The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CHARLES TALBERT, :
Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-1906
v. : (JUDGE MANNION)
COMM. OF PA, et al., :
Defendants :
MEMORANDUM
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Charles Talbert, an inmate confined at the State Correctional
Institution, Camp Hill (“SCI-Camp Hill”), Pennsylvania, filed the above
caption civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. (Doc. 1). He
challenges his detention at SCI-Dallas during the COVID-19 pandemic,
claiming that due to his underlying health issues he should have been
included in the “Reprieve of Sentence Incarceration Program,” previously in
effect, that provided that certain vulnerable inmates could be released due
to the pandemic so long as they met certain criteria, including being “within
nine months of their minimum eligibility release date.” Id. The named
Defendants are the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Governor Tom
Wolf. Id.
Presently before the Court is the Defendants’ motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s complaint. (Doc. 15). The motion is ripe for disposition. For the
reasons that follow, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
II. ALLEGATIONS IN COMPLAINT
Plaintiff alleges that “at, and during the time of the COVID outbreak
and emergency disaster in Pennsylvania, [he] was in the custody of the State
and Wolf, within its DOC state correctional institutions, and has suffered from
the following underlying serious health conditions:
A. high blood pressure
B. chronic asthma
C. Angina
D. Antisocial personality disorder
E. Bipolar.
(Doc. 1). He claims that “pursuant to the WHO, CDC and DHS, inmates like
Plaintiff, with the aforesaid underlying serious health issues, specifically A
though C, were more at serious risk of serious bodily injury and death if
infected with COVID.” Id. He states, “[h]owever, despite the Defendants
aforesaid duty and obligations to Plaintiff, pursuant to Article IV, Section 2 of
the State Constitution, and the Emergency Management Services Code, the
State and Wolf breached their aforesaid duties and legal obligations by way
of:
A. Depriving Plaintiff protection of his safety and welfare during
the disaster emergency caused by the COVID outbreak.
B. Failing to exercise its power to remove Plaintiff from the
disaster area within the DOC where the outbreak infected
thousands and killed serval from those employed by the State.
C. Failing to exercise the law of the State faithfully, and in a
manner in which protected the Plaintiff’s health, safety, and
welfare.
D. Failing to utilize the criminal justice system during the
emergency disaster caused by COVID and direct the PPD to
parole Plaintiff since he was not on death row or serving life.
Id. Plaintiff believes that “as a result of these aforesaid breaches, the
Defendants enforced contrary executive orders, and failed to act, which was
contrary to public law and policy and thus, jeopardized Plaintiff’s health,
safety and welfare during the emergency disaster.” Id.
By November, 2020, Plaintiff claims that he “began to experience
symptoms of COVID, due to the aforesaid dangerous State owned
institutions such as:
A. loss of smell and taste
B. blurred vision
C. migraine headaches
D. breathing complications (shortness of breath)
E. chest and lung pain
F. known and unknown health (short and long term) conditions.
Id. Plaintiff states that he “was seen and treated while at SCI-Dallas for some
of his COVID symptom, to which Plaintiff still suffers from others.” Id.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “on or about April 10, 2020 had
established and maintained a discriminative and gross negligent executive
order, in the form of a reprieve of sentence of incarceration program by only
considering, inter alia, the inmate’s minimum eligibility release date, which
had to be within 9 months from the date of the order.” Id. Plaintiff claims that
“even though [he] was not 9 months away from reaching his minimum
eligibility release date, nevertheless, he did not have a life sentence or
sentenced to death row and public policy and law with the Emergency Code
intended for inmates with short sentences, in emergency disaster situations
and circumstances to be released early, especially those at risk due to
serious underlying health conditions.” Id.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “failed to allocate CARES Act funding
for the safe removal of inmates from the emergency disaster area” and
“showed more concern to the economic and government operations such as
DOC official payrolls, substantially failing to prioritize the use of its various
statutory and constitutional authorities to grant Plaintiff home confinement.”
