Myers v. Clinton County Correctional Facility

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SHANNON MYERS, :

Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-867

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

CLINTON COUNTY :

CORRECTIONAL

FACILITY, et al., :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Pending before the court is a report which recommends that

defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint be granted in part and

denied in part. (Doc. 19). Defendants have filed objections to the report and

recommendation. (Doc. 20, Doc. 21). Upon review, the report and

recommendation will be adopted, in part, and the matter will be remanded

for further proceedings.

Plaintiff filed the instant action on June 8, 2020, in which she alleges

violations of her Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42

U.S.C. §1983. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that defendants are

liable for failing to take steps to prevent her suicide attempt while she was

incarcerated at the Clinton County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”).1

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint, which is the subject

of the instant report. It is recommended that the motion be granted as to

plaintiff’s claims against defendants CCCF, Clinton County Prison Board,

Snyder, Smeltz and Conklin; plaintiff’s due process and equal protection

claims under the Fourteenth Amendment; and plaintiff’s claims for punitive

damages against Clinton County and the Warden defendants in their official

capacity. It is further recommended that the motion to dismiss be denied as

to plaintiff’s claims for deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment

and punitive damages as to the Warden defendants in their personal

capacity. (Doc. 19). Defendants have filed objections only as to the standard

applied to the Eighth Amendment claim.

When objections are timely filed to the report and recommendation of

a magistrate judge, the district court must review de novo those portions of

the report to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. '636(b)(1); Brown v.

Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011). Although the standard is de novo,

1 The named defendants include the Clinton County Prison Board,

Angela Hoover, Michael Kunes, Jason Kormanic, CCCF, Clinton County,

Jeff Snyder, Pete Smeltz and Paul Conklin. However, upon the filing of

defendants’ motion, plaintiff agreed that defendants CCCF, Clinton County

Prison Board, Snyder, Smeltz and Conklin should be dismissed from the

action. Therefore, the court will direct that these defendants be dismissed.

the extent of review is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge,

and the court may rely on the recommendations of the magistrate judge to

the extent it deems proper. Rieder v. Apfel, 115 F.Supp.2d 496, 499 (M.D.Pa.

2000) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)).

For those sections of the report and recommendation to which no

objection is made, the court should, as a matter of good practice, Asatisfy

itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept

the recommendation.@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), advisory committee notes; see

also Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 465, 469

(M.D.Pa. 2010) (citing Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir.

1987) (explaining judges should give some review to every report and

recommendation)). Nevertheless, whether timely objections are made or not,

the district court may accept, not accept, or modify, in whole or in part, the

findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C.

'636(b)(1); Local Rule 72.31.

Defendants’ only objection to the report is with respect to the standard

applied in denying their motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

claim. The report has been reviewed in all other respects and the court finds

no clear error on the face of the record. Therefore, the court will adopt the

report to the extent that it recommends that defendants’ motion to dismiss

be granted as to plaintiff’s claims against defendants CCCF, Clinton County

Prison Board, Snyder, Smeltz and Conklin; plaintiff’s due process and equal

protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment; and plaintiff’s claims for

punitive damages against Clinton County and the Warden defendants in their

official capacity.

As to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, defendants argued in their

motion to dismiss that the specific standard for suicide cases set forth in

Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 946 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Colburn

II”) should apply.2 Plaintiff argued, on the other hand, that the more

generalized deliberate indifference to serious medical needs standard

should apply because her actions did not actually result in death. Relying on

Hayes v. Gilmore, 802 F.App’x 84 (3d Cir. 2020), the magistrate judge

agreed with plaintiff and applied the more generalized deliberate indifference

standard. After evaluating plaintiff’s claim under this standard, it was

recommended that the motion to dismiss be denied on the Eighth

Amendment claim.

2 In Colburn II, the Third Circuit recognized that a “particular

vulnerability to suicide” is a serious medical need and that, in a prisoner

suicide case, the plaintiff must establish: “(1) the detainee had a ‘particular

vulnerability to suicide,’ (2) the custodial officer or officers knew or should

have known of that vulnerability, and (3) those officers ‘acted with reckless

indifference’ to the detainee’s particular vulnerability.” Colburn, 946 F.2d at

1023.

In their objections, defendants point out that, although Hayes also

involved claims by a prisoner relating to suicide attempts that did not result

in death and the generalized deliberate indifference standard was used, the

appropriate standard to be applied was not an issue raised in either the

Western District court or the Third Circuit on appeal and was therefore not

considered.

Moreover, defendants point out that, prior to Hayes, the Third Circuit

applied the Colburn II standard in cases where suicide attempts did not result

in death. Most notably, in Hinton v. Mark, also an inmate case involving a

failed suicide attempt, the magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the

plaintiff’s complaint applying the generalized deliberate indifference

standard. 2011 WL 13123885 (W.D.Pa. June 27, 2011), report and

recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 12877736 (W.D.Pa. Mar. 20, 2012). The

plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the Third Circuit specifically took note that the

magistrate judge failed to consider the Colburn II elements apparently

evidencing its intention to apply those elements even where the suicide

attempt was unsuccessful. 544 F.App’x 75, 77 (3d Cir. 2013). Other Third

Circuit opinions have applied the Colburn II standard in cases where suicide

attempts did not result in death. See e.g., Vargo ex rel. Vargo v. Plum

Borough, 376 F.App’x 212 (3d Cir. 2010); Serafin v. City of Johnstown, 53

F.App’x 211 (3d Cir. 2002); Joines v. Twp. Of Ridley, 229 F.App’x 161 (3d

Cir. 2007). Courts in the Middle District have followed the Third Circuit in

applying Colburn II in cases where suicide attempts did not result in death.

See e.g., Brown v. Monsalud, 2021 WL 4502238 (M.D.Pa., Sept. 30, 2021);

Coit v. Luther, 2020 WL 4260765 (M.D.Pa., July 24, 2020).

As pointed out by defendants, the intention of the Third Circuit to utilize

the Colburn II standard in cases of unsuccessful, as well as successful,

suicides is reflected in the Third Circuit Model Instructions. Model Instruction

4.11.2, Failure to Protect from Suicidal Action, lists the three Colburn II

factors. The Comment thereto provides, in relevant part, that “[a] Section

1983 claim arising from a prisoner’s suicide (or attempted suicide) falls

within the general category of claims concerning the denial of medical care.”

Comment to Third Circuit Model Jury Instruction 4.11.2, rev. 2020 (emphasis

added). Although not binding, the jury instructions are indicative of the

Circuit’s intent to apply the Colburn II standard in cases, such as the one at

hand, where the suicide attempt is unsuccessful.

In light of the foregoing, defendants’ objections to the report will be

sustained as to the standard applied in evaluating plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment claim. The matter will be remanded for consideration of

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim under the appropriate Colburn II

standard. An appropriate order shall issue.

S/ Malachy E. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

DATE: March 11, 2022

21-867-01