502 F.2d 1291

(5th Cir. 1974)).

36 See e.g., Ali v. Kauffman, No. 1:20-CV-1462, 2021 WL 3929741, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 2,

2021); Wilkins v. Wolf, 1:20-CV-2450, 2021 WL 2376678, at *5, 6 (M.D. Pa. June 10, 2021);

Bevins v. Kauffman, No. 1:20-CV-2012, 2021 WL 322168, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2021).

37 See Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): People with Certain Medical Conditions,

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-

ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-with-medical-conditions.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2022).

knowingly and deliberately flout DOC policies and directives put in place to

protect the health and safety of inmates and correctional staff.

As to defendant Brown, Cooper alleges that she continued to transfer

prisoners through bus and van transportation despite knowing of the risks of the

COVID-19 virus and that it was an airborne pathogen. He claims that she was

aware of “the danger of transporting prisoners in the mi[d]st of this pandemic,” but

she “packed buses with inmates” and failed to “slow, halt, or redesign” inmate

transfers.38 The Court finds that such allegations regarding the basic transfer of

inmates during the pandemic do not plausibly state an Eighth Amendment

violation. Specifically, while they might suggest negligence, they do not implicate

deliberate indifference to prisoner health or safety. Moreover, Cooper has not

plausibly alleged a connection between Brown’s purported actions and his harm.39

In sum, the Court finds that Cooper has sufficiently alleged facts that, if true,

could establish an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim with

respect to Wetzel and Ransom. He has not done so with respect to Brown. The

38 Doc. 11 ¶ 72.

39 The Court notes that, at several places in the complaint, Cooper appears to be attempting to

make claims on behalf of other SCI Dallas prisoners. See, e.g., Doc. 11 ¶¶ 16, 24, 33, 56. The

Court rejects these attempts for several reasons. First, Cooper is the only named plaintiff and

the only individual who signed the complaint. See id. ¶ 3; id. at p. 19. Second, Cooper is not

an attorney and is acting pro se, and thus he cannot adequately represent a class of prisoner

plaintiffs. “[I]t is well settled that pro se inmates are not permitted to represent a class of

litigants.” Mincy v. Deparlos, 497 F. App’x 234, 238 n.3 (3d Cir. 2012) (nonprecedential)

(citing Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 145, 159 (3d Cir. 2009); Fymbo v. State Farm Fire & Cas.

Co., 213 F.3d 1320, 1321 (10th Cir. 2000)).

Court will therefore dismiss Brown as a defendant, as she is named only in the

constitutional tort count.

B. State-Law Negligence40

Defendants contend that state statutory sovereign immunity bars Cooper’s

negligence claims against Wetzel and Ransom. They argue that these Defendants

were acting within the scope of their employment when the alleged events took

place, no exception to immunity applies, and thus Wetzel and Ransom are immune

from Cooper’s negligence claims. Cooper does not provide any response to

Defendants’ assertion of statutory sovereign immunity.

Commonwealth parties acting within the scope of their employment

generally are immune from suit except when immunity is explicitly waived.41

Pennsylvania’s General Assembly has carved out certain limited exceptions from its

grant of sovereign immunity to Commonwealth actors.42 Section 8522(b) of Title

42 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes provides ten narrow categories where

40 Cooper asserts that he is bringing state-law claims against Wetzel and Ransom in their “official

capacity” rather than their individual capacity. Doc. 11 ¶¶ 4-5. This distinction is immaterial

for state-law tort claims. Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity statute places “the

Commonwealth” and “its officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties” on

equal footing for immunity purposes, see 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2310, and an “official capacity”

claim against a Commonwealth official is akin to suing the Commonwealth itself. See

Brautigam v. Fraley, 684 F. Supp. 2d 589, 593 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (explaining that statutory

sovereign immunity under Section 2310 applies to Commonwealth employees in their official

and individual capacities provided that they are operating within the scope of their duties).

41 See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2310; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8521, 8522(a).

42 See generally 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8521, 8522.

the state has waived its sovereign immunity for claims involving negligent conduct

by Commonwealth parties.43

The only possible immunity exception that could apply to Cooper’s claims

involving physical deterioration, poor ventilation, and nonworking showerheads

would be the “real property” exception, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(4). Upon

closer review, however, this category is not applicable to Cooper’s negligence

claims. Cooper’s alleged injuries did not result from defects in the building, land,

or fixtures of SCI Dallas; rather, they were caused by the COVID-19 virus. It is not

enough that the poor ventilation or broken showerheads purportedly facilitated the

spread of the virus.44 Instead, “the dangerous condition must derive, originate from,

or have as its source the Commonwealth realty,”45 and the dangerous condition or

“defect” must cause the injury.46 When construing this exception to immunity

strictly, as required,47 the Court finds that it does not apply to Cooper’s negligence

claims. None of the other exceptions apply either, so the claims are barred by state

statutory sovereign immunity.

43 See id. § 8522(a), (b).

44 See Hall v. Sw. Pa. Water Auth., 87 A.3d 998, 1001 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014).

45 Id. at 1000 (quoting Snyder v. Harmon, 562 A.2d 307, 311 (Pa. 1989)).

46 Snyder, 562 A.2d at 311-12.

47 See id. at 311 (citations omitted).

C. Leave to Amend

Generally, “in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints subject to

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment

would be inequitable or futile.”48 Because Cooper’s negligence claims are barred

by statutory sovereign immunity and no exception applies, granting leave to amend

those claims would be futile. Amendment would likewise be futile for Cooper’s

Section 1983 claim against Brown, as the complaint’s allegations do not state an

Eighth Amendment violation or implicate a connection to Cooper’s health and

safety. Accordingly, this case will proceed on Cooper’s Section 1983 conditions-

of-confinement claim against Wetzel and Ransom only.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant in part and deny in part

Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 4) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

48 Grayson, 293 F.3d at 114.