Id.
Thus, Plaintiff files the instant action for damages and injunctive relief,
alleging negligence, violations of the Pennsylvania State Constitution, the
Equal Protection Clause, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the
Rehabilitation Act. Id.
III. Motion to Dismiss
Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide the
defendant notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See
Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). The plaintiff
must present facts that, accepted as true, demonstrate a plausible right to
relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2) requires “only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief,” a complaint may nevertheless be dismissed
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for its “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court
accepts as true all factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from them, viewed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); In re Ins.
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). To prevent
dismissal, all civil complaints must set out “sufficient factual matter” to show
that their claims are facially plausible. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Fowler v.
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). The plausibility
standard requires more than a mere possibility that the defendant is liable
for the alleged misconduct: “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Accordingly, the Third Circuit has identified the following steps that a
district court must take when reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion: (1) identify the
elements that a plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify any
conclusory allegations contained in the complaint that are “not entitled” to the
assumption of truth; and (3) determine whether any “well-pleaded factual
allegations” contained in the complaint “plausibly give rise to an entitlement
to relief.” See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Third Circuit has
specified that in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, “a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the
complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic
documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents.”
See Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d
Cir. 1993)).
In the context of pro se prisoner litigation, the court must be mindful
that a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” See Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully
pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers” and can be dismissed for failure to state a claim only if it
appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim that would entitle him to relief. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520-21 (1972).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Defendant Wolf
Plaintiff names Governor Wolf as a Defendant, noting that he was
personally involved by ordering all state prisons to lockdown and impose
restrictions because of the COVID-19 pandemic. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff’s
allegations, however, are insufficient to plead personal involvement. In Rode
v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1208 (3d Cir. 1988), the Third Circuit stated:
“In a large state employing many thousands of employees, a contrary holding
[concluding that the Governor has personal knowledge] would subject the
Governor to potential liability in any case in which an aggrieved [individual]
merely transmitted a complaint to the Governor’s office of administration or
to the Lieutenant Governor’s office.” See also Christian v. Garman, No. 1:20-
cv-1842, 2021 WL 1017251, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2021) (Governor
dismissed where the inmate-plaintiff alleged that he was personally involved
by ordering all state prisons to lockdown because of COVID-19); Hampton
v. Wetzel, No. 1:15-cv-897, 2015 WL 2405062, at *2 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2015)
(Governor dismissed where the inmate-plaintiff “merely allege[d] that he sent
letters to defendants Corbett and Wolf expressing his dissatisfaction with the
DOC and the parole board”). The Court, therefore, will grant Defendants’
motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Wolf.
B. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
“To state a claim under §1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must
show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under
color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The Eleventh
Amendment bars suits against a state in federal court when the state has not
waived that immunity. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
65-66 (1989). The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not waived that
immunity here. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §8521(b). Additionally, the
Commonwealth is not considered a “person” for purposes of §1983. See Will,
491 U.S. at 69.
For these reasons, Talbert cannot state a §1983 claim against the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Eleventh Amendment immunity also
precludes Talbert from asserting his negligence claim against the
Commonwealth in federal court. See Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App’x 923, 926
(3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (noting, with regard to inmate’s negligence
claims, that “the state has expressly retained its Eleventh Amendment
immunity for purposes of federal lawsuits”).
C. Fourteenth Amendment Claim
The Equal Protection Clause requires all persons “similarly situated” to
be treated alike by state actors. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Traditionally, “[i]n order to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, [plaintiffs] need[]
to prove that they were members of a protected class [such as race or
gender] and that they received different treatment than that received by
similarly-situated individuals.” See Oliveira v. Twp. of Irvington, 41 F. App’x
555, 559 (3d Cir. 2002). However, where a plaintiff alleges that he alone “has
been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that
there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment,” he may raise a
“class of one” equal protection claim. See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553
U.S. 591, 598 (2008). To maintain such a claim, a plaintiff must establish that
he has been irrationally singled out for disparate treatment. See id. “[A]t the
very least, to state a claim under [a class of one theory], a plaintiff must allege
that (1) the defendant treated him differently from others similarly situated,
(2) the defendant did so intentionally, and (3) there was no rational basis for
the difference in treatment.” Mosca v. Cole, 217 F. App’x 158, 164 (3d Cir.
