Ramey v. Holt

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARQUIS RAMEY, No. 3:19-CV-00636

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

OFFICER HOLT, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JANUARY 24, 2022

Plaintiff Marquis Ramey is currently incarcerated at the State Correctional

Institution, Benner Township (SCI Benner), in Bellefonte, Pennsylvania. He filed

this pro se Section 19831 action in 2019, alleging unlawful conduct by SCI Benner

officials. Ramey asserts constitutional tort claims under the First, Sixth, and

Fourteenth Amendments. Presently pending is Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.2 Because Ramey has

failed to meet his Rule 56 burden as to any of his Section 1983 claims, the Court

must grant judgment in Defendants’ favor.

1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves

as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.

v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002).

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND3

Ramey initial filed suit in early 2019 in the Court of Common Pleas of

Centre County, Pennsylvania.4 Robert Marsh, the only defendant specifically

named in the complaint, removed the case to this Court.5 Marsh then moved to

dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or,

alternatively, for summary judgment under Rule 56.6 The Court granted Marsh’s

Rule 12(b)(6) motion and dismissed the complaint, but granted Ramey leave to

amend.7

Ramey filed an amended complaint in March 2020.8 In his amended

complaint, Ramey names as defendants six SCI Benner correctional officers of

varying ranks: Officer Dustin Holt, Officer Travis Macidym, Officer Larry

Matthews, Officer Scott Alleman, Sergeant Jeremiah Boone, and Lieutenant Justin

Schilling.9 Ramey contends that prison officials confiscated and destroyed his

3 Local Rule of Court 56.1 requires that a motion for summary judgment be supported “by a

separate, short, and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to

which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” LOCAL RULE OF COURT

56.1. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a separate statement of

material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the moving party’s statement

and identifying genuine issues to be tried. Id. Defendants filed a short statement of material

facts, see Doc. 48, to which Ramey has not responded. Accordingly, those facts are deemed

admitted. See LOCAL RULE OF COURT 56.1.

4 Doc. 1-2.

5 Doc. 1.

6 Doc. 4.

7 See generally Docs. 17, 18.

8 Doc. 24.

9 Id. ¶¶ 4-9; see also Doc. 29 (waiver of service identifying Defendants’ full names). The Court

will use the spellings of Defendants’ names as provided by their counsel.

legal materials, thereby violating his constitutional rights in two ways: first, the

confiscation and destruction of his legal materials was done in retaliation for filing

prison grievances against the officers involved; second, the confiscation and

destruction interfered with Ramey’s access to the courts by prohibiting him from

prosecuting a direct appeal in his state criminal case.10 Ramey alleges that the

prison officials’ actions contravene the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution,11 and seeks compensatory damages, punitive

damages, and declaratory relief.12

Defendants filed two motions to dismiss13 the amended complaint but, even

though they were granted multiple briefing extensions,14 failed to file supporting

briefs. Thus, both motions to dismiss were deemed withdrawn pursuant to Local

Rule of Court 7.5.15 Defendants now move for summary judgment on all claims

against them.16 Defendants’ Rule 56 motion is fully briefed and ripe for

disposition.

10 See Doc. 24 at 4.

11 See id. at 5.

12 Id. at 5-6.

13 Docs. 30, 34.

14 See Docs. 32, 36.

15 See Docs. 33, 37.

16 See generally Doc. 45. This motion was filed late, but the Court granted Defendants’

subsequent motion to deem the Rule 56 filing timely. See Doc. 51.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate

and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.”17 Summary judgment is

appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”18 Material

facts are those “that could alter the outcome” of the litigation, and “disputes are

‘genuine’ if evidence exists from which a rational person could conclude that the

position of the person with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.”19

At the Rule 56 stage, the Court’s function is not to “weigh the evidence and

determine the truth of the matter” but rather “to determine whether there is a

genuine issue for trial.”20 The Court must view the facts and evidence presented

“in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” and must “draw all

reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.”21 This evidence, however, must be

adequate—as a matter of law—to sustain a judgment in favor of the nonmoving

party on the claim or claims at issue.22 A “scintilla of evidence” supporting the

nonmovant’s position is insufficient; “there must be evidence on which the jury

17 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

18 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

19 EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Clark v. Modern

Grp. Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993)).

20 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

21 Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014).

22 Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250-57; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 587-89 (1986).

could reasonably find for the [nonmovant].”23 Succinctly stated, summary

judgment is “put up or shut up time” for the nonmoving party.24

III. DISCUSSION

As noted above, Ramey claims that his First, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights were violated. However, his amended complaint plainly pleads

two claims: retaliation for filing prison grievances and denial of access to the

courts. Retaliation for undertaking protected free-speech conduct is a First

Amendment claim,25 and denial of the right of access to the courts “is sourced from

both the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”26 Consequently, none of Ramey’s

claims involve the Sixth Amendment.

Defendants contend that—regardless of what constitutional provisions

Ramey asserts—his claims fail for the following reasons: (1) Ramey has not pled

or established personal involvement by the majority of the named Defendants;

(2) Ramey has sued Defendants in their official capacities only, so his claims are

barred by state sovereign immunity. We agree with Defendants and find that, on

23 Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477

U.S. at 252) (alteration in original).

24 Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 391 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Berkeley Inv. Grp.

v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006)).

25 See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 2017).

26 Jutrowski v. Township of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 294 n.17 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation

marks omitted) (citing Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008); Bill Johnson Rests.,

Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983)).

the record before the Court, Ramey has failed to carry his Rule 56 burden on any

of his Section 1983 claims.

A. Personal Involvement

It is well established that, in Section 1983 actions, liability cannot be

“predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”27 Rather, a Section

1983 plaintiff must establish facts that demonstrate “the defendants’ personal

involvement in the alleged misconduct.”28 Personal involvement can include direct

wrongful conduct by a defendant, but it can also be demonstrated through a

defendant’s “personal direction” or “actual knowledge and acquiescence.”29

Ramey’s amended complaint does not include allegations of personal

involvement by any of the named Defendants. After identifying each defendant

under the “Jurisdiction” heading of his amended complaint,30 Ramey then vaguely

alleges that “members of the RHU”31 or “defendants” confiscated and destroyed

his legal materials.32

At summary judgment, Ramey rectifies this deficiency as to only one

Defendant: Schilling. Along with his brief in opposition to Defendants’ Rule 56

27 Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556. U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (affirming same principle in Bivens context).

28 Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374.

29 Id. (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).

30 Doc. 24 at 2; Doc. 48 ¶ 9.

31 “RHU” is the commonly used acronym for the Restrictive Housing Unit.

32 Doc. 24 at 3-5.

motion, Ramey attached a Form DC-709 “Security Level 5 Housing Unit Activity

Restriction Form.”33 The form establishes that on October 6, 2018, Schilling

requested that Ramey’s “Bedding Materials” and “paperwork / cell contents” be

removed from his cell due to Ramey allegedly destroying property.34 This request

was approved the same day by the shift commander.35

As for the other named Defendants, Ramey baldly asserts that he is “one

hundred percent (100%) sure that these officers” were personally involved “in this

claim.”36 He maintains, without proof, that Holt, Macidym, Alleman, and

Matthews were “on shift the day of the incident,” (that is, October 6, 2018), and

were “stationed in” the RHU.37 Ramey further contends that the Court “would

ha[ve] to verify through Defendants’ counsel if the Defendants are the officers that

were on shift.”38

Ramey is mistaken. At summary judgment, it is his responsibility, not the

Court’s, to proffer evidence showing that a jury reasonably could find in his favor

on his claims.39 Although Ramey argues that his lack of evidence is Defendants’

fault for failing to respond to discovery requests, the Court will not entertain such

33 Doc. 56 at 8.

34 Id.

35 Id.

36 Id. at 2.

37 Id. Ramey does not mention Boone in his Rule 56 briefing.

38 Id.; see also Doc. 65 at 2.

39 See Daniels, 776 F.3d at 192 (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252).

arguments at the Rule 56 stage. Discovery ended in April 202140; any discovery

dispute should have been presented—before that deadline—to the opposing party

and then, if unable to be resolved, to the Court.41

Moreover, the discovery request on which Ramey relies is from August

2019,42 long before the amended complaint was filed and served on Defendants.

The Court further notes that on June 8, 2021, in response to Ramey’s “objections”

to discovery closing,43 the Court ordered Defendants to respond to any outstanding

discovery requests.44 Ramey raised no further discovery-related complaints with

the Court after its June 8 Order.