2007). When alleging the existence of similarly situated individuals, plaintiffs
“cannot use allegations . . . that amount to nothing more than ‘conclusory,
boilerplate language’ to show that he may be entitled to relief,” and “bald
assertion[s] that other[s] . . .were treated in a dissimilar manner” will not
suffice. See Young v. New Sewickley Twp., 160 F. App’x 263, 266 (3d Cir.
2005) (citing Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “treated Plaintiff differently” than
others who were released under the Governor’s Order of Reprieve1 when
they failed to release him early under the program. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff,
1 See ORDER OF THE GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH
OF PENNSYLVANIA REGARDING INDIVIDUALS INCARCERATED IN
STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS
https://www.governor.pa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/20200410-
GOV-DOC-reprieve-release-order-COVID-19.pdf
himself, however, admits that he did not meet the nine-month grace period
required for early release consideration under the Order. Id. Nor is there any
indication that Plaintiff satisfied any other prerequisite either. Thus, Plaintiff’s
own complaint demonstrates that he is not similarly situated to the population
of which he wishes to be treated akin. Consequently, his equal protection
claim, fails on the face of the Complaint.
D. ADA and RA Claims
Plaintiff claims that Defendants “deprived [him] the opportunity to
benefit from the Emergency Management Services Code and Reprieve
Program for early release through a substantial showing of discrimination.”
(Doc. 1).
Plaintiff’s ADA and RA claims will be considered together because “the
substantive standards for determining liability are the same.” Furgess v. Pa.
Dep’t of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 288 (3d Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). To prevail
on his claims under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the RA, Plaintiff
must show: (1) “he is a qualified individual with a disability”; (2) he “was
precluded from participating in a program, service, or activity, or otherwise
was subject to discrimination”; (3) “by reason of his disability.” Id. at 288–89;
42 U.S.C. §12133.
Here, Plaintiff is not a qualified person. His own allegations reveal that
he did not meet the baseline criteria for the program, applicable to all, which
was an inmate within nine months of their minimum eligibility release date.
As such, he cannot demonstrate that he was excluded from the early release
reprieve by reason of a disability. Furgess, 933 F.3d at 288-89. And given
that the Plaintiff is now incarcerated at a different institution—SCI-Camp
Hill—his remaining ADA and RA claims are now moot, as “[a]n inmate’s
transfer from the facility complained of generally moots the equitable and
declaratory claims.” Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003), as
amended (May 29, 2003)(citation omitted).
E. Claims Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Constitution
Plaintiffs also seek damages based on Defendants’ alleged violations
of Article IV, section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. (Doc. 1). As the Third
Circuit has recognized, however, “[n]o Pennsylvania statute establishes, and
no Pennsylvania court has recognized, a private cause of action for damages
under the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Pocono Mtn. Charter Sch. v. Pocono
Mtn. Sch. Dist., 442 F. App'x 681, 687 (3d Cir. 2011). Accordingly, the Court
will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the Pennsylvania Constitution.
F. State Law Claims
Defendants assert that the Court should decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims raised by Plaintiffs. (Doc.
17 at 9.) When a district court has dismissed all claims over which it had
original jurisdiction, as is the case in the above-captioned action, the Court
may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent state law
claims. See 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3). The Court’s decision regarding the
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is one that should be based on “the
values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” See
Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). Ordinarily, when
all federal claims have been dismissed and only state law claims remain, the
balance of these factors indicates that the remaining claims properly belong
in state court. See id. In the absence of a viable federal claim and finding
nothing to distinguish this matter from the ordinary case, the Court finds that
the balance of factors in this case “point[s] toward declining to exercise
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.” See id. at 350 n.7.
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims against
Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3).
G. Motions for Preliminary Injunction
Also pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion for temporary
restraining order and motion for preliminary injunction in which Plaintiff
requests the Court “order the Commonwealth to send Plaintiff to a nearby
hospital to be assessed, diagnosed and treated by a lung and heart specialist
for his severe symptoms caused by COVID-19” (Doc. 8) and for an Order
“directing Plaintiff to be immediately released onto home confinement
supervision and/or parole due to COVID-19 risks.” (Doc. 13).
In determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction, a court must
consider whether the party seeking the injunction has satisfied four factors:
“1) a likelihood of success on the merits; 2) he or she will suffer irreparable
harm if the injunction is denied; 3) granting relief will not result in even greater
harm to the nonmoving party; and 4) the public interest favors such relief.”
Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 109 (3d Cir. 2010)
(quoting Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 2010) ). See also Fed.
R. Civ. P. 65. Because a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy,
the party seeking it must show, at a minimum, a likelihood of success on the
merits and that they likely face irreparable harm in the absence of the
injunction. See Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir.
2000); Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989). Where the requested
preliminary injunction “is directed not merely at preserving the status quo
but ... at providing mandatory relief, the burden on the moving party is
particularly heavy.” Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 1980).
Thus, a request for any form of mandatory prospective relief in the prison
context “must always be viewed with great caution because judicial restraint
is specially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of
prison administration.” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995).
Here, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he contracted COVID-19 while
confined at SCI-Dallas. (Doc. 1 at 5). He states that he was “seen and treated
at SCI-Dallas” for his COVID-19 symptoms. Id. To prevail on an Eighth
Amendment claim for inadequate healthcare, an inmate must demonstrate
that the defendant was “deliberately indifferent” to his serious medical needs.
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). As such he has failed to
show the likelihood of success on the merits.
Subsequent to his diagnosis, Plaintiff was transferred to SCI-Camp
Hill. To the extent that he has requested and been denied medical treatment
for his COVID-19 symptoms by SCI-Camp Hill employees, Plaintiff is free to
file a separate action raising such allegations against those individuals, as
the instant action does not relate to any individual at his current place of
confinement. In other words, “there must be a connection between the
underlying complaint and the relief requested in the motion for a preliminary
injunction.” James v. Varano, 2017 WL 895569, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2017)
(citing Ball v. Famiglio, 396 Fed. Appx. 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010) ). A district
court “should not issue an injunction when the injunction in question is not of
the same character and deals with a matter lying wholly outside the issues
in the suit.” Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Fla., 122 F.3d 41, 43 (11th Cir. 1997)
(citing De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945) ).
Additionally, it is axiomatic that a request for immediate release from
prison may only be made by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus rather
than a civil rights action. Black v. Moser, 2018 WL 3239775, at *1 (M.D. Pa.
July 3, 2018) (“It is well-settled that inmates may not use civil rights actions
to challenge the fact or duration of their confinement or to seek earlier or
speedier release.”) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1975) ). As
explained by the United States Supreme Court, when a prisoner seeks
“immediate release or a speedier release from [his] imprisonment, his sole
federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500.
Plaintiff’s request for an immediate release from prison is simply not
cognizable in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. As such, his motions
for preliminary injunction will be denied.
V. Leave to Amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a civil rights complaint is
vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must
permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable
or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
Here, it is clear from the facts alleged in the pro se complaint that any
attempt to amend the Plaintiff’s §1983 claims against the named Defendants
would be futile. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). Thus,
the Court will dismiss the Plaintiff’s §1983 claims without leave to amend.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to
dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint.
A separate Order shall issue.
s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
DATE: April 22, 2022
21-1906-01