Accordingly, Ramey has failed to establish personal involvement for any

Defendant except Schilling. The Court is thus constrained to grant judgment in

favor of Defendants Holt, Macidym, Alleman, Matthews, and Boone on Ramey’s

Section 1983 claims.

B. State Sovereign Immunity

Even if Ramey were able to establish Defendants’ personal involvement, his

claims are barred by sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment to the United

States Constitution prevents federal courts from entertaining lawsuits—by United

40 See Doc. 37.

41 See LOCAL RULE OF COURT 26.3.

42 See Doc. 56 at 2; Doc. 12.

43 Doc. 50.

44 See Doc. 51 at 1.

States citizens or citizens of foreign states—brought against a state.45 This

immunity from private suit extends to state agencies as well as state officials acting

in their official capacity, because such lawsuits are essentially civil actions

“against the State itself.”46 States may waive this immunity if they choose, but

Pennsylvania has explicitly not waived its immunity with respect to claims brought

under Section 1983.47 There are two exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment’s bar

to private suits against nonconsenting states: (1) “Congress may abrogate a state’s

immunity” and (2) “parties may sue state officers for prospective injunctive and

declaratory relief.”48

Ramey has sued Defendants in their official capacity only.49 Such claims

against state officials in their official capacity are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment unless immunity is waived or an exception applies.50 Ramey

argues—without any legal support—that his amended complaint asserts claims

against Defendants in both their official and individual capacities because he

45 U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267-68 (1997);

Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).

46 Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

47 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8521(b); Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir.

2020); Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 42

PA. CONS. STAT. § 8521(b)).

48 Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Pa., 141 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 1998)

(emphasis added) (citing, inter alia, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).

49 See Doc. 24 at 2; Doc. 48 ¶¶ 1-6.

50 Will, 491 U.S. at 71.

sought punitive damages in his “Requested Relief” section.51 The Court disagrees.

Although it is well settled that pro se pleadings must be liberally

construed,52 that does not mean a Court should override a pro se litigant’s explicit

allegations or provide substantive legal assistance.53 Ramey’s typewritten,

amended complaint is unambiguous. He provides a separate paragraph identifying

each Defendant and ends each paragraph by stating, “He is being sued in his

‘official’ capacity.”54

Ramey further alleges in his amended complaint that he is asserting

“constitutional violations by the institution,”55 as opposed to the individual

defendants. There is nothing to “construe” from such plain language other than

that Ramey’s claims target Defendants in their official capacity only. The request

for punitive damages alone does not override Ramey’s otherwise express

allegations throughout the rest of his amended complaint.56

51 See Doc. 65 at 2.

52 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted); Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d

333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011).

53 See Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining that “courts

need not provide substantive legal advice to pro se litigants” and that “pro se litigants still must

allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim”).

54 Doc. 24 at 2; see also Doc. 48 ¶¶ 1-6 (unanswered and thus deemed admitted).

55 Doc. 24 at 3, 5.

56 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit employs a “course of proceedings”

test to determine whether a Section 1983 plaintiff sued a state official in an official or

individual capacity when the plaintiff’s intentions are unclear from the complaint. See Melo

v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 635-36 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1990); Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 119 (3d

Cir. 1988) (explaining that, because complaint was ambiguous, court “must interpret the

pleadings to ascertain what plaintiff should have stated specifically”). However, Ramey’s

allegations in his amended complaint are not unclear or unspecified. Nor did Defendants

Ramey identifies no exception to sovereign immunity that would apply in

this case.57 Consequently, summary judgment must be granted in favor of all

Defendants on Ramey’s Section 1983 claims because those claims are barred by

the Eleventh Amendment.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion (Doc. 45)

for summary judgment. An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

respond in their motion for summary judgment with defenses that would indicate individual

capacity claims, like assertions of qualified immunity. See Melo, 912. F.2d at 636.

57 Ramey’s amended complaint includes a request for declaratory relief, but not prospective

declaratory relief. See Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d

Cir. 2002) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102-03 (1984)).

He seeks a declaration that his constitutional rights were violated. See Doc. 24 at 5; Doc. 48

¶ 8. Ramey further concedes that his request for declaratory relief is redundant of his claims

for monetary damages. See Doc. 56 at 3. Accordingly, the Ex parte Young exception to

Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